Search

Alasdair MacIntyre's relationship to Karl Marx and Marxism has been and remains fundamental in his work. Drawing on a number of important MacIntyrean texts, this paper shows how it has animated his Marxist early years, how it has been a crucial element in the epistemological crisis he experienced and how it has left him an important legacy. At the heart of the history of this relationship are the question of truth, the problematics of the right telos of human action, of the achievement of the individual and common goods, of the desires, the role of the critique of both the capitalist system and the Marxist politics. Understanding how MacIntyre positioned himself in relation to all these issues helps us to understand the reasons that led him to switch from a Marxist to an Aristotelian narrative. Key concepts of Marx and the Marxist tradition find a new life today in the now Aristotelian-Thomist thought of Alasdair MacIntyre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The polarization and charges of "post-truth" that mark contemporary politics may have its source, ultimately, in a crisis of epistemology, which is characterized by a tension between different forms of naïve realism—the view that reality appears to us directly, unmediated by interpretation. Perhaps too schematically, those on the right tend to be first-person naïve realists in treating economic and social realities as accessible to the ordinary political participant by simple common sense, while those on the left tend to be third-person naïve realists in treating credentialed experts as forming a consensus—a new common sense. In treating reality as transparent enough to be legible either to oneself or to a group of experts, both sides tend to treat disagreement as a motivational problem—a problem of bad faith, motivated reasoning, perversity, and refusal to see the truth—rather than as an epistemic problem caused by the possibility that each side may hold a different set of interpretive frameworks that determines how and what it sees of reality. In obviating the possibility of genuine disagreement, the epistemological crisis is quite naturally transformed into a political crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prevalent political narrative is that we are facing an epistemological crisis, where many citizens no longer care about truth and facts. Yet the view that we are living in a post-truth era relies on some implicit questionable empirical and normative assumptions. The post-truth rhetoric converts epistemic issues into motivational issues, treating people with whom we disagree as if they no longer believe in or care about truth. This narrative is also dubious on epistemic, moral, and political grounds. It is epistemically dubious in being largely insensitive to the problem of complexity in politics; it is morally dubious because "post-truth" is often a derogatory label for individuals or groups that are deemed stupid, irrational, or morally compromised; and it is a politically toxic neologism because it purports to use the language of 'truth' as a weapon against power, yet these truth-claims are often themselves attempts to exert power over others by delegitimizing their perspectives. While it may seem as if truth and democracy are on especially bad terms lately, politics and truth have long had a vexed relationship, and moral panics about the value of truthfulness in politics are as old as politics itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our clinical practice is contextualized by a co-participant trauma constituted by a confluence of upheavals–pandemic, politics, an epistemological crisis, pervasive distrust of expertise and evidence. Psychoanalytic work, parallel to the external world, has become defamiliarized, if not, at sometimes unrecognizable. The affect on the frame and the boundaries of the therapeutic frame and of the psychoanalytic institution are explored with an awareness of the uncertainty of the future. The experience of the onset of the pandemic is discussed with awareness of an unknown future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), beginning with DSM-III in 1980, emerged in response to notable challenges to psychiatry's practices and ways of knowing in the early 1970s. Because these challenges threatened psychiatry's scientific self-understanding and moral authority, they exemplify what Alasdair MacIntyre has termed "epistemological crisis." As a response to crisis, the modern DSM has been a stunning political achievement, providing the central diagnostic constructs around which psychiatric research, practice, and reimbursement has been organized for four decades. Indeed, the DSM's authority survives in the face of ongoing trenchant scientific and philosophical critique. But if psychiatry is to be healthy, it must be epistemologically humble, reckoning honestly with the limits of the DSM before a future epistemological crisis destabilizes it entirely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is now constituted by a set of characteristic symptoms, its roots lie in Post-Vietnam Syndrome, a label generated by a Vietnam-era advocacy movement that focused not on symptoms but on war's traumatic context. When Post-Vietnam Syndrome was subsumed into the abstract, individualistic, symptom-centered language of DSM-III and rendered as PTSD, it not only lost this focus on context but also neglected the experiences of veterans who suffer from things done or witnessed, not primarily from what was done to them, in war. This agent-related trauma has been rediscovered in contemporary work on moral injury, but moral injury too is increasingly subjected to the hegemony of the symptom. Focusing on symptoms, however, unhelpfully pathologizes and individualizes trauma, neglects traumatic context, and legitimates problematic therapeutic approaches. Trauma researchers and clinicians should decenter the language of symptoms and focus instead on context and on alternative accounts of trauma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern science has no basis of positivist epistemological and methodological foundations sufficient for building a comprehensive understanding of the world of man and society. A study of contrasts to the paradigms of science, technology and modern rationality expressed the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Boaventura Santos Souza was conducted. We used a dialectic approach to highlight the contradictions and limitations of this paradigm and highlight other paradigms of positivist epistemological basis not carry that enabled the overcoming of knowledge as regulation by knowledge empowerment. It was evident, based on the theories of these authors and arguments of researchers such as Albert Einstein, Ilya Prigogine, Michel Foucault, among others, that modern science has methodological limitations Cartesian basis and fragile epistemological basis when trying to conceive man, world and society while dynamically articulated.

The article explores the nature of the Elim movement by utilizing Alasdair MacIntyre's concept of tradition as 'an argument extended through time'. In doing so it seeks to identify the essential content of the Elim argument (read: tradition) and its method (read: rationality); and to narrate how the Elim argument has progressed during its 100 year history, with particular emphasis on its two major epistemological crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a response to the recent essay by Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker on "Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field of Study." I clarify my earlier positions on method and virtue in comparative religious ethics and try to respond to some of the issues that Bucar and Stalnaker raise in regard to my arguments specifically and the field more generally. I argue that while we need not measure the practical impact of scholarly work in comparative religious ethics purely in terms of political or social action, I nevertheless worry that defining the goals of comparative inquiry in terms of the production of bewilderment, intellectual vertigo, or skeptical questions can lead to impressionistic or therapeutic methodological norms. In a similar vein, I refine my earlier position on externalism that acknowledges the impossibility of a purely externalist approach but also notes the desirability of coming to understand others "in their own terms" prior to engaging in the process of transmutation. I also question Bucar and Stalnaker's pessimism about the potential of producing "rigorously convincing ethical theory from the lived experience of regular folk," suggesting that perhaps we are working with different conceptions of the sociology of knowledge. Finally, I consider whether we are currently in the midst of an epistemological crisis and conclude with some reflections on the rationality of the craft of comparative religious ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Christian apologetic witness should be understood as cross-cultural persuasion rather than as an effort to justify the Christian faith in terms of a supposedly universal rationality. It begins by exploring barriers to such cross-cultural persuasion related to human nature, the nature of worldview and of the way communities deal with objections to their way of life. It then explores three mutually reinforcing possibilities for cross-cultural persuasion. (1) Exposing tensions and antinomies in cultures, worldviews and life styles shows the need to explore alternatives. (2) Building bridges to relevant culture and worldview-specific points of contact shows that the Christian faith is coherent with and the fulfilment of what is best and what is most true in the former worldview. (3) The rearrangement of all these elements around Christ reveals the illuminating power of the whole Christian way of life in this world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]