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Copyright of Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on the influence of Brexit on value-added tax (VAT) in Great Britain. Topics discussed include negative aspects of Brexit, ratification of the withdrawal agreement signed by Great Britain, sales tax paid by German companies and Great Britain as the first country who exit from European Commission.

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 1972 the author was a member of the German Bundestag. During this time he had the function as a reporter for the political, social and economic agreements made between West Germany and some Eastern bloc countries. The article demonstrates that there were two main differences compared to normal ratification procedures establishing international treaties. On the one hand the topic was mainly worked out by an agreement between the two involved committees. This took place without any allocation by the plenum of the parliament. The political arrangement was worked out by the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as by the Department of Justice. On the other hand the printed paper of the Bundestag was not designed as a synthesis of the two committee reports, instead both the report by the Department of Justice and the Department of Foreign Affairs were simply added one after the other. This procedure may have led to an additional constitutional review and to the possibility that the President might have to decide over the constitutionality of these papers. The final design of the printed paper was originally worked out for the final vote in the plenum of the parliament. However it can be stated that theses papers were constitutionally permissible. The arguments above give prove that there was no need to fear examination by the Federal President. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Vereinte Nationen is the property of Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European power structure has been in a transformational phase. This new power structure has to find its balance. However, the great winner is the European Parliament through its great gain in power. The author explains, using the example of the European Parliament's INTA Committee, that the European Parliament has evolved from a side actor into a major player in the field of EU foreign relations. New rights and authorising possibilities are clearly presented. But, nonetheless, the author also critically points out that the European Parliament should not miss out on its potential. The Parliament should consider its possibilities in trade policies within the overall context of EU foreign relations and thus provide the EU with greater influence and democratic legitimacy on the world stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on the 2nd of October 2009 was won with an over two thirds majority. Thus, it revised the negative vote one year before. This article examines the debate in the run-up to the polls. Thereby, it follows a discourse-analytical approach which is seldom used in political science and may be seen as complementary to the established methods of election studies. Leaning on Radical Constructivist assumptions, the referendum is regarded less as an electoral act than as an election campaign. The speakers engaged and the essential arguments articulated in the campaign are analysed to test the hypothesis that the economic situation in Ireland can be seen as the main factor to explain the swing of opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Sozialreform is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Sozialreform is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper addresses the problematic issues of the Lisbon Treaty. It starts by highlighting the problems signalled by the failed initial Irish referendum and originating in the controversial constitutional debate in the Union since the nineties. It provides an overview of the initial proposals on solving the crisis and two research projects (devised by Jürgen Schwarze and the Rosmini Institute) on constitutionalism in the EU, as well as the delicate constitutional situation in Germany. Then it moves on to the discussion of the Lisbon Treaty itself, its structure and its most notable modifications of the existing Treaties, and the problems of its ratification as well as reconciliation with national legal systems, focusing on the delicate issue of balancing the competences of the EU and its Member States, and concludes with the implications of the German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty in the summer of 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On June 30, 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon) is compatible with the German Constitution. However, the court called for more participatory rights for both Bundestag and Bundesrat in European Union lawmaking and treaty amendment procedures, other than provided for so far by laws accompanying the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Through the Responsibility for Integration Act (IntVG) the Bundestag has implemented the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. The IntVG contains 25 treaty amendment procedures not requiring ratification. In practice, § 8 IntVG should be the most relevant provision concerning participation of both Bundestag and Bundesrat when the flexibility clause (Art. 352) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The author presents his opinion on the Treaty of Lisbon that was signed on December 13, 2007 and replaces the existing European constitution. He notes that Germany did not ratify the treaty and he explains that the political conditions in Germany would be completely changed as a result of the treaty, rendering the individual states as parts of a whole union state, the European Federal State. He argues for a renewed contract for the European Union.

Media and European politicians are worried about the crisis precipitated by the Irish 'No'. But the current crisis is not only made up of the Irish 'No': the Lisbon Treaty does only overcome some of the unresolved problems of the EU. Particularly the succession of insufficient (Nice Treaty) or failed reforms (Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) gives reason to consider whether the current strategy is a promising one. Many proposals, though, seem to aim only at dealing with the immediate crisis or at improving the image of the EU. Is this really enough? At least critical observers in academia and media should attempt to come up with new ideas. Without developing new perspectives, the EU will not be able to really find a way out of the current crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversial and emotional debate on the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty shows a number of different evaluations and strategies. These do not only provide different suggestions, but also a lot of different analyses of the status quo and the developments of the EU. It thus seems reasonable to integrate the variety of opinions in the following schools of thought: Insisting on the Lisbon Treaty, deepening integration in a core Europe, founding a new Europe, and living with the Nice Treaty. The author analyses and evaluates these schools of thought with regard to their explicit and implicit assumptions, expectations and implications. In view of the many skeptical voices, this article advocates a careful consideration that, in the case of a failure of the Lisbon Treaty, a productive - even if compared to the Lisbon Treaty more arduous - life with the Nice Treaty is possible and perhaps necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Irish 'No' poses a great problem for the EU. On the one hand, the result cannot be ignored, on the other hand, the cooperation of 27 member states and 500 million people cannot be blocked by 862.415 people from one member state. It remains true that the EU is - with the Nice Treaty - not capable of solving the challenges of the 21st century efficiently and effectively. A lot speaks for a second referendum with certain promises and guaranties for Ireland. The debate has to be based, though, on a better understanding of the reasons for the Irish 'No'. To draw consequences of the 'No', measures in communication policy have to be taken and decisions of the EU have to be better suited to the wishes of the people. Furthermore, with regard to the ratification process so far, the ratification method for treaty changes itself has to be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compared to the existing provisions of the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty offers a remarkable potential to improve the EU's role as a global actor in foreign and security policy. Readers might have pains to find their way through a much more complex and partly repetitive contractual basis but the new text opens ways to improve the visibility, continuity and effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The end of the rotating presidency and its replacement by a more permanent and double-hatted 'face and figure' in the form of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, accompanied by an European External Action Service is key hereof. Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of the somewhat re-named 'Common' Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, currently ESDP) will turn out as another important tool to improve ESDP-capabilities of those among the 27 who wish to advance quicker than the others. The Irish 'No' will not only prolong the ratification procedure but might also have negative effects for the solution of a number of institutional details the reform debate has been unable to tackle sufficiently so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France started off its EU Presidency under highly difficult circumstances. For one thing, Paris has set high, maybe too high goals. For another thing, the 'No'-vote of the Irish from the 12th of June 2008 created considerable confusion regarding the further course of the ratification process and the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Initially, both should have been clarified during the French EU Presidency. France has, therefore, to master an EU crisis that resembles the one which the French 'No'-vote of 2005 had provoked. Simultaneously, a lot of decisions have to be prepared in the second half of 2008 that are to be taken in 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reform of the EU is hanging on by a thread since the Irish 'No' to the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008. Of all countries, Germany has now emerged as a country in which ratification could be endangered or at least delayed. The reason for this are two constitutional challenges against the German ratification law to the Lisbon Treaty, which are currently pending at the Federal Constitutional Court. The authors show that the new Treaty is in no way a danger to democracy, as suggested by the constitutional court challenges. Instead, because of the numerous parliament-friendly aspects, it rather deserved to be called 'Treaty of the Parliaments'. The authors explain the many ways in which the Lisbon Treaty is strengthening democracy and parliamentarianism in the EU, thereby paving the way towards a more democratic and participatory Union. Against this background, the constitutional challenges against the Lisbon Treaty are - insofar as they are admissible at all - in any case, evidently unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sozialer Fortschritt is the property of Duncker & Humblot GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Sozialer Fortschritt is the property of Duncker & Humblot GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the concept of a European Constitution, specifically focusing on ratification efforts taking place in 2007. The author focuses on the "definition of Europe" and remarks on the difficulties in creating a Constitution that meets the needs of all of Europe's member countries. In addition, he discusses how Christianity and European Christian value systems have influenced the writing of the Constitution and discusses how the European Union (EU) has made efforts to expand its policies and integrate other values, as exemplified by its inclusion of Turkey to the EU.

Germany takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the twelfth time in 2007. The presidency will find that its tasks largely consist in the preliminary and ongoing work of the EU bodies and will not be able to choose for itself. On the example of the conflict about the future of the European Constitutional Treaty it is clear that the presidency will be shaped by a dependency on paths which are already being pursued. But because path dependency plays so great a role in an institution as large and complex as the EU, with its 27 members, it is a matter of using every opportunity to shape existing paths and follow new ones. The central problem of the debate which has revived since the beginning of 2006 consists at first glance in dissent concerning how to respond to the stalemate over the Constitutional Treaty and the crisis of the European integration project which lies at the bottom of it. The reason for this lack of purpose and the fact that the various proposals for a remedy are barely systematized or properly considered in relation to one another lies deeper: in the ongoing discussion about the future of the EU none of the protagonists has laid down the political objective of each proposed development path. As a result, a common and graspable measure is lacking on the basis of which the potential for solving the problems and the chances of realizing the various proposals could be measured. At least three criteria present themselves to the German presidency for such a measure: (i) Should an attempt be made to realize the Constitutional Treaty by the agreed time of 2009? If so, it must be asked whether proposals serve the end of concluding the Treaty by the European elections of June 2009 and the beginning of the next term of office of the European Commission. In any case, the heads of state and government are committed to this by the signing of the Treaty. (ii) Should the reasons why the citizens rejected the Treaty and integration in general be addressed? On this basis it must be assessed to what extent reform proposals respond to the concerns of those who rejected the Treaty in France and the Netherlands or who could reject the Treaty in countries in which ratification is still to come. (iii) Finally, should an attempt be made to achieve the reform goals laid down in the Treaty? In accordance with the mandate of the Constitutional Convention and the intergovernmental conference laid down in the Nice Treaty, and more in detail at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001 all reform proposals can be assessed on the basis of how far they meet the requirements of this mandate. The mandate encompassed an adaptation of the EU to enlargement - which took place in May 2005 - a delimitation of competencies between the EU and the member states, clarification of the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a definition of the role of national parliaments in the EU, and simplification of the Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty can be regarded as fulfilling this mandate. As a result, evaluation in accordance with this third measure can bring the various reform proposals face to face with the existing answers of the Constitutional Treaty. These test measures allow a transparent evaluation of possible reform paths. Above all in the political debate of an increasingly complex community like the EU the actors should make their goals and standards transparent in order to enable their fellow actors to see what problems they want to solve and what conceptual prerogatives and political interests they conceal. The German government wishes to rescue the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. If one defines this substance as the sum of all innovations in the text of the Treaty in comparison with the existing treaties Germany will have to give priority to the options of amending or abridging the Treaty in preference to complete renegotiation.… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The preamble and founding articles of the Maastricht treaty establishing the European Union are presented. Citations concerning membership, economic and social goals, and treaty ratification are given. Specific goals touch on workers rights, non-discrimination in employment on the basis of gender, and social security guarantees.

In this comment, the author strongly urges the German government to sign and ratify the 2008 Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although the Protocol, which includes inter alia an individual complain procedure, has been open for signature and ratification since September 2009, the government has still not moved towards ratification. The author gives six reasons why Germany should no longer delay ratification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]