The offer presented to Iran on June 6, agreed among the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (P5 + I), contains more concessions than the EU-3 (Germany, France, the UK) were able to make in the negotiations that failed in August 2005. Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy is confirmed, as is the exercise of that right, including uranium enrichment on Iranian territory- the latter, however, only after a period of international confidence building. The offer was made possible through a change in the position of the U.S. government. Still, it can only serve as a basis for negotiations since crucial Iranian interests, especially regarding security guarantees, are not met. Also, it is not likely that Iran will agree to anything that gives veto rights to the U.S. government on whether Iran has done enough to build international confidence. A big problem prior to negotiations is the P5 + I'S demand that uranium enrichment cease before negotiations can begin. This demand in itself could lead to an unnecessary escalation of the crisis. Considering the current state of the Iranian nuclear program, a continuation of uranium enrichment is not such a crucial issue in the short term. Iran is still at the experimental stage with its enrichment capabilities, and it would take years for it to accumulate sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium for military use, if it decided to go that way. More important is a high degree of transparency and international control of all relevant activities on Iranian territory. Sanctions would also probably escalate the situation in Iran. They would consolidate the government's position rather than lead to popular protest against the leadership. However, there is a difference between sanctions aimed at hampering the Iranian nuclear program and thereby prolonging the window for negotiations; symbolic sanctions, the main purpose of which would be to demonstrate the condemnation of Iranian policy by the international community; and economic sanctions, which would primarily harm the population. Military action is not a realistic option for stopping the Iranian nuclear program, on practical grounds and as a matter of principle. They would not even be justified if Iran openly declared its intention to launch a military program. The Federal government should push hard for negotiations, but it should also try to find allies in Europe and elsewhere for the position that even if negotiations break down a war against Iran should not find support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]