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Conferences, meetings and congresses are an important part of today's economic and scientific world. But the environmental impact, especially from greenhouse gas emissions associated with travel, can be extensive. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions account for the warming of the atmosphere and oceans. This study draws on the need to quantify and reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with travel activities and aims to give suggestions for organizers and participants on possible ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, demonstrated on the example of the European Geography Association (EGEA) Annual Congress 2013 in Wasilkow, Poland. The lack of a comprehensive methodology for the estimation of greenhouse gas emissions from travel led to an outline of a methodology that uses geographic information systems (GIS) to calculate travel distances. The calculation of travel distances in GIS is adapted from actual transportation infrastructure, derived from the open-source platform OpenStreetMap. The methodology also aims to assess the possibilities to reduce GHG emissions by choosing different means of transportation and a more central conference location. The results of the participants of the EGEA congress, who shared their travel data for this study, show that the total travel distance adds up to 238 000 km, with average travel distance of 2429 km per participant. The travel activities of the participants in the study result in total GHG emissions of 39 300 kg CO2-eq including both outward and return trip. On average a participant caused GHG emissions of 401 kg CO2-eq. In addition, the analysis of the travel data showed differences in travel behaviour depending on the distance between conference site and point of origin. The findings on travel behaviour have then been used to give an estimation of total greenhouse gas emissions from travel for all participants of the conference, which result in a total amount of 79 711 kg CO2-eq. The potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by substituting short flights with train rides and car rides with bus and train rides is limited. Only 6 % of greenhouse gas emissions could be saved by applying these measures. Further considerable savings could only be made by substituting longer flights (32.6 %) or choosing a more central conference location (26.3 %).

The focus of this paper is on markets for transport infrastructure capacities. Efficient allocation of scarce infrastructure capacities under cost recovery constraints requires the application of adequate pricing instruments. Under increasing returns to scale with respect to the extension of infrastructure capacity optimal congestion fees do not guarantee cost covering of the infrastructure. Therefore, alternative price and quality differentiation mechanisms for access charges are considered based on the social marginal costs of scarce infrastructure capacities. Efficient competition on the markets for transport services requires the non-discriminatory access to the infrastructures for all providers of transport services. The regulatory problem of guaranteeing non-discriminatory access arises, irrespective of whether infrastructure provision is profitable or in deficit. While price level regulation becomes relevant for profitable infrastructures, non-profitable infrastructures have to be ordered by political authorities. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags liegt auf den Märkten für Verkehrsinfrastrukturkapazitäten. Mittels geeigneter Preisinstrumente gilt es, eine effiziente Allokation knapper Infrastrukturkapazitäten sowie die erforderliche Kostendeckung anzustreben. Zunehmende Skalenerträge beim Ausbau einer Verkehrsinfrastruktur führen dazu, dass selbst optimale Staugebühren die Investitionskosten der Verkehrsinfrastruktur nicht decken können. Das Ziel marktkonformer Benutzungsgebühren macht es erforderlich, aufbauend auf den sozialen Grenzkosten der knappen Infrastrukturkapazitäten die Potenziale der Preis- und Qualitätsdifferenzierung auszuschöpfen. Funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb auf den Märkten für Verkehrsleistungen erfordert zudem den diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu den Verkehrsinfrastrukturen für sämtliche aktiven und potenziellen Anbieter von Verkehrsleistungen. Die regulatorische Aufgabe, einen diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu den Verkehrsinfrastrukturen zu gewährleisten, stellt sich unabhängig vom Kostendeckungsgrad. Demgegenüber ist eine Preisniveau-Regulierung der Zugangstarife nur bei profitablen Infrastrukturen erforderlich. Bei defizitären Infrastrukturen stellt sich dagegen das Bestellerproblem der öffentlichen Hand.

Different pricing policy measures exist to improve the environmental accounting of motorised transport modes as well as to finance road infrastructure investment. A CO2 related tax or road pricing are two examples of such measures. This article describes a computable general equilibrium model for Germany that has been developed specially to assess the impact of pricing policy measures introduced within the transportation sector. One outstanding characteristics of the model is the integrated demand for passenger travel differentiated by household types of equivalence-weighted income quartiles and land use characteristics of the residential location. The setup of the model allows the assessment of macroeconomic effects as well as welfare distributional impacts from the introduction of policy measures (e.g. car user road charges) and the subsequent use of the revenues. Zur Verbesserung der Umweltbilanz der Verkehrsträger oder auch zur Finanzierung von Straßeninfrastruktur werden verschiedene preispolitische Maßnahmen wie zum Beispiel die CO2-Steuer oder die Pkw-Maut diskutiert. Um ex-ante-Bewertung von Maßnahmen durchführen zu können, sind geeignete Instrumente der Wirkungsanalyse erforderlich. Gegenstand dieses Artikels ist die Beschreibung eines allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells, das eigens für Deutschland zur Analyse preispolitischer Maßnahmen im Verkehr entwickelt wurde. Eine Besonderheit des Modells ist die integrierte Personenverkehrsnachfrage, differenziert nach Haushaltstypen in Abhängigkeit vom äquivalenzgewichteten Haushaltseinkommen sowie siedlungsstruktureller Wohnlage. Eine derartige Modellerweiterung erlaubt neben der Berechnung von makroökonomischen Folgen der Einführung preislicher Maßnahmen auch die Abschätzung von verteilungspolitischen Effekten der Allokation der im Rahmen der Maßnahme generierten Einnahmen, die zum Beispiel im Sinne einer Kompensation den privaten Haushalten zugeführt werden könnten.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth $90 billion (U.S.), it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether important infrastructure should be built are highly and systematically misleading. The result is continuous cost escalation of billions of dollars. The sample used in the study is the largest of its kind, allowing for the first time statistically valid conclusions regarding questions of cost underestimation and escalation for different project types, different geographical regions, and different historical periods. Four kinds of explanation of cost underestimation are examined: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, i.e., lying. The policy implications are clear: In debates and decision making on whether important transportation infrastructure should be built, those legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust the cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts. Independent estimates and analyses are needed as are institutional checks and balances to curb deception.