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The article "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic" is a review of the book of the same name written by Daniel Cohnitz and Luis Estrada-González. The book offers a contemporary and accessible introduction to the philosophy of logic, addressing topics such as terminology, standard logic, first and second-order logic, logical constants, the metaphysical status of logic, the revisability of logic, logical pluralism, and the laws of logic. It is a valuable resource for logic students and teachers, analyzing principles and objections related to deductive reasoning. It also explores the relationship between logic and other disciplines such as mathematics, cognitive science, and philosophy. In summary, the book offers a wide range of topics to delve into the philosophy of logic and highlights its importance in knowledge. [Extracted from the article]

The article presents a bibliographic selection on non-classical logics, which have proliferated in the last 60 years. These logics include logical systems such as non-monotonic logics, free logics, and intuitionistic logics. The article is divided into three inquiry sets: foundation, applications, and permanence, and offers a representative selection of theoretical production in this field. Various authors and relevant works in the field of non-classical logic are mentioned, addressing topics such as second-order logic, temporal logic, and abduction logic, among others. Applications of logic in social sciences and computational decision-making are also mentioned. [Extracted from the article]

The article is a review of the book "Philosophical Logic: A Contemporary Introduction" written by John MacFarlane. The book addresses logical systems and the epistemological and ontological foundations of the discipline. The author defends the ambiguity of the term "philosophical logic" and argues that both philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic are necessary to understand the nature of logic. The book focuses on issues of the philosophy of logic, such as the nature of quantifiers, logical truth, and logical consequence. The validity of modus ponens in logic and its relationship with reasoning are analyzed. It is emphasized that logic is a restricted symbolic system, independent of other beliefs, while reasoning is a broader cognitive phenomenon. It is mentioned that logical orthodoxy can become perverse by considering arguments valid that are not understandable to common thought. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Opuntia Brava is the property of Universidad de Ciencias Pedagogicas de Las Tunas, Centro de Documentacion e Informacion Pedagogica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law is the property of Revus - European Constitutionality Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to reconstruct part of Adam of Wodeham's theory of reflexibility. This reconstruction is based on the analysis that he himself offers from a fragment in De Anima III.2 425b 11-17. In this fragment, Wodeham argues that we can access certain of our own mental states --i. e. first-order intuitive cognitions-- through certain second-order states --i. e. intuitive reflexive cognitions--. However, for Wodeham, in virtue of a second-order intuition, an agent cannot access to the content of a first order-state. This is not consistent with the idea that the content of an intuitive cognition is intrinsically determined, for if this was the case, theoretically we could access such content in virtue of a second-order state directed at the first one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on our teaching experience, is evidence of the need to give more relevance Prolog in the initial course of Mathematical Logic, showing how through the use of Prolog is possible to develop many ideas in students, among which stand out the understanding of exercises purely procedural and specification for resolving situations declaratively. This learning process can be generated by building a solid knowledge base in both propositional logic, as in first-order logic. This is why it seeks to expose in this article some of the alternatives to using Prolog (and other declarative programming languages like Lisp) for educational purposes, given that it is considered, among others, a programming language, a tool for development of expert systems, a support for teaching programming logic and a tool that gives the student a better approach to artificial intelligence and a possible interconnection between these two areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizational world will always have goals to reach and obstacles to fight, in order to reach those goals. Identifying and representing goals and problems are previous stages in solving problems and establishing goals. These tasks are commonly made in natural language, and no formal methods are used on them. For this reason, in this paper we propose first-order predicate-logic structures for expressing goals and problems, so we can easily analyze them and establish semantic relationships and consistency among them, making a direct translation from natural language to a phrasal formal representation. This representation leads us to assess true-or-false value of statements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Someone who believes "I believe it with rain" can easily be mistaken about the rain. But it does not seem likely, and might even be impossible, that he is wrong about the fact that he believes that it is going to rain. How can we account for this authority about our own beliefs―the phenomenon known as first person authority? In this paper I examine a type of theory proposed, in distinct form, by Crispin Wright and Jane Heal for an explanation of our authority. Both authors claim that our second-order beliefs (of the form "I believe that p" are constructive of the first-order beliefs that are self-ascribed in them "beliefs of the form p" and both try to derive the necessity of first person authority from this constructive relation. My paper analyses and criticizes the two proposals and suggests a non-constructive, alternative account of first person authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an approach to abductive reasoning on C-structures, that is, structures with a finite domain such that each of its elements is the interpretation of a known constant of the language. We use a modification of the tableaux calculus and dual resolution to make a process which finds minimal abductive solutions within the proposed semantics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I investigate the logical analysis of statements in which a predicate applies collectively to a plurality of subjects. The standard treatment of such cases in first-order logic is not completely satisfactory, and the search for alternative modes of representation opens up interesting perspectives. I concentrate on the introduction of multigrade predicates, pointing out a number of weaknesses in the current literature on the subject. I argue that the collective/distributive opposition must be located in the logical structure of the statement in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]