Since the very beginning of his accession to the throne in June, 1888, German emperor William II strived to develop Germany’s naval potential, as an integral element of so called “world policy” Weltpolitik. He regarded the transition of the German Reich into a full-scale naval great power as one of the crucial aims of his reign. In his eyes a new fleet should perform many important tasks such as improving Germany’s international position and appeal as a potential ally. This would widen its freedom of movement and help gain new colonial acquisitions. In addition, a German fleet was needed to protect her growing overseas trade and defend communication lines with German colonies. The pride of a new, powerful navy should also help to establish a real unification of German society and to fight back the socialist influence within the working-class, which challenged the existing political and social status quo. In economic terms, this largescale naval armament program should improve Germany’s economic situation, acting as an important catalyst for developing branches of modern industry and for boosting employment. To convince German public opinion of the necessity of naval armaments, the German government started a huge, unprecedented, modern PR-campaign. A key figure of the whole project was Admiral Alfred Tirpitz, nominated in 1897 to the post of State Secretary of the Naval Office. Tirpitz framed the conception of “the risk fleet”. In his opinion Germany should possess a fleet so strong that it would discourage potential aggressor. Mainly, thanks to his efforts in 1898, the German parliament voted in favor of a naval bill. In the following years, until 1912, this law was amended four times. The aspirations of this project were quashed. Instead of strengthening the German international position among the great powers, this program lead to the isolation of Germany among them. Especially, the British politicians and British public opinion were convinced that the German battle fleet stationed permanently in home waters within striking distance of their islands could have only one meaning, namely that such a fleet was built to challenge British naval supremacy and prepare the way for the eventual German invasion. Great Britain was keen to maintain her naval preponderance, which it regarded as indispensable for defending the British Islands and maintaining its vast overseas empire. In vain they tried to work out a compromise with Germans on that issue. But William II was determined to not allow any foreign intrusion in his naval-building program. The last attempt of finding a compromise was the failed mission to Germany of lord Richard Haldane at the beginning of 1912. Thus Great Britain seemed to have no choice but to try to tighten political and military relations with countries regarded, until now, as potential enemies, namely France and Russia. The cost of the program weighed down the German state budget, thus necessitating financial reform and new taxes. During the First World War, the German battleship fleet did not play a substantial role in military operations and after the war was handed over to the victorious allies.