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With its geopolitical location and underground resources, the South Caucasus region has turned into a competitive field for regional and global powers, especially since the 19th century. Three Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) gained independence in the region where Soviet domination had been effective for many years. In the first years of their independence, these countries, on the one hand, faced political and economic crises and, on the other hand, sought ways to integrate into the international system. These crises had negative consequences for Azerbaijan, which has been at war with Armenia, and the lack of military capacity led to the loss of the First Karabakh War. The history of military cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which built their relations on the discourse of “one nation, two states”, dates to the Caucasian Islamic Army’s liberation of Baku in 1918. Military relations, which ended soon after Azerbaijan went under Soviet domination, were re-established after its independence in 1991. Cooperation in the field of military and defence, which continues in many areas from training and technical issues to exercises, has expanded especially in the last decade. This study claims that Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Türkiye was decisive in winning the Second Karabakh War. In this context, Türkiye-Azerbaijan military relations, which date back 100 years, will be discussed from a historical perspective, and Azerbaijan’s military capacity will be evaluated. In addition, the study will include the cooperation opportunities that have deepened with the Second Karabakh War and the future expectations.

This paper intends to explore the various determinants that intervene in the decision making process in the field of military equipment acquisition currently applied by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Recent reports by the National Audit Office have highlighted the growing deficit incurred by the MoD regarding the cost of the fifteen most important arms projects at various stages of their completion cycle which have been vetted by the Defence Equipment and Support Unit of the MoD. The reports have estimated that the MoD was facing a shortfall between £6 and £36 billion over the next ten years (depending on the yearly growth of the MoD budget in real value). Part of this deficit originates in the programme delaying strategy resorted to by the MoD to ease financial pressure. But the main causes of this black hole are to be found in a combination of factors : the competition between the three Services for securing state-of-the-art equipment, often as a result of the required level of interoperability with American Forces ; the fact that this overspecification trend has been tacitly encouraged by the incapacity or unwillingness of the MoD to scrap an arms project once the main financial gate has been cleared irrespective of its wayward development ; the “cosy relationship” between major defence industrialists, MoD procurement officials and MPs, which often affects the way major contracts are awarded. Employment considerations are likely to trump cost saving attempts. Following the Strategic Defence and Security Review published in October 2010, British political leaders are now committed to reorganising the whole arms procurement system with a view to allowing British Forces access to the best possible capabilities at a cost affordable to the British taxpayer.

The article examines the evolution of the French military research and development system in a post-Cold War context using an institutionalist approach based on public policy analysis and Jullien and Smith’s model. While adaptations to the new geopolitical and economic context have been made, the defence policy has kept the country in the arms race. In doing so, the relationship between the state and the defence companies remains very close, much like during the Cold War.