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Common slave (servus communis) is a slave who belongs to two masters. Both masters may entirely dispose with the slave because their joint ownership allows it. However, acquisitions through common slave (servus communis) is not that clear. Does a slave evenly oblige co-masters or only the master on whose behalf he has acted? Is it possible for a slave to work in the interest of one master and oblige another? Who does the unconscientious slave correspond to, the third party or a betrayed master? This paper will analyze the opinions of two Roman iurists, which will partly solve doubts that this institute causes.

Roman lawyers interpreted causation in a very specific way, without any abstractions or generalisations, existence or non-existence of causation was established in each particular case ( ad hoc). They did not establish the existence of the causation between an act of a tortfeasor and a harmful result, but causation had to exist between the culpa of the tortfeasor and the result. Initially, it was necessary for the causation to be direct, made with active doing body to body (damnum corpori corpore datum). With the time, the narrow understanding of causation was overcome and indirect causation started to be appreciated, while the human behavior could exclusively be omissive. Aquilian's casuistry is very rich with the cases of problematic causation. Meanwhile, these elementary rules for resolving a particular case in practice proved insufficient and incomplete, since unique life circumstances had created a need for a more complex view of causation.

In Rome, legal status of woman and her factual possibilities of impact on public life were in serious discrepancy. General attitude of the legal status of woman in time of Romans is best shown by Papinian, 'In many provisions of our law, the position of woman is worse than of man (D.9.1.5.)'. Every free Roman woman was considered a subject of law, according to classical Roman law. Nevertheless, there were extensive legislations that limited her legal and business capacity. Naturally, woman did not have legal personality in all periods of Roman state and her legal status was adjusted to the factual changes that had occurred in Roman society. What makes her position specific in Rome is progressive social role that did not exist in Greek-Asian world. From these previously mentioned views, which were confronting, it is possible to draw some doubts. Was woman really on the margins of political happenings, or was she an actual actor, even initiator, of some political events?.

In this paper the author attempts to differentiate cases in which liability for damage is not excluded regardless of the (non)existence of fault of the offender, i.e. existence of intention or neglect/negligence, whence the ultimate aim of the paper is to prove that objective liability in Roman law did not exist as a burden of past and primitive animosity but as casuistics, which inevitably signifies a rather mature legalistic judgement of Roman legalists and pretors. Although Romans had not accepted the possibility of representation for a long time, they had however accepted noxal liability from the earliest times as a ligitimate form of liability for another. Although cases of objective liability mentioned in this paper have not left a significant trace on modern legislation, they are considered intriguing for their original legal solutions and thus deserve detail theoretical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]