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BOOK REVIEW OF: Wouter Wolfs European political parties and party finance reform: Funding democracy? Leuven: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, p. 316 ISBN 978-3-030-95174-0 (paperback) ISBN 978-3-030-95175-7 (eBook)

Under Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, national Parliaments have been granted participation in EU law-making through the Early Warning System (EWS). Within the framework of this mechanism, national chambers can evaluate EU legislative proposals on subsidiarity grounds, within an eight-week period, following their submission by the European Commission. The contribution of the National Parliaments Representatives at the European Parliament (or the liaison officers) is crucial for the national chambers to follow up on the Union agenda and participate in EU affairs. This piece offers novel data about the opinions of the national parliamentary representatives in Brussels on the implementation of the EWS and how it might be restructured. Data were collected through a questionnaire administered to the liaison officers in April 2022. In short, these transnational practitioners tend to support the enhancement of the broader “political dialogue” between the European Commission and national Parliaments, while they express scepticism towards the idea of reforming the subsidiarity mechanism..

This paper will analyse the most frequent French and Italian proverbs in speeches at plenary sessions of the European Parliament (EP) from 2014 to 2022. After illustrating the methodology used in corpus-driven extraction of proverbs in French and Italian reference corpora (frWaC and itWaC) and in plenary sessions of the EP, some examples of proverbs in speeches at plenary sessions will be analysed in order to see how the EP staff interpreters deal with them in simultaneous interpreting (SI) from Italian into French. Furthermore, the multimodal dimension of proverbs and its management in SI will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1415-1435 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Guaranteeing democratic accountability within the EU. - II.1. Democratic accountability in today's EU. - II.2. Persistent shortcomings in the accountability framework post-Lisbon. - III. Democratic ac-countability of EMU decisions. - III.1. EMU decision-making procedures and their characteristics. - III.2. Parliamentary involvement in the different fields of EMU: dialogue instead of full involvement. - III.3. Executive and Eurogroup centrality in EMU. - IV. Conclusion: EMU accountability regime is (still) distinct from the standard EU regime... and rightfully so? | (Abstract) This Article compares the democratic accountability mechanisms in place in the area of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with those existing in other fields of EU law. In so doing, it shows that, although democratic accountability standards have generally been improved following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, important shortcomings still exist as a result of institutional flaws and practice in EU decision-making. It then shows that the accountability gap that exists in the field of EMU is even deeper owing to the complexity of the procedures in place, and to the informality that characterises some of them as well as some of the decision-making bodies involved (chief of which is the Eurogroup). The Article concludes by making some proposals to improve the current unsatisfactory situation, improvement which will be ever more necessary in post-Covid times.

This article is based on the oral interviews that Members of the European Parliament (EP) from 1979 to 2019 have deposited at the Historical Archives of the EU (HAEU) and that are freely available to researchers.Their memories inspired us to focus on some specific features that are, in our view, relevant to the evolution and development of the European Parliament. In the forty years from 1979 to 2019 the EP completely changed its role: from mere discussion forum to co-legislator. Many manuals give an excellent and complete overview of formal and informal EP powers. This is not the aim of this article. Our ambition is to raise curiosity and interest sufficiently for readers to visit the HAEU website and to listen to some of the interviews.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 239-268 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The European Parliament: a lobbying target sui generis? - II.1. Specificities of lobbying in the EU. - II.2. Specificities of lobbying in the European Parliament. - III. The place of EP lobbying in EU primary law and EU parliamentary law. - III.1. The TEU and the TFEU. - III.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. - III.3. The EP's Rules of procedure. - III.4. The Joint Transparency Register. - III.5. The Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register. - IV. Evaluating lobby regulation in the EP from the perspective of EU primary law. - IV.1. Transparency as the main driver of lobby regulation. - IV.2. A troubling neglect of equality. - IV.3. Transparency as a proof of integrity? - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Citizens' perception that lawmaking is dominated by special interests undermines their trust in democratic institutions and lawmaking processes. This also applies to the EU, where lobby regulation remains weak despite past lobbying scandals. While the European Commission and the European Parliament established a Joint Transparency Register in 2011, registration remains voluntary for lobbyists. Given that domestic lobbies have increasingly been oriented towards the European supranational realm, adopting effective lobby regulation at EU level has become more essential than ever to protect the democratic legitimacy of EU lawmaking. This especially applies to the European Parliament, which has important decision-making powers in the context of the ordinary legislative procedure, and which represents the citizens of the EU, thereby constituting a key lobbying target. My goal, in this Article, is to show why and how lobbying should be further regulated in the European Parliament. I first examine the specificities of lobbying in the EU and in its Parliament, before looking at the EU's constitutional framework, as well as EU parliamentary law, the Joint Transparency Register established in 2011, and the provisional version of the Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register published in December 2020. I then evaluate the European Parliament's current regulation of lobbying from the perspective of EU primary law. I argue that its narrow focus on transparency is misguided and neglects other fundamental democratic values, such as equality. Moreover, the existing framework does not sufficiently focus on MEPs' duties of integrity.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(1), 209-223 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. European Union: a democratic or a political deficit? - III. Conceptualizing accountability. - IV. Mechanisms of accountability in the EU and the EP elections. - IV.1. EU complexities. - IV.2. The deficiencies of electoral accountability. - V. Conclusion: from legitimacy to authority. - VI. Acknowledgments. | (Abstract) This Article discusses the usefulness of the concept of accountability, and of electoral accountability more precisely, for the analysis of the European Union (EU). Starting from the idea that the EU does not suffer so much from a democratic deficit but rather from a political one, it argues that much more attention should be given to the concrete mechanisms through which EU decision-makers are held accountable. Among the latter, elections to the European Parliament (EP) are of special interest as they provide - at least in theory - the most direct channel for institutional accountability as well as the necessary incentives for political actors to act responsively. However, the declining turnout in European elections and the lack of knowledge of the EU on the part of voters reveal flaws in accountability at the EU level. The latter are attributed to the internal working of the EP and to certain features of the electoral system for the election of its members.

This paper analyses the importance of stakeholders’ actions on the effectiveness of the European competition policy. The national governments, European decision-makers, advisory institutions and civil society take the form of interest groups that have expectations, invest resources and advocate on competition policy. The paper follows the process of adopting a specific strategy (insider/outsider), depending on the type of the interest group and it divides the organizations in those with ”strong ties” and ”weak ties”. The goal of each interest group is to arrive at the main European competition law authority, the European Commission. As it has the full power to investigate cases and manage the process, as well as implementing decisions based on proposals, influencing this institution represents a real challenge for the stakeholders. In this process, some relevant aspects are the perfect timing for lobby, the dimension of the lobbying coalitions and also the capacity of attracting supporters of the cause. Interest groups do not have equal amount of influence power nor the resources but they do change the policy, according to their particular interests, by choosing the right strategies, partnerships and means to influence the decision-makers.

The article discusses the key principles invoked and issues addressed while drafting the Lithuanian language version of the Glossary of Sensitive Language for Internal and External Communication of the European Parliament. As a first step, it offers a short overview of the three categories of terminology presented in the Glossary related to disability, LGBTQ+, and race, ethnicity and religion. Thereafter it touches upon the issues pertaining its use in the light of current societal trends, correct and clear language requirements, influence of foreign languages and human rights. The article argues that sensitive language is imperative in communication with disadvantaged groups continuously marred by prejudices, fears, and stereotypes. Based on this proposition the article emphasizes the importance of political correctness as personal stance. At the same time, it exemplifies limitations thereof that could be triggered by the language system itself.

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Comparative Law / Revista Romana de Drept Comparat is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2019 4(2), 423-425 | Editorial | (Abstract) On 21 October 2019, in a piece published on Verfassungsblog, twenty-nine influential experts in European affairs have harshly rebuked the European Parliament for rejecting the nomination of Sylvie Goulard to the new European Commission (Fairness, Trust and the Rule of Law: Statement on the European Parliament's confirmation procedure concerning Sylvie Goulard, www.verfassungsblog.de). The European Parliament only narrowly elected Ms. von der Leyen President of the Commission. Various political groups were torn apart, between bowing to the European Council and the chaos that could have ensued had the European Parliament voted otherwise. The process of appointment of the other members was dotted by parliamentary skirmishes and manoeuvrings and some of the candidates were rejected by the European Parliament after informal hearings, among them Ms. Goulard. Far from being irreprehensible, thus, the unilateral choice of the future President of the Commission seems to have been inspired by the desire of the heads of State or Government of the Member States to re-take the full lead, at the expense of the European Parliament. By no means, however, this twist is a zero-sum game. In the complex institutional system of the EU, the loss of prestige, influence and power of one institution will hardly be compensated by the gain of another. The loss of influence of the European Parliament will fatally disturb the institutional balance, in such a way that it will be hard to recast it. If this is the first backlash of the populist wave in Europe, the process of the European integration is to have harsh days ahead.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2019 4(1), 3-6 | Editorial | (Abstract) The elections of May 26 have been welcomed with a sense of relief by the inhabitants of the European districts in Brussels and Strasbourg. If, on the eve of the elections' day, the dominant mood was fear of a euro-sceptic landslide, that would have deepened the cleavage between peoples and elites and shaken at its roots the process of integration, this mood has gradually changed as this looming perspective faded away. It turned out to be almost enthusiastic as certainty materialized to have the majority of the Members of the European Parliament's on the "right" side. In a nutshell, the populist parties increased their shares of the ballots, but less than expected. A final touch of optimism came from the turnout, which has significantly increased, thus bestowing more legitimacy on the resistance to the populist wave. One may presume that, with a haircut on austerity policies, some more emphasis on social policy, and a crackdown on immigration, business could continue as usual. Things, however, may be more complex than that. The avoided danger of having the Parliament controlled by nationalist parties should not overshadow the profound implications of this elections day. In particular, two aspects ought to be seriously considered, despite the fact that they are somewhat incoherent. On the one hand, the elections, unlike their preceding ones, have been dominated by European, not domestic, themes and, in particular, by the fate of the integration project. On the other hand, precisely because of that, the European Parliament is now deeply divided between a pro-integration majority and a euro-sceptic minority, sometimes labeled as sovereigntist. It is this divide that will probably have a major impact on the functioning of the European Parliament and, ultimately, on its role in the decision-making process of the Union. The 2019 elections may reverse the direction of the European political tide. Instead of injecting new blood in, and of bestowing additional authority upon, the European Parliament, the Europeanisation of the elections may prompt, paradoxically, the opposite effect: to establish a permanent link between the majorities in the European Parliament and the intergovernmental Institutions, and, by so doing, to undermine the authority of the former to the benefit of the latter. Even more paradoxically, it may expedite the transformation of the European Parliament, from one of the independent branches of the European political system to a verbose Parliamentary house, controlled by the executive and deprived of a real decisional autonomy. If this were the effect of the revolutionary elections of 2019, this would be the beginning of the end of the new model of democracy that has germinated in the European laboratories.

European Parliament elections have often been defined second-order elections, focused on national rather than transnational issues. This paper investigates the combined impact of Eurosceptic populism and social media in the development of the campaign during the 2019 European Parliament elections. It evaluates how populist and non-populist politicians and parties campaigned for the European elections on Twitter by using the case study of Italy. Computer-assisted quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis of social media content are used to assess the relevance of Europe in political communication and the strategies used by different political actors. Findings show that the concept of nation plays a central role in the campaign, with Europe depicted either as an enemy (by nationalist populism) or a saviour (by pro-Europeans). Moreover, there is e tendency towards a “populist shift” in the communication style.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(2), 469-473 | Editorial | (Abstract) On 12 September 2018, two events occurred, both with considerable legal and political implications, and seemingly inspired by different conceptions about the role of European fundamental values and principles. The first event is a resolution adopted by the European Parliament - on the basis of a large majority - calling upon the Council to determine the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the fundamental values of the Union - the so-called preventive procedure established by Art. 7, para. 1, TEU (P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340). The second event is the order in joint cases C-208/17 P to C-210/17 P, NF and Others v. European Council, by which the Court of Justice declared the appeals lodged against the three orders of the General Court of 28 February 2017 manifestly inadmissible, which, in turn, had declared as inadmissible three actions for annulment against the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 (see case T-192/16, NF v. European Council; case T-193/16, NG v. European Council; case T-257/16, NM v. European Council: hereinafter, NF). There is no relation, of course, between these two events, that only by accident must have occurred on the same date. Their only connecting factor lies in the diverse, perhaps opposite, conception of the inspiring principles of the process of integration in Europe. On 12 September 2018, the European Parliament embraced the fundamental values of Europe as its own mission and brandished its democratic legitimacy as a sword against the popular legitimacy that, hélas, supports the path towards illiberal democracy. On the same date, the Court of Justice abstained from unveiling the mysteries that still surround one of the most controversial instruments of the Union's migrant policy; by so doing, it abdicated its role as ultimate custodian of the principles and values of the process of European integration. These two events symbolise how fragile and inconsistent the conduct of the various actors of this process may be. At the same time, they remind us of the need to maintain firmly the fundamental values, common to the EU and to its Member States, as the only polar star to navigate the troubled waters of integration.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 103-119 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The T-Dem's Parliamentary Assembly of the Euro Area. - III. The choice for an external institutionalization. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The Draft Treaty on the Democratization of the Governance of the Euro Area (dubbed "T-Dem") is an academic project aimed at reducing the democratic deficit in the euro area by creating a Parliamentary Assembly of the Euro Area, outside of the EU institutional framework, which would exercise political control, exercise a legislative function and adopt a budget for the Member States of the Euro Area. Democratizing the governance of the Euro Area is certainly a priority; however, like any serious institutional endeavour, it is not without risks and challenges. The present Overview aims at providing a summary legal analysis of the project, focusing on its two main features. First, I will comment the project of the Assembly itself, analysing its powers and composition. Then, I will analyse the choice the authors of the draft made for an external institutionalisation, i.e. the creation of institutions outside of the European Union to deal with EU-related issues. I will contend that this choice raises questions of legality and constitutionality and generates legal complexities I call "legal costs".

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 121-125 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. An Assembly fitted with the multifunctional nature of legislatures. - III. An insurance against free-riding. - IV. A fair share for the European Parliament. - V. The devil is in the details. - VI. Conclusions. | (Abstract) A new assembly proposed for the Eurozone can be qualified as realistic utopia. Indeed, the Overview supports the view that the draft Treaty on the Democratization of the Governance of the Euro area (T-Dem) offers a coherent proposal given past lessons from legislative and EU studies. This is particularly the case regarding: a) the multidimensional functions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Euro area proposed; b) the fact that this assembly would have important and open decisions to make; c) the provision of 80 percent of national Members of the Parliaments within it; d) the high level of detail regarding the membership of the assembly. Yet, the provisions of the treaty call for some changes or precisions regarding basic features of the parliamentary matrix, notably: pluralism, transparency and permanency.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 83-91 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. A crucial European debate. - II. The nature of the democratic problems of the European Union and the Eurozone. - III. Five limits of the proposed new Parliamentary Assembly. | (Abstract) The Overview aims to analyze merits and limits of the book Pour un traité de démocratisation de l'Europe (Seuil, Paris, 2017). In the first section, the author argues, in agreement with the theses presented in the first part of the book, that the facile formula of the "democratic deficit" is a misrepresentation of the real democratic problems of the EU institutional system. In the second part, the author takes issue with the proposal to establish a new parliamentary assembly for the Eurozone, composed of four fifth of national MPs delegated by national parliaments from the Eurozone and of one fifth of MEPs, formulated in a new "Draft treaty on the democratization of the governance of the Euro area" (T-Dem), and expounded in the second part of the book.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 93-102 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Practice and proposals on interparliamentary cooperation following the approval of Art. 13 FC. - III. Criticism on the draft. - IV. Possible alternative solutions under the existing Treaty provisions. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The Overview offers a critical appraisal the proposal put forward by the T-Dem to set up a Parliamentary Assembly for the Euro Area. It acknowledges the presence of a democratic problem in the democratic governance of the Economic and Monetary Union, in particular of a black hole in the net of the elective assemblies that are expected to ensure political representation in Europe. The Overview argues that to create a new parallel EU institution next to the European Parliament would make things more complicated rather than filling this gap. By contrast, to work for strengthening the already existent representative network, for example by revising the Rules of procedure of the European Parliament and the Parliament's relationship with the Interparliamentary Conference ex Art. 13 of the Fiscal Compact, may help build a better solution.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 67-73 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Genuine EMU. - III. Wrong Method. - IV. Right Direction. | (Abstract) The main problem of Economic Monetary Union (EMU) is not a weakness of parliamentary control but the lack of a strong executive. A fiscal union needs a treasury, housed within the Commission. No new parliamentary assembly is required outside the European Parliament. And no new treaty should be agreed outside the EU framework.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 33-43 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. T-Dem or the democratic question put back at the heart of economic governance. - II. The European Parliament, rather than an assembly of the Euro area. - III. The ways of strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. - IV. Taking into account the interest of the Euro area as a whole. - V. From democratic frustration to parliamentary challenge. | (Abstract) The Euro Area crisis has strengthened the European Union's power to monitor the national economic policies but it has left unchanged the accountability obligations, vis-à-vis the European Parliament, of both the EU intergovernmental institutions and the European Commission. In order to reduce this democratic deficit, Thomas Piketty et al. support the idea to create a new parliamentary body specific to the Euro Area. In contrast, this contribution advocates the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament. It recommends the generalization of the ordinary legislative procedure within Economic and Monetary Union, and the creation of a "euro area" subcommittee within the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs or the creation of a parliamentary office for the evaluation of economic choices.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(1), 59-65 | Overview | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Democracy and economic reforms. - II.1. Democracy needs to take priority over effectiveness in Eurozone governance. - II.2. Disentangle democratization of the Eurozone from any particular policy program. - III. What kind of parliamentarization? - III.1. The parliamentarization of Eurozone governance requires an integrated approach. - III.2. Empower and refocus existing parliamentary institutions instead of creating new ones. | (Abstract) The T-Dem project of Hennette, Piketty, Sacriste and Vauchez puts the spotlight on, possibly, the main shortcoming of the flurry of recent Eurozone reforms: the lack of effective democratic controls. I offer a sympathetic comment on the initiative that goes to endorse and reinforce much of its intentions. However, I also raise two criticisms as I insist on the need to disentangle democratic reforms from any substantial policy proposals and advocate strengthening accountability relations between the present institutions rather than establishing a new Parliamentary Assembly for the Eurozone.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2019 4(2), 659-661 | European Forum Highlight of 21 June 2019 | (Abstract) The election of the Commission President was amended with the Lisbon Treaty. This new procedure inserted a quite controversial parameter: the European elections results. The aim of this paper is to briefly argue in favour of a direct connection between the elections results and the proposal of the European Council to the European Parliament of a candidate for President of the Commission, in line with the lead candidate system, in order to secure the 2014 paradigm.

This article analyzes questions from the European parliament (EP) to the Commission and Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). The exponential increase in the number of questions since the first direct election of the EP in 1979 is testimony to the changing pattern of inter-institutional relations in the EU and to the growing involvement of the EP in a variety of policy areas. At the individual level, the members of the EP strategically use questions either for the purposes of specialization or in order to connect with their voters. Analyzing parliamentary questions is therefore relevant for a better understanding of representation in a supranational setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(2), 599-609 | European Forum Insight of 17 August 2016 | (Table of Contents) I. Premessa. - II. Base giuridica sostanziale e cumulo di basi giuridiche PESC e TFUE. - III. Quale base giuridica sostanziale per l'accordo con la Tanzania? - IV. La soluzione della Corte. - V. Considerazioni conclusive. | (Abstract) It has already been made clear in case-law that a European Union measure - including a decision approving an international agreement - may have a dual substantive legal basis. This is necessary wherever the measure simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, or has several components, which are linked to each other, without one being incidental to the other, so that various provisions of the Treaty are equally applicable. However, a combination of CFSP and other external policies legal basis' is difficult because of the diverging decision-making procedures and instruments. This contribution analyses the Court's approach to competence and choice of legal basis in the context of the agreement EU-Tanzania and argues that, in order to avoid the problems related to such a dual legal basis, the Court has rejected its normal "aim and content" legal bases reasoning. It also examines the implications of the judgment for the role of the European Parliament in the procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement.

In the current system of “consensus democracy”, negotiated agreement seems to be achieved through a shared vision, a sort of “communitarian ethos” that can overcome any ideological rifts. The minority opinions contained in the European Parliament non-legislative reports show however that the institutional discourse is fundamentally based on controversy. This paper examines the role of minority opinions in the negotiation of a consensus through the analysis of some examples borrowed from the Committee of Foreign Affairs and from the Committee of Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in the current Parliament. The differences between two kinds of opinions - individual or in-group - show that, in addition to a dissenting discourse, the in-group counter-discourse opposing values and ethè produces an alternative discourse that nourishes the European democratic space.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(1), 339-341 | European Forum Highlight of 16 April 2016 | (Abstract) The decision in Case C-363/14, European Parliament v. Council concerns the eternally awkward intersection between EU international relations law and constitutional and administrative procedures, not least in the post-Lisbon framework. It is a striking decision on one level, where the EP once again post-Lisbon increasingly litigates to defend its prerogatives within inter-institutional balance as the new post-Lisbon framework of EU law, this time in response to the evolution of Europol. The post-Lisbon institutional balance era contains many examples of external action but also institutional balance being 'enlarged' through weakly reasoned CJEU decisions. And they raise the question then, what is a victory in this context?

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On September 7, 2010, the European Parliament voted in a resolution encouraging its members to use Web 2.0 technologies and “enter into a dialogue with the citizenry.” This article looks at the perceptions professional politicians develop regarding the audiences they believe they are reaching through digital multimedia platforms. The objective is twofold : to analyze these perceptions or representations and then to understand how such representations are constructed. The authors' objective is to contribute, in the field of politics, to a better understanding of the users and their uses of two specific digital platforms, Facebook and Twitter, through a longitudinal study over a period of five years (2009-2014).

This paper investigates the role of the Italian Left political parties and the complex process towards their consensus to the integration of Italy into the European Union after years of debated rejection positions against the EU project. In order to better develop such an analysis, the following research focuses on two political parties, namely the PCI and PSI. The following research will be carried out by identifying four significant moments in the European and Italian history: 1950: when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded; 1956-1957: when the XX CPSU Congress took place, the so-called “frontismo” broke up in Italy and the Treatises of Rome were signed and the European Economic Community was rising; 1962-1963, a turning point for the Communists represented by the conference hold at Istituto Gramsci on “Directions of the Italian Capitalism”; 1969, when the Italian Left political delegates entered the EP.

Many people have been preoccupied with Europe ever since the beginnings of time. Their ideas can be traced back as far as ancient mythology, as attempts to explain the world. But as of the 18th century, they looked at it differently, as an organized, unified, political institution. Numerous essays have influenced the history of the European idea, among them the work of Saint-Simon who, in 1814, thought of a European Parliament governing the national parliaments. In his essay on reorganizing the European society he brought forth ideas such as Europe rebuilt as a confederation, the establishment of a general parliament responsible for making decisions concerning the common interests of the whole European society. He strongly believed that putting the great political issues to the test is the aim of all contemporary efforts. If the previous century's philosophy was revolutionary, the 19ths centurys philosophy had to be organizing.

The democratic deficit of the European Union is not the fruit of the chance but of aprocess of construction which goes up at the origins of the European Community. For as much,widenings of 2004 and 2007 did not have an effect “the waving of a magic wand”. Indeed, the ratesof participations in the new countries members are generally even weaker than in the old ones. Ifthe Central European countries and Eastern had suddenly taken the practice, like the UnitedKingdom, of an average participation lower than 37%, that would become a true difficulty.However, Austria shows that a recent adhesion can quickly lead to a modest participation. Here arewhich sounds like a warning for the next election of the European Parliament, in June 2009.

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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the EU's enlargement (2004), issues related to the interpretation of European history have increasingly come up for debate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. World War II, the Holocaust, the fight against Soviet domination in central Europe and the crimes of Communism have been recurrent themes in a conflict of symbols that sets at odds European nation-states with different historical heritages (West/East) and political lineups (right/left). Although more than half of the member states of the Council of Europe also belong to the EU and share much the same history during the 20th century, we are forced to admit that the debates and the the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly are quite different. This difference can largely be set down to the “logics of operation and socialization" in these two assemblies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents French abstracts on topics including the process of institutionalizing the field of European power including the European Council, the European Parliament's judicial committee and the European Community's political system during the 1960s, and violence against women in Russia.

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Copyright of Cultures et Conflits is the property of Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Revue Cultures & Conflits and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cultures et Conflits is the property of Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Revue Cultures & Conflits and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cultures et Conflits is the property of Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Revue Cultures & Conflits and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)