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This paper argues that the distinction between the dynamic and the descriptive unconscious is in danger of being lost and indicates some of the practical, clinical consequences of this loss. It does so against the background of Freud’s own struggles with his radical conception of the dynamic unconscious as ultimately unknown, as they appear in the revisions of The Interpretation of Dreams, invoking Laplanche’s recognition of Freud’s Copernican Revolution and the temptation he felt to make a Ptolemaic Return. It also comments on confusion about whether feelings can be said to be unconscious and the implications of this confusion for clinical practice, especially for our understanding of the concepts of transference and countertransference. An extended analysis of a dream is presented to show the dynamic unconscious in action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will try to show how the chimera, as I understand it, is the result of an unsettling encounter between the traumatic traces of the two protagonists, culminating in a process of reverie, a process, indeed, of hallucinatory emergence, in which a creature emerges from the emotional embers of their traumatic clay. Although I take up Michel de M’Uzan’s notion of depersonalization, I would like to show how my understanding of a chimera filled with sensory qualities is different from his. Back in 2016, I spoke of the unconscious and clandestine agreement of the traumatic traces of both protagonists, from which I think it emerges. This conception seemed to me to reposition the question of the subjective and intersubjective effect of the two protagonists in the session, reaching into their deepest interior, since this »mythical creature«, to use de M’Uzan’s words, emerges from in between them during the analyst’s reverie, expanding into depersonalization. Not only does it arise from the dispositif that contains the emotional truth of the patient and of the analyst, but it also completes the attainment of O, that ultimate reality by which the analyst abolishes their ego by becoming one exclusively with the emotions of the patient. In the first section I will discuss in detail the metapsychology from which de M’Uzan recasts his conception of the chimera, followed by that of James Grotstein, who insists on the agency of projective identification, and finally I will address de M’Uzan’s challenge to the Kleinian approach through his conception of the »vital-identital«, which delineates a field of self-preservation infused with unheard-of energies. With the help of an example, I will try to show that when this creature emerges from the very deepest intimacy of each couple, it comes from the greatest distance and mixes the species based on what is most affective in the transitional characters of the infantile. I will follow a path that connects the Freudian memory traces of 1896 with Bion’s rejection of memory in the session in favor of O – that ultimate reality achieved through the experience of oneness or »at-one-ment« when the analyst, confronted with the patient’s emotional experience, draws on his or her own corresponding emotional resources. Evidence for this will be provided by a detailed example of a chimera. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study deals with countertransference on the part of observers in analytical groups. It complements an earlier study by the same team on participants' feelings towards observers. In a content analytic evaluation of an anonymous survey conducted among group observers, only around a third of all response items, interestingly, referred to the observer's feelings towards participants, whereas about half of the items referred to the observer's own position as an observing person, and the remainder to the group leaders and other staff. In contrast, in the preceding complementary study almost all response items referred to the group participant's feelings towards observers. Almost all observers reported positive, sympathetic states of feeling touched or moved, while negative feelings towards participants were the exception. Where states of stress were reported, they referred to the setting or to situations by which the respondent felt stressed or productively impacted. Participants were found to be viewed consistently as individuals who were following a path that also concerned the observers themselves. The accompanying supervision was described as valuable and beneficial. By contrast, perceptions contained very little evidence in favour of views found in the literature according to which observers are able to provide support to group leaders by giving them feedback or by offering insight, through analysis of their own feelings, into unaddressed issues within the group. In a different setting this resource could possibly be made better use of. Clear evidence was found of idealizing transference from observers to group leaders. This can be readily explained as a natural phase in developing an identity as a therapist. The response items confirm the assumption that an important function of observers lies in "neutralizing participants' superego". Conversely, the reflective setting helped observers to attenuate their superego traits, thus promoting a lively development process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]