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Copyright of JLIS.it: Italian Journal of Library, Archives & Information Science is the property of Firenze University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes' denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called "second navigation" emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain "common opinions" are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which - as is argued - must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7-8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called "final argument." Here, Antisthenes' presence seems somewhat more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By framing Aristotle’s dialectic in the broader context of scientific inquiry and demonstration, this paper is aimed at showing of what use the “reputable opinions” can be for grasping the principles of sciences, as declared in Topics I.2. It argues that such a use cannot imply ‒ at any stage of inquiry ‒ a replacement of the logic and intrinsic goals of demonstration by those proper to dialectic. However, it also defends a substantive (but still modest) contribution of dialectic ‒ beyond its well-attested methodological role in discarding contradictory opinions and its (possible though not germane to the context of Topics I.2) application to proving the principle of non-contradiction by means of refutation. This contribution consists in providing the preliminary accounts of facts in order to have scientific inquiry started, as required in Posterior Analytics II.8. To better appreciate how the proposed location of dialectic in a pre-demonstrative stage of inquiry is operational, the paper finally examines Physics IV.1-5.

Based on the debate on children’s ability to produce argumentative discourse in different edu­cational settings, this paper provides further support for the fact that small children are able to support their opinions with arguments. In particular, the paper makes a case in point on children’s appeal to definitional loci, when supporting their standpoints. The analysis of their reasoning’s implicit components shows how children apply different definitional arguments.

This paper aims to give a new definition of the word “Archives” as a result of an accurate survey of doctrinal orientations on this specific subject, analyzing - word by word – each particular lemma which makes up the new proposal. Even though there is no definition that is valid in every context, but archival theory seems to suffer largely from a heterogeneous vision, downstream of a rigorous scientific journey, but dense of conceptual and lexical unexpected contingencies. Each term - with meanings and contexts - does not constitute a simple signifier, but refers to a specific baggage of every disciplinary and cultural tradition. For these reasons, we will attempt to provide an overview of the definitions of archives, from the particular to the general.

The Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno coined the expression “substantive arts” to refer to those arts that do not serve any immediate, mundane or practical purpose. In this paper, I briefly present this idea and put forward a definition of the substantive arts as an alternative to those used until now. Starting from the assumption that since the end of the 18th century there has been a set of arts that have their own substantivity, I expound on certain criteria widely used as distinctive features to define the substantive arts. I subsequently put forward an alternative intensional criterion to characterize the substantive arts. To end, I draw some corollaries following from the application of this criterion.

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.

ABSTRACT This paper aims at exposing a strategy to organize the debate around physicalism. Our starting point (following Stoljar 2010) is the pre-philosophical notion of physicalism, which is typically formulated in the form of slogans. Indeed, philosophers debating metaphysics have paradigmatically introduced the subject with aid of slogans such as “there is nothing over and above the physical”, “once every physical aspect of the world is settled, every other aspect will follow”, “physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical”. These ideas are very intuitive but they are, of course, far from being a satisfactory metaphysical conception of Physicalism. For that end, we will begin with the definition of physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical, following Stoljar, we should be able to respond to one central question: how to interpret the physicalist claim that everything in physical.

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denomi­native logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems some­what more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites.

The attribute of omniscience raises serious problems for theism. What the theist can coherently say about divine omniscience will, however, be constrained by the interpretation which he or she accepts of two further defining properties of God, namely his eternity and his omnipresence. We explore how these two properties can be interpreted, and then consider how they generate problems about omniscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constitutes a kind of protocol, based on the author’s experience, which proposes to review several situations that occurred during her attempt to determine equivalence between French and Polish terms in the field of individual retirement plans. This attempt was made exclusively on various textual sources and their related data allowed to isolate a number of situations that differ in their details

Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.

This paper presents part of the problems and difficulties encountered in the elaboration of the first Romanian dictionary of sociolinguistic terminology. The presentation starts with the steps we have taken in accomplishing this work to eventually evoke some of the terminological endeavours imposed by several entries of the dictionary.

As it is well known an historical comprehension of the time in which people live and philosophers work is something essential in order to outline a theory that could grasps something of the world. The history of the relationship between art and philosophy is almost as old as philosophy itself. Among the first to take up the topic was Plato who posed the question in the most classical of ways—that is, by facing the problem of definition. The question of definition is nowadays deeply debated by philosophy of art and ontology. The paper address the problem of the definition suggesting a proposal which synthesizes ontology, epistemology and theory of perception.

In this paper we intend to prove the importance of cognition in the difficult and complex task of finding the right definition for a term or a collocation. The principles of categorization can be successfully applied in order to find the needed and structured information about the perceived world. They can also help finding the attributes that distinguish representatives of one category. Categorizing by using prototypes contributes to the development of individuals’ vocabulary in various fields and also in discovering the most important distinctive features in order to define object, beings or abstract notions of the perceived world. A good definition must contain not only distinctive features but also specific attributes, in order to increase its accuracy.