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When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, it brought many social and cultural changes. One of them was suppressing the widespread culture of holding and carrying arms that existed in Ottoman Bosnia. Holding arms was still possible but under strict control. Firearm holders were, therefore, a very tiny, privileged group inside society. In this paper, we analyze the ethnic/religious and social structure of this group in the case of the Tuzla Circle in 1904. How large was this group? Were there differences along ethnic and social lines in terms of firearm holding rates? These are the key questions we are seeking answers to in this paper, with an aim to get the first insight into the broader picture of firearm holding in the entire province under the Monarchy’s control.

Ignoring the historical context of the events in a city that had been under siege for nearly a month, the debates surrounding May 2nd and 3rd, 1992, which exclusively focus on the deaths of members of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) at various locations in the city, including Dobrovoljacka Street, continue without interruption. The citizens of Sarajevo killed during those two days are nowhere mentioned, and their memory is not included in the official memorialization of the city's siege. Furthermore, within the interpretation of the events on Dobrovoljacka Street, there is a noticeable continuous strategy aimed at connecting all the deceased JNA members at the end of April and the beginning of May with the events on Dobrovoljacka Street, effectively camouflaging the previous attacks on the city and the involvement of the JNA in them. Therefore, it was important for us in the first part of our work to point to documents from the Command of the 2nd Military District related to the participation of the JNA in digging artillery positions around the city, their role in the division of Sarajevo's districts along national lines, the relocation of weaponry to „safer areas“ where the Serbian population constituted an absolute ethnic majority, the initiation of the attack on the city, the first casualties in April, as well as the shelling and the burning of residential, cultural-historical, religious, economic, and other facilities in the city. All events that preceded the actual siege of Sarajevo, starting from the autumn of 1991, including the war in Croatia and the subsequent occupation of Bosnian cities, contributed to the perception of the JNA as an enemy force by the citizens of Sarajevo and all pro-Bosnian forces. The shelling of Sarajevo with weaponry and armaments previously positioned on the hills and mountains around the city, in particular, intensified the animosity towards the JNA from the citizens of Sarajevo. The main part of the work will address the chronological sequence of events in the city during May 2nd and 3rd, 1992, street battles in multiple locations in the city, including sites such as the JNA House, Marin Dvor, Skenderija, in front of the National Theater, UPI building, Workers' University Djuro Đakovic (now: Bosnian Cultural Center - BKC), Estrada café, in front of the Command of the 2nd Military District, and ultimately Dobrovoljacka Street. This section will also discuss all other locations where battles took place, as well as the shelling, infantry and sniper activities directed towards civilian objects in the city, which resulted in casualties among the civilian population. Numerous internet sources contain information about 42 JNA members who perished on Dobrovoljacka Street, and this number is always mentioned on the anniversary of the event. However, through a comparison with official sources, we have analyzed how many JNA members genuinely died on Dobrovoljacka Street, how many died at other locations where street battles took place during the city's attack, and how many names on the mentioned list have incomplete identities with unknown locations and times of death. Additionally, based on multiple primary historical sources and relying on the previously interpreted context of events in the city, the work will present the locations and identities of the killed members of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as civilians who were killed in the city during May 2nd and 3rd, 1992. Various scientific methods were employed for this purpose, with an emphasis on analytical-documentary and comparative processing of primary and secondary sources of diverse origin, statistical data analysis, interview methods, particularly focusing on several target groups of interviewees crucial for the reconstruction and contextualization of these events. In the final chapter, we will address the (non-)prosecution of crimes, including the most serious crimes committed against the civilian population and civilian facilities in Sarajevo from April 5th to the beginning of May 1992.

The area of Sarajevo at the beginning of April 1992 was violently divided. Units of the 4th Corps of the 2nd Military District of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the armed forces that were gathered and supported the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) as well as many local and foreign volunteers and mercenaries occupied strategic positions in and around Sarajevo. Open armed aggression began after Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as an international independent state. After that, Sarajevo was blocked and put under siege for almost four years. After the partial withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2nd Military District of the JNA was transformed into a part of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (VSr RBiH), from August 1992 under the name of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). Through the transformation, the 4th Corps of the JNA became the Sarajevo-Romanian Corps (SRK) VSr RBiH. In the period of the four-year siege of Sarajevo, in order to control Sarajevo, the said forces carried out a “coordinated systematic and long-term campaign of shelling and sniping” in order to “kill, maim, injure and terrorize the civilian population of Sarajevo”. In addition to artillery attacks, which were the most widespread way in which the inhabitants of Sarajevo were killed, another frequent way of killing was sniper attacks. The sniper clearly sees his victim and kills him with intent. Residents of Sarajevo were intentional victims of sniper attacks and were not safe anywhere. Without water, electricity, gas and other necessities of life, the residents fought a daily struggle for bare survival. It was a day and night fight for survival. Cruel individual and mass murders of civilians, including those of the youngest residents, followed by daily wounding, terrorizing, violations of psychological integrity, illegal actions and others, are part of the crimes committed against the inhabitants of Sarajevo in the period 1992-1995. years. Guided primarily by the verdicts and documents of the International Tribunal for War Crimes in The Hague, as well as other relevant archival documents and the statements and expertise of experts, the author shows in her work what the sniping campaign meant. A very important part is the display and description of the types of weapons that were used in such operations, as well as the description of localities and parts of the city from which snipers were most often used. Based on these data, it is very clear to see what the daily life of the inhabitants of the city under siege looked like. The organization of sniper training as well as the places where the training was conducted and in what way are also important parts of the work. The demand and delivery of sniper weapons and ammunition to the Sarajevo-Romania Corps, as well as the identities of the snipers, as well as hired mercenaries and volunteers from other countries, are parts of the work presented by the author. Based on the examples of the victims of sniping, primarily the killing of children, it is clear that the enemy's goal was to kill civilians with intent, directly and in a targeted manner. In this section, the investigated and identified minor victims of sniper attacks as well as the circumstances of the murder are presented in chronological order. As a clear indication that the sniper's intention was to kill them or seriously injure them with permanent consequences, the parts of the body that were hit, which are very often the head, the area around the heart, the stomach, and the lungs, are also shown. In the final part of the paper, the emphasis is on the prosecution and non-prosecution of persons responsible for crimes committed by snipers, before domestic and international courts. Although there is irrefutable evidence of sniper killings of Sarajevo residents, very few or no indictments are filed against those responsible. The direct perpetrators - snipers, who killed the inhabitants of Sarajevo with intent, have not yet been brought to justice and convicted of the crime.

The cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were in the period 1992-1995. were under siege or surrounded by Serbian forces, were exposed to continuous mortar and artillery attacks from positions controlled by the VRS. Locations that were regarded as mass gathering places for people, such as markets, squares, schools, kindergartens, children's parks, hospitals, city transport vehicles were very often the targets of sudden shelling, which resulted in mass killings of civilians. Exactly the same methods were applied by the Serbian forces in all the cities that were declared safe zones by the United Nations. In this paper, applying a historical approach, the massacre at the Tuzla Gate was analyzed on May 25, 1995, which was one of the saddest days in the history of the city of Tuzla, when 71 civilians were killed and 173 civilians were wounded by shrapnel from a grenade fired from the direction of Ozren. , which represents the largest number of victims and the most massive crime from a single shell during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the indispensable interpretation of the political and military context at the time of the crime at the Tuzla Gate, and the then-current NATO attacks on the positions of the VRS, the work also deals with the analysis of the minutes of the investigation of the Prosecutor's Office and the Security Service Center of the MUP of RBiH, the investigative actions of the United Nations carried out on the ground the places immediately after the crime, the daily reports of UNPROFOR, as well as the reactions that followed this crime. Immediately after the massacre, representatives of investigative bodies, the Municipality of Tuzla, archival institutions, journalists, intellectuals and citizens of Tuzla made a significant contribution in documenting the facts of the crime committed. On the first anniversary of the massacre, 5/25/1996. In the book The Dawn Murder, photographs and short biographical data with a lot of emotional content about each victim, their occupation, an exact description of the circumstances of the crime, as well as the exact place where they were at the time of the crime were published. The smiles in the photos full of liveliness are forever stopped in their interrupted youth, but through the mentioned book, as well as through the permanent exhibition of the Kapija Memorial Center, they continue to live permanently in the memories of their fellow citizens of Tuzla, Bosnians and Herzegovina, with a message to future generations: You don't just live here to live, one does not live here only to die, one dies here to live. Respecting everything that the people of Tuzla have done in terms of memorialization of crimes, collective memory and memory, the mentioned activities can certainly serve as an example to other cities, where civilians were killed in the same or similar way. The Archives of the Tuzla Canton have important materials about the massacre, such as the “Tuzlanska Kapija” Collection of documents, and I am extremely grateful to the management and collaborators of the Archives for allowing me access to the said documentation. The judgment in the Đukić case (2009, 2010 and 2014) also offered very significant answers to crucial questions regarding the direction of the shelling, as well as the responsibility of Novak Đukić and TG Ozren for the aforementioned criminal offense, in which the aforementioned issues are discussed in an argumentative manner, with plenty of evidence. . Without major ambitions to enter into a discussion about the complexity of the mentioned case in relation to the question of how Đukić, even without having served his prison sentence, found himself free, we note that there was a lot of discussion about the incorrect application of the law (CZ BiH 2003-CZ SFRY 1976) regarding the height punishments, while the facts established in the Judgment were not called into question. The documentation that was used in the Đukić case was also available to me for research. It was extremely important to analyze the aforementioned material from the point of view of historians, and I am also very grateful to the associates of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina for providing it. A special research focus in this paper relates to the contextualization of the mentioned crime, the clarification of what preceded the massacre itself, as well as the reactions that followed. The paper is structured into five chapters, which deal with the circumstances that preceded the massacre at the Tuzla Gate, the killing of youth on Youth Day, investigations after the massacre, reactions and military intervention, while the final chapter discusses the revision of historical facts and the denial of the court verdict in the case. Novak Djukic.

Urban areas, depending on their characteristics, have different effects on the engagement of forces and equipment and the manner in which military operations are conducted. The characteristics of these areas that are important for conducting operations are position, location, shape, size, the method of construction, the layout of the street network, the existence of underground facilities, plants, etc. Their complexity is one of the greatest challenges for planners of these operations. To conduct operations in urban areas, forces are expected to be modular and thus flexible, and adaptable to a constantly changing environment. It is necessary to focus on smaller units that are in the field, up to company level. Their most important feature is to disperse fast, and then quickly concentrate towards target. The discussion between scientific and military circles is whether to establish special forces to fight in an urban area or to use the existing ones with certain technological solutions and futuristic weapons. The consideration of the type of weapons that will be used in these military operations in urban areas is primarily related to the issue of the protection of civilians. The use of weapons that have limited effect (do not break through several walls) and weapons that do not cause additional effects (such as fire, unnecessary destruction) should be the choice of modern armies in military operations in urban areas. The issue of command and control is also one of the challenges that modern armed forces conducting military operations in urban areas face. In this context, modern technology (robots, sensors, satellites, etc.) can be of great help to the forces conducting these military operations. On the other hand, they are very expensive for most armies in the world. The logistical challenges are also very great when it comes to military operations in urban areas. The increased use of food and water, as well as greater consumption of ammunition pose additional challenges for planners and logisticians of these operations, which, above all, have to be taken into account when planning these operations. In any case, the issue of future military operations in urban areas should not be a taboo subject because it is expected that there will be more and more of them in the future. Population movement has made suburbs huge and a major challenge for military forces, even greater than urban centres. Distinguishing combatants from non-combatants, providing basic necessities for civilians during operations, the use of conventional and unconventional combat equipment are some of the challenges that planners of operations in urban areas have also to consider. The detailed analyses of previous operations in urban areas, transformation of these identified lessons into lessons learned, adaptation of training and equipment for such operations are some of the first steps that should be taken. Special emphasis should be placed on the need to study more the topic of combat in urban areas in operations of battalions and brigades and to be as much as possible an integral part of the training process of these units.

The paper is an attempt to show the role of the Jasenovac concentration camp in the destruction of peoples from different parts of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) based on partially revised list „Victims of War 1941–1945” from 1964. On the basis of achieved results in the process of revision of the census list, a calculation of the total losses of the civilians of Yugoslavia, of those in the NDH and its regions, with particular focus on losses in the Jasenovac camp was made. The losses in Jasenovac were analyzed through the prism of the general losses of the civilian population of NDH during the war, in all its parts. They were all compared with the demographic structure of the population of the NDH and its regions. Jasenovac camp system, was the largest concentration camp in the NDH, where a quarter of all killed civilians in this territory lost their lives (24.53%). The scope of the crimes committed in the Jasenovac camp clearly identify it as a destruction camp. The victims in Jasenovac were brought to the camp from all parts of the NDH. Most of the dead were originally from the two regions with which the camp was bordering, 30.60% from Slavonia and 25.13% from Bosanska Krajina, with 12.62% of losses originating from Eastern Bosnia. The victims from 4 regions had a greater share in losses in Jasenovac than their representation in the population of NDH, Banija 2.25 times, Bosnian Krajina 2.14 times, Slavonia 2.13 times and Srem 1.19 times, while Kordun had equal share. The victims of the other 7 NDH regions had much less participation in the losses in Jasenovac than their representation in the population, from 19.12 and 11.21 times lower in the part of Dalmatia and Lika, up to 2.27 and 1.23 times lower in Northwestern Croatia and Eastern Bosnia. Jasenovac was the site of the death of half of all killed Slavonia civilians (54.11%), two fifths from Srem (38.30%), one third of killed civilians from Banija (32.73%), a quarter from Northwestern Croatia (26.70% ) and Bosanska Krajina (23.27%), but also minimal parts of the killed civilians from Lika (1.28%), Dalmatia (3.49%) and Herzegovina (5.57%). Jasenovac was the central place of death in the NDH, where 78.08% of all victims of the Roma lost their lives, 61.68% of the victims of the Jews, 23.24% of Serbian civilian victims, 11.81% of Croats, 3.50% of Muslims and 4.39% of members of other and unknown nationalities. In nine of the twelve NDH regions, Serbs accounted for the bulk of the loss of prisoners in the camp, everywhere with a predominant majority of 92.43% in the Bosnian Krajina and 91.85% in Banija, up to 54.87% in Srem, the Jews were majority in two regions (Eastern Bosnia 55,35% i Northwest Croatia 36,21%), and the Romas in one. Three-quarters of Serbs killed the Jasenovac (74.61%) come from three regions (36.88% from Bosanska Krajina, 27.20% from Slavonia, 10.53% from Banija). Of all Serb civilians victims from Slavonia, 55.54% lost their lives in Jasenovac, as well as 33.99% of Serb civilian victims from Northwestern Croatia, 33.70% from Banija, 28.34% from Srem, 23.50% from Bosanska Krajina, while the share of victims of Jasenovac in the other seven regions was far smaller or minimal (Lika 0.89%). Half of all Jews victims in Jasenovac were from Eastern Bosnia (47.65%), with 21.27% from Northwestern Croatia and 18.63% of Slavonia, while 12.45% were from the other nine regions. While in Eastern Bosnia almost all Jews lost their lives in Jasenovac (90.74%), from Jews from Slavonia and Northwestern Croatia, 54.69% and 35.89% of them were killed in that camp. Of the dead Roma in Jasenovac, 59.95% originated from Slavonia, where life was lost by four fifths of all the Romas victims from Slavonia, Srem and Northwestern Croatia. Of the Croats killed in Jasenovac, 45.92% were from northwestern Croatia, while 43.22% of the Muslims killed in the camp were from the Bosnian Krajina.

War as a method of dispute resolution has been present since ancient times. The consequences of the war affect the civilian population, perhaps even more than members of armed forces. Among civilian victims the war makes the greatest impact on women and children. Therefore, it is necessary to pay more attention to this category of persons who are protected in armed conflicts. The existing international norms and rules clearly indicate that a certain degree of protection is achieved, but in this area of constant improvement is necessary. This paper analyses the existing rules, noting where protection could be improved. The work is divided into two parts. The first relates to the special protection of women in armed conflict, and the other is dedicated to the protection of children. In both parts the attention has been given to the normative solutions in written International Humanitarian Law and international custom law. All four Geneva Conventions of 1949 has been reviewed. Additional protocols to these Conventions have also been a part of the research. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179029: Srbija u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima: Strateški pravci razvoja i učvršćivanja položaja Srbije u međunarodnim integrativnim procesima - spoljnopolitički, međunarodno ekonomski, pravni i bezbednosni aspekti]

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