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This paper develops a particular Florentine perspective through which the contemporary debate on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology can be approached. The Florentine perspective combines transformative attitude and explicative method in philosophy. More specifically, the paper highlights the distinguishing features according to which Paolo Parrini's position on the relationship between Carnap's and Husserl's philosophies can be identified within Carnap scholarship. For this purpose, a phenomenology free of ontological-metaphysical presuppositions is elaborated by establishing its necessary conditions in revisiting material a priori statements. The paper reinterprets material a priori statements as those of neutral monism’s ideal umbrella theory and proposes Machian anti-metaphysics as a third way between the philosophies of Carnap and Husserl.

Copyright of Critical Hermeneutics: Biannual Journal of Philosophy is the property of Universita degli Studi di Cagliari and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Husserl deals with God and religion within metaphysics, which starts from the factum. We will examine, first, the distinction between eidos and factum, and then briefly consider the relationship between teleology and theology. The analysis of the types of religious experience will finally allow us to address the problem of Revelation as the discovery and call of God to human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl and the phenomenology of religion have a delicate relationship that combines direct references to religious themes with broader analyses subsumable under the more general phenomenology of consciousness. This paper shows the themes and problems of a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of religious consciousness through an encounter with its elements. Word, Prayer, relationship with the Sacred and Faith are some of the indelible traces of a phenomenology of religious consciousness. The belief, however, is that phenomenology can be spoken of if and only if the themes are addressed through the analysis of consciousness as the method teaches. Thus, an analysis of religious livedexperiences and transcendence (subjective and absolute) is joined by such phenomenologically diriment questions as a possible dichotomy between transcendence of immanence or immanence of transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with the book E. Husserl, Prayer and the Divine. Ethical-religious Writings, edited by A. Ales Bello, this essay aims to highlight some decisive factors in Husserl's interpretation of God problem. After a brief reference to some of the fundamental implications connected to the topics (Augustine, the peculiarity of the phenomenological method, the tension between the God of philosophers and the God of faith, the investigation into the genesis of the religious attitude), Husserl's field of research is indicated as the experience of God, in response to the question: why do we think of seeking God? From this we derive that God is, at once, inside and outside of us, and that the origin of the experience we have of Him lies in a web of rational and irrational ingredients that constitutes the structure of transcendental subjectivity. Ultimately, that experience is a feeling or, rather, a presentiment that opens up an indeterminate horizon of meaning. It is accessed through religious consciousness and the faith that nourishes it, according to a perspective that Husserl defines as "atheological". This perspective oscillates, not without ambiguity, between philosophical or phenomenological faith and religious faith, jointed by the inherent necessity of God for the constitution of human subjectivities in the common surrounding world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Community that Believes the Good. About some Ethico-Religious Texts of the Late Husserl. The research manuscripts of the late Husserl address boundary issues in phenomenology, including religious experience and theological perspective. In particular, a teleological-communitarian foundation of religiosity and faith emerges, even in the face of an evident ethical-political decline that calls for intellectual and moral resistance. The great themes of love and Berufung, with their contextual obligations that counteract contingent evil, are developed by Husserl in reference to the community that believes the good and builds it in the communion of spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is proposed a fine-tuning of the definition of intersubjectivity as inferable by Giuseppe Civitarese (2023a) – especially with regard to the expression “with-being” which is included therein – in order to overcome certain ambiguities within a constructive perspective, also paying particular attention to compatibility with Bion’s notion of group (and therefore of “field”). It is urged also to stick to the most consolidated interpretations of the philosophers mentioned, if their ideas are used in non-philosophical disciplines; in this way it is further attested to Husserl’s unlikely compatibility with psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While aiming with Civitarese (2023) at a notion of intersubjectivity capable of justifying an idea of the psychoanalytic field based on the "being-with" analysand/analyst, the inadequacy for the purpose of Husserl's philosophy is shown, ultimately for a notion of subject (transcendental ego) that is alien to psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the difference between the approach of Husserl and other authors who deal fruitfully with intersubjectivity should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the difficulties of the transition from philosophical speculation to clinical research, conducted from a field perspective, are underlined, and therefore attention is paid to the specific trans-individual phenomena, empirically detectable in the analytic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After recalling the agreement with Giuseppe Civitarese (2023a, 2023b) on important theses, it is pointed out that the divergences concern the review of philosophers and other thinkers - on which some perplexities are raised in terms of merit and method - that Civitarese considered in order to support an acceptable notion of intersubjectivity. Therefore the result is an unclear definition of intersubjectivity, despite the intentions declared by Civitarese (2023a). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticizing the interpretations that Civitarese (2023a, 2023b) has given of the philosophers he relies on in order to justify his idea of intersubjectivity, Fornaro (2023b) neglects the recent historiography which includes leading researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary psychoanalysis lacks a clear and distinct definition of intersubjectivity. For the most part, the term is used in reference to relational models and the exchanges that take place between two separate subjects. It then serves to indicate the deep involvement of the analyst in the process of the cure. The author argues that this usage, roughly as a synonym for interaction or interpersonal, is trivial and not true to its meaning in Husserl's philosophy. The German philosopher was the first to speak of intersubjectivity in order to explain that if the subject has access to the other and vice versa, it is because on the ontological level a dimension of mutual co-being and co-implication (a common transcendental field) already always exists. If, then, we wish to formulate a clear and distinct, but above all specific, definition of intersubjectivity, we must recover this intuition and translate it into coherent principles of technique. On the basis of these two simple rules, fidelity to the original speculative meaning of the concept and its translation into technical tools, it becomes possible to differentiate the various models of psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Critical Hermeneutics: Biannual Journal of Philosophy is the property of Universita degli Studi di Cagliari and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I now intend to return to Husserl’s argument against psychologism in logic, aiming to frame it within the broader antinaturalistic controversy and see how recent proposals of a natural (or naturalized) epistemology could affect it.

This contribution aims to be a concrete proof of how fertile, rich and innovative dialogue and confrontation between transcendental phenomenology and naturalising sciences can be. Through the phenomenological-transcendental analysis of the neurodegenerative pathology of dementia, an attempt will be made to propose, within the debate on the possible naturalisation of phenomenology, the perspective of an actual mutual enlightenment, as proposed by Gallagher. Not a naturalisation of consciousness in the sense of a reduction to neural process, but a pluralisation of the valid and rigorous perspectives through which it can be investigated. The phenomenological-transcendental eidetic study of dementia thus becomes complementary to the neurobiological one, revealing what the subject feels ‘from within’, his losses, but also what persists in the patient until the most advanced stages. Such a study, in synergy with the biological one, would greatly help in the holistic understanding of dementia in this particular case and, in general, of consciousness phenomena.

This article presents the evaluation that Marion makes of the ontotheological determination of metaphysics and of conceptual idolatry, and the resolution that is proposed through the phenomenology of the gift. The new name of God, in the logic of this phenomenology of Marion, no longer starts from the language of being, esse, but from gift and love. “Love purifies our heart from every idol, since it alone is given and said as the name of God and yet it alone occurs in the experience of this world”. God is a Gift, is donation; he is Love, and his revelation is the saturated phenomenon par excellence which shows the impossibility of impossibility by God. In past times the dialogue of theology with other sciences and atheists was partly supported by arguments provided by classical metaphysics. The cry of triumph of nihilism calls for the very end of this metaphysics and the death of its God (Nietzsche). By what name, then, do we call God after “the death of God”, in today’s philosophical background? Also, if God is really God, how can he die? Only a God who is only a “god” can die. If metaphysics has come to its end, who will assume his task and duty? These are some questions which, following Marion’s and Husserl’s indications, we will briefly try to answer, after a short presentation of the status quaestionis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el concepto de animalidad desde la perspectiva de Edmund Husserl y Martin Heidegger. Más precisamente se plantea la pregunta de si el animal posee el estatuto de la otredad o carece de él. En efecto, el animal, respecto al humano, resulta un ente otro, pero ¿eso basta para que este sea aprehendido como una intersubjetividad o una coexistencia que se dona al mundo de los seres humanos? Para responder esta cuestión revisaremos la argumentación de Husserl, especialmente en Hua IV y Hua XXXIX y la de Heidegger en GA 2 y GA 29/30. Finalmente añadiremos una consideración crítica de las ideas de los autores estudiados de cara a los desarrollos de la biología contemporánea para preguntarnos en qué medida su indagación filosófica se condeciría con la evidencia zoológica actual.

El presente artículo se centra en algunos de los aspectos centrales de la concepción heideggeriana de la indicación formal. Como es sabido, el filósofo toma como punto de partida en una de las más tempranas exposiciones de este metaconcepto, una explicación delimitativa frente a otras operaciones conceptuales (generalización y formalización). Se revisará críticamente la explicación que Heidegger hace de la generalización a diferencia de la formalización, destacando especialmente que no se trata aquí de una mera distinción entre generalización y formalización, sino de una estructura de fundamentación. En segundo lugar se argumenta que la crítica de Heidegger no se dirige directamente contra la formalización, sino contra el contexto metódico al cual sirve. Por último, a modo de conclusión, se intenta mostrar que para Heidegger concebir la indicación formal como principio (metódico) de la investigación fenomenológica, supone que ella es, por vía negativa, una radicalización de la tendencia a lo formal.

This article explores the birth of American Phenomenology in Josiah Royce’s “New Phenomenology”, proposed in his Thought Diary (1878-1880), in dialogue both with Husserl’s Contemplative Practice and with Peirce’s version of pragmatism.

La comprensione delle emozioni costituisce da sempre un decisivo banco di prova per la filosofia, e in particolar modo per tutte quelle filosofie – come la fenomenologia – che programmaticamente reclamano la necessaria “liberazione” del reale dalle sovrastrutture del pensiero. Simile sfide appare tanto più significativa nel caso della fenomenologia materiale di Michel Henry. In questa prospettiva, nel presente contributo si propone una ricostruzione della concezione henryana dell’affettività considerato alla luce della tesi della duplicità dell’apparire e in vista di una discussione critica circa l’articolazione interna tra questi due distinti ordini del trascendentale.

Edmund Husserl has certainly been one of the first important sources of Sartrean philosophy. Despite having been very critical of many aspects of Husserl's thought once adopted his positions, the French philosopher has a great debt with the father of phenomenology. In this paper, which is a development of a section of our doctoral thesis, we will firstly try to explore Husserl's key concepts, so that the fundamental aspects of his philosophy can be clarified and understood in their own meaning. Secondly, we will explain why Sartre adopted some of them, refusing others instead. Once done that, in a third moment we will be able to comprehend that Sartre was not only trying to criticize, but he strongly wanted to re-elaborate Husserlian phenomenology, in order to explore consciousness in an original way. In the end, we will discover why intentionality is the key element of this Sartrean turn, thanks to which the concepts of Ego and consciousness became the roots of his later thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between Merleau-Ponty's lectures on institution and his lectures on passivity. I argue that the relationship depends on Merleau-Ponty's internal critique of institution as outlined in Husserl's ouevre. That is, institution is not only human institution, which rests on temporality and time-consciousness (and so concerns memory, history, culture, etc), but also animal, biological and even virological, which rests on a certain, non-euclidian space of the body. Merleau-Ponty's focus in the course is animal institution: animal morphology, menstruation, puberty, etc. These are what tie institution and passivity together, and especially the passivity that Merleau-Ponty calls the "symbolic matrix," the touchstone of which is the "implex." While the paper discusses, Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl and the consequent understanding of a passivity in institution, it opens the possibility that the virological may be yet another kind of passivity that has instituted a new trajectory in human institution. This is highlighted in the very word "pandemic."

RESUMO Reconstituímos o problema da gênese em sua dimensão mais fundamental na fenomenologia da temporalidade. Em seguida, mostramos em que condições ele pode ser recolocado a partir de uma fenomenologia do movimento e, finalmente, dispensado numa fenomenologia da diferença em vias de elaboração. Trata-se de um encaminhamento para o problema do logos fenomenológico: em que medida ele pode ser reformulado sem que, com isso, se perca a consistência da fenomenalidade.

Questo articolo presenta l’importanza della Rückfrage (domanda retrospettiva) nel metodo fenomenologico, poiché significa un “ritorno” all’origine costitutivo di tutto senso e validità dell’essere. È il modo di accedere alla genesi del mondo della vita, come un mondo doxico, soggettivo-relativo da cui sono costituite tutte le nostre esperienze. In questo senso, ci dà tutti gli strati che la tradizione e la cultura hanno posto sulle nostre esperienze più originali. Si presentano anche obiezioni e risposte a questa applicazione del metodo fenomenologico, come pure la presentazione della fenomenologia come archeologia del senso.

pretende-se tensionar a tese, difundida no Brasil de que Foucault é um filósofo nietzschiano, mostrando que seu pensamento pode e deve ser visto sempre em confluência com outros pensadores, formando o que se pode chamar de uma comunidade de pensamento. Para isso, busca-se mostrar a singularidade do pensamento de Foucault, seja em relação àquele de Nietzsche, seja a de Husserl, acentuando alguns de seus pontos de convergência e divergência.

In this article we wish to look into the nature of Edith Stein's thought, in the light of a specific work by Karl Jaspers (Psychologie der Weltanschauung), especially in order to clarify the matter of its possible close dependence on Husserl's Phenomenology during the mystical phase of her work. Especially, we theorize that the path followed by Stein has widened the field of Phenomenology to a much extensive horizon than that traced by Husserl. The reading of the work of Karl Jaspers had offered us various ideas on this context, especially for the following aspects: 1) the primacy of "observational psychology" over philosophy as the ultimate scenario for validating knowledge; 2) the achievement of a balanced position between idealism and realism; 3) a justification of metaphysics and mysticism that is independent of the rigorous philosophical rationalism still present in Husserl's Phenomenology. The grounds of this thesis were obtained by analyzing the Jaspers's texts and by comparing them with the Stein's thought, and finally by focusing on the following themes: 1) type of phenomenology; 2) concept of formation; 2) realist ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El presente artículo se propone explorar la noción de mundo ficcional desde la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, destacando la potencialidad de la fenomenología para los campos de la estética y la teoría de la ficción. Para ello, partiré de la descripción de las estructuras sobre las que se erige la vivencia ficcional, que aquí será tratada como una vivencia de fantasía. Bajo este enfoque, el análisis muestra primero la correlación entre conciencia de fantasía y mundo de fantasía, pasando a continuación a explicitar las estructuras de cada uno de los polos de experiencia. Para Husserl, esta correlación se sustenta lógicamente en la doctrina del idealismo trascendental y en su concepción del mundo de fantasía como mundo posible.

While developing the ambiguity of the concept of boredom, we discuss a psychological, neuroscientific and an educational-phenomenological approach to boredom in educational settings. Analysing these various perspectives with the help of a recently developed taxonomy of four different boredom types, we argue that the classification conflates antecedent and resultant states with actual boredom. Although such classifications may still be helpful for practical purposes, we argue that approaches that are mostly driven by an aim to control and avoid boredom do not allow for a critical questioning of the potential role that boredom plays in education, and that it does not cater for a critical self-reflection on traditional aspects of the educational provision.

O presente artigo pretende investigar a possível articulação entre o pensamento filosófico de Friedrich Nietzsche e a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl. Para tanto, usaremos autores internacionais que abordam o tema e indicam a possibilidade da relação entre eles. Usaremos como principal referência as pesquisas de Christine Daigle e Babette Babich.

In addition to framing Vergani's book Nascita. Una fenomenologia dell'esistenza in the international debate on the issue of birth, the present essay aims at discussing the key theoretical coordinates of Vergani's work. It focuses, therefore, on the concept of the "phenomenology of birth" and on the author's attempt to follow a double logic: the fidelity to Husserl's phenomenological system on the one side and, on the other, the "heretical" distancing from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore Husserl's theory of specifically normative concepts (in contemporary idiom: thin normative concepts) as presented in his lectures on ethics. In the first section I examine Husserl account of normative judgment in the Prolegomena. I argue that it is insufficient because it doesn't appreciate the irreducibility of normative to non-normative concept. In the second section I turn to Husserl's later account of normative concepts and explicate the meaning and significance of his claim that such concepts invariably refer to posita or Sätze, rather than ordinary objects. I also explain how, on Husserl's account, the normative stance that makes specifically normative concepts possible can be extended to ordinary objects and acts of consciousness. I conclude with some remarks about the significance of Husserl's analysis for metanormative theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the Author analyses the fundamental reasons for the disintegration of Europe. Mis- trust towards European institutions is a symptom of deeper problems, such as the economic and financial crisis, migration flows and terrorism. All themes that refer to the thesis of a ‘tired Europe’ announced by Edmund Husserl. However, the Author believes that opening up to the Mediterra- nean is not the problem of Europe, but a great opportunity for its recovery thanks to the contribu- tion of the ‘newcomers’.

After a brief introduction to the history of the Husserl Archives I focus on the methodological specificities in studying Husserl’s work on the basis of his manuscripts and of his archives. In a second step I expound on the effects that the current shift from an analogous to a hybrid analogous and digital archives is producing in the self-understanding of the practices of our institution. Particularly, developing digital technology means that the Husserl Archives are entering a new phase in respect to how archival and editorial impulses will affect the presentation of Husserl’s writings. Finally, I offer some perspectives about how the planned virtual platform («digitalHusserl»), which will give direct access to his manuscripts, is designed to promote a new understanding of Husserl’s specific process of philosophical writing, of his unique wording of thoughts.

Este artículo describe tres conceptos de Husserl: acto intencional, significación e intuición complementadora, que se ponen en relación con la semántica estructural. En este trabajo defiendo que estos tres conceptos adelantan los tipos de contenido definidos en Semántica posteriormente, con J. Lyons y E. Coseriu: sentido, designación/referencia y significado. Asimismo, se muestra una teoría del signo husserliana comparada con otras conceptuaciones contemporáneas al filósofo. Se destaca la importancia para los desarrollos ulteriores de lo que será la Semántica como ciencia lingüística.

At the end of the Fifties, an Italian scholar, Piero Bertolini, provided a phenomenology-based theoretical framework for rethinking education that largely anticipated the phenomenological turn that was to impact social sciences in the following decades. By founding his proposal on Husserl’s phenomenology, Bertolini proposed a major theoretical shift in educational theory, research and practice: from “what reality (i.e. natural facts, other peoples’ behaviour, traditions, established social order, everyday routines, early years etc.) does to people” to “what people make or can make of it”. This anti-deterministic stance is probably the best known side of his work, yet Bertolini never claimed an omnipotent mind nor did he conceive the socialisation process as occurring in a social, cultural or material vacuum. On the contrary, he stressed the constitutive role of reality on whatever a mind can make of it. By outlining Bertolini’s main theoretical claims and discussing his ground-breaking contribution to the 20 th century scholarship in education, this essay introduces this special issue dedicated to the contemporary relevance of his theory of education.

Este ensaio visa problematizar a definição da fenomenologia a partir da contribuição de três autores: Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre e Maurice Merleau-Ponty. A recepção do pensamento de Husserl é marcado, na França, pela corrente existencialista que exige, tanto de Merleau-Ponty quanto de Sartre, a reformulação da fenomenologia. A fim de acompanhar esse processo de assimilação e, ao mesmo tempo, modificação da fenomenologia, este ensaio apresenta três definições que, apesar de justapostas, relacionam-se entre si: 1) O que é a fenomenologia de Husserl?; 2) O que é a fenomenologia francesa?; 3) O que é a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty? Este trabalho de definição, apesar de topicalizado, apenas surge e é examinado a partir da relação de contraposição e renovação da escola da fenomenologia, que é vasta e plena de nuances, apontando ecos e vozes dissonantes entre si. Ao acompanhar a reformulação da fenomenologia em três momentos, fica mais claro, ao fim do ensaio, o processo de elaboração de Merleau-Ponty. [Cet essai avance la problématique de la définition de la phénoménologie à partir des contributions d’Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre et Maurice Merleau-Ponty. La pensée de Husserl, en France, est marquée par son caractère existentialiste et exige, de ce fait, tant pour Sartre comme pour Merleau-Ponty, une reformulation de la phénoménologie. Afin d’accompagner ce processus d’assimilation, mais aussi de modification de la phénoménologie, cette essai présente trois définitions qui, bien que juxtaposées, sont étroitement liées : 1) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie de Husserl?; 2) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie française?; 3) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty? Cette tentative de définition n’est examinée qu’à partir de la relation d’opposition et de rénovation de l’école de phénoménologie, elle-même vaste et pleine de nuances, où nous tenterons de mettre en relief les échos et les voix dissonantes. C’est en accompagnant ce travail de reformulation de la phénoménologie en trois temps, que nous espérons éclaircir, à la fin de l’essai, le processus d’élaboration de Merleau-Ponty.]

El presente artículo defiende que las nociones de epojé y de modificación de neutralidad, a pesar de su aparente semejanza, deben mantenerse radicalmente diferenciadas. La razón de fondo es que ambas surgen en el seno de operaciones de la conciencia que son metodológica y jerárquicamente distintas. Para tal efecto, haré una descripción de sus funciones y estructura, de modo que se hagan visibles tanto sus respectivas esferas de aplicación como el alcance operativo de sus procedimientos.

I will examine in this paper the concept of process proposed by R. Ronchi in his book Canone minore (Feltrinelli 2016). I will retrace a certain relationship between this idea of process and two major languages which historically strived to elaborate an idea of process: the language of classical metaphysics, and the writing of modern and contemporary mathematics. On this basis I will investigate which status and which effects could have Ronchi's idea of process and the whole speculative itinerary proposed by Canone minore. A first hypothesis is formulated in the direction of what I could call a politics of knowledges and technologies. A second one in the direction of a mystic of knowledges and technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Virtual of Phenomenology in Physics. The Theory of Relativity like proof bench of Temporality and Kinaesthesia. From Einstein and Husserl’s manuscripts The search for objective knowledge purports to aim at a reality independent of our experience of it, but we find ourselves dependent upon our sense experience as the only possible access to this purportedly independent reality that is the object of science. Husserl’s phenomenological point of view reveals how this aim is understandable, and, as the major developments in twentieth-century physics have shown (Einstein’s Relativity Theory), how science must take account of the way that virtual forms of our thinking play a key role in capturing the phenomena scientists describe and explain. What this paper claims to prove is the epistemological evidence of an unavoidable relationship between the virtual and real that are described through the formal sciences and the concrete objects that they purport to capture. In one of his manuscript entitled: “Overthrow of the Copernican theory” Husserl emphasized the role of virtuality of natural laws such as it arises from Michelson’s experiment, dwelling on natural scientific naiveté. In fact, even though we eventually come to understand the earth as a thing moving among things, the unmoving earth remains the virtual condition that makes any movement intelligible. Thus, we might consider the actual world, each of its pieces and all determinations in them, as «intentional-real» objects of «virtual-conscious» acts.

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox.

Aim of this work is to illustrate the comparison of Alfred Schütz with Husserlian phenomenology and his attempt to solve the question of intersubjectivity. In this regard, it will be shown how the solution proposed by Schütz, consisting in considering intersubjectivity not as a mere phenomenological question but as a fundamental category of human existence, allows the exit from solipsism, on which the thought of Husserl had run aground, and the foundation of a phenomenological sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff's Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator's walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl's phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thesis that I will discuss in this essay can be summarized as follows: the most significant feature of intermediality is related to the possibility of a regeneration of the relationship between image and reality. I will analyze this thesis by referring to the phenomenological aesthetics. My hypothesis is that there is an essential relationship between the processes of intuitive experience objectivation described by Husserl and the strategies of image elaboration based on intermediality. This elaboration precisely concern those processes of reality constitution that are more original from the phenomenological point of view; that is why intermediality can produce effects of image authentication.

The phenomenological Essence of Relativity. Matters concerning the Border between Husserl and Einstein According to Hermann Weyl, Einstein’s Relativity Theory is a method that combines “analysis of essence” and “mathematical construction”. From this point of view, in this article I try to establish a parallelism between the formulation of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and Husserl’s Phenomenology based on the comparison of the original texts and manuscripts. From this analysis, e.g. the conception of the gravitational field, as important result of the General Relativity Theory, seems to be nothing else but a new type of “essence”, a phenomenological essence, in an environing objective world that is the “world-of-life”. In this world, pre-scientific world of the everyday life experience, the reality is given us as a relativistic reality dependent on the subjective activity of the individual knowers. On the basis of the consciousness data, we reconstruct the real and objective world of experience as starting point for every mathematical and physical construction of the world comprehension. This study seeks to present a convincing case both that Husserlian phenomenology influenced 20th Century natural science in an important way.

Ao propor a crítica da razão lógica em Lógica Formal e Transcendental, Edmund Husserl ampliou sua concepção de lógica e constatou uma lacuna dos Prolegômenos à Lógica Pura: a ausência da consideração da noção de modalidade. O artigo reflete sobre a alteração na concepção de lógica pura a partir da perspectiva modal e sua importância para a filosofia husserliana. A afirmação da dimensão modal aparece em fragmentos espalhados pela obra do autor e inspira hipóteses sobre a interpretação do desenvolvimento de seu pensamento, mas também abre perspectivas sobre o alcance da crítica da razão lógica proposta por Husserl.

Pretendemos dar una visión de conjunto de la obra husserliana, que explique la evolución posterior a Ideas. Desde ella es hacedera una comparación con Heidegger, en particular en orden a precisar el carácter incorporado de la inteligencia humana. Estaremos en condiciones entonces de considerar la propuesta de Leonardo Polo sobre el estatuto del cuerpo humano latente bajo la intelección.

Phenomenology is not the simple description of a fact, but rather the description of an intentional immanent moment, and it presents itself as a science of essences, and not of matter of facts. The Leib, the lived body of the phenomenological tradition, is not a generic corporeal reality, but rather an intentional subject, a transcendental reference point, on the base of which the connections between physical body and psychic body should be grasped. So, the reduction of empathy to mirror neurons amounts to an “objectivisation”, with the consequent absolutisation of a process that is a function of the Leib as intentional subject, not as a physical reality. The main task of the philosophical research, bracketed by the new “neuro” researches, thus emphasizing their theoretical limits as soon as they depart from experimental enquiries, is then to understand the conditions of possibility of cognitive procedures, that is to say, in other words, the genesis of consciousness, that in aesthetics becomes “the genesis of aesthetic consciousness”. Interdisciplinarity is already an ancient and out of fashion word, now it is the time of “dialogue”, being aware however that the “logoi” not always require synthesis, and that the unity of the corporeal reality implies, as Husserl emphasizes, very different descriptive behaviours.