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This paper investigates the phenomenology of religions. The issue is studied by utilizing Turkish translation of writings and books of religion phenomenologists' and studies of domestic researchers. This study aims to first form an original text by surveying, simplifying and clarifying existing texts on the phenomenology of religions and then aims to emphasize the importance of the phenomenology of religions toward understanding the religions. This study points that both the phenomenology of religions and mystics point the same direction and qibla. If humanity takes a step toward a common temple, a certain direction and a return to the same essence, one of the important connections will be the phenomenology of religions. From this point, it is concluded that hopes for "the kingdom of god", "universal church", "Salvation", "the peace of world", "absolute justice" can be fulfilled through the phenomenology of religions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socrates was charged with not believe in the Greek gods, calling the people to believe in some unknown gods, and corrupting the morals of the young men through his constant questioning of everything. Actually, the real basis for this charge was his criticism on polytheist and anthropomorphic Olympian gods and his claim that he sometimes heard a divine voice (daimonion) as a kind of inspiration. Although in Socratic literature there are quite strong evidences for Socrates' monotheistic belief, one can also read in the same literature both the concept of God and gods. It seems there is a contradiction, but this paper instead claims the theses that Socrates believed in One and Supreme God who created this world and will charge the people in hereafter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to classify the Islamic Law Concerning religious belief freedom with respect to its special characteristics. Islamic scholars have different views when concerning the subject of freedom of religious belief Naturally, historical thinking has substantial effect in these different approaches. But more importantly, the criteria of interpretation of the applicable Islamic Law need to be considered. Two important criteria are "belief" and "person". Most of the differences among Islamic scholars can be explained by the difference in importance placed to either one of these two criteria. These differences can be observed clearly in cases involving crime and punishment, the citizenship status of non-Muslims, the argument of justification for war and the consequences of religious conversion. Therefore, the main reason why Islamic scholars reach different conclusions in these matters is not in the ambiguity of Islamic Law but the differences in its interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]