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This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by J.B. Rosen for concave games with coupled constraints, is used to characterize a family of dynamic equilibrium solutions in an m-player game where the agents are (groups of) countries and the payoffs are the welfare gains obtained from a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The model deals with the uncertainty about climate sensitivity by computing an S-adapted equilibrium. These equilibria are computed using an oracle-based method permitting an implicit definition of the payoffs to the different players, obtained through simulations performed with the global CGE model GEMINI-E3.

International audience; Les auteurs proposent un modèle de coopération pour résoudre les problèmes d'environnement global sur la base de trois acteurs : acteur local, national et international. Ils donnent une typologie des différents régimes allant du régime international négocié au "régime de collaboration" basé sur une relation hiérarchique. Ainsi, la mise en oeuvre d'une mesure va dépendre des contextes politiques, légaux, économiques et physiques des différents pays. Dans ce cadre, ils concluent que seul un système de normes négociées intégrant les aspects socio-économiques et biologiques semble efficace, ce qui conduit à la question de la gouvernance dans les régulations environnementales.

This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.