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Twenty-two EU member states, including Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, oblige some lay participation (lay judges/jury) in the administration of justice. However, the models of this institute differ among countries. Based on the analysis of lay participation models in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, this article aims to point out and describe their advantages and disadvantages. To achieve this aim, qualitative research was carried out. The methods employed for data collection included thematic analysis and document selection. Document content analysis (i.e., the analysis of research papers, scientific literature on the topic, the Constitutions of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, and other international and national legislation) was applied for data processing, and the methods of a dogmatic and comparative analysis were employed for data analysis. The findings of the research disclose that lay judges and jurors are ordinary citizens who work together with legal judges to decide several different types of criminal cases in the Danish and Swedish district and regional courts. Meanwhile, Sweden also has this institute in civil and administrative cases. Finland has only lay judges in criminal cases. This article is divided into four sections: the first section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the Danish model; the second outlines the Swedish model; and the third describes the Finnish model. The last section compares these models and provides a discussion on the issue. Finally, the article provides conclusions based on the analysis of scientific sources and documents, and the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the introduction of the institute of individual constitutional complaint in the Lithuanian legal system, an additional opportunity arose for individuals to defend violated constitutional rights or freedoms, disputing the constitutionality of the legal regulation of criminal proceedings. Analyzing the practice of individual constitutional complaints regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter – CCP) formed by the Constitutional Court, various reasons for their non-acceptance become apparent. Complaints are usually rejected on the grounds that the petitioners misinterpret the disputed legal regulation, raise the issue of its application rather than constitutionality, or associate the violation of their constitutional rights or freedoms with decisions that are not adopted on the basis of the disputed legal regulation or are not final. This article focuses on the requirement to use all the means of protection of one’s constitutional rights or freedoms established by law before applying to the Constitutional Court. Taking into account that, according to the CCP, certain decisions of a court or pre-trial investigation judge are final and not subject to appeal, this paper seeks to establish whether they are considered as such in the context of constitutional disputes. Although a person is not required to exercise the possibility of reopening a criminal case before filing an individual constitutional complaint, in certain cases decisions adopted in accordance with the legal regulation regulating it must be considered final within the meaning of Law on the Constitutional Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Socialinių Mokslų Studijos is the property of Mykolas Romeris University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper discusses changes of the concept of cultural value of agrarian landscape in a few last decades. The interaction of the community and landscape, urgent problems of assessment and treatment of cultural landscape in rural areas of today's Lithuania are revealed. Recent changes in the understanding of the value and shifts in the contents of this concept require improvement of the legal system of Lithuania on a few levels. Contradictions in the system of listing in the context of low efficiency of urban heritage preservation and economic decline are analysed. Inadequate role of local communities is revealed as one of the basic factors of threats to authenticity of relict agrarian landscapes. Recent international documents on cultural landscape protection enable perfection of this heritage preservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word "public" has two meanings in the Lithuanian language. It means "useful for society" and "overt" ("nonsecret"). Double- edged meaning of the category is not acceptable in the sphere of practical urban development, where decisions mean the distribution of goods among individuals as well as the distribution of goods among individuals and overall. In general it is not clear whether the development of the city should be only overt or whether it has also something to do with the interest of society, with the interest of the entire population of the city. The language peculiarities require a special approach of the legal system to the term. The Lithuanian legal system makes not very much in this direction, may be rather on the contrary it makes the term "public interest" even more misty. The Lithuanian Constitution mentions societal interest (requires to support useful for society economic activity), however, neither the Constitution nor the Law on Territory Planning describe what the category "society use" (societal interest) means. The Law does not see the difference a person and the entirety of city population. It says that the term "public" ("society") means one as well as more natural or legal persons. This situation has many sequences: the main question of the social system of the state is not clear; the basis of the mission of urban planning is not clear too; the principle of distribution of goods in urban development is not declared; the question of a legal goods distribution can hardly even be raised. The idea of a more precise legal definition of the term "public interest" is raised in the paper. The author thinks that the formula "public goods are goods that cannot be produced by an individual" can be a good basis for elaborating a legal definition of the category "public interest". It allows to divide clearly and logically overall and individual goods. It allows to see what concrete development proposals are useful for. It allows to show the logical place of urban planning in general: public interest in urban development should be the production of goods that cannot be produced by separate citizens; this production should also be accepted as the mission of urban planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses some problematic issues of the relation between material (real) law and the law of obligation, analyses the interaction between these two laws and discusses consequences of such interplay. The main purpose of this paper is to indicate some problematic issues of the interplay between material law and the law of obligations, also to point out guidelines for separating material law institute from the law of obligations and to emphasize the need for such distinction. The first part of this article looks at material law using obligatory categories and tries to ground the statement that material legal relationships are influenced by obligatory relationships. The conclusion is made that material legal relationship is embodied only with the help of obligations. The second part of the article describes the main forms of the interaction between material law and the law of obligation. Three types of the interplay between them are indicated: first, material (real) law can originate as a consequence of obligatory relationship; second, some material (real) legal relationships can determine appropriate obligations; and third, material (real) relationships are able to transform into new obligations in a case of tort against someone's material right. The third part of the article reveals that obligatory law not always serves as the reassurance of material circulation. The discussion is initiated to prove that in some cases, rules of material law can be used to safeguard the stability of obligatory relationship. However, the conclusion is made that the theory of civil law and judicial practice in Lithuania commonly accepts the hierarchy of material law against obligatory law. The fourth part of this article is dedicated to discuss problems of an approach of material law and the law of obligations. In the light of this aspect, a problem of "right to right" is emphasized. The conclusion is made that the legal construction of "right to right" is not legally correct and should be avoided in theoretical and practical fields of civil law. Further, it is emphasized that a distinction between material (real) law and the law of obligations has not lost its importance, and it is necessary to take into consideration different legal regulation of material (real) and obligatory relationship. This aspect is also highlighted in judicial practice of Lithuania's Supreme Court. The fifth, the last part of the article, analyses a practical example of distinguishing material law from obligatory law. As an example, legal regulation of rent in the Lithuanian Civil Code was presented and analyzed. The author is trying trying to present a practical example how easily a rent as the institution of obligatory law, can be confused with a rent (emphyteusis) as material law. To avoid such of confusion in qualifying legal relationship of rent, some guidelines are pointed out. Some conclusions have been drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]