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Aristoxenus of Tarentum (375-335 BC) was one of Aristotle’s most important students. He was best known for his treatises on musical theory, including the Elements of Harmonic Theory. However, Aristoxenus was also notable as a great author of biographies of personalities such as Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates and Plato. Unfortunately, only fragments of these works have reached us. However, from reading these fragments we can derive very interesting information about the biographies of these philosophers and the way they were portrayed in Antiquity. Furthermore, we can also reach some conclusions about Aristoxenus’ position regarding Socratic-Platonic theories. In this paper I will discuss the information contained in the fragments of biographies that Aristoxenus wrote about Socrates and Plato and what would be his point of view on these authors would be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the very broad field of Platonic scholarship, we note that the most respected scholars have views that sometimes are completely different. On the one hand, it results from the richness and complexity of these works, on the other, it is also a consequence of different methods that the scholars use in approaching the Dialogues. In the light of that, a natural question emerges: How should we read the Dialogues? However, analyzing the different approaches used, we can see that the answers to a previous question often determines, even if tacitly, the answers to how to read the Dialogues and the approach used in practice. This previous question is the question about the main function of the Dialogues, which tends to be similar to the question about what are the Dialogues. For example, scholars that tend to focuse in the theses and arguments (instead of the literary elements) assume that they are dealing with “philosophical” works, which therefore should fullfil “philosophical” tasks, such as (according to certain conception often presupposed of philosophy) to define a concept, to answer a theoretical question with rational arguments and so on. On the other hand, scholars that tend to focuse in the dramatic and literary aspects assume that they are interpreting literary works which therefore do not need to accomplish philosophical tasks. Thus, I would like to challenge one of these hypothesis often used (even if implicitly) about the function of the Dialogues: the idea that these works or at least some of them are a defense of Socrates against the accusation that put him to death. Comparing the charge with some passages of the Dialogues, I intend to show that we should leave this hypothesis aside while reading the Dialogues. The exegetical benefits that might result from this are considerable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Phaedrus, Socrates produces a rhetorical speech in which the question of reminiscence appears as a fundamental activity: the soul remembering its divine origin. Through reminiscence, only the philosopher can go back to the divine origin of the soul, retrieving and understanding the truth, the being really existing and the intelligible forms. Phaedrus is distant from Socrates because he is not a philosopher, but close to him because, as a lover of speeches, he accompanies Socrates in the exercise of reminiscence to criticize and reconfigure Lysias' rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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ABSTRACT It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.

En este artículo se pretende mostrar bajo qué perspectiva surge el siguiente problema para la interpretación del Eutifrón, del Laques, y del Cármides: ¿en qué sentido ciertas preguntas, que Sócrates formula en términos de “¿qué es…?”, son discutidas “a la luz de casos” en cada uno de estos diálogos? Para mostrar que esta interrogante es un problema, se justifican los tres criterios que rigen la selección del Eutifrón, del Laques, y del Cármides, para investigar esta investigación. Estos criterios son: (i) los diálogos suelen ser considerados como “diálogos de definición”, (ii) los diálogos suelen ser citados en discusiones a favor o en contra de “la falacia socrática”, (iii) se asume que en los diálogos se presentan casos. En la primera sección del artículo se muestra que, cierta manera de interpretar a estos tres diálogos como “diálogos de definición” tiene un problema, y que ese problema persiste en las interpretaciones de quienes discuten “la falacia socrática”. En la segunda sección se sugiere cierta manera de entender que, en los diálogos en cuestión, se presentan “casos”, aplicando el concepto de caso esbozado por André Jolles en su obra Einfache Formen. Por último, se defiende que, investigando si los casos de cada uno de los diálogos son “casos” en el sentido sugerido, se puede avanzar en una interpretación de estos textos más precisa que las interpretaciones consideradas en la primera sección.

In the Symposium of Plato, Socrates reports that Diotima once described to him a process of initiation by which a lover rises from desiring one beautiful body to catching sight of what seems to be the Platonic form of beauty. Scholars have debated whether the lover is to make this ascent by a rational process or a non-rational one, or by both working either in concert or independently. This paper argues that love leads and guides a process in this initiation that necessarily involves rational activity. No teaching is necessary or appropriate, so that the process is an example of learning without being taught. The philosophical insight that results is life-changing, but it does not amount to the kind of knowledge that would fully satisfy a Socratic seeker after knowledge.

La búsqueda y el tratamiento de la valentía han sido llevados a cabo por Platón en numerosos diálogos, desde la temprana Apología hasta las Leyes, lo que indica la gran importancia que el filósofo ateniense concedía a esta cuestión. Por otro lado, la valentía es tratada en numerosos contextos diferentes —con diferentes interlocutores, diferentes temas y diferentes objetivos— que dan lugar a un nutrido número de aproximaciones a partir de las cuales cabe construir una visión bastante completa de lo que Platón entendía por valentía (andreía).

Este artigo tem o objetivo de expor a contra doutrina dionisíaca ao otimismo a partir da discussão sobre a interpretação que o filósofo Friedrich Nietzsche faz de Sócrates no livro O nascimento da tragédia. Nossa discussão traz em perspectiva a crítica nietzschiana ao denominado socratismo estético, o qual coloca a filosofia socrática longe da sua proposta para o dionisíaco na arte. Para tanto, reconstruímos os argumentos de Nietzsche e investigamos o alcance dos mesmos, como também apresentamos as considerações de Paul de Man sobre a tensão emergente. Como conclusão, apontamos para a abrangência dos conceitos de pessimismo e otimismo dentro do escopo construído.

This article aims at drawing attention to a series of inquiries that may and, in our view, still should be asked about a supposed, unique and definitive political doctrine of Plato. Then, initially, the following question is raised: The Republic, one of the most famous and commented dialogues written by Plato, would be in fact the only moment of "his" work in which this author would express "his" political theory (communist)? Supported by Hector Benoit's immanentist reading and interpretation of the Platonic dialogues, we hypothetize that Plato, not being Socrates, exposed - through a character called Athenian - in his last dialogue, The Laws, in the temporality of the lexis, a project of city radically different from that on The Republic. Such a project is based on the unity of contradictories for the educational formation of the inhabitants of a city composed of friends who really had all things in common; city that should be put into practice, and not just in the metaphysical soul of the philosopher, as Socrates idealistically proposed in The Republic. Thus, far from having abandoned, as some interpreters argue, his youthful communist positions, Plato would have in fact found them, at the end of his life, in a more rigorously determined way. At the end of our article, Marx and Lenin take on the leading role, which suggests that political theory is one of the guiding threads of the millennial dialectical tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Resumo: É conhecida a importância fundamental de Shakespeare para as artes e para o debate estético alemão nos séculos XVIII e XIX. O drama de Shakespeare foi apontado entre os alemães como uma verdadeira revolução cultural, o exemplo do gênio original em que deviam se mirar caso quisessem se desvencilhar das amarras do classicismo francês e desvendar sua própria originalidade. Este artigo pretende mostrar como Nietzsche dá continuidade a essa leitura ao apontar o drama shakespeariano também como um acontecimento que tinha a importância de uma revolução cultural entre os alemães. Shakespeare era o “Sócrates musicante”, o sinal do despertar do gênio trágico em solo alemão.

This article examines the role that humbling plays in Socratic practice. Specifically, we consider how Socrates humbles his interlocutors in order to turn them towards the pursuit of philosophical friendship. We argue against a standard interpretation of humbling in the Lysis, which holds that Socrates humbles Lysis by exposing his own ignorance to him at 210d. Instead, we argue that the humbling occurs not when Lysis is (allegedly) made aware of his own ignorance, but at 222d near the end of the dialogue, when Lysis is made to think that he is not as good a friend as he thought he was. On this reading, Socrates humbles Lysis not by exposing to him his ignorance about theoretical matters but by suggesting to him that he may be not the sort of person he thought he was.

In the present investigation, contrasting Plato's Socrates with Socrates' character that emerges from the texts and doxography from the Socratics, I present two hypotheses about who Socrates' erotic teacher was. On the one hand, there is the general doxographic hypothesis of the Socratics who point to Aspasia as his erotic teacher, since Aeschines and Xenophon, disciples of Socrates, as well as other philosophers and doxographers after the classical period (Alciphron, Athenaeus, Cicero, Philostratus, Lucian, Maximus of Tyre, Plutarch, Synesius, Victorinus), portray Aspasia as Socrates' teacher in the erotic arts. On the other hand, there is the Platonic innovation that presents Diotima as the true erotic guide of Socrates. I seek to demonstrate the importance of the priestess of Mantineia in the Banquet, since Diotima is directly associated with the platonic novelty of philosophical éros. Next, I indicate the possible reasons for this displacement (replacing Aspasia with Diotima as the central figure of philosophical éros and Socrates' erotic guide) carried out by Plato, focusing on how these reasons are linked to essential aspects of the erotic novelties proposed by Plato. Finally, I question whether this Platonic strategy, which limits the wisdom of Aspasia to just one of the subjects for which it was known (rhetoric), would not it be another one of the camouflages that philosophy made with the sophistic inheritances, in particular, of the Aspasian rhetorical-erotic sorceries that profoundly influenced Socratism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michel Foucault (1926-1984) when analyzing Plato's Apology of Socrates dialogue states that Socrates does not use rhetoric to defend himself against the accusations received in the Athenian court. He makes no use of a speech aimed at the adulation of the jury by commotion and pity. According to Foucault (2009), the philosopher makes use of frank speech (parresía) and seeks to examine the accusations received in search of the truth and the promotion of justice. Socrates follows his daímon's advice not to prepare a defense speech and practices examining the charges in court. Socrates acts against what was practiced in that space until then, putting his life at risk and being later sentenced to death for poisoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this brief article will be considered comparatively the passages of the platonic dialogues Phaedo (Pl. Phd 60b1-5) and Philebus (Pl. Phlb 46a8-11) in which Socrates uses the common attitude of rubbeding the skin as a starting point for reflections on the interdependent relationship of pleasure and pain, mediated by the body. The two passages will be studied by lexicography, in the study of the Greek terms employed by the philosopher in comparison with the meaning of the translations in Portuguese used. This approach will serve to investigate the common nature of both sensations, contributing to Plato's teaching in the gestures and words of Socrates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este trabajo tomo como eje el concepto de ironía para analizar el elenchos que Sócrates practica sobre las opiniones de Calicles en el diálogo Gorgias. Asumo como punto de partida que Sócrates aspira a que su interlocutor modifique su disposición anímica y adopte un modo de vida filosófico, abandonando el retórico. Para ello, desarrolla un elenchos irónico que posee tres momentos: una fingida aceptación por parte de Sócrates de la dicotomía presentada por Calicles entre la vida del político, digna de imitación, y la del filósofo, merecedora de reproche; una inversión de dicha dicotomía; y finalmente una puesta en cuestión de dicha inversión. Concluiré sosteniendo que este tercer momento constituye una nueva maniobra socrática para instar a Calicles a que suspenda sus actividades políticas y examine previamente con él, de manera filosófica, el camino para volverse virtuoso.

Sócrates es retratado como un aficionado de Homero en los diálogos de Platón, tanto explícitamente a través de su expresión de afecto y respeto a Homero desde niño (República 595b9-10), como implícitamente a través de sus numerosas citas y referencias. Del mismo modo, Sócrates utiliza con frecuencia referencias homéricas en los diálogos que Jenofonte escribió para preservar sus recuerdos. El estudio comparativo de estos autores hasta ahora sugiere que el Sócrates histórico se sirvió de Homero con frecuencia en su conversación. Sin embargo, también debería considerarse si ese retrato coincide con el Sócrates representado en las Nubes de Aristófanes, una fuente más contemporánea que las obras de Platón y Jenofonte. Este artículo examina la representación de Sócrates en las Nubes y argumenta que aquí, también, podemos encontrar un reflejo de su afecto a Homero, especialmente en su invocación de las Nubes en las líneas 265-74. También se considerará cómo esa representación de Sócrates puede afectar nuestra visión de Sócrates.

Resumo Busca-se, a partir do exame dos compromissos existenciais implicados pela prática filosófica dos dois pensadores, estipular uma série de convergências entre ambos. Porque tal associação parece improvável, se se tem em vista o combate dado por Nietzsche a formulações substantivas do repertório filosófico tradicional talvez autorizadas por Sócrates, importará oferecer ao final um balanço da reflexão também quanto a isso.

RESUMO Tendo o Livro I da “República” de Platão como seu horizonte de referência, este artigo pretende, enquanto apresenta sumariamente as posições defendidas por Sócrates e Trasímaco sobre a justiça, examinar suas principais implicações para nós, no sentido de estabelecer algumas pistas sobre como responder à pergunta feita em seu título, a saber, “como devemos viver?”.

El Fedón de Platón tiene como objetivo restaurar la reputación de Sócrates transformándolo de un chivo expiatorio político de Atenas a un héroe de la misma ciudad que lo había condenado a muerte. Como han demostrado los estudiosos, la heroización de Sócrates en el diálogo comparte afinidades con la tradición religiosa del culto al héroe (ver White, 2000; Nagy, 2015). En este artículo sostengo que la conceptualización del filósofo como héroe de culto se desarrolla más en República y Leyes. La República presenta a Sócrates como el "oikist" de la polis ideal, que toma decisiones religiosas bajo la autoridad del dios Apolo. En el mismo sentido, las clases distinguidas de los filósofos-gobernantes en República y de los auditores en Leyes se comparan con otro grupo también subsumido bajo la categoría de héroes de culto, los atletas olímpicos victoriosos.

La figura de Sócrates separa la historia del pensamiento en dos e inaugura un modelo de filosofía que impactó en toda la tradición posterior con la sola fuerza de su influjo y el halo totémico de su muerte trágica. No faltaron relatos de lo acaecido, pero entre ellos ninguno opaca a la Apología de Sócrates de Platón como texto fundamental para adentrarse en los pormenores del juicio y la condena. En este contexto poco suele tenerse en cuenta que se trata de un texto transido de opacidad. Parece un documento testimonial, una versión cuasi taquigráfica del proceso, pero no lo es. En efecto, nos interesa referirnos especialmente a un hecho que ha sido notado pero no del todo dimensionado: la Apología de Sócrates de Platón presenta similitudes imposibles de atribuir a la mera casualidad con la Apología de Palamedes de Gorgias. ¿Por qué este texto platónico presenta curiosas relaciones intertextuales con un ejercicio retórico basado en figuras míticas en el clima de la promoción de la retórica? Trataremos de responder esa pregunta apelando a su relación con el origen del diálogo socrático.

RESUMO Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. Para isso, há de se observar a relação da justiça com o governo e a força (krátos) que a determina. O intuito é reavivar as discussões hodiernas sobre as teses de Trasímaco dentro da filosofia platônica, assim como demonstrar sua importância para o âmbito da filosofia política.

Resumo O presente artigo discute o estatuto da figura de Sócrates em O nascimento da tragédia. Partindo da hipótese de que é insuficiente tratar de Sócrates apenas como antípoda de Nietzsche, como quer boa parte da fortuna crítica, desenvolvo a tese de que Sócrates é bem mais uma espécie de lente de aumento, a partir da qual o pensador analisa a origem e os desdobramentos modernos da cultura ocidental. Além disso, e principalmente, demonstro que a riqueza de antagonismos de que Nietzsche propositalmente lança mão em suas análises do filósofo grego indica uma de suas primeiras concepções do próprio criar filosófico.

O artigo pretende mostrar como a chamada “ironia socrática” desempenha papel central nas obras literárias e filosóficas de Schlegel, Tieck e Novalis.

This paper deals with the problem of determining Phaedrus’ age in the eponymous dialogue. The vocatives ὦ νεανία and ὦ παῖ, in Pl. Phdr. 257c8 and 267c6, could suggest that Plato depicts him as a teenager. However, most scholars believe that Phaedrus is an adult and that the vocatives point at his passive and childish character. I will first summarize the evidence given for supporting the latter thesis. Then, I offer complementary evidence, showing that those vocatives mockingly compare his passiveness with that of a young beloved in a homoerotic context.

Plato’s Symposium has no less than three dramatic dates: its narrative frame is placed in 401 BCE; Agathon’s dinner party is envisaged as having occurred in 416; finally, Plato makes Socrates meet Diotima in 440 BCE. I will argue that the multi-level chronology of the Symposium should be approached along the lines of Socrates’ intellectual history as placed against the background of Greek ideas of age classes (also exploited in the Republic). As a result, the Symposiumfunctions as a retrospective of Socrates’ life, which uses the traditional concept of ages of man to create a paradigm of philosophical life.

Plato’s Gorgias concerns the tension between political and philosophical power. In it, Socrates and Gorgias discuss rhetoric’s power, which Gorgias claims is universal, containing all powers, enabling the rhetorician to rule over others politically. Polus and Callicles develop Gorgias’s understanding of rhetoric’s universal power. Scholars addressing power’s central focus rightly distinguish Socrates’ notion of philosophical power from Gorgias’s. However, these authors make this distinction too severe, failing to acknowledge the kinship between philosophy and politics. This paper argues that Socrates’ notion of power has its origins in Gorgias’s, but instead of seeking to persuade others, philosophy primarily concerns self-persuasion.

"Socratism despises instinct and, with it, art. It denies wisdom just where it is in its most proper reign". With this quote from The Dionysian world's view Nietzsche shows up how he takes the philosophy's most emblematic figure since the phylosophy's birth in a duel. Nietzsche starred a duel with Socrates, or rather with what his represents in the course of Western thought. Nietzsche will regard Socrates as a kind of philosopher-antipode that will be present in early Nietzschean's writings to the later works. The term 'socratism' encompasses a number of consequences not exactly to Socrates's philosophy, but to the way within the German philosopher considers the master of Plato legacy's as a cultural degeneration to what is here called Socrates's sickness, other the sickness that is Socrates. Our intention here is to put in question this legacy. To overcome the metaphysics where the socratism as a disease takes place, our author calls the tragic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expression ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης used by Aristophanes in Birds has been interpreted in different ways. However, the fact that the comediographer compares the action of invoking the souls of the dead to Odysseus, ὥσπερ Οὑδυσσεύς, suggests that book 11 of the Odyssey was the model that inspired the scene. Many platonic passages from Protagoras, Republic, Gorgias, Phaedo and Apology explain which could have been the cause of the aristophanic parody: Socrates’ propensity to mention Odysseus in his descriptions of what is awaiting for the souls in Hades after the death.

In Plat. Prot. 349d2-351b2, first Socrates leads Protagoras to acknowledge that wisdom and courage are the same thing, then Protagoras accuses him of having put in his mouth words that he never said. Starting from a new reconstruction of the logic of Socrates’ demonstration, I will show how this is more complex, sophistic, and corresponding to Protagoras’ accusation than what is usually believed.

Reseña de Gutiérrez, D. Sócrates y la práctica de la espiritualidad (2019).

Em sua segunda filosofia, Ludwig Wittgenstein apresenta um método por exemplos com o intuito de resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos. De acordo com Wittgenstein, em vez de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos, como Sócrates demandava de seus interlocutores, caberia aos filósofos dar exemplos dos conceitos a fim de responder às questões tradicionais da filosofia, como “O que é o conhecimento?”, “O que é a amizade?”, “O que é o justo?”. Neste artigo, não apenas se argumenta que o método por exemplos de Wittgenstein nunca poderia resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos porque diferentes pessoas dão diferentes exemplos de um conceito, sendo impossível decidir objetivamente quais são os exemplos certos e quais são os exemplos errados, como se analisa o fato de que Wittgenstein desconsiderou esse empecilho ao sucesso de seu método ao elaborá-lo. Além disso, reitera-se neste texto o dever dos filósofos de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos.

Las reflexiones de Sócrates se centran primordialmente sobre la ética, su filosofía parece ser más práctica que especulativa. Sin embargo, existen algunos elementos que podrían considerarse principios, en términos aristotélicos, que darían soporte a las nociones socráticas sobre los actos ordenados y el alma como ordenadora de la persona. Estos elementos, κόσμος y ψυχή se presentan en Sócrates como innovaciones frente a la especulación filosófica de sus predecesores. En el presente ensayo se desarrollan como en la reflexión de los filósofos presocráticos evolucionan estos conceptos hasta Sócrates y cómo esto influyó en el modo en el que concibe las acciones humanas como buenas o no.

Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.

This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue (PSV). It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons (2014), and then I adapt these concepts so as to render them apt to be used in the formulation I intend to offer. In the third section I present my formulation of the PSV using the concepts introduced in the second section and explain why I believe this formulation is better than the one offered by Vlastos.

A discussão entre Trasímaco e Sócrates no Livro I da República de Platão dá vigor à questão da justiça iniciada com Céfalo. Trasímaco é um personagem importante da obra, pois vai relacionar a justiça ao governo da cidade. Isso faz com que a justiça saia da esfera individual e entre na esfera pública. Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. O problema da consistência das teses é antigo entre os comentadores e apresenta diferentes soluções. Nosso intuito é propor uma solução para o problema e relacionar isto à arte do governo proposta por Trasímaco. Isso nos permite verificar a maneira pela qual Sócrates e Trasímaco diferem entre si em suas propostas de governo e dos tipos de governante. Desse modo, nosso trabalho pretende contribuir com a literatura platonista sobre o papel ocupado por Trasímaco dentro da obra de Platão.

This paper focuses on the figure and the role of Aspasia in Aeschines’ eponymous dialogue, with special regard to the Milesian’s ‘paideutic’ activity and the double bond connecting it to Socrates’ teaching, namely the elenctic method and a particular application of Σωκρατικὸς ἔρως. The study aims to highlight some crucial traits of Aeschines’ Aspasia by examining three key texts, all numbered among the testimonies on the Aspasia: Cicero’s account in De inventione 1.31.51-53 and two fundamental passages from Xenophon’s Memorabilia (2.3.36) and Oeconomicus (3.14). After analysing a set of ancient sources which repeatedly mention the close and personal association between Socrates and Aspasia (Plato, Maximus of Tyre, Plutarch, Theodoret of Cyrus), I will try to reconstruct the dialogical context of Xenophon’s testimonies and to combine them with Cicero’s account. My final aim is to clarify the role of Aspasia in Aeschines’ presentation of the Socratic theory of ἔρως. In pursuing this main objective, in the concluding section I will address two further issues: (1) Aspasia’s connection with the figure of Diotima, as depicted in the same ancient sources and (2) the relationship between Aspasias’ pedagogical use of ἔρως and that made by Socrates in the Alcibiades.

The foundation of political philosophy, which means, according to Arendt, the attempt of producing an escape from politics altogether, can be understood as a moment of what Foucault called the history of Western’s will to knowledge. According to this hypothesis, we examine Arendt’s analysis of the transformation from action to rulership in Plato and Foucault’s reading of the exclusion of sophism by Aristotle. We show the differences between the archaeology of a pre-political philosophy world that Arendt reconstructs, based on an ambiguous restitution of Socrates, and the strategic theory of discourse which Foucault discovers in sophistic. We finally examine the political consequences of this difference, specially concerning a reconsideration of the traditional relations between thinking and acting.

Copyright of Hypnos is the property of Hypnos / Instituto Hypnos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An issue that bears continuous interest concerning Socrates is to determine the best terms to understand the link between his life and his philosophical practice. This paper aims to essay an introductory debate about this question. Thus, we begin with a reconstruction, in general lines, of the three main direct sources testimony, go forward from there to some current formulations with respect to the theme of examination to, lastly, review the whole question it in the light of the death of Socrates and of the deployments provided by his example regarding this point, now in the sphere of hellenistic schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RESUMO: O presente artigo tem por intuito analisar o Julgamento de Sócrates e a sua interpretação na atualidade. Discorre-se inicialmente acerca do conceito de justiça para o filósofo Sócrates. Em seguida, analisa-se o julgamento deste, comentando os principais pontos. Por fim, faz-se uma comparação entre a repercussão que o julgamento teve antigamente, com a que ele tem na atualidade, procurando demonstrar tal evolução. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Julgamento; Justiça; Atualidade; Sócrates; Evolução.

Este artículo intenta mostrar, de manera muy sintética y casi programática, la necesidad e incluso urgencia, aunque a la vez la dificultad, la imposibilidad quizás, en el mundo actual, de una orientación “socrática” de la pedagogía (en el sentido en que será definido aquí este término), como vía de emancipación de las personas.

Pretende-se oferecer aqui uma justificativa, tal como ela parece ter sido indicada por Platão no Teeteto, para o método de Sócrates, anunciado em Apologia como uma anthropíne sophía, capaz de avaliar os diferentes tipos de conhecimento. O recurso à imagem da maiêutica, no Teeteto, traz a representação de um aspecto desse método, posterior à refutação (élenkhos), em que o examinador ou parteiro elevam as opiniões do interlocutor até um princípio transcendente, para mostrar-lhes ou sua vacuidade ou sua solidez. Por fim, o Diálogo de Platão parece não apenas representar o método de Sócrates, mas se inspirar nele para a composição do seu discurso, que joga com a forma de fazer ver e com aquilo que se vê a partir dele.