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In the second half of the 20th century, integral serialism and rational way of thinking were considered as an indicate of determinism in music. At the same time, indeterminism was associated with the music composed with the use of chance operations, classified like that by Henri Pousseur in his reading entitled Theorie und Praxis in der neusten Musik, delivered in Darmstadt in 1958. However, certain music pieces show that the demarcation between determinism and indeterminism in music remains unclear. The author attempts to outline the problem of determinism and indeterminism in avant-garde music of the second half of the 20th century, taking into consideration selected crucial compositions and the context of development in science and philosophy of that time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents a thought experiment against the deterministic theory of consciousness (i.e. free will), which is a consequence of a naturalistic (materialist) and physicalist approach to the problem of consciousness, prevailing in contemporary philosophy of mind. The physicalist approach presupposes the possibility of third-person descriptions of human actions in physical terms, and a fortiori the predictability, in principle, of human behaviour. The experiment emphasizes some consequences of this approach, especially some logical problems to which it gives rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that free will is hidden behind determinism or indeterminism. We can imagine that God created three sets of possible worlds whose past events are identical. The first set contains deterministic worlds in which future actions of any person are the same. In these worlds free will doesn't exist. The second set contains indeterministic worlds in which future actions of any person are different in every world. In these worlds the free will doesn't exist either. In the third set there are worlds in which the free will exists, but future actions of any person are the same as in the deterministic or indeterministic worlds. Free will in these worlds is hidden behind determinism or indeterminism. We cannot distinguish worlds with free will from worlds without it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]