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This paper aims to consider a series of politico-symbolic aspects in a specific politicized dystopia of the twentieth century: Lord of the Flies (1954) by William Golding (1911–1993). This analysis is paired with a brief overview of the relationship between utopian fictions and politics.

The intellectual property theory of Kenneth E. Himma aims to vindicate natural rights to the "intellectual content of creations", which is believed to consist of abstract objects. Himma proposes a reformulation of John Locke's well-known argument in terms of value. He maintains that even if abstract objects preexist their alleged creation, then they are not yet ready for consumption until the access to them is provided by the labor of innovators and artists. He declares that making them available is an act of value creation that justifies granting intellectual property rights. In this paper several assumptions on which Himma's theory relies are identified and challenged. Against his claims, it is argued that no human labor can improve the availability of abstract objects. It is then demonstrated that "intellectual commons" cannot be "stocked" by human activities and that the alleged value creation cannot happen, because the concept of value is inapplicable to abstract objects. This derails Himma's IP justification. Finally the meaning of rights envisaged by Himma is investigated. It is shown that they cannot be exercised with respect to causally inert entities.

Locke’un Hükümet Üzerine İki İnceleme adlı eserindeki; iktidarın kaynağının toplum olduğuna dair toplum sözleşmesi hipotezi ve bu hipotezi açıklarken oluşturduğu ihtilal teorisi, insan haklarının(tabii hukukun) yıllar süren mücadelesinin zafere ulaşmasına büyük katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu hipoteze göre Locke’un tabiat halindeki insanı; sosyal, ahlaklı ve akıl yoluyla kavradığı tabiat kanunlarının güdümünde, barış içinde yaşayan insandır. Devletleşmemiş bu nitelikteki insan topluluğu, kısmi çatışmalar ile bozulan barışın yani insanların tabii hukuka uymalarının teminatı ve cezalandırmanın kurumsallaştırılması amacıyla, toplum sözleşmesinin neticesinde devleti oluşturmuştur. İnsanlar devleti kurarken yalnızca cezalandırma yetkisini devlete devretmiş, tabii haklarını ise saklı tutmuşlardır. Tarihi gerçekler, Locke’un tabiat haline dair düşüncelerini kanıtlar niteliktedir. Lakin toplum sözleşmesi açısından, bazı istisnalar hariç aynı kanıya varmak mümkün değildir. Tabiat hali ve toplum sözleşmesinin günümüzdeki benzerleri uluslararası insan hakları metinleri ve yeni kurulan devletlerin kurucu anayasalarıdır. Locke’a göre sonraki insanlar, atalarının devleti kurarken yaptıkları toplum sözleşmesi ile bağlı tutulamazlar. Ancak açık olarak toplum sözleşmesine rızasını açıklayan kişiler, devletin uyrukluğundan çıkamayacaklardır. Modern dünyada ise toplum sözleşmesini reddederek tabiat haline dönüş mümkün görünmemektedir. Locke’un “olması gereken” devleti; kuvvetler ayrılığına ve genel iradeye dayanan, çoğunlukçu demokrasiye sahip, liberal bir hukuk devletidir. Locke’a göre tabii hakların tamamen devredildiği despotik iktidarlar, rızai iktidar olamayacaklarından meşru da değillerdir ve bunlara direnmek insanlık için bir ödevdir.

Usually, the interpreters of Hobbes and Locke have discussed the two systems of political philosophy from the perspective of liberal political doctrine, meaning the opposition between unliberal absolute monarchy, which Hobbes promotes, and liberal parliamentary democracy, asserted by Locke. However, some interpreters have pointed out that, beyond the political matter, the two philosophies are first grounded in the culture of the 17th century and in the structure of English society. From this point of view, even Hobbes would keep in his concept of state of nature certain schemes of social behavior, which will allow him to reinvent society. Therefore, Hobbes’s man is the representative of a special type of society that Macpherson calls „possessive market society”. I analyze the implications of this hypothesis on the problem of moral and political obligation in Hobbes, with respect to those conventions which are called social mores. The status of mores is ambiguous in Hobbes, since they depend to a great extent on conventions and they do not have any direct link to natural law; on the other hand, they can be seen as an expression of attitudes and natural interests (civilization being the sum of mechanisms and social rules by means of which people attain their natural purposes). In the absence of sociability, morals cannot be understood in other way.

The comparison between the concept state of nature, as it appears in the contractualist theories of XVII and XVIII centuries, and the original position of the the- ory of justice by John Rawls, reveals the assumptions, difficulties and limitations of the latter. In spite of its claims, the original position does not justify the search and existence of a well ordered society, and it is far away from reach the brightness and coherence with which their predecessors (Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau) argued on behalf of societies where safety, freedom or equality ruled. Besides, Rawls, on amounting justice to a material welfare which must arrive, does not know the important role that the historical memory plays when claiming the resolution of the injustices from the past