The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the attendant end of the Cold War neither led to the "End of History" nor to an acceleration of the „Clash of Civilizations" as some political scientists have prophesised. On the contrary, relations between Russia and Iran after 1991 have been further proof that national security policies are of greater importance than religious affiliation or the ideological interests of incumbent governments. As a consequence, there has been no clash of religious or "cultural/civilization" clash between "Islamic fundamentalist" Iran and the newly „democratic" Russia. The opposite is true: the two countries became friendlier in reaction to the dominance of the USA and its unilateralist concept of politics. Although German political scientists have studied Russia's relations to Europe, the USA and the post-Soviet region, there have been no analyses of Moscow's current policies concerning the Near and the Middle East. This essay attempts to close this gap, at least as far as Iran is concerned. The new Russia inherited volatile and complicated relations with Iran and immediately had to block Teheran's political interference in Tajikistan. Iran tried to install a pro-Iranian sharia state in the Pamir Republic. While the civil war was at its height, secret negotiations were held between Moscow and Iran in 1993 and 1994. Moscow's aim was to ensure that the pro-Russia government of President Rachmonov remained in power in Tajikistan. When in 1996 the Taliban, assisted by Pakistan and with the understanding of the USA, managed to seize control of Afghanistan, Iran and Russia settled their dispute over Tajikistan. In the years that followed the two states even developed friendlier relations which included cooperation in trade and military technology. In return, Iran agreed to support Russia's Caucasus policies during the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over Nogorno-Karabach and to forego the chance to interfere in the Chechen conflict. In central Asia too, Russia was able to pursue its policies unhindered. If this had not been the case, Teheran would have had to deal with the presence of the USA and its NATO allies in the area. One of the concrete results of the closer relations fostered by Russia and Iran was the building of the Bushehr Atomic Power station against the will of the USA. For a long time the political classes in Moscow were undecided whether to support USA's anti-Iran policies. They argued that the USA had also done nothing to prevent Pakistan's atomic ambitions. On the other hand, security experts in Russia feared that Iran in possession of atomic power could threaten the whole geo-political area including Russia. As a consequence, Moscow did not supply Iran with any technology for building atomic weapons. Since Iran began to intensify its efforts to possess weapons of mass destruction, however, there has been a continuous cat and mouse game between Teheran and the IAEA, Russia and the USA. In November 2005, the crisis worsened when Teheran rejected Russia's compromise for the founding of a joint Uranium enrichment enterprise in Russia. So insulted was Moscow that it voted with the USA to inform the UN Security Council about the Iran atomic weapon program. Nevertheless, Russia has still not agreed to levy sanctions against Iran. Although relations between Russia and Iran have not been burdened by the label of being officially a „strategic partnership", they are de facto just that. Iran is the only state in the Middle East to which Russia maintains close military and political relations.… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]