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As early as in the 1950s, especially in connection with the events of the fall of 1956 in Hungary, the need appeared for the formation of the Soviet doctrine of intrabloc policy aimed at keeping under the military-political control of the USSR (if it was necessary – by force) the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, which fell under its influence as the result of the Second World War. However, this policy demanded its detailed ideological foundation as late as in 1968, when a large-scale military action was undertaken by five member countries of the Warsaw Pact to suppress the “Prague Spring”. The concept of the Soviet foreign policy towards the bloc allies, which was reflected in some program manifestations of 1968, as defined in the West as the doctrine of limited sovereignty or the “Brezhnev doctrine”. Polish crisis of 1980–1981 demonstrated the objective limits that stood in the way of the practical application of this doctrine. With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his team in 1985 the Soviet leadership launched a revision of the principles of its policy towards the allied countries but it was not inclined to exert pressure on the communist leaders of Eastern Europe to reassess the specific facts of the Allies’ military intervention in the internal affairs of these countries. The official revision of the Soviet concept, which affirmed the principle of collective responsibility for what is happening in one of the bloc’s allied countries, was announced on December 1989, after the “velvet revolution” in Czechoslovakia.

The Ceauşescu regime in Romania, which sought to weaken Soviet influence in the country and deviated significantly in its foreign policy from the general line of the Soviet bloc, from the very beginning did not support Moscow’s power pressure on the Czechoslovak reformers who initiated the Prague Spring. Ceauşescu and his team, who had no thought of making the “human face” of the Czechoslovakian or any other socialism, watched the events through the prism of their own national-communist doctrine. Thereby they viewed the Prague Spring only as a movement for the expansion of national sovereignty, and in Czechoslovak reform, communists saw their potential allies in the struggle for Romania’s full independence in the international arena, its liberation from the dominant Soviet influence. Sharply denouncing the intervention of August 21, 1968, in Czechoslovakia, the communist leaders of Romania did not exclude the military threat against its own country, adopting a whole range of defensive measures. Later, recognizing that neither Tito’s Yugoslavia, nor China, nor Western countries, will render Romania effective military assistance in case of an attack from outside, the Romanian leaders made efforts to renew a broad dialogue with the USSR.

Автор исследует военные и невоенные факторы, способствовавшие обострению «кризиса евроракет», такие как давление на руководство США со стороны их союзников, разочарование на Западе результатами «разрядки», стремление со­ветского руководства активизировать общественное движение на Западе про­тив «империалистической политики». «Кризис евроракет» ускорил консерва­тивный поворот в европейских странах. Разместив современные ракетные ком­плексы в Европе, СССР достиг кратковременного военного преимущества. Объя­вив программу Стратегической оборонной инициативы (СОИ, Strategic Defense Initiative), США вернули себе стратегическую инициативу. Военно-силовая стра­тегия «баланса сил» в Европе потерпела поражение, создав предпосылки пере­хода к «балансу интересов». The author analyses the military and non-military factors that contributed to exacerbate the “crisis euromissiles”, such as pressure on the U. S. government by their allies, the disappointment of the West countries with the results of detente, the desire of the Soviet leadership to strengthen the social movement in the West against the “imperialist policy”. “Crisis euromissiles” accelerated conservative trends among the European countries. Placing new missile systems in Europe, the Soviet Union reached a short-term military advantage. Announcing Strategic Defense Initiative and deployment euromissiles, USA regained the strategic initiative. So military strategy of “balance of power” in Europe has failed and set the stage transition to a “balance of interests”.