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In 1904, the last January issue of the newspaper “Moskoskiye vedomosti” carried an article by Alexey I. Vvedensky, philosopher and theologian, Professor of the Moscow Theological Academy, entitled “The Great Rationalist. On the Centenary of Kant’s Death”. Although the publication could hardly be called unique for its time, as many Russian philosophers and journalists commented on this date, the article merits attention because of the way it represents Kant, and the fact that it sheds light on Vvedensky’s attitudes toward Kantian philosophy. Alexey Vvedensky is to this day a little-known figure in the history of Russian philosophy, such that I thought it would be helpful to preface the publication with a review of the landmarks in the Russian philosopher’s intellectual biography. I go on to demonstrate the ambivalent character of Vvedensky’s attitudes toward Kant’s philosophy. To this end, I show that the Russian philosopher, on one hand, calls for a “return to the universally acclaimed Kant”, whose genius he unreservedly recognises; and on the other hand, he argues that Kant should not only be studied and profoundly reflected on, but also overcome because his rationalism “has desiccated the thought of the new cultured humanity”.

The article focuses on the crisis faced by liberalism and the open society ideal, which are increasingly influenced by scandalization, emotionalization, and moralization rather than rational arguments and critical thinking. Topics include the foundational principles of Critical Rationalism and Pure Theory of Law, the historical and ideological contexts within which these theories developed, and the significant contributions of key figures like Hans Kelsen, Karl Popper, and Hans Albert.

This paper analyzes the theory of Islam as a religion that could have formed a rationalistic civilization, based on scientific progress, individualism and democracy. One of the representative studies on this topic is the work of Mustafa Akyol Reopening of Muslim Minds, in which the author uses the method of counterfactual analysis, posing the fundamental question: what would Islamic civilization look like if in the Sunni majority had not prevailed Ash’ari theology, but rationalistic, Mu’tazili theology? Although it could be said that the author of this study does not err when he concludes that Ash’ari occasionalism stopped the development of science in Islam, he nevertheless errs when he claims that the doctrines of voluntarism, predestination, and uncreatedness of the Qur’an, were generators of injustice in Islamic society. In this paper we tried to analyze the metaphysical foundations of these doctrines, re-examine the validity of the hypothesis about their harmfulness, and re-examine whether the observed harmful effects come from Islamic tradition or from the more recent attempts of modernization of Islam.

Walter Benjamin called Felix Noeggerath (1885-1960) the “universal genius” or simply “genius.” In his 1916 treatise “Synthesis and the Concept of System in Philosophy,” Noeggerath offered a reading of Kant’s concept of synthesis in an original and radical manner. He dares to confront thought with the incommensurability of atheoretical Being. The linkage between logic and incommensurability is what he calls rationalism. In contradiction to this claim, any attempt to exclude atheoretical Being from the realm of logic is anti-rationalism. Noeggerath elaborates on this in a penetrating discussion and modification of epistemological positions, especially those of the Marburg School and Hermann Cohen. Noeggerath constructs a notion of the philosophical system with the help of Kant’s three tables of transcendental judgements, categories, and principles in the Critique of Pure Reason. Each of these tables is known to contain 12 individual elements in four groups of three each. For the systematic division, the third group under the title “Relation” is decisive. Noeggerath assigns one systemic part to each kind of relation: “For it is to be connected: the categorical relation with ethics, the hypothetical with logic, and the disjunctive with aesthetics.” As a result the classical sequence, beginning with logic, is changed. “The order of the limbs is: a) ethics, b) logic, c) aesthetics.” In Noeggerath’s logical outline, specific mathematical concepts of meta-geometry play a decisive role. According to him, philosophy can resemble their preciseness in building a viable concept of the infinite. The prerequisite is that philosophy does not itself behave mathematically but proceeds along its own path in critical distance to the “specialized, act-kindred thinking” of the mathematician.

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Cultural Poetics / KulturPoetik: Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichtliche Literaturwissenschaft is the property of Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In its 2018 publication, Come On! the Club of Rome advocates the need for a New Enlightenment. It associates Kant with an Old Enlightenment that favours (i) individualism, (ii) rationalism and in general (iii) a lack of balance between different elements such as reason and feelings. In this discussion note, I argue — based on Kant’s theoretical as well as practical philosophies — that the charges are not properly levelled at Kant. (i) In finding truth as well as what is morally right, Kant advocates abstracting from private ends and testing one’s views against the views of others. (ii) Kant also points out the limits of what we can know rationally; (iii) and in theoretical as well as practical cognition, he emphasises that we need both: reason and sensibility.

This contribution aims to present the different philosophical interpretations of Descartes and Cartesian philosophies in the 17th century within the Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Studies on Descartes and Cartesian philosophies profoundly influenced the scientific orientations of the Revue by promoting the encounter between historical-philosophical and epistemological research. By reconstructing a century of Cartesian interpretations in the Revue, from the 1930s to the present day, the contribution examines the link between the universality of philosophical ideas and the analysis of texts, between the history of ideas and the history of philosophical systems.

This historically oriented study is dedicated to the German naturalist, mathematician and philosopher Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708) and aims to introduce his main philosophical-logical work, Medicina mentis. After a biographical overview, from which important connections emerge, the article sets out and comments upon his four empirical principles, which provide an overview of the philosophical theory of knowledge. The key theme of his main work is the art of invention (ars inveniendi) and the concept of science as applied algebra, which was an obvious influence on Tschirnhaus’s epistemology and logic. The thinking of this philosopher engages with the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Geulincx and Gassendi, with which – like Leibniz – he tries to harmonize. Although Tschirnhaus’s approach is in many regards dependent on other thinkers, he stands out for his appreciation of the controlled imagination in science and experimentation. The four empirical principles, then, emphasize inner experience and an a posteriori approach.

Hermann Cohen, as it is well known, criticised the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. And before him the Kantian thing-in-itself was criticised by Fichte and other German idealists. Probably for this reason, Hermann Cohen is sometimes regarded as a person who said things similar to Fichte. This gives a completely wrong perspective, making it impossible to understand the philosopher's ideas. The basis for his critique of the Kantian thing-in-itself is quite different from the motives, determining the criticism of Kant in the classical German Idealism. Such interpretation does not allow to see close connection of Cohen's theoretical philosophy with revolution in physics which took place at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The article explains how Cohen's demand that pure thinking must form its own content is connected with transformations taking place in physics and mathematics, and the peculiarity of Cohen's understanding of idealism is demonstrated: for him, correct idealism must realize that autonomous, free thinking should work seriously with sense data. The closeness of Cohen's ideas to the postpositivist thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is explained. For Cohen, serious work with sense data is opposite to uncritical acceptance of them as given. The origin of scientific thinking is thinking itself. It responds to the challenge of sensory material by creating its own constructs. Mathematized natural science becomes for Cohen both an example and a confirmation of this thesis. For him, what is real is what is described in the language of mathematical analysis, i.e. continuous processes, in spite of the fact that any data are discrete. It is shown that the source of Cohen's assertions on this issue is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, namely in the doctrine of the Principles of pure natural science and, more specifically, in the Anticipations of Perception. Cohen's conviction of the constructive character of the theories of mathematized natural science is confirmed in the article by references to the authority of A. Einstein.

Karl Jaspers received much attention in the interwar period as the founder of a new philosophy of existence that, however, was – in tandem with his psychological training, focus on “borderline situations” of human experience, and critique of philosophical systems – often misinterpreted as a form of subjectivism or irrationalism. The study presented here strives to depict the substance of Jaspers’ use of the philosophy of existence for a new reconstruction of human rationality, of the universal characteristics of humanity. Understanding these characteristics shall, in his estimation, help us to resist the degradation of human dignity in modern totalitarianism and in the global economic-technological system, in which the values of humanity, as defined by Jaspers’ philosophy, have ceased being decisive criteria. The study presents Jaspers’ anchoring of existence in the relationship to transcendence and of individuality in the communication with others, as well as his critique of monistic thinking, which in his philosophical conception does not allow for plurality.

Copyright of Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts und Unternehmensethik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Today Church faces the issues of secularism and rationalism. In this era, one is al-lowed to believe, to be interested in metaphysics, just as one is free to engage sciences. Besides traditionalist approach to faith, the existential approach has also been pushed into shadows and reserved only for those who deal with theology or philosophy, i.e. for those who are interested in more then conventional understanding of faith. This opens up the question of dogma. How does a modern human understand dogmas of the Church and does he/she understand them at all? Is there knowledge of dogmas, ecclesiology, and conscience of belonging to Church outside traditionalist, ethical, and ritualistic approach to faith? Why does not anyone speak of dogmas except ex cathedra? Why ecclesiological approach to faith does not exist? Are dogmas some truths sealed with ‘seven seals’, can they be lived, or are they in the domain of imaginary and abstract? How to explain the meaning of dogma to modern human? These are some questions that are dealt with in this paper.

Philosophical interests of Joseph Życiński (1948-2011) in the domain of the philosophy of science were focused on the debate concerning the nature of science and philosophy of science that followed the Einstein-Planck revolution in science. The unexpected discovery of the philosophical, extra-scientific presuppositions in science, as well as of the extra-rational factors determining the way these presuppositions are accepted in science were to be explained within the meta-scientific framework. It is the aim of this paper to present ˙ Życiński’s diagnosis of this post-revolutionary situation in the philosophy of science as well as his critique of the metascientific answers to this challenge. The reasons will be given why all those answers are put under two dichotomous rubrics of internalism and externalism. It will be also explained how Życiński intends to supersede this false in his opinion opposition with a new concept of the doxatic rationality. However, the details of the metascientific proposal of Życiński will be given only in the subsequent paper. In order to perform the aim of the paper the metatheoretic tools set out by Popper (1979) will be used.

"The project for Villa Borsotti, whose construction ended in 1932, is the result of a collaboration between the architect Umberto Cuzzi and the artist Gigi Chessa, who built this small house at the edge of the village of Balme in Val d’Ala di Lanzo, in the area surrounding Turin. The essay focuses on the genesis of the project, with reference to the cultural and professional context within which the protagonists have worked. In terms of the relationship between the external aspect and its location in the Alpine context, the building seems to be characterized by the presence of two apparently opposite tendencies. On the one hand, the building looks for a contextualization in the mountain landscape through the declination in local key of a rationalist language, with a modern use of local dialect, composed of “lemmas” from the Alpine building tradition (stone masonry, wooden infill, bipartition between stone basement and wooden upper floor, etc.). At the same time, thanks to the bending configuration of the plan and the ribbon window, the surrounding environment also “enters” the house and becomes an integral part of it. On the other, the house seems to pursue the effect of alienation from the context through the conscious research of a formal autonomy with which the object “lands” in the natural framework of the valley. Another interesting trait of the house is the treatment of interiors according to the idea of configuring a wrap-around environment in which architecture and interior design are strongly intertwined."

"The country house that Adolf Loos designed for Paul Khuner in Payerbach represents one of his most brilliant achievements, complementary to the more famous Villa Müller in Prague. These two buildings, both completed in 1930, constitute a sort of legacy summarizing Loos’ visions and architectural principles. The country house is particularly significant in regard to the apparently contradictory relationship between modernity and tradition. Furthermore, the building reveals a quieter approach to the Raumplan, thanks to the adoption of a clear typological figure: the double-height central space with an upper-level distribution gallery. In this work, Loos applies the principles presented in his seminal text “Architecture”, where he criticized the incapacity of a villa designed by an architect of integrating the idyllic and peaceful character of a mountain valley. In this perspective, the Khuner house was a unique occasion for Loos to build in a completely new context, far away from the typical urban situations where he was accustomed to working. The pitched roof, the wooden construction and the general shape of the building are alien to Loos’ ideas. Nevertheless, they are so carefully defined and their integration in the landscape is so calm that one could have the impression of looking at a traditional mountain building. Upon careful observation, one discovers that many elements do not correspond to a vernacular vocabulary, but rather produce a series of slight dissimilarities that demonstrate how modernity can affirm its values in a discreet way."

The central place of Danilo Kiš’s novel Hourglass, which is a kind of an illness/disease narrative (écriture patografique), is occupied by the human condition as an animal rationale. It was one of the subjects raised by many intellectuals, including Edmund Husserl, whose name does not appear here accidentally. Phenomenology was a strong intellectual impetus for the authors of the new French novel. Although in his statements Kiš resolutely distanced himself from any connections with him, emphasizing the documentary, auto/biographical character of his work, in this article I point to the existent (albeit unintended) connections between Kiš’s novel and the literary views of his French colleagues.

The overall goal of the article is to reexamine Hobbes’s concern to respond to the challenges of the republican perspective on the relationship between the liberty of subjects and the political power. If, according to Skinner, republican theorists appealed to sources of classical antiquity, I argue that Hobbes chooses to offer a blend of classical and theological ideas in order to generate a “science” of the political life within the confines of a postlapsarian world dominated by passion and the fear of death. If the image of God is maintained in the Hobbesian politics, it is because Hobbes needed a model of imitation of a stability that the individuals dominated by passions failed too often to have. Hobbes also needed a model of omnipotence and providence to be imitated by the sovereign. This complex relationship between the theological heritage of the past and the novelties inaugurated in political thought by Hobbes’s accent on human passions triggers a series of changes in Hobbes’s understanding of the law of nature and natural right. The article brings to discussion Hobbes’s indebtedness to Lactantius in reading Lucretius’s materialism, Augustine’s model of God as a Creator and the theological controversy between intellectualism and voluntarism when formulating his own anthropological perspective on “natural” and “civil” law and right.

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The International Year of Chemistry (2011), intertwined with commemoration of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry awarded in 1911 to Marie Skłodowska-Curie, made me to ask about the philosophical background of this outstanding woman. The first factor which I could see was the positivism, launched by August Comte in France and developed a few decades later by his Polish followers. Another factor which seemed to me important was the interplay between the emotional (romantic) and intellectual (positivistic) attitudes among the Poles in the 19th century. In her research, Marie Skłodowska-Curie used the positivistic, rationalistic method. This has led her (jointly with her husband Pierre Curie) to elucidation of the radiation phenomena discovered by Henri Becquerel in 1896. The research initiated by the Curies (rewarded by the half of the Nobel Prize in Physics 1903) caused a subversion of the 19th century’s views on the structure of Matter. The way to such spectacular results must have been paved not only by the positivistic intellectual discipline but also by a dose of romantic enchantment. In the applicative terms, Marie Skłodowska-Curie became a pioneer of the evidence-based medicine. In moral terms, she represented a rare example of the practical altruism, inspired indirectly by Christianity, and directly by the Comte’s “religion of Humanity”.

The article broaches the issue of Kant’s claim of the enlightenment of the philosophizing subject by tracing his criticism of philosophical enthusiasm (“Schwärmerei”). For Kant intellectual intuition (“intellektuelle Anschauung”) serves in case of philosophical enthusiasm as a reason for the justification of philosophical knowledge. This determination is a threat for his project of enlightenment, because it entices the philosophizing subject to contradict the maxim of self-thinking. In order to show the link between Kant’s criticism of the concept of intellectual intuition and his claim of the enlightenment of the philosophizing subject, the article gives an analysis of Kant’s usage of the concepts ‘intellectual intuition’ and ‘enthusiasm’ in his critical works. Subsequently Kant’s criticism of the philosophical enthusiasm is rendered more precisely in the context of his criticism of the philosophers of intuition (“Philosophen der Anschauung”) and his criticism of rationalistic metaphysics. Both positions refer — explicitly or implicitly — to intellectual intuition in order to justify philosophical knowledge. As the concept of intellectual intuition is invalid for Kant but central for enthusiastic philosophical positions, philosophical enthusiasm is not merely a threat for his project of enlightenment — it is the ‘death of all philosophy’ (“Tod aller Philosophie”).