The extrpolation of the Evo-Devo perspective in the cognitive sciences realm is promising but at the same time it can carry some interesting epistemic problems. Such considerations are engaged with the different type of explanation or conceptualization of causality in the hierarchichal systems of Evo-Devo, vis-à-vis the typical explanations of characteristic hierarchichal systems of cognitive sciences. Frans de Waal and Pier F. Ferrari had established a bottom-up hypothesis for explaining the imitative behaviors of primates during affective interactions. From this point of view, they suggest that "deep homology" a concept from Evo-Devo can be used to analyze the most inferior hierarchichal levels that underlie the functioning of mirror neurons. In accordance with my analysis, the model proposed by the authors do not satisfactorily calrify if the mirror neurons of different primate species share a set of common genetic-embriologic determinants, a mandatorily condition for a valid use of the concept of deep homology. Due to the possibility that different regulatory networks could give place to sets of mirror neurons with similar functional properties, it would be frail to establish that behavioral capabilities, which are in fact functional properties, depend on a straightforward anatomical and functional implementation in primates. From a historical and epistemological analysis of the concept of homology I revise the previous hypothesis and propose some relevant aspects for its assessment. I close this paper with a commentary on the broad epistemic landscape in which this interesting hypothesis is framed, the bioanthropological discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]