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This paper analyzes two acquired language disorders: Broca’s aphasia and Wernicke’s aphasia. It has been commonly suggested that these disorders respectively affect functions related to speech production and language comprehension and they have been understood to result from two specific types of brain lesions: Broca’s aphasia from lesions in the third left frontal convolution; Wernicke’s aphasia from lesions in the posterior section of the left superior temporal gyrus. For this reason, these cerebral regions, also known as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, have long been viewed as the neuroanatomical correlates of language production and comprehension. This paper shows that in light of current research: (a) with regard to language disorders, it is no longer possible to conceive of Broca’s and Wernicke's aphasias as unitary disorders; (b) with regard to the cerebral localization of linguistic functions, it no longer possible to suggest that Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas are the only regions involved in speech production and comprehension.

When trying to give a universal definition to the term “neurophilosophy,” difficulties arise, since each researcher who identifies himself as a member of this field sets his own definition. The common thing for the work of “neurophilosophers” can be described as an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account the achievements in the field of consciousness research of both philosophical thought and neuroscience. How this approach is implemented and what it represents depends on the particular researcher. This article focuses on Georg Northoff's neurophilosophical approach. For a long time Northoff has been developing a project of neurophilosophy, the distinguishing feature of which is its nonreductive nature: Northoff does not reduce consciousness to the brain but develops a special method that allows philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience to investigate the problems of consciousness and the brain in an integrated way. The article discusses the philosophical foundations of brain research that Nortoff provides, as well as the role of process ontology for the study of consciousness and the brain. In addition, the empirical studies of brain activity with which Northoff illustrates his philosophical claims are presented. The paper also identifies the philosophical significance of the brain-body-environment connection for the emergence of the processual self in Northoff's theory. At the same time, Northoff does not engage in a search for a solution to the consciousness-brain problem and, in particular, the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, he seeks to question and dissolve the problem while questioning its premises. Northoff argues that philosophers of consciousness refer to studies of particular areas and aspects of the brain to construct their theories, whereas to solve the problems of consciousness it is necessary to consider the brain holistically, as represented in neuroscientific research.

Neuro-ethics is probably fastest growing part of applied ethics. The main thesis is that certain natural processes in brain and nerves produce certain moral, and immoral, behaviors. All these processes can be explained causally, and (if this is so) neuro-ethics might be the final result of neuroscience. There are some metaphysical and ethical pitfalls to be considered, however, like the (incorrect) conflation of causal explanation and rational justification in definingvalues, not only non-moral values but moral values as well. Certainly, the knowledge of how neurological processes function could help to enhance the quality of human life, not only in coping with defects but also in improving the so-called „normal life“. This implies that neuroethics is instrumental, dealing with values which are instrumental as well. However, neuroethics, it seems, aspires to go further than that: to explain how goals come into existence and what their articulation should look like. All of this should be causally explained, or at least explainable; and the main focus of the paper is an analysis of this aspiration. The analysis refers to some important distinctions like the distinction between causes and reasons, explanation and justification, or the one between means and ends. At the end of the paper there is a section about applications, where some of the benefits and risks are summarily indicated, with a conclusion that neuroethics surely might help in advancing the overall quality of human life, individual and social.

A Neuroscientific Exploration of Post-Traumatic Dissociation and its Relevance for an Ethics of Psychotherapy - The first part of the paper presents two hypotheses linking dissociation to traumatic experiences: the idea that the link is an intrapsychic defensive process protecting an individual from the mental pain of traumatic memories, and the idea that traumatic experiences and memories directly disintegrate higher mental processes. The second part of the paper summarizes the findings of an ongoing research program assessing cortical connectivity (EEG coherence) in a situation of rehearsal of childhood cumulative traumas in the context of attachment relationships. These findings seem to support the hypothesis of a direct, non-defensive, dissociative influence of traumatic memories on cortical connectivity. This leads to a discussion on the possibility for neuroscientific contributions to the ethics of psychotherapy.

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A theory of personal identity is a theory about what makes some person P2 at a time T2 the same person as some person P1 at an earlier time T1. Most contemporary theories are “complex theories”. Complex theories hold that the identity of two persons depends on a certain degree of “continuity” or “connectedness” between the two persons of one or more features – P2 having some of P1’s body or brain, and/or being able to remember some of the experiences of P1. All these theories are open to the arbitrariness objection – that any such theory has to state exactly what degree of the relevant feature would make P2 the same as P1, and the choice of any particular value for that degree would be entirely arbitrary. To meet this objection complex theories have to claim that being the same person as P1 is a matter of degree. But such “partial identity theories” are open to the objection that they have the consequence that more than one later person could be partly identical to P1, a consequence that cannot be spelled out coherently. It follows that either P2 is fully identical to P1, or P2 is not at all identical to P1, and so leads to the “simple theory” of personal identity, that personal identity cannot be analysed in terms of features of which there can be different degrees. But there must be a difference between a person at T2 who is P1 and one who is not P1. And so the paper concludes that P2 is identical to P1 if they both have the same indivisible non-physical part, that is the same soul; but otherwise they are not the same. What makes a person who they are is their soul.

This paper aims at showing the heuristic value of several semiotic models in scientific research, and in particular the neurosciences. In Greimas and Lotman’s theories, for example, we find effective and operationalized instruments that could help us address some of the most difficult problems related to the mind, consciousness, and the origin of semiosis and languages. In this way, certain scientific discoveries in the neurosciences seem to gain coherence in the light of complex systems theories and integrated information models. The emerging concept is a view of “extended mind” in which human consciousness requires an inter-subjective mode for its construction and functioning.

Assuming that there is a "neuroscientific turn" in moral philosophy, I will be discussing in this paper how neurophilosophy could shed light on the normative problems raised by a naturalistic project of ethical and social research, particularly related to the question of the articulation between the biological evolution of human species and the social and historical evolution of society and social groups. Taking a critical approach to naturalism and normative theories, I argue that there is a neurophenomenological deficit in naturalism (particularly in the versions of naturalism that follow the program of a naturalized epistemology) and in the normative theories (particularly in the critical theory) and I put forward a version of social constructivism that combines the neuroscientific and neurophilosophical models of Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz.

Libet’s experimental setting has been criticized at length ever since its first appearance, under both methodological and empirical aspects. In this paper, the attention will be driven on a neglected underpinning theme which has not yet been investigated, central for the economy of the argument: the time of choices. The pivotal role played by mental chronometry at the beginning of psychology and neurophysiology will be pointed out, and how the lack of a proper definition of time affected the course of the following research on the subject. The Aristotelian definition of time will be considered in order to cast some light upon Libet’s empirical findings.

Planet of the Apes: A Critical Examination of Raymond Tallis’ Idea of “Neuromania” and “Darwinitis” - This paper presents a critical examination of Raymond Tallis’ Aping Mankind. Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity. The main themes are summarized and briefly discussed. Tallis presents some of the most extreme reductionist interpretations of contemporary neurosciences, and labels them “neuromania” and “darwinitis”. He proposes instead a non-reductionist philosophical naturalism, one that, according to him, is able to value the latest scientific achievements, without reducing the importance of other humanistic branches of knowledge.

Emotional Developmental Disorders: The Case of Alexithymia and Self-harm. From Psychological and Neuroscientific Research to Psychotherapy - The paper examines the contribution that psychological and neuroscientific research on emotional developmental problems may offer for psychotherapy. Alexithymia – i.e. the inability to recognize and express one’s own emotions – and self-harm in adolescence are considered as examples of emotional problems. Starting from this analysis, we address some currently debated theoretical and methodological issues in psychotherapy.

Love and the Neurosciences - In my paper I take on two tasks. First, I examine some recent publications which take a largely neuroscientific perspective on the topic of “love”. My purpose here is to highlight and discuss some problems with the arguments presented. Second, I shed some light on presuppositions that, often tacitly, influence neuroscientific approaches and bias conclusions. The question I would like to finally address is what is the meaning of love, and how can we make sense of this fundamental human experience, if we identify it with mere brain states.

Neuroethics: The Birth of a New Kind of Anthropology? - This paper proposes a view according to which the specific field of neuroethics is conceived as an exploration of what we learn about ourselves and our “functioning” thanks mainly (but not exclusively) to neuroscience. In other words, neuroethics proposes a new kind of anthropology dealing with the intersection of various disciplines (cognitive neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, law...) which becomes ever more pertinent in current debates due to the strong naturalization of research concerning the human beings. The subject of study – in light of its new and controversial features – would thus not be what we can do, but what we know or reliably think we know.