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In the present revision, it will be argued that two prestigious but incompatible linguistic theories (the generative and the systemic-functional) have been able to disconfirm and confirm some particular hypotheses from the basis of different pieces of empirical evidence. The particular confirmations of one theory or the other, are never conclusive, among other things, because there are apparently crucial experiences whose effects seem to favor (or contradict) one of the two theories considered. Both the generative and the systemic-functional theory are (like the rest of scientific theories) under-determined by the available evidence, however, this fact has not been an unavoidable obstacle for their development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generative and systemic-functional theories may be conceived as scientific theories: they have confirmed hypotheses, they provide explanations, and based on these explanations, they make predictions. Nevertheless, both theories use incompatible assumptions about the same object: language. After analyzing the problem of confirmations and explanations in linguistics, this incompatibility will be treated in terms of "a principle of complementarity": Language is, simultaneously, a "faculty of the mind" and a "product of culture," but both aspects (the "mental" and the "cultural") cannot be captured by any single theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two mature and renowned linguistic theories --the generative and the functional-- hold incompatible hypotheses. In spite of that, both have made successful confirmations. Given that in science there are no crucial refutations, incompatibility does not pose an insurmountable problem to the development of linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]