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Mark Solms' revision of the concept of drive represents the latest in a series of his indepth reviews of the most fundamental Freudian concepts. The movement of neuropsychoanalysis begun in 2000 with the first Congress focused precisely on a neuroscientific definition of affects and emotions. In 2013, Solms proposed a substantial and profound modification of Freud's structural model, motivating his theses which argue that the instinctual id can only be conscious. In the current paper, Solms (2021a) reaffirms and re-evaluates the centrality of drive theory in psychoanalysis and neuroscience as a starting point for understanding conscious and unconscious phenomena, in normality as well in pathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The biography of a person allows us to reconstruct his lifestyle, his personality, and this finds correspondence in his thought. The early recollections which, according to Adler, can provide valuable clues like projective tests and dreams cannot be considered a biography and, especially if taken from multiple sources, must be carefully screened and verified. If you don't do it, the Individual Psychology is banalized and discredited. Similarly, the important assessment of the position in the family constellation cannot be simplistically transferred to the fruitful contrast of ideas between Freud and Adler, especially now that there is documentary evidence of their debate and the schism of the psychoanalytic movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper "Revision of drive theory" (Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane, 2022, 56, 3: 363-422) Mark Solms (2021a) correctly argues that the basic motivational forces are affect systems, activated following the general homeostatic principles that govern biological processes that assure survival and reproduction. However, psychoanalytic object relation theory points to a specifically human, supraordinate integrative motivational system that condenses component affect systems into the affiliative and counteraffiliative motivations described by Freud with the concepts of libido and aggression. They are not "drives" in the psychobiological sense, but profoundly define unconscious intrapsychic conflict and are relevant in clinical psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Also on the basis of autobiographical memories regarding fascism and the Second World War, some reflections are made on the ideology and propaganda of the war, especially in reference to the education of children. Among others, the following concepts are discussed: the "«as if» personality" of Helene Deutsch; the "authoritarian personality" of Theodor Adorno and collaborators, and the "fascist character" described by Wilhelm Reich. Also other contributions are mentioned, such as Sigmund Freud's study on mass psychology, Erich Fromm's reflections on "escape from freedom", Ernst Kris' considerations on the "danger" of propaganda, and so on. After an Introduction, this paper consists of the following paragraphs: Questions of method; The construction of a soul; By way of reason; The "as if" personality; Authoritarian Personality: "F" Personality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychoanalysis leaves open many methodological questions. One of these is the relationship between theory and clinical practice. In order to discuss such a problem, we propose to conceptualise the Freudian theory as a multifacet paradigm. We argue that psychoanalysis can be defined as the meeting of two souls: metapsychology and the clinical practice. They differ from each other: in fact, the former seems to follow the methodology of natural sciences, whereas the latter the methodology of social sciences. In the context of justification, Freud gives more weight to the clinical data interpreted by the light of the metapsychological assumptions than to the therapeutic successes. In this sense, he seems to suggest a disjunction between theory and practice. Such a point deals with the following problems: what is the nature of the clinical data and what is their validity? What is the relationship between these data and the metapsychological assumptions? How to translate these assumptions in sound and reliable clinical procedures? In this paper we point out that Freudian theory suffers from a vicious circularity between theory and the clinical datum. In fact, according to our analysis, the theoretical assumptions to be justified are the same that Freud uses to interpret his data. In other words, psychoanalysis seems to lack of the requirement of independent evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]