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In the early 1920s, Russia moved on from the New Economic Policy to industrialization. The Kuznetsk Coal Basin needed an advanced mine-rescue system to support its growing coal industry. This research focused on the chain of decisions made by the state authorities to expand the mine-rescue stations network across the USSR. The authors used the examples of mine-rescue stations in Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Leninskiy, and Kemerovo to describe the formation and development of respiratory and supporting rescue teams. Archival sources made it possible to restore the quantitative composition, wage system, and funding sources of the Kuzbass mine-rescue service in July 1, 1924, as well as to identify the first management team. The mine-rescue development followed the expansion of the coal industry under the efficient state control provided by the centralized mining supervision. By the beginning of the second five-year industrial plan, Kuzbass was responsible for 8.5 % of the total mine-rescue stations in the country. The Kuzbass region owed its wide and efficient network of mine-rescue stations to the financial and organizational support of the state.

This paper examines the international experience of the restructuring coal mining industry. The paper highlights the issue of inefficiency public restructuring and features of its the implementation of developed countries. The research identified socio-economic consequences of reform and formulated measures to improve the investment activity to coal mining regions carrying out restructuring.

Emil Kirdorf is known for his early promotion activities for the National Socialism. While research has centered his role in financing the National Socialist Party since the second half of the 1920s, this paper considers the conditions of his rise to one of the most influential business managers in the Ruhr-valley in the days of the German Empire. In fact, Kirdorf ’s future prospect was not promising when he began working in this area in 1871. The weaving mill of his father had crashed and it was only by the mediation of his brother that he was recruited as a finance director (book keeper) for a small coal-mine in the Ruhr-valley. When he was hired for managing the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG, a company that was mainly founded by the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1873, he became its appointed director. This company developed into one of the greatest coal and steel companies in Europe. Although Kirdorf ’s authority as a director was highly restricted in the first years, he managed to increase his executive powers by his campaign for concentration and cartelization in the industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an important fuel, hard coal shaped industrialisation. Due to its specific materiality, coal established different options for intertwining industry and resource. This paper concentrates on the one hand on the specific properties of coal and, on the other, on the economic and technological operations with coal. Using the example of the different material properties of coal from the coal districts of Inde and Wurm, these interrelations are examined and illustrate how a space of resource extraction could be arranged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the cyclical trajectory of the British coal miner from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Within less than one generation, the miner turned from doomed industrial proletarian to self-assured embodiment of the future back to doomed proletarian. The renaissance of King Coal in the 1970s proved short-lived, and yet it needs to be taken seriously if one is to understand the nature of the coal strike of 1984/85 and the rundown of the industry that followed. Indeed, the figure of the miner offers a lens for reconfiguring our understanding of the 1970s and British contemporary history more generally, as the article seeks to demonstrate both empirically and conceptually. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1960s and 1970s the war economy of World War I was a major field of interest. Its main focus was, however, the governance of the war economy and the relationship between business and politics. From then on the economic history of World War I came out of style and despite the 100th anniversary of its outbreak a recovery is out of sight. In contrast to previous research the following contributions focus on the reaction of (mainly) private business towards the unexpected and exceptional situation of a total war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German war economy suffered from resource shortages during WWI because the Allies were able to block imports with its naval blockade. Coal was more or less the only natural resource relevant to the war economy which was available domestically and in abundance. Therefore, authorities were hardly concerned with the supply of coal when the war broke out. As the war lasted longer than expected, even the coal ran short. This article examines the measures adopted by the authorities to secure the supply of energy for the military, the war economy and households. On the one hand, the authorities relied on the syndicated marketing organization of the coal cartels. On the other hand, the Prussian state was itself a major coal producer in the Ruhr which was not part of the Ruhr Coal Syndicate and competed with the cartelized privately owned mining companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State intervention was characteristic of most industries after the outbreak of WWI. This contribution draws attention to the contractual effects of state intervention in the coal industries of Germany and the Netherlands. While Germany, foremost with the Coal Syndicate, was an exporter of coal, the Netherlands were traditionally dependent on German coal imports. Although both states intervened in the structure of their coal industries, the outcomes of intervention were unexpected and clearly deviated from the objectives defined by the states. As a result, the close relationship between the Coal-Syndicate and its Dutch Trading Association allowed advantages to be taken from state intervention in terms of their own profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from a February 12-13, 2015 conference in Roubaix, France on the economic history of World War I hosted by the Politiques économiques et vie des entreprises pendant la Première Guerre mondiale economic history society. Topics of presentations delivered included the history of French corporations and businesses during the war, the history of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlensyndikat German coal cartel, and the history of the textile industry employers' society in Armentières, France.

The article investigates the takeover of the Gewerkschaft Sophia Jacoba (GSJ) coal mining company in Hückelhoven, Germany, by the Dutch coal trading and redistribution company Steenkolen-Handelsvereeinging (SHV) in 1917. The author outlines the organization of the European coal industry before World War I, emphasizing the role of cartels and the problems of SHV to invest in GSJ against the wishes of its parent, the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat (Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, RWKS), as well as the loosening of these restrictions during the war. She discusses SHV's investment, diversification, and risk management strategies. The German-Dutch Credit Treaty of 1920 is also addressed.

This article focuses on the changes made to the business strategy of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG (Vestag), a German company that produced steel, iron, and black coal during the time that Germany was ruled by the National Socialist (Nazi) Party in the early 20th century. Topics discussed include how private businesses were controlled by the Nazi government, how Vestag was founded through a business merger between the majority of the steel and coal mining companies in Germany during the 1920s, and how the company was controlled, restructured, and consolidated by the Nazi government until a different conglomerate, the Reichswerke, was started by the Nazi official Herman Göring in 1937.

The article presents information about the relations between German entrepreneur Hermann D. Krages and West German business elite networks. Descriptions are given of Krages' activities as a yield-oriented financial investor, his involvement in stock market aspects of the West German coal industry, and his conflict with the German banking corporation Dresdner Bank AG. The author suggests that Krages can be seen as a pioneer of the shareholder value perspective. Further comments are made concerning Krages' gradual career failure which is attributed to a lack of correspondence with his contemporaries' business styles.

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The article discusses German energy policy particularly with reference to the coal industry. The twenty-year decline in the industry is traced together with rising unemployment in the mining workforce, as well as increasing labor costs in the face of general inflation. The author suggests that raising mining industry wages will exacerbate the unemployment problem.

The article presents information about socio-political developments in West Germany in 1981. Note is taken of the publication of legislative changes for employee participation in the West German coal and steel industry. The development of hospital finance legislation is also described. Additional discussion is given regarding accident insurance for West German students.