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It is proposed a fine-tuning of the definition of intersubjectivity as inferable by Giuseppe Civitarese (2023a) – especially with regard to the expression “with-being” which is included therein – in order to overcome certain ambiguities within a constructive perspective, also paying particular attention to compatibility with Bion’s notion of group (and therefore of “field”). It is urged also to stick to the most consolidated interpretations of the philosophers mentioned, if their ideas are used in non-philosophical disciplines; in this way it is further attested to Husserl’s unlikely compatibility with psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl and the phenomenology of religion have a delicate relationship that combines direct references to religious themes with broader analyses subsumable under the more general phenomenology of consciousness. This paper shows the themes and problems of a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of religious consciousness through an encounter with its elements. Word, Prayer, relationship with the Sacred and Faith are some of the indelible traces of a phenomenology of religious consciousness. The belief, however, is that phenomenology can be spoken of if and only if the themes are addressed through the analysis of consciousness as the method teaches. Thus, an analysis of religious livedexperiences and transcendence (subjective and absolute) is joined by such phenomenologically diriment questions as a possible dichotomy between transcendence of immanence or immanence of transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edmund Husserl has certainly been one of the first important sources of Sartrean philosophy. Despite having been very critical of many aspects of Husserl's thought once adopted his positions, the French philosopher has a great debt with the father of phenomenology. In this paper, which is a development of a section of our doctoral thesis, we will firstly try to explore Husserl's key concepts, so that the fundamental aspects of his philosophy can be clarified and understood in their own meaning. Secondly, we will explain why Sartre adopted some of them, refusing others instead. Once done that, in a third moment we will be able to comprehend that Sartre was not only trying to criticize, but he strongly wanted to re-elaborate Husserlian phenomenology, in order to explore consciousness in an original way. In the end, we will discover why intentionality is the key element of this Sartrean turn, thanks to which the concepts of Ego and consciousness became the roots of his later thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between Merleau-Ponty's lectures on institution and his lectures on passivity. I argue that the relationship depends on Merleau-Ponty's internal critique of institution as outlined in Husserl's ouevre. That is, institution is not only human institution, which rests on temporality and time-consciousness (and so concerns memory, history, culture, etc), but also animal, biological and even virological, which rests on a certain, non-euclidian space of the body. Merleau-Ponty's focus in the course is animal institution: animal morphology, menstruation, puberty, etc. These are what tie institution and passivity together, and especially the passivity that Merleau-Ponty calls the "symbolic matrix," the touchstone of which is the "implex." While the paper discusses, Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl and the consequent understanding of a passivity in institution, it opens the possibility that the virological may be yet another kind of passivity that has instituted a new trajectory in human institution. This is highlighted in the very word "pandemic."

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