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This paper aims to expound the main ethical and metaethical assumptions in Richard Ekins's The Nature of Legislative Intent and to examine some of their implications. Firstly, we focus on the notions of nature and of central case, which lead Ekins to appeal to the common good as the end of the legislature. Secondly, we take into consideration the moral norms that, according to Ekins, are implied by the common good and the related idea of human flourishing. Thirdly, we explore how Ekins's moral cognitivism, objectivism, and internalism influence his conception of legislative reasonableness and rationality, as well as the central case of non-corrupt legislation. Finally, we deal with the rule of interpretation proposed by Ekins, which, again, results (at least partially) from his adoption of the notion of common good. Our general conclusion is that, aside from the problems directly regarding his fundamental notions of central case and of common good, Ekins's ethical and metaethical assumptions end up affecting negatively his analysis and hindering its adherence to contemporary legal language and to the current problems of legislative decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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