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Management of the South China Sea disputes must consider the "hedging" behavior of the claimant and non-claimant countries. This behavior is characterized by an insistence on not aligning with any of the competing powers, through intentionally contradictory actions to offset multiple risks, or through a continuous effort to maintain a fallback position. Indeed, in the face of China's increasingly assertive actions and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, nearly all the states in the region have avoided "balancing" (fully aligning with the U.S. to check China) and none of them have adopted "bandwagoning" (fully aligning with China for economic reasons but at the expense of autonomy and other national interests). Instead the Southeast Asian states have insisted on hedging. This paper argues that this proclivity to hedge is a result of both structural and domestic factors. Structurally, the high uncertainties surrounding China's intentions, U.S. commitment, and future U.S.-China ties have compelled the smaller states to avoid putting all their eggs in either power's basket. Domestically, for their political legitimation, the ruling elites in the states hedge to offset multiple risks and pursue mixed policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The competition between the United States and China is now more complex compared to the era of the Cold War. This is evident from the Trade War, the issue of 5G technology, megaproject initiatives, the South China Sea issue and most recently the Covid-19 issue. Malaysia has taken a pragmatic approach and has been careful not to get caught up in the competition between the two powers. During the Pakatan Harapan (PH) era, Malaysia decided to cancel the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore high-speed rail (HSR) mega project, renegotiate the construction cost of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) as well as the grey zone issue in the South China Sea. These decisions created tension in the Kuala Lumpur-Beijing bilateral relations. In response, China delayed any form of cooperation to re-evaluate Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy towards Beijing under the new Pakatan Harapan government. However, Mahathir successfully renegotiated with China to proceed with the projects. This event is expected to leave a significant impact on why Malaysia is increasing its confidence and cooperation with China despite facing national security threats. By utilizing library research and interviews this study analyzes the factors influencing the improvement of bilateral diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China from 1971 until 2018. The study applies the theory of neoclassical realism and the concept of threat balance to argue that Malaysia's response and stance towards China are based on threat, risk, and opportunity factors. First, it finds that the trend in Malaysia-China bilateral cooperation is influenced by the perception of trust. Second, the factor of leadership in identifying threats and opportunities also influences bilateral relations. Third, economic, political, and diplomatic harmony requires a relationship of mutual trust and interdependence in line with the international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China during the Post-Cold War era from 1989 to 1996. The Post-Cold War era had seen the anomalies in diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the United States and China. Furthermore, during the Cold War era, a closer relation between Malaysia and the United States could be seen in balancing China’s power. However, the post-Cold War era had seen an increase in diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China and was cold towards the United States. The anomalies of bilateral diplomatic relations are argued through international political changes, domestic interests and the perception of leaders. The research also employs neoclassical realisme theory in analyzing Malaysia's foreign policy anomalies towards China during the Mahathir Mohamad era. This research applies a qualitative method of obtaining primary data through structured interviews with key informants from Malaysia and China; an analytical method based on chronology; and uses supportive empirical evidence from secondary data. Findings show that the anomalies of Malaysia's foreign policy change towards China is influenced by the U.S. pressure on Malaysia and from China's foreign policy change; economic slowdown and political elite crisis; and changes in Mahathir's perceptions and actions towards China. Analysis also found that there was an increase of Malaysia's trust towards China in the Post-Cold War despite the relations normalization have been established since 1974. Although Malaysia can enjoy China's booming economy in terms of trade and investment which did not occur in the previous era, Kuala Lumpur never compromises with Beijing on the issue in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]