Search

This article aims to highlight the way through which the weaving of a value and two legal concepts in the loom of Articles 2 and 19 of the Treaty on European Union ('TUE') by the Court of Justice of the European Union has produced a new institutional obligation of Member States and a new legal formula, in order to ensure the integrity and the application of the rule of law within the Union, alongside other rather political processes such as Article 7 TUE. These include the value of the rule of law, referred to in Article 2 TUE, and the concepts of a) effective judicial protection under Article 19 TUE and enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and b) judicial independence, as a more specific aspect of the latter, enshrined also in Article 47 of the Charter. The new institutional obligation, deriving from Article 19 (1) TUE, places judicial independence at the heart of the rule of law, while setting limits on the Member States' discretion in the organization of their judicial systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Juridique Thémis is the property of Editions Themis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Criminal Law Review is the property of Carswell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the history of the language of justice in New Brunswick. Topics include the use of English language as language of justice in the province until 1967, the Evidence Act's amendment that enabled the use of other languages, and the judicial discretion maintained by the Official Languages of New Brunswick Act of 1969 for fixing the language of proceedings.

Copyright of Canadian Criminal Law Review is the property of Carswell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Court sitting on appeal and that of the judge sitting on leave of appeal. It mentions judgment of a judge sitting on leave to appeal because he had usurped the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by refusing to grant such leave. It also mentions hoping to protect themselves against the effect of closure which may result from the exercise, by the judge, of his discretion.