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This research discusses socio-political movements in Papua as a result of the implementation of special autonomy policies (Otsus) by the government for almost two decades. Theoretically, indigenous Papuans should support it but in empirical reality, Otsus has been considered "fail" by the indigenous Papuan people because there are still many problems that have not been resolved by Otsus. This negative response indicates public dissatisfaction towards the development planning process in Papua. This dissertation aims to examine these issues; why these policies and development plans failed and are protested, why protests against them are prolonged, how do protests develop into social movements, and whether indigenous Papuan movements can be classified as social movements. The study uses qualitative approach, through case study methods. Data are collected through interviews, observations and documentation studies. The research finds that the presence of Otsus in Papua in addition to being a source of new conflict, also triggers conflicts in the form of protests and resistance movements against the government of Indonesia, both physical and political. This research discovers that, indeed the Otsus management has succeeded in changing the face of Papua because of the many physical projects but the development of human aspects and supporting instruments has not been touched at all. Thus, only a small percentage of indigenous Papuans feel the benefits of Otsus, while most of them are still struggling. This paper finds that protests against Otus are due to the growing resentments from the community so long as their demands are not met. This study suggests that the presence of the state in Papua through the Otsus policy must be re-evaluated. The state must ensure that in the Otsus era, the indigenous Papuans should not be marginalized, so that aspirations for the welfare of all indigenous Papuans through Otsus can be realized.

This dissertation explains when and how non-state actors (NSA) apply informality in the EU’s policy making in the area of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Many analyses have acknowledged the increasing role of informal governance applied by state actors in global policy making, yet less is known about the nature of informality used by NSAs to counsel state actors. Combatting the challenges posed by migration, the EU institutions have increasingly established formal channels to facilitate consultation by NSAs. In some cases, NSAs prefer informality to advice the EU institutions over formal channels, but it is unclear when and how this takes place. The dissertation introduces the concept of informality in International Relations and European Union research and further defines informality as an instrument used by actors to bypass non-responsive formal policy making. Based on assumptions of rational choice institutionalism the analysis shows that NSA overcome formal institutional restrictions to increase their benefits by the application of informality. It also identifies variance in types of informality depending on the policy stage applied in., Die Dissertation erklärt wann und wie nichtstaatliche Akteure (NSA) Informalität in der Politikgestaltung der EU im Bereich Justiz und Inneres anwenden. Viele Analysen haben die zunehmende Rolle informeller Governance durch staatliche Akteure in der internationalen Politikgestaltung anerkannt. Informalität, die NSA zur Beratung staatlicher Akteure entwickeln, ist jedoch wenig untersucht. Um den politischen Herausforderungen im Bereich Migration zu begegnen, haben die EU Institutionen Möglichkeiten der formalen Beratung durch NSA zunehmend ausgeweitet. In einigen Fällen ziehen NSA informelle Formen der Beratung vor, allerdings ist unklar, wann und wie dies geschieht. Die Dissertation erklärt das Konzept der Informalität in den Internationalen Beziehungen und der EU-Forschung. Sie definiert Informalität weiter als ein Instrument, das von Akteuren genutzt wird, um den eigenen Nutzen innerhalb formaler Strukturen zu erhöhen. Basierend auf Annahmen des Rational Choice Institutionalismus zeigt die Analyse, wie NSA formale institutionelle Beschränkungen überwinden, um ihre Präferenzen zu realisieren. Die Arbeit identifiziert Varianz dieser Typen von Informalität in Abhängigkeit von der Phase des Politikgestaltungsprozesses, in der sie angewandt werden.

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 04

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Deliverable, vol. D3.3b

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Deliverable, vol. D3.3a

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 08

This essay deals with the concept of enmity and its representation in Athenian drama and modern rhetoric. It analyses the dynamics of friendship and enmity and its prominent opposition, as well as the limits of the moral standard of helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. This dichotomous pattern proved problematic not only in Ancient Athens, but also in today‘s politics.

The new strategy “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership” aims at strengthening research cooperation between Europe and Central Asia. It also seeks to address the lack of Central Asia expertise among European decision-makers. Based on assessments of the current state of affairs of Central Asian Studies in Europe and European Studies and Central Asia, the “SEnECA Agenda for Future Research Cooperation” provides concrete recommendations for policy-makers, university managements and researchers on how to improve research cooperation between the EU und this region of increasing importance to Europe., SEnECA - DELIVERABLE: Strengthening and Energizing EU-Central Asia Relations, vol. 1.3

This policy paper provides recommendations for the implementation of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia with regard to the first and second parts of the Strategy – “Partnering for resilience” and “Partnering for prosperity”. It follows the first part of recommendations (paper No 14) which gave a general assessment of the new Strategy and the recommendations on the tasks provided in the third part of the Strategy “Working better together”. This paper provides a set of recommendations to the EU on the implementation of the tasks from the new Strategy ranked the highest in the SEnECA scorecard (discussed in detail in Paper No. 14). Among those are the tasks aimed at “Partnering for resilience” – border management, strengthening cooperative mechanisms on the environment, water management and climate change, as well as support in legal and judicial issues, human rights, labour standards, governance, electoral process, reform and women's rights. Tasks related to scientific aspects of climate and water issues, as well as high-level political and security dialogue also scored high among the experts. These recommendations are expected to bring the EU’s experience in the respective fields to Central Asia while also expanding the EU’s normative power in the region. Among the tasks aimed at “Partnering for prosperity”, those related to the promotion of business and investment environment and support to the private sector in Central Asia scored the highest in the SEnECA scorecard, followed by the tasks devoted to development of transport corridors, supporting mobility of students and tutors, participation in science programs, as well as standardisation and quality issues for trade facilitation. SEnECA experts came forth with multiple recommendations for the implementation of the aforementioned tasks. In general, these recommendations suggest that the EU should focus on the direct counterparts (paying less attention to intermediaries) in Central Asia, pay particular attention to the different needs and situations in each of the Central Asian countries, make the communication with the relevant subjects more efficient, use assistance of other external like-minded actors and take particular note and lessons from similar actions of not like-minded actors.

This policy paper provides a reflection on the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership” (hereafter – the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia). The paper contains a general assessment, recommendations and a SEnECA Scorecard of the tasks set forth by the Strategy. It also gives a more detailed assessment of the Strategy’s third part – “Working better together” and offers recommendations on its implementation. The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia is a timely and necessary document during the period of changes in Central Asia. It is setting out a comprehensive approach and it signals a clearer understanding of the region, putting the emphasis on “working together” instead of “teaching how to live”. It also gives due attention to the expanding regionalisation trends and Afghanistan as a shared source of risks and opportunities. On the other hand, the strategy signals less ambitions compared to some expectations. The narrative of the EU’s approach is unclear since many tasks mentioned are rather general. Methods and tools for measurement and the underpinning financial resources for the implementation seem to fall short of the necessity. The potential of cooperation with the EU member states and like-minded external actors has not been sufficiently addressed. Also, insufficient emphasis on universal human rights upsets some in the EU and Central Asia, whereas too much emphasis on Afghanistan upsets others in the region. The aim of the SEnECA experts’ assessment is to support the implementation of the new strategy as constructively and concretely as possible.

In the aftermath of the large inflow of asylum seekers in 2015, questions pertaining to values and norms in Swedish integration work have become more salient. Many integration providers experience an increased importance to communicate and con-vey norms and values in their daily work. This development, however, leaves many integration providers with question marks on how to best communicate, transmit, or argue for certain values and norms. This policy research alert spells out some of the recent developments and highlights a number of areas of integration to improve., Efter det stora inflödet av asylsökande 2015 har många frågor om normer och värderingar kommit i förgrunden i det svenska integrations‐ och inkluderingsarbetet. Många av de som arbetar med integration och inkludering upplever att det blivit allt viktigare för dem att kunna kommunicera och förmedla normer och värderingar i sitt dagliga arbete. Det reser många frågor om hur man bäst kommunicerar, för vidare eller argumenterar för normer och värderingar. I denna policy research alert sammanfattar vi den senaste tidens utveckling och pekar ut några områden där arbetet med normer och värderingar behöver bli bättre., NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 03

It is likely that the current positive trends in political, societal and economic development will continue in all five Central Asian countries, though at a different pace. A decade from now, the Central Asian countries probably will be slightly better off and most of them will be economically more open, while freedoms and liberties will progress much slower. However, sudden and unexpected changes can also occur and change the course of development of one or more countries of the region. Intra-regionally, Central Asia in 2030 will most likely be a more cooperative region, if the development of the region continues on the current path. Bilateral and multi-lateral relations could improve if new domestically and externally facilitated engagements develop. The enhanced cooperation, however, will most likely not amount to regional integration. Issues of tension among the region’s countries will remain, especially regarding water and borders. In 2030, the EU will still be an important player in Central Asia. Economic engagement will remain a central driver for cooperation, having impact also on other sectors. At the same time, the EU’s comparative role in the region will decrease due to the growing economic and political influence of the People’s Republic of China and the persistent political, economic, military and cultural influence of Russia. Growing influence of both will predominantly shape the region. The role of other external powers, especially of India, Turkey, Iran, Arab countries is set to rise.

This paper assesses the implementation of the EU’s Central Asia policy and its perception in Central Asia since 2007. It analyses the EU’s economic and trade policies, as well as tangible outcomes in the relationship between the EU and Central Asian countries. It also compares the EU’s approach and results with other external powers in the region such as Russia, China and Turkey, and examines how the EU is perceived in Central Asia as an economic and trading partner. This paper concludes that for the EU and its member states to assist Central Asian countries in improving their economic development and regional stability, existing economic engagement must be maintained and built upon through tailor-made economic initiatives. In particular, the EU could continue to support small and medium enterprises, improve its explanations of EU trade and business regulations and increase awareness of the kind of trade agreements available to Central Asian countries. The EU could also further support Central Asian countries by providing technical and English language training, promoting good governance in business, assisting the countries with agricultural practices, as well as border management to facilitate cross-border trade.

The international conference „Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship“ took place from August 27-29, 2018 on the Essen Campus of the University of Duisburg-Essen. The conference was jointly hosted be the Special Interest Group Moral and Democratic Education of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI SIG 13) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research of the University of Duisburg-Essen (InZentIM).

This paper examines why despite increasing corruption since the 1980s, China's development has advanced so rapidly. The author argues that a strong developmental state, the prevalence of "developmental corruption" over "predatory corruption" and a temporary and relative acceptance of leading local cadres' corrupt practices by the Chinese leadership contributed to a high level of economic development. The development model of purely quantitative growth has meanwhile been replaced by one in favor of more sustainable development. However, social groups benefitting from corrupt practices or having invested heavily in social relationships are opposing such a step. Therefore, the central political leadership resorts to a combination of fighting at the same time both political corruption and political opposition of individuals and organizations against its new development policies and anti-corruption drive. Thus, combating corruption is also a mechanism to enforce the new reform and development program.

Initiated under the Presidency of Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is still a young, yet a fast-developing and most ambitious regionalist project. Despite BRI’s great potential to shape international trade and – more broadly – international relations amongst participating countries and beyond, scientific studies so far have largely neglected the question of how BRI goes together with contemporary approaches of regionalism and regional integration. This article argues that BRI constitutes a type of hybrid regionalism that seems to largely elude the old-new-regionalism divide and instead, it embraces elements of both traditions. In order to elucidate this double nature of the project, we will first discuss the idea of integration theory that has been developed in the context of the European integration process as well as such approaches that came up in the context of approaches of new regionalism. On this basis, and by referring to central elements of BRI as well as current developments in the framework of the project, we will shed light on the parallels and differences of BRI with “old” and “new” regionalism.

The SEnECA Stakeholder Analysis aims at listing relevant stakeholders for the EU’s Central Asia Policy and categorising them according to their power and interest. This will enable the project to communicate more effectively to different groups of stakeholders, tailored to their power and interest. The document also provides insights, gathered through semi-structured interviews, on how stake-holders communicate their work to the European public and on how stakeholders are or are not involved in EU decision-making. The SEnECA Stakeholder Analysis gathered information of 521 stakeholders and categorised them in four types (type 1: Monitor, type 2: Keep informed, type 3: Keep informed and engaged, type 4: Involve in the project) according to their power and interest.

My thesis makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the understanding of international society and governance by comparing the development pathways of Europe and North East Asia and these regions' respective responses to the financial crisis and to the climate change challenge. The novelty of my approach lies in conceiving of nationalism and multilateralism as competing but compatible principles of order in international society. These two organising principles form ideological institutions of international society and have shaped constitutive institutions such as sovereignty, international law and the economy. They determine role and power relationships between states. I start by researching how these ideological beliefs have changed the world: how was Confucianism replaced by nationalism in NE Asia and nationalism by multilateralism in Europe? The anarchy of Westphalian Europe has evolved into a syndicated supranational hierarchy in the EU, while the Confucian hierarchy in pre-modern NE Asia has given way to nationalist rivalry and territorial conflicts between Japan, China and Korea. Today the two regions – one integrated, one conflicted – play leading roles in global governance of a complex world of issues. The EU is guided by its multilateralist DNA, while NE Asia handled the financial crisis and the climate change challenge with a nationalist approach. In the theoretical part I am taking the English School's approach beyond its euro-centrism and also examine the contributions of the new Chinese school of International Relations. Dissertation, Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2017

In this Policy Paper, actual issues of cultural ties of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) with three world powers (Russia, China and the United States) are gradually analysed. These cultural relations consist of the following areas: shared identity and values, leadership links, foreign media outlets operating in Central Asia, cultural influence, diasporas, financial support to cultural activities and people-to-people cooperation. Each of the above world powers has its own mechanisms and channels for establishing, maintaining, and sometimes strengthening cultural ties with specific countries individually, or with the region in its entirety. The countries of the region in turn have their own preferences and approaches in maintain-ing cultural ties with each of these three world powers.

Cultural relations between Central Asian and the other Asian states (defined here as India, Japan, South Korea, Iran and Turkey) mostly transpire through classic and modern culture imports, shared historical narrative, and cooperation in education. South Korea, Iran and Turkey have particular his-torical links, established through diaspora and linguistic ties. There are few shared cultural touch-points to speak of, and there is a lack of comment on human rights or other values. Nevertheless, that has not prevented the identified powers investing in cultural relationships with the Central Asian states. The popularity and reach of the Asian countries’ cinematic industries into Cen-tral Asia is extensive. Countries have likewise sought to forge cultural ties by establishing cultural centres and funding educational institutions and scholarships. The presence of foreign media outlets in these Central Asian countries is significantly lower, leaving a more open space to non-Chinese or Russian sources of information and media. It is unclear to what extent this has an impact on political relationships. Overall, there are few close or intimate leadership links between the countries. Likewise, diaspora seem to do little in bringing significant value to bilateral relationships.

The aim of this paper is to study the role and impact of the world powers in Central Asia. The paper analyses the Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turk-menistan - in terms of their economic and trade cooperation with Russia, the United States of Amer-ica and China, taking into account the impact of such developments like sanctions and labour mi-gration. The study addresses both the national and supranational levels, as it features the mapping of the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), and the Eurasian Eco-nomic Union (EAEU). Further, it addresses the engagement of the Central Asian countries in the international trade agreements and bilateral trade by providing an outlook of the most notable invest-ment and bilateral projects and looks into the disputes that have arisen during the implementation of the said projects.

Largely under-reported, India, Japan, Iran, Turkey and South Korea represent important trading and investment partners for the Central Asian countries. In the wake of independence, all five Central Asian powers signed a range of different agreements with the five Asian powers – though the depth of these agreements varies substantially. Bilateral trade between the five Central Asian countries and the other Asian countries is broadly in favour of the non-Central Asian ones, though a considerable spike in individual bilateral trade is observed due to hydrocarbons. Of the countries in question, Turkey’s relationship is likely the most balanced in trade terms. There is some direct investment from the countries into Central Asia, with South Korean and Japa-nese projects, in particular, being focused on aid opportunities. Turkish companies focus on con-struction and all seek some access and stake in the energy sector. A number of prestige projects have been undertaken by these powers in the region, largely as conduits to improve relations rather than driven by any practical economic benefit. The impact of sanctions on Iran can be felt across the region with both direct relations with Iran being largely stunted, and the broader potential for Iran to provide an access way for Central Asian prod-ucts to reach the international market remaining under-developed. There is some labour migration to the countries in question, with some Uzbekistani migrants going to South Korea, and labour migrants from across the region going to Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and India have all articulated major cross-regional connectivity visions. In 1985 Iran, Turkey and Pakistan founded the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) that now includes the entire re-gion, is headquartered in Tehran, but has done very little in its lifespan.

This paper discusses the economic relations among the countries of Central Asia on the one hand and the European Union and its member states on the other. First, the EU interests and priorities as a whole are analysed to distinguish the role of Central Asia in the documents and agreements of the EU in the spheres of economic cooperation, development, and financial aid. Then, national interests of the six EU member states - Latvia, Italy, Finland, Germany, Poland and France - in Central Asia are reviewed as separate cases to demonstrate their sustained interests and accomplishments in relations with the five countries of the region. In the following sub-chapter, business, trade and in-vestment interests of EU in Central Asia are scrutinized.

Geography and history matter when it comes to the political and security relationship between Cen-tral Asian countries and the world powers – China, Russia and the United States. In terms of strategic partnership, there are certain national priorities among the Chinese, Russian and American political establishment when dealing with Central Asia. Whereas the Kremlin has managed to preserve its institutions and political influence in Central Asia, in particular in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-istan, the White House episodically addresses the region with its own Afghanistan-driven security agenda. Yet, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain the U.S. strategic allies in the region. Beijing is strengthening its political and security ties with Central Asian countries by providing all of them with Strategic Partner Status. There is no single regional security organization covering all five Central Asian states. However, the world powers offer their agenda both bilaterally and multilaterally within CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and PfP/NATO (Partnership for Peace). The United States are trying to preserve their C5+1 initiative that brings them together with all Central Asian countries. As for political dialogue, Russia remains the leader in quantitative terms (numbers of visits and meetings).

Few of the countries examined (India, Japan, Iran, Turkey and South Korea on the one hand, the five Central Asian countries on the other) have included one another in their national strategy papers, with the exception of Turkey. Ankara features prominently in the foreign policy strategies of all five of the Central Asian states. With deep historical ties, since their independence, Central Asian states have relied on Turkey’s assistance to enter international economic, financial and political multilateral organisations. The majority of Central Asian states have also supported Japan in its bid for a UN Security Council seat and vote alongside South Korea in UN votes. Even where strategic alliances have not been outlined in overarching foreign policy, these countries have signed extensive bilateral political agreements with one another covering a variety of fields of cooperation. These have often followed periods of high levels of activity in bilateral relations and high-level (including heads of state) meetings and visits. Bilateral relations are further solidified by reciprocal diplomatic representation in each state and a variety of visa free regimes. Political ties are also underscored by shared security threats and challenges. The continued instability in Afghanistan, in particular, is a concern for countries in this region given that drug trafficking as well as the potential risks around radicalisation and terrorism remain a considerable challenge. Afghanistan is a particular driver of activity for India, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, Central Asian republics and South Korea have a similar understanding of responsibility for international security and stability in Asia. Central Asian states and the other Asian states covered in this paper have had few disputes. There has in the past been political tension between Turkey and several Central Asian states for a variety of reasons. Iran has had a variety of disputes over territorial boundaries and natural resources, as well as Iran’s nuclear programme and the resulting restrictions placed on Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement between the EU and Iran on curtailing Iran’s nuclear programme. Indeed, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty also ensured that the support for a country’s nuclear weapons programme was limited. Despite this, Iran has, by some countries, been used as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Central Asia. More recently, there have been growing tensions between Iran and Tajikistan, which reflects a concern across the region about the Islamic Republic’s negative influence. Of all the Asian states examined in this paper, India and South Korea are the most involved in the sphere of defence and security relations. They have engaged in military training, exercises, as well as arms sales and military modernisation, and India has sought the lease of an airbase in Tajikistan. Turkey has limited, but growing, potential in this area for greater cooperation.

This paper discusses the political and security relations among the countries of Central Asia on the one hand and the European Union (EU) and selected member states on the other. First, the institu-tional dimension and priorities of the EU as a whole are analysed to uncover the role of Central Asia in the documents and practices of the EU institutions. Then, the current state of play in political relations, as well as in security and military relations is assessed. Six EU member states – Latvia, Poland, Germany, Finland, France and Italy – that have shown particular interest in the EU-Central Asia relations are analysed as separate cases to demonstrate their underpinning interests and accomplishments in relation with the five Central Asian countries (the selection of these countries provides both geographical and political-economic size balance).

Mercator-Professur 2007, Prof. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi. 2. Vorlesung. Aufzeichnung vom 29. Januar 2008 aus dem Auditorium Maximum des Campus Essen: - Begrüßung durch Professor Dr. rer. nat Eckart Hasselbrink - Vortrag - Fragerunde

Mercator-Professur 2007, Prof. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi. 1. Vorlesung. Aufzeichnung vom 29. November 2007 aus dem Auditorium maximum des Campus Duisburg: - Begrüßung durch den Rektor Prof. Dr. Lothar Zechlin - Vortrag - Fragerunde

“One Belt, One Road” is an extensive and complex initiative whose potential effect and influence are still currently pending for answers. This paper addresses the following research question: What is the effect of the New Silk Road intercontinental railways on the trade between China and its trading partners in Central Asia and Europe? We focus on nine railway lines connecting Europe and China, which started operations between 2011 and 2015. The countries’ trade patterns with railway connections to China are then compared to the countries without railway connections to China. We find the intercontinental railways have a positive effect on China’s exports to its trading partners in Central Asia and Europe, especially concerning exports of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured articles. Moreover, the intercontinental railways have a positive effect on China’s imports of food and live animals from its trading partners.

The challenges of a polycentric world necessitate new ways of addressing global problems. Of late, strategic partnerships have become prominent features in the foreign profiles of international actors. They can be seen as a practice of cooperation, and can be further broken down to patterned actions, such as diplomacy and summitry. These practices feature prominently in the ASEAN-China strategic partnership for two reasons. First, diplomacy has proven to be pivotal in both the securitization and the desecuritization of the South China Sea maritime dispute. Second, summitry is the foundation of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, which was formally established in 1996, and on which the strategic partnership is built. Looking at the ASEAN-China strategic partnership from the perspective of practice theory can then identify the constitutive effects of practices on regional cooperation. This effectively moves the discussion about strategic partnerships from what they are to how they operate in international relations. The practices of diplomacy and summitry in ASEAN-China relations can then be argued as the key forces behind regional cooperation.

We examine the role of informal social ties and of relationship orientation in two types of inter-organizational research collaborations in South Korea: new product development (NPD) collaborations and university-industry research collaborations (UICs). An in-depth content analysis of five NPD collaborations and five UICs reveals that whereas both informal social ties and relationship orientation are prevalent in research collaborations in Korea, they play different roles for relationship quality and collaboration outcomes. Informal social ties strongly vary in their types and strength, and enhance relationship quality and outcomes only when they are well-aligned with the task-specific requirements for a given collaboration. Relationship orientation manifests itself both in task-related and social exchanges between collaboration partners. A strong relationship resulting from such exchanges often enhances outcomes such as knowledge acquisition and business performance.

Why have so few countries managed to leave systematic corruption behind, while in many others modernization is still a mere façade? How do we escape the trap of corruption, to reach a governance system based on ethical universalism? In this unique book, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Michael Johnston lead a team of eminent researchers on an illuminating path towards deconstructing the few virtuous circles in contemporary governance. The book combines a solid theoretical framework with quantitative evidence and case studies from around the world. While extracting lessons to be learned from the success cases covered, Transitions to Good Governance avoids being prescriptive and successfully contributes to the understanding of virtuous circles in contemporary good governance.

This paper combines two strands of the experimental sunspot literature. It extends the rare literature that focuses experimentally on the coordination problems caused by sunspot variables. It also extends the literature that focuses on coordination games that have a payoff-dominant and a divergent risk-dominant equilibrium. To achieve this, we use a repeated three-player stag hunt game with fixed groups. In our experiment, a sunspot variable points randomly at the risk-dominant or the payoff-dominant choice. We find out-of-equilibrium behavior (discoordination) caused by the sunspot variable in the short run. In the long run, the sunspot variable can lead to coordination of the payoff-dominated equilibrium (miscoordination). If the sunspot-generating process points more frequently to the risk-dominant choice, some groups converge to the sunspot equilibrium.

This paper provides a literature review and preliminary field observations on the topic of political representation in the Chinese cyberspace. The authors demonstrate that multiple new communication platforms are being established in the Chinese cyberspace. These new platforms not only transform conventional forms of political representation but also create new representative patterns, such as in cases of interactive and connective e-representations. They conclude that the proliferation of new communication technologies has been transforming the relationships between representatives and represented as well as between the state and society. Furthermore, in this paper the authors take their analysis beyond the description of the Chinese case and argue that the Chinese case also contributes to the Western theory of political representation. More specifically, they question the performative nature of claim-making and the role of “performer” and the “audience”. They propose two concepts of interactive and connective e-representations and further claim that the current developments in the Chinese cyberspace may signal a new digital turn in the theory of political representation.

Despite the high international consensus on the enormous potential of the Belt and Road Initiative for reconfiguring international relations in Eurasia and beyond, and the consequent attention raised by this strategy throughout the world, there are still many unanswered questions. The present paper analyzes the case studies of the Yuxinou (渝新欧) and the Yixinou (义新欧) railway lines to tackle three debates surrounding this initiative: its scope, whether this is a merely economic scheme or also has a geostrategic dimension; its actors, underlining the coordinated action of Chinese central and local authorities; and its implications on EU-China relations, with emphasis on trade imbalances and the consolidation of global value chains. Both secondary and primary sources have been used in this paper, including interviews with relevant officials, business people, and scholars from China, Germany, and Spain.

China’s economics education started at the beginning of the 20th century, when China was learning from the Western civilization, and accordingly economics curriculum system was introduced as well. As the communist government was established in 1949, economics education in China was interrupted, started to follow a conventional Marxism, and almost acted as ideological education approach and as a tool to economic plan. The fundamental economic reform from 1980s brought modern economics back to China, and from 1990s, economists who were educated in Europe and the USA introduced Western Economics, of which majority are neoliberalism, to China’s Universities, and the popular economics textbooks and curriculum prevailed in China as well. This made the existing socialism economics education struggling in the research evaluation and classroom, although the Communist Party still is giving strong support to Marxism. The 2005 debate between Marxist and Neoliberalism actually reflected two monism tried to lead whole China’s economics education. A hidden issue behind the learning from the West is that China’s economists are keeping pursuing an approach based on China’s reality, which in particular has been reinforced by the recent impressive economic success. Generally, China’s economists have a common sense of that China did not follow a single economic theory to lead its reform and development, and believe that China’s success can contribute to economics, although none tells what is a China’s idiosyncratic economics. Hence, an unknown monism might be emerging in China, but pluralism may act as a channel for understanding Chinese economy, and accordingly be the essential parts of China’s idiosyncrasy economics, which will be a new monism.

The aim of this paper is to unveil the main cultural patterns adopted by the Chinese leadership to project smart power abroad, and to provide a new perspective on the claims by Chinese scholars and politicians who argue that a new paradigm in international relations is being promoted by Beijing. Principles as “inclusiveness”, “win-win cooperation”, “peaceful rise”, “harmonious world” – often raised in relation with China’s vision for a new global order and its flagship policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – are part of a new narrative which cannot replace, for instance, fundamental issues as a clear regulatory framework needed for enterprises willing to participate in BRI-related infrastructural and energy projects. The lack of a clear legal framework is at the moment one of the most important problem hindering foreign firms’ ability to invest and grow within the China-led initiative. The importance of this study rests on the necessity to find new interpretative insights to understand the main driving forces behind China's foreign policy (often not complying with Western-set rules and practices) by assessing the role of Chinese classical culture in the projection of China's smart power. The main cultural patterns and perspectives guiding Chinese policies abroad; the possibility that the Chinese government is introducing a narrative shift in global policy practices; the surfacing of a possible new way for international relations consistently based on an effort to improve international relations and enhance the state of world affairs, or maybe simply of a strategic scheme meant to avoid creating a clearer framework which could guarantee access to the initiative to all interested parts, at the same time limiting Beijing's power to arbitrarily choose partners and directions, will all be objects of reflection.

Economists believe in (monetary) incentives. However, in the specialized area of prosocial behaviours, (monetary) incentives could backfire because extrinsic motivation might crowd out intrinsic motivation. Moreover, national differences in the perception of incentives should also be considered, taking the cultural background of individuals into account. In this project, we ran a real effort experiment in Germany and in China. In addition to an extrinsic monetary incentive (personal payment) to the subjects, we made a donation to UNICEF, and the amount of the donation depended on the effort of the subjects, which served as an intrinsic motivation. The results indicate that with respect to activities with a prosocial element, Germans tended to exert a high level of effort, regardless of the alternation of the art and the level of their payoff; in contrast, the Chinese did react to extrinsic monetary incentives and exerted more effort with a linear payment or if the level of payment was high. Females exerted significantly more effort than males, and this was true for both the German and Chinese subjects. The last finding is that the Chinese were more motivated by a fixed non-monetary payment than a fixed monetary payment, if the level of payment was relatively low.

This study, by conducting a laboratory experiment, investigates whether social inducement can be an external instrument to promote open innovation. The study&rsquo, s findings suggest that social inducement, on average, leads subjects to invest more in open innovation projects. In particular, in an asymmetric inducement setting, both induced and non-induced subjects invest more and are more active in open innovation compared to a full inducement setting. Furthermore, economic uncertainty increases the effectiveness of social inducement, suggesting that open innovation is easier to promote in the presence of economic uncertainty. Our findings may suggest practitioners and policymakers applying public channels to communicate open innovation concepts with the public, which in turn helps the adoption of open innovation.

Taiwan has embedded itself in the global markets and established strong economic relations with many countries, especially the neighbors in East Asia. However, working in a foreign country, as part of international economic exchange is still constrained by the regulations and/or socio-cultural barriers in respective countries. Nonetheless, it is argued that transnational labor markets, which are primarily constructed by private actors, are emerging in East Asia. Taking up Taiwan as a case, this study investigates how private actors - temporary help agencies - go ahead of the states and forge institutions that facilitate labor mobility across national borders in the absence of supra-national institutions, such as EU or ASEAN Economic Community, where freedom of movement has taken place or is expected to launch. Based on interviews with staffing agencies, union activists and government officials, it is found that staffing agencies serve as a transnational HR management function, as they develop international networks and provide their clients and workers with services such as visa application and employment arrangements that accommodate to business, employment and social welfare regulations in both sending and receiving countries. Moreover, staffing agencies translate and diffuse socio-cultural meanings between countries by engaging in socio-cultural training for workers as well as their clients to ensure the success of cross-border labor placements. This research contributes to the understanding of transnational labor mobility by studying the process of building transnational institutions and how these institutions make sense to the involved actors.

In the context of the ongoing transformation of China’s economic development model, the central government under Xi Jinping announced a general upgrading of China’s skill-formation system. The initiative is part of a larger strategy to avoid the middle income trap and move towards a high-skill route of development. One of the core challenges in this respect is to consolidate the cooperation of enterprises and vocational schools and colleges, and to couple the realms of education and employment more tightly. The aim of this paper is to analyze these issues in the institutional context of state-permeated capitalism from the perspective of actor-centered institutionalism. By conducting a structured and focused comparison of the fields of nursing and mechanical engineering in two vocational colleges in Eastern China, it identifies important factors facilitative to reforms. The nursing case illustrates that bureaucratic integration and a dominance of the public sector facilitate the cooperation of schools and enterprises and the coupling of education and employment. Here, hierarchical steering can reinforce cooperation and couple education and employment via vocational qualification certificates. The fragmentation of bureaucratic authority and marketization, on the other hand, require new patterns of cooperation and coupling. The case of mechanical engineering illustrates the potential of well-performing education facilities to attract cooperation partners without direct state support, and of industry associations to play an intermediary role between schools and companies, and to develop new vocational qualifications geared to companies’ requirements. The case study design focuses on areas of vocational education with high incentives for cooperation and good material conditions. The preliminary results indicate that the generally negative assessment of China’s TVET system in the literature may be somewhat too pessimistic, and that a more differentiated analysis is needed.

OA Förderung 2016 - OA hybrid Research suggests that nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaigns are more successful in deposing dictators than armed rebellions. However, ousting dictators is only the first step in the process of democratization. After deposing an autocratic regime, societies enter a transition phase where they must learn to consolidate the gains of democracy and bargain about the new rules of the democratic regime. But even if free, fair, and competitive elections are held, indicating a successful transition to democratic rule, uncertainty about its stability remains salient. In the period that follows, either democracy survives and proves to be resilient, or an autocratic backslide occurs. In this article, we analyze the effect of NVR campaigns on the survival of democratic regimes. Building on the literature on modes of transitions and nonviolent resistance, we argue that those democratic regimes that come into being as a result of a NVR campaign are less prone to democratic breakdown. The main mechanism which produces this effect is that the organizational culture of NVR campaigns spills over to the subsequent democratic regime fostering conditions favorable for democratic survival. We test the effect of NVR campaigns on democratic regime survival using survival analysis and propensity score matching. The results show that democratic regimes that experience NVR during the transition phase survive substantially longer than regimes without NVR.

This paper starts out from James C. Scott’s seminal book “Weapons of the Weak” dealing with everyday forms of collective action by private entrepreneurs. It raises the question by what kind of formal and informal mechanisms Chinese entrepreneurs exert political influence in order to protect or enforce their interests. The author explored two aspects: First, the way in which private entrepreneurs in China act in a collective manner, i. e. as a strategic group; and second, how collective action by private entrepreneurs is altering both political structures and the institutional setting of the political system and what effect this is having on stabilization of the system as a whole. In addition, this paper examines patterns of formal and informal representation of private entrepreneurs in Chinese politics. The author contends that as Chinese entrepreneurs increasingly turn to patterns of collective action they are developing into a coherent group with a broad range of strategies aimed at safeguarding their interests, and that in so doing they are playing a salient role as system stabilizers.

This paper presents both a literature review on the issue of political representation and the preliminary framework of a sub-project on new political claims of representation in China. It is primarily concerned with portraying and typing diverse schools of thought in both a “Western” and a Chinese context, while the sub-project is part of the French-German Joint Cooperation Project “New Political Representative Claims: A Global View: France, Germany, Brazil, China, India”. The paper is organized as follows: (1) The concept of representation is examined by a brief review of the history of this concept, including the existence of two diverging strands of representation in “Western” discourses. (2) We then examine the meanings of representation, its definitions, and its peculiarities. Points (1) and (2) in particular are based on a literature review. (3) We discuss the issue of representation in a non-democratic, authoritarian setting in general and in China specifically in light of the fact that almost no literature on representation in authoritarian polities exists. (4) We outline the Chinese domestic discourse on political representation. (5) Finally, we clarify the distinction between political representation and participation on the one hand and elections as a specific feature of representation on the other. We then conclude with a summary of our preliminary findings.

The parliaments in the EU are facing a choice. They may exploit the existing possibilities, continue business as usual (possibly with declining participation in inter-parliamentary cooperation, so no change), or bypass existing interparliamentary structures. The last and most extreme scenario would mean that some national parliaments, for example the six founding members or the Member States that have adopted the euro, create their own conference, with serious repercussions to “pre-in” countries, to the EU institutions, and to the inclusiveness of economic and financial governance. The second option (business as usual) does not help building a genuine Economic and Monetary Union either. Only the first scenario would help reduce the existing weakness in democratic accountability and legitimacy, both in general, and especially in connection with the genuine EMU in the making. An inter-parliamentary conference as a place to discuss these policies could have the positive effect of gradually becoming an arena in which the future direction of the Union’s economic policy is shaped.