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Copyright of Itobiad: Journal of the Human & Social Science Researches / İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Itobiad: Journal of the Human & Social Science Researches and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ictimaiyat is the property of Ictimaiyat and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Turkish Journal of Psychiatry is the property of Turk Psikiyatri Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Modern dönemde zihin felsefesi alanında, nöro-biyoloji ve nöro-fizyolojinin verilerine bağlı olarak yapılan çalışmalarda, zihin kavramıyla bağlantılı olarak zât/benlik, şu‘ûr/bilinç ve eş-şu‘ûr bi-zât/benlik bilinci kavramları daha fazla ön plana çıkmış olsa da erken dönemden itibaren gerek İslam gerekse Batı düşüncesinde bu kavramlar kullanılmıştır. İslam düşüncesinin önemli filozoflarından İbn Sînâ, nefsin bedenden ayrı ve farklı bir mevcudiyete sahip olduğuna dair geliştirdiği düşünce deneyi Uçan Adam Nazariyesi’nde, nefs-beden ilişkisi, nefsin mâhiyeti, nefsin bedenden farklı ve bağımsız bir varlığa sahip olup olmadığı, nefsin bilince sahip olup olmadığı ve nefsin benlik bilincini nasıl ve ne zaman kazandığını ele almıştır. Farklı eserlerinde kısmi farklılıklarla ele aldığı nazariyesinde İbn Sînâ ilk aşamada, nefsin bedenden ayrı ve farklı bir mevcudiyeti ve nefsin gayri maddi bir mâhiyete sahip olduğunu temellendirmiştir. İkinci aşamada ise gayri maddi, ayrık ve farklı gerçekliğe sahip olan nefsin farklı melekelerin işlevlerini önceleyen ve bu işlevleri ‘ben’ bilinciyle birleştiren tek bir özün yani zâtın varlığını dolaylı şekilde izah etmiştir. Bununla birlikte İbn Sînâ’nın nazariyesinde asıl neyi temellendirmeyi amaçladığına dair farklı yorumlar yapılmıştır. Kimi nazariyede nefsin mâhiyeti ve gerçekliğini ele aldığını savunurken kimi de buna ek olarak nefsin benlik bilincini de temellendirdiğini savunmuştur. Bu çalışmada, İbn Sînâ’nın düşünsel deney olarak geliştirdiği uçan adam nazariyesi ele alınacaktır, nazariyenin izahına bağlı olarak nazariyenin temel amacının ne olduğu ortaya konacaktır. Daha sonra nefsin kendi zâtının şuûrunda/bilincinde olmasından kastının ne olduğu izah edilecektir. İbn Sînâ’nın şuûra ilişkin yaptığı benlik bilinci (eş-şu‘ûr bi-zât/zatî bilinç) ile bilincin bilinci (eş-şu‘ûru bi’ş-şu‘ûr) ayırımı değerlendirilecektir. Sonuç olarak da her ne kadar İbn Sînâ nazariyede öncelikli olarak nefsin bedenden ayrı ve farklı gayri maddi bir mâhiyete sahip olduğunu ele almış olsa da ikincil düzeyde nefsin kendi zâtının bilincinde olduğunu da kanıtlamayı amaçladığı temellendirilecektir.

In philosophy of mind, the problem of consciousness refers to a difficult problem about the nature and properties of consciousness. This problem includes fundamental questions such as “what is consciousness” and “how can it be explained”. Consciousness refers to the subjective awareness that an individual experiences. However, how consciousness arises and how it relates to neurological processes is still not fully understood. The problem of consciousness is handled with two basic approaches: physicalist and dualist approaches. The physicalist approach tries to explain consciousness in terms of physical processes. Physicalists argue that brain activities, neural interactions, and neuronal networks are the main factors that create consciousness. According to this view, consciousness arises as a result of neurological activities. However, exactly how the physicalist approach works and how consciousness relates to neurological processes still remains unclear. Another approach, dualism, argues that consciousness is a non-physical entity and cannot be fully explained by brain activities. According to dualists, there is a relationship between consciousness and the brain, but consciousness is something that exists outside the physical world. According to this view, another explanation or existence beyond physical processes is necessary for the explanation of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the concepts of zat/self, shu'ūr/consciousness, and al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt/selfconsciousness have come to the fore more in connection with the concept of mind in modern studies in the field of philosophy of mind based on the data of neuro-biology and neuro-physiology, these concepts have been used in both Islamic and Western thought since the early period. Avicenna, one of the most influential philosophers of Islamic thought, in his thought experiment The Flying Man theorem, which he developed on the soul having a separate and distinct existence from the body, dealt with the relationship between the soul and the body, the essence of the soul, whether the soul has a separate and independent existence from the body, whether the soul has consciousness, and how and when the soul acquires self-consciousness. In his theory, which he discusses with partial differences in different works, Ibn Sīnā, in the first stage, justified that the soul has a separate and distinct existence from the body and that the soul has an immaterial essence. In the second stage, he indirectly explained the existence of a single essence, i.e., the dhāt that prioritizes the functions of the different faculties of the immaterial, separate, and different realities of the soul and unites these functions with the consciousness of 'I'. However, there have been various interpretations of what Avicenna actually aimed to ground in his theory. While some have argued that he dealt with the essence and existence of the soul in his theory, others have argued that he also grounded the self-consciousness of the soul in addition to this. In this study, Avicenna's theory of the flying man, will be discussed, and the main purpose of the theory will be revealed depending on the explanation of the theory. Then, it will be explained what he means by the soul being in the consciousness of its own dhāt. Ibn Sīnā's distinction between the consciousness of the self (al-shu'ūr bi-zāt) and the consciousness of consciousness (al-shu'ūr bi al-shu'ūr) will be evaluated. As a result, it will be justified that although Avicenna's theorizing primarily deals with the soul as having an immaterial essence, separate and distinct from the body, at a secondary level he also aims to prove that the soul is conscious of its own essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Descartes doubted the existence of everything sensible, he expressed the indisputability of his own existence as “I think, therefore I am.” He then questioned what he is and deduced that he is a thinking substance, namely a soul or mind. Meanwhile, Kant claimed to concluding that I am a thinking substance (i.e., a soul) from “I think” is a paralogism because, according to Kant, this inference starts from the substantiveness of intuitional objects used as subjects in judgment and deduces that I, namely the thinking thing, is also a substance due to being used as a subject in judgment. Therefore, according to Kant, the middle term is used with a double meaning in this inference. However, it is not observed how the middle term is used with a double meaning in Kant’s inference. Moreover, Descartes’ conclusion “I am a spiritual substance” is not based on any such reasoning that requires intuitive content. Because Descartes did not deduce his undoubted existence from the substantiveness of the objects of intuition he was doubting, on the contrary, he expressed it as a spiritual substance in order to distinguish between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mutefekkir, Faculty of Islamic Sciences is the property of Aksaray University, Faculty of Islamic Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Afyon Kocatepe University Journal of Social Sciences / Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Afyon Kocatepe University (AKU) Sosyal Bilimler Enstitusu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Genelde insanın mahiyeti özelde ise ruhun varlığı ve mahiyeti konusu, düşünce tarihi boyunca tartışılagelmiştir. İnsan, bilen özne olarak önce kendini tanımaya çalışmıştır. Bu sorgulamayı yaparken sadece fenomenal varlığını (bedenini) değil, orada bir yerde olduğundan şüphe etmediği manevi kimliğini de merak etmiştir. Bu merak; anatomiden fizyolojiye, ilm-i ruhtan felsefeye, tıptan sosyolojiye, biyolojiden nörobiyolojiye, psikolojiden nöropsikolojiye, kimyadan nörokimyaya kadar uzanan bilimsel bir yolculuğun tahrik gücünü meydana getirmiştir. Sonunda her uygarlığın kendi bilimsel ve felsefi birikimine uygun olarak çeşitli insan tasavvurları geliştirilmiştir. İnsanlığa mâl olmuş kadim düşünce geleneği, insanı kahir ekseriyette düalist bir tanıma dahil etmiştir. Modern bilimle birlikte insanı fizik olarak incelemek için geliştirilen pek çok aygıtın sağladığı imkanlarla sayısız veriye ulaşılmış, bu veriler insanın fizik ve metafizik veçhesiyle nasıl bir varlık olduğunu anlamada büyük yararlılıklar sağlamıştır. Bununla birlikte doğal dünyaya ve onun bir parçası olan insana dair bilgimiz artıkça bakış açıları paradigmatik değişimlere zorlanmıştır. Bilimsel bilgiyle koşut bir şekilde gelişen ve değişen felsefi akımlar, dinin özellikle Batı dünyasında gerilemesi, bilginin yorumlanmasındaki hâkim modelleri geriletmiştir. İnsan nosyonları da bu büyük tagayyürden payını kaçınılmaz olarak almıştır. Eylemlerin arkasındaki özne, bedenden/beyinden ayrı/bağımsız ve bütünüyle otonom ve rasyonel midir? Yoksa çağdaş sinir bilimin öne sürdüğü gibi bedenden/beyinden ya da onun işlevselliğinden mi ibarettir? Bu uyumlu işlevsellik bütünüyle ya da kısmen doğal nedenselliğe bağlı olarak mı gerçekleşmektedir? İnsanı insan yapan bir öz veya ayırt edici bir özellik var mıdır? Varsa bu öz/özellik fiziksel midir yoksa fizik ötesi bir töz müdür? Bu sorulara ilk dönem kelâmcılarının hangi çerçevede ne cevap verdiği; daha çok dinî bilgi, kısmen dönemin tıp bilgisi ve büyük oranda mantıksal akıl yürütme ekseninde geliştirilen hipotezlerin çağdaş bilimin ileri sürdüğü insan ve ruh tarifleriyle ne oranda örtüştüğü meselesi, makalenin ana konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Özetle bu çalışma; süregelen kadim soruşturmanın iki önemli evresi olarak gördüğümüz, ilk dönem kelâmcılarının ruh teorileriyle güncel bilimsel veriler arasındaki paralellikleri ve yaklaşım benzerliklerini tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Zira akültürasyon sürecine bağlı dönüşümün düşünce üzerinde belirleyici güç hâline gelmediği kelâmın ilk döneminde (mütekaddimûn) serdedilen fikirlerin daha orijinal ve değerli olduğu düşünülmektedir. Problemin temel kavramları arasında yer alan ruh, nefs, zihin, benlik ve bilincin tanımları hakkında kısa bilgiler verildikten sonra erken dönem Mu‘tezilî ve Ehl-i Sünnet mütefekkirlerinin konuya ilişkin düşünceleri güncel verilerle karşılaştırmalı olarak aktarılmıştır. Araştırma boyunca elde edilen veriler, analitik ve semantik tahlillere tabi tutularak sağlıklı bir tasvirî çıkarım yapılmaya gayret edilmiştir.

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Spinoza sisteminde bir bilinç teorisinin varlığı konusunda dünden bugüne devam etmekte olan ciddi bir tartışma mevcuttur. Bu makale, bir yandan mevcut tartışmanın hafifletilebilmesi için farklı bir okuma teklifi sunmakta, diğer yandan ise söz konusu tartışmanın ana tezlerini -henüz bu konuda herhangi bir çalışmanın yapılmadığı- Türkçe felsefe literatürüne kazandırma amacı gütmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Spinoza sisteminde bir bilinç teorisinin çıkarılabileceği savunulmakta ve tüm paralelizmine rağmen gerçekte olmasa bile kavramsal olarak zihni bedenden bağımsız bir biçimde düşünebilme imkânı irdelenmektedir. Söz konusu bağlamda, öncelikle “fikrin fikri” doktrini, bilincin metafizik temeli olarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Daha sonra bedenin kompleks yapısını oluşturan parçalara dair zihnin daha fazla “fikir”e ulaşabilme ve bu “fikir”lerden “fikrin fikri”ni çıkarabilme durumuna göre oluşan “bilinç dereceleri”, bilincin epistemolojik yönü olarak saptanmaktadır. Bedenin etkilenişlerinin zihin tarafından bilinme derecesine ve bilgi türlerine bağlı olarak insan zihninin nasıl “kendisinin, “Tanrı”nın ve “diğer varolanlar”ın bilincine ulaştığı tespit edilmektedir. Çalışmada varılan sonuç, Spinoza’da bilincin “bilgi” üzerine inşa edildiği, “fikir”in bilgiyi, “fikrin fikri”nin bilinci temsil ettiğidir. Böylece, neredeyse tüm tartışmaların odağında olan “bilinçli zihinler” ile “bilinçsiz zihinler” ve insan zihnindeki “bilinçli fikirler” ile “bilinçsiz fikirler”e dair ayırımın net olmayan sınırları belirginleştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda Spinoza’nın bilinç teorisi, onun en genel kapsamıyla zihin teorisiyle ve bu teorinin bir sonucu olan bilgi teorisiyle temellendirilir. Spinoza’nın zihin teorisine göre, özellikle insan zihni söz konusu olduğunda bedende gerçekleşen her değişim zihinde bir fikre tekabül eder (paralelizm) ya da bir fikir olarak temsil edilir. İnsan zihninde meydana gelen fikirler, bedenin etkilenişlerinin, yani bedenin kurduğu ilişkiler neticesinde alıp verdiği etkilere göre kendisinde meydana gelen değişimlerin birer temsilinden ibarettir. İnsan zihni bu fikirlerin bir kısmını “bulanık”, “bölük-pörçük” ya da “yetersiz” (inadequate) bir şekilde algılarken, bir kısmını da “apaçık”, “upuygun” ya da “yeterli” (adequate) bir şekilde kavrar. Spinoza bu temelden hareketle zihin ve bilgi teorilerini ortaya koyar. Ancak insan zihni kendisinde meydana gelen bedenin etkilenişlerinin fikirleriyle yetinmez, aynı zamanda bu fikirlerin yeterli ya da yetersiz olduklarına bakmaksızın onlara dair ikincil fikirler de oluşturur. Bu ikincil fikirler, birincil fikirlerin -yeterli ya da yetersiz olmalarına göre- farkındalığını ifade eder. Makalede bu oluşum ve farkındalık, yani “fikrin fikri” (ideas of ideas) Spinozacı bilinç teorisinin temel zemini ya da ana hattı olarak detaylı bir şekilde ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bilinç teorisinin diğer sonuç veya çıktıları da her şeyden önce bu temel zeminin anlaşılmasını zorunlu ya da gerekli kılmaktadır. Buna göre insan bedeni, diğerleriyle kıyaslandığında Doğada en fazla parçaya ya da bileşene sahip çok karmaşık bir yapıdır. İnsan zihni ise bedenin kompleks yapısının her bir unsuruna dair fikirlere ulaşabilme imkanına sahiptir. Ancak bu fikirlerin içeriği, insan zihninin kendi bedenini tanıma derecesine göre oluşur. İnsan zihninin kendi bedenini bilme derecesi, aynı zamanda onun bilincinin de derecesini belirler. Spinoza insan dışındaki varlıkların da belli bir “canlılık derecesi”ne sahip olduğunu ve söylediklerinin insan kadar diğer varlıklar için de geçerli olduğunu belirtirken aynı zamanda insan bedeninin diğer bedenlerden, insan zihninin ise diğer zihinlerden daha üstün olduğunu temellendirmeye çalışır. Spinoza bir bedenin diğer bedenden üstünlüğünü, diğeriyle kıyaslandığında birinin kendi başına daha çok eylemi daha fazla gerçekleştirebilmesi olarak görür. Bir beden ne kadar çok parçaya sahipse ya da bünyesinde ne kadar çok çeşit cismi barındırıyorsa, o kadar daha fazla eylemi yerine getirmeye ve etki alıp vermeye müsait olur. Çünkü bir beden diğer bedenlerle karşılaştığında ya da ilişki kurduğunda, parçalarının her biri bu karşılaşmadan ya da ilişkiden etkilenebilir. Dolayısıyla beden ne kadar çok kompleks bir yapıdaysa zihin de o kadar çok fikre sahip olabilir. Bu, bedeni diğer bedenlerden üstün olan insanın, zihninin de diğer zihinlerden üstün olma sebebidir. İnsan zihninin kendi bedenini bilme imkanına bağlı olarak aynı zihindeki fikirler arasında ve birbiriyle kıyaslandığında iki zihin arasında “bilinçsiz fikirler” (non-conscious ideas) ve “bilinçli fikirler” (conscious ideas) olduğu gibi, daha düşük seviyeden daha yüksek seviyeye bilinçte derece farkı da oluşur. Bu derece farkı, makalede bilincin epistemolojik sonucu ya da çıktısı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bilincin metafiziksel temeli ve epistemolojik sonucu birlikte düşünüldüğünde, insanın “kendilik-bilinci” makalenin son konusu olarak gündeme getirilmektedir.

İnsanın kendi varlığına dair ben bilinci yine kendisi açısından şüphe götürmez. Öyle ki Descartes tarafından ifade edildiği gibi, duyulur her şeyden şüphe ettiğimde bile kendi varlığımdan şüphe edememem, bu nedenle, eğer şüphe ediyorsam “düşünüyorum, o halde varım.” Diğer bir deyişle ben, algılarken, düşünürken veya bir şeyi isterken kendimin en açık ve seçik bir şekilde farkında olurum ve bundan da var olduğum sonucu çıkar. Çünkü düşünen bir şeyin yok olduğu kabul edilemez ve dolayısıyla var olmak için düşünmek yeterlidir. Bu da benim düşünen varlığımın, şüphelendiğim duyu nesnelerinden örneğin bedenden farklı bir töz olmasını gerektirir. Çünkü duyulur her şeyden şüphe ederken kendimden şüphe edememem, benim şüphe edilen şeylerden birisi olmadığımı gösterir. Kısacası, şüphe edilen şeyler ile şüphe edilemez şey, bir ve aynı doğadan olamaz. Bu da benim varlığımın en temel biçiminin düşünen bir şey yani bir ruh veya bir zihin olduğu anlamına gelir. Bununla birlikte böyle bir ruh veya zihnin varlığı, deneyci epistemolojiye göre ciddi bir sorun oluşturur. Çünkü ruh veya zihin özellikle dış deneyde bizim için mevcut değildir. Bu nedenle Hume gibi kimi deneyci düşünürler, ben bilincini üreten bir benliğin tözsel varlığını reddeder ve onu olayların içinde gerçekleştiği bir tiyatro sahnesi gibi algılar toplamına veya duyu deneylerine indirgerler. Hatta kimi deneyci düşünürler daha da ileri gider ve algılanan şeylerin onları algılayan ve ben olarak adlandırılan bir tözün varlığını gerektirmediğini ileri sürerler. Bununla birlikte benliğin deneyde nesne olarak gösterilememesi onun yokluğunu kanıtlamaya yetmez. Çünkü eğer algılar var, fakat algılayan bir özne yoksa algılayanın ne veya kim olduğu ya da algıların nerede bulunduğu gibi sorulara cevap verilemez. Hâlbuki “ben”, aktif bir öznenin fikridir ve düşünme, bilme veya isteme gibi tüm zihinsel işlemler onları gerçekleştiren bu aktif öznenin varlığını gerektirir. Bir özne olmadan söz konusu işlemlerin kendi kendine ortaya çıktığı kabul edilemez. Bu nedenle “ben”, bir tiyatro sahnesi gibi sadece algıların toplamı değildir. Buna göre deneyci epistemoloji benliğin varlığına dair tam bir açıklama veremez. Dolayısıyla deneyci epistemolojiye göre benliğin deneyin bir nesnesi olmadığı doğru olmakla birlikte tüm zihinsel işlemlerdeki aktif rolünün ve varlığının reddedilmesi mümkün görünmemektedir. Öyle ki Kant tarafından da ifade edildiği gibi bilincin varlığı olmadan bilginin meydana gelmesi de düşünülemez. Bununla birlikte Kant’a göre her ne kadar bilginin ortaya çıkması için bilincin varlığı gerekli ise de bilinç bir bilgi değeri taşımaz. Çünkü bilinç, sezgi içermez. Dolayısıyla sezgi nesnelerinin bilgisi gibi ben kendimin bilgisine sahip olamam. Bundan da benim, dünyanın sezgi nesneleri gibi duyusal/maddesel bir varlık olmadığım sonucu çıkar. Bununla birlikte Kant’a göre sezgisi bulunmadığı için benim bir ruh veya zihin olduğum da bilinemez. Bu şekilde Kant hem maddeciliği hem ruhçuluğu bilinemez olarak niteler. Ancak Kant’ın çift taraflı bilinemezci tutumu, insanı, kendi varlığının doğası hakkında tatmin etmeye yetmez. Çünkü duyulur nesneleri bilen insan, Kant tarafından, kendi doğasını bilemez olarak bırakılmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle Kant, Descartes’ın şüphe duyduğu duyulur nesneleri bildiğimizi fakat Descartes’ın şüphe götürmez bulduğu kendi varlığımızın doğasını bilemeyeceğimizi söyler. Halbuki Kant’ın aksine benliğin maddeselliğine dair bilginin yokluğu, onun ruhsallığına dair bir bilgi sayılabilir. Çünkü kendi varlığımıza dair sezginin yokluğu yani kendimizi elle tutup gözle göremememiz bizim maddesel olmadığımızı kanıtlar ve bu da bizim bir ruh veya zihin olduğumuz anlamına gelir. Zaten ruh ve zihin kavramları da aslında maddesel olmayan varlık türünü ifade eder.

Bu çalışmanın amacı; tarih, toplum, edebiyat birlikteliğini temsil eden tarihî romanların yalnızca edebî nitelik taşıyan metinler olmadıklarını, aynı zamanda bazı insanî değerlerin bireye ve topluma kazandırılmasında etkin rol oynayabileceklerini ortaya koymaktır. Nitekim kurgu-gerçek birlikteliğinin en somut biçimlerinden birini simgeleyen tarihî romanların, dış gerçeklikten bağımsız olmadıkları gözlenebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma boyunca öncelikle toplumsalkültürel bellek kavramıyla ifade edilmek istenenin ne olduğu konusuna ve bu kavramla tarih bilimi arasındaki ilişkiye kısaca açıklık getirilecektir. Ardından tarihî romanları ortaya çıkaran etkenlere ve bu etkenlerin toplumsal-kültürel bellek oluşumu üzerindeki etkilerine değinilecektir. Son olarak tarihî romanların özellikle “yeniden canlandırma” ve “eğlendirme” olmak üzere iki ana başlıkta ele alınacak işlevsel özelliklerinin, toplumsal-kültürel bellek kavramının devamlılığının sağlanmasına ve tarih-kimlik-aidiyet bilincinin inşa edilmesine belli düzeyde katkı sunabileceğinden bahsedilecektir. Öte yandan konuyla bağlantılı olarak, kurmaca metinlerin temelini oluşturan anlatı unsurlarının (kişi, zaman, uzam, olay örgüsü) tüm bu faaliyetlerin yürütülmesi sürecinde etkin rol üstlendiği gösterilecektir. Tarihî romanların işlevsel özellikleri arasında özellikle “yeniden canlandırma” işlevinin bahsi geçen amaçlara doğrudan katkıda bulunduğu belirtilecek; diğerinin ise, ancak bu işlev kapsamında anlamlı bir bütün oluşturduğu anlatılacaktır. Bunun yanında tarihsel gerçeklerin kurmacayla yoğrulduğu bu tür romanlarda, tarihsel verilerin roman yazarları tarafından daha dikkatli ve sorumluluk duygusu çerçevesinde ele alınması gerektiği konusu üzerinde durulacaktır.

Spinoza, conscientia ve conscius kavramları arasında anlamsal herhangi bir ayırım yapmayıp birini diğerinin yerine kullanmıştır. Ancak geleneksel felsefede conscientia kavramı “ahlaki duyarlılık” ya da “farkındalık” anlamına gelen bir “iç ses” ya da “vicdan” olarak kullanılmakta ve hem rasyonel hem de irrasyonel süreçleri ifade etmektedir. Diğer yandan aynı felsefi gelenekte conscius kavramı ise “bilinç” anlamında kullanılmakta ve rasyonel süreçlere dayalı zihinsel ya da psikolojik bir düşünümsel faaliyeti ifade etmektedir. Bu çalışma, öncelikle Spinoza’nın iki kavramı aynı anlamda kullanmasından hareketle “ahlaki duyarlılık”ın da zihinsel bir eylem olan refleksif düşünce neticesinde oluştuğunu iddia etmektedir. Çalışmada bilincin fikirler arası ilişkiye dayanan düşünümsel bir faaliyet olarak anlaşıldığı yerde, “ahlaki farkındalık”ın zihinde fikirler arası ilişki neticesinde yeni bir fikir olarak meydana geldiği savunulmaktadır. İkinci olarak çalışmada Spinoza’nın bir “vicdan teorisi”nden ziyade, söz konusu farkındalıktan hareketle bir tür “ahlaki bilinç” teorisi geliştirdiği tespit edilmektedir. Bu iddia ve tespitlerin ana odağını ise Spinoza etiğinin temel kavramları olan “iyi” ve “kötü”nün zihinde birer duygu olarak meydana gelen “sevinç” ve “keder” fikrinden doğması oluşturmaktadır. Burada “sevinç” veya “keder” bedenin etkilenişleri neticesinde zihinde meydana gelen “birincil fikirler”; “iyi” veya “kötü” ise zihnin bu birincil fikirler üzerine tefekkürü neticesinde oluşturduğu “ikincil fikirler” olarak ele alınmaktadır. Makalede “ahlaki bilinç” teorisi, bu tarz ikincil fikirler olan “fikrin fikri”ne dayandırılarak oluşturulmaktadır.

Agriculture must be necessary and sustainable for the continuity of human beings. For sustainable agriculture, productive crops can be made with good irrigation in productive crops and conscious irrigation in good irrigation. A survey was conducted with 111 producers in the central district of Tokat province to determine the factors affecting conscious irrigation and conscious irrigation. In the research, first of all, the socio-demographic structure of the producers was determined: it was determined that the producers with an active working population had a low level of education. In the second part of the research, irrigation information was tried to be determined and it was observed that most of the producers were doing salman irrigation. In the third part of the research, irrigation awareness was tried to be determined by using the scoring method of the producers and it was determined that 24% of the producers were in the category with a high level of awareness. In the last part, the factors affecting irrigation awareness were determined with the help of the ordered probit model. As a result, it has been determined that there is a linear relationship between the level of awareness of the producers, their educational status and membership in the irrigation union.

The nature of the human being in general and the existence and nature of the soul in particular has been discussed throughout the history of thought. As a knowing subject, man firstly tried to know himself. While making this questioning, he not only wondered about his phenomenal existence (body), but also about his spiritual identity, which he did not doubt was out there somewhere. This curiosity has created an ongoing scientific journey from anatomy to physiology, from science to philosophy, from medicine to sociology, from biology to neurobiology, from psychology to neuropsychology, from chemistry to neurochemistry. In the end, various human conceptions have been developed in accordance with the scientific and philosophical background of each civilization. The ancient tradition of thought, which is the common accumulation of humanity, has largely included man in a dualist definition. Along with modern science, many devices have been developed to study human beings physically. Numerous data have been reached with the opportunities provided by technology, and these data have provided great usefulness in understanding what aspects a human being has in terms of physics and metaphysics. However, with the increase in our knowledge of the natural world and human, which is a part of it, the perspectives of the period were forced into paradigmatic changes. The philosophical movements that developed and changed in parallel with scientific knowledge, the decline of religion, especially in the Western world, regressed the dominant models in the interpretation of knowledge. Notions of human have inevitably taken their share from this great change. Is the subject behind the actions separate/independent from the body/brain and completely autonomous and rational? Or is it just the body/brain or its functionality, as modern neuroscience suggests? Does this coherent functionality arise entirely or in part from natural causation? Is there an essence or a distinctive feature that makes us human? If so, is this essence/property physical or is it a metaphysical substance? What answers did the early theologians give to these questions? What are the points of overlap between the hypotheses developed mainly on religious knowledge, partly on medical knowledge of the period via largely logical reasoning, and the definitions of human and soul revealed by contemporary experimental science? This line forms the main frame of the article. In summary, this study; It aims to identify the parallels and similarities of approach between the spiritual theories of the early theologians and current scientific data, which we see as two important phases of the ongoing ancient investigation. It is thought that the theories developed in this first period, when the transformation due to the acculturation process is not sufficiently determinative on thought, are more original and valuable. After giving brief information about the definitions of soul, mind, self and consciousness, which are among the basic concepts of the problem, the thoughts of early Mu'tazilī and Ahl al-Sunnah thinkers on the subject are presented comparatively with current scientific data. We tried to make a healthy descriptive inference by making analytical and semantic arguments on the data obtained during the research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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There is a significant debate going on long time about the existence of a theory of consciousness in Spinoza's philosophical system of thought. This article, on the one hand, offers a different reading to alleviate the current debate, and on the other hand, it aims to bring the main theses of the discussion in question to the Turkish philosophy literature, which has not been studied yet. In this matter, it is argued that a theory of consciousness can be deduced in Spinoza's system of thought, and despite all its parallelism, the possibility of conceptual thinking the "mind" independently from the "body" even if not in reality, is examined. In this context, first, the doctrine of "ideas of ideas" is put forward as the metaphysical basis of consciousness. Then, the "degrees of consciousness", which are formed according to the mind's ability to reach more "ideas" about the parts that make up the complex structure of the body, and to extract the "ideas of ideas" from these "ideas", are determined as the epistemological aspect of consciousness. Depending on the degrees of ideas of the body's affections by the mind and the kinds of knowledge, it is determined how the human mind reaches the consciousness of "self", "God" and "other things". The conclusion in the study is that in Spinoza, consciousness is built on "knowledge"; while "ideas" represents knowledge, the "ideas of ideas" represents consciousness. Thus, the unclear boundaries of the distinction between "conscious minds" and "unconscious minds" and "conscious ideas" and "un-conscious ideas" in the human mind, which are at the center of almost all discussions, are tried to be clarified. In this sense, Spinoza's theory of consciousness in its most general scope is based on the theory of mind and the theory of knowledge, which is a result of first. In Spinoza's theory of mind, especially when it comes to the human mind, every change that occurs in the body, corresponds to an idea (parallelism) or is represented as an idea. The ideas that occur in the human mind are just representations of the affections of the body, that is, of the changes that occur in the body according to the effects it receives and influences as a result of the relations established by the body. While the human mind perceives some of these ideas in a "confused", "fragmentary" or "inadequate" way, it grasps some of them "clearly" or "adequately". Spinoza puts forward his theories of mind and knowledge on this basis. However, the human mind is not settled with only the ideas of the body's affection that occur in it, but also constitute secondary ideas about these ideas, regardless of whether they are adequate or inadequate. These secondary ideas express awareness of primary ideas, whether they are adequate or inadequate. In the article, this constitution and awareness, that is, the "ideas of the ideas", is tried to be revealed in detail as the basic ground or main line of the Spinozist theory of consciousness. Other results or outcomes of the theory of consciousness require first to understand this basic ground. Accordingly, the human body is a very complex structure that has the most parts or components in Nature compared to the others. The human mind, on the other hand, has the capability to reach ideas about each element and its change of the complex structure of the body. However, the content of these ideas is formed according to the degree to which the human mind recognizes its own body. The degree to which the human mind knows its own body also determines the degree of its consciousness. Spinoza states that non-human beings also have a certain "degree of animation", and while stating that what he says is valid for other beings as well as human beings, he also tries to justify that the human body is superior to other bodies and the human mind to other minds. Spinoza sees the superiority of one body over the other as the ability of one to perform more actions on one's own, compared to the other. The more parts a body has or the more different kinds of objects it contains, the more it is available to perform actions and influences or receives effects. Because when a body encounters or interacts with other bodies, each of its parts can be affected by this encounter or relationship. Therefore, the more complex the body has, the more ideas the mind can have. This is the reason why the mind of a person is superior to other minds because of whose body is superior to other bodies. Depending on the human mind's ability to know its own body, there are "unconscious ideas" and "conscious ideas" between the two minds when compared to and between ideas in the same mind, as well as a difference degree in consciousness from a lower level to a higher level. This degree of difference is discussed in the article as the epistemological result or outcome of consciousness. The "self-consciousness" of human, which comes to the fore as a result of considering the metaphysical basis of consciousness and its epistemological result together, constitutes the last subject of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The self-consciousness of a person's own existence is also beyond doubt for himself. So much so that, as expressed by Descartes, I cannot doubt my own existence even when I doubt everything sensible, therefore, if I doubt, "I think, therefore I am." In other words, while perceiving, thinking, or wanting something, I am most clearly and distinctly aware of myself, and from this, it follows that I exist. Because it cannot be accepted that a thinking thing does not exist, and therefore it is sufficient to think in order to exist. This requires my thinking being to be a different substance from the sense objects I suspect, such as the body. Because of the fact that I cannot doubt myself while doubting everything sensible shows that I am not one of the things that are doubted. In short, what is doubted and what cannot be doubted cannot be of one and the same nature. This means that the most basic form of my being is a thinking thing, that is to say a soul or a mind. However, the existence of such a soul or mind poses a serious problem for empiricist epistemology. Since the soul or mind is not available to us, especially in external experience. For this reason, some empiricist thinkers like Hume reject the substantive existence of a self that produces self-consciousness and reduce it to the sum of perceptions or sense experiments, like a theatre stage in which events take place. Some empiricist thinkers go even further and argue that things perceived do not require the existence of a substance that perceives them and is called the self. However, the fact that the self cannot be represented as an object in the experiment is not enough to prove its absence. Because if there are perceptions but there is no perceiving subject, questions such as what or who the perceiver is or where the perceptions are cannot be answered. Whereas “I” is the idea of an active subject, and all mental operations such as thinking, knowing, or wanting require the existence of this active subject who performs them. Without a subject, it cannot be accepted that the events in question have arisen by themselves. Therefore, “I” is not just a collection of perceptions, like a theatre stage. Accordingly, empiricist epistemology cannot give a full account of the existence of the self. Therefore, although it is true that the self is not an object of experience according to empiricist epistemology, it does not seem possible to deny its active role and existence in all mental processes. So much so that, as expressed by Kant, the formation of knowledge is unthinkable without the existence of consciousness. However, according to Kant, although the existence of consciousness is necessary for the emergence of knowledge, consciousness does not have the value of knowledge. Because consciousness does not contain intuition. Therefore, I cannot have knowledge of myself like knowledge of intuition objects. It follows from this that I am not a sensory/material entity like the objects of perception of the world. However, according to Kant, it cannot be known that I am a soul or a mind since it has no intuition. In this way, Kant qualifies both materialism and spiritualism as unknowable. However, Kant’s double-sided agnostic attitude is not enough to satisfy the human being about the nature of his own existence. Because the human being who knows sensible objects is left as ignorant of his own nature by Kant. In other words, Kant says that we know the sensible objects, which Descartes doubted, but we cannot know the nature of our own being, which Descartes found beyond doubt. However, unlike Kant, the absence of knowledge about the materiality of the self can be considered as knowledge of its spirituality. Because the absence of intuition of our own existence, that is, our inability to grasp and see ourselves, proves that we are not material, and this means that we are a spirit or a mind. In fact, the concepts of spirit and mind actually refer to the type of non-material being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anadolu University Journal of Art & Design / Sanat & Tasarım is the property of Anadolu University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Research / İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi is the property of Turkey Economical & Cultural Solidarity (TEK-DAV) Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Experts in neuromarketing, conduct research to find new solutions to marketing problems using various techniques from the field of neuroscience. Experts, also known as neuro marketers, make marketing decisions based on information obtained by measuring the reactions of the human brain with neuroimaging techniques. As a result of neuromarketing research, the human mind is analyzed by categorizing it into various structural categories, and it is stated that the path to success in this field is directly related to understanding the brain's structures. The neuroscience literature contains basic studies that will aid in understanding of the brain's structures, but there are not enough studies on this subject in the field of neuromarketing. The purpose of this research is to examine at neuroscience studies on how the brain works from a neuromarketing standpoint and to look for elements that will contribute to the neuroscience literature. According to the findings of this experimental research study, Sigmund Freud's topographic mind model, which includes the conscious and subconscious, and the structural model of the mind, which includes the id, ego, and superego, are critical in terms of neuromarketing approaches. Based on the findings, it is revealed that Freud's structural model of the mind is a fundamental idea in understanding neuromarketing research, and some recommendations are given on the assessed issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Abant Social Sciences / Abant Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Journal of Abant Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Humanitas: International Journal of Social Sciences / Uluslararasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Humanitas: International Journal of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, the effect of praying on consciousness of being the slave of Allah will be investigated. Prayer, literally means asking and claiming, in fact is a declaration of intention for the Believer (Mü'min) who can build consciousness of being the slave of Allah. For the "worshipper" who can not build such a consciousness, prayer is a remembrance of the Creator and a solution oriented recalling of Him in every serious problem that comes through the border of being human under non-standard circumstances, which is concordant to his / her nature. This type of solution oriented prayer has no effect on building consciousness and it ends when the problem is solved because of the process operating against it. However, prayer that is made on the level of declaration of intention occurs within the awareness of the distance between the current situation of the person and the situation that is the will of Allah, and this prayer includes the struggle for reaching the intention of Allah as the target. Thus, on the contrary of being a sole demand, prayer is an effort exhibited for a change in the mental and the functional sense. For this reason, also in revelation period of the Glorious Qur'an, on one hand, belief in Allah in the mental context was being built while on the other hand, sense of prayer was being shaped. Ultimately, aim is to reach conscious worshipping and prayer that dignifies humans as mentioned in the Glorious Qur'an. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Near East University Islamic Research Center / Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi İslam Tetkikleri Merkezi Dergisi is the property of Journal of Near East University Islamic Research Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Motif Academy Journal of Folklore is the property of Motif Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Having the ability to abstract and to create notions have caused humans to be sorrounded with the notions only consist of their fiction, and reinforced their beliefs to their own consciousness' consistency. Thus, the distance between human and nature has possibly, increased. Well, does consciousness have the right to explain the nature, and what moral perception can be generated from the idea of a creature with consciousness? In our everday life, we completely believe that, the notions in our vocabulary can explain the external world. Because of our eligibility to comprehend this world, we think we are exempt from the necessities of it and we can determine our actions via our free-will. But according to Friedrich Nietzsche, our assemption in this direction is only delusion; there is actually a necessity arising from physical weakness behind humans being conscious creatures and forming their own vocabulary. As being weak creatures, humans have to give the meaning to the world with their conceptions; but these conceptions are only common metaphors, truncate the wealth of the nature via “similarize the dissimilars”. Humans externalize this delusion they interiorise voluntarily also to their moral lives, and believe that they can categorize and judge the others in conformity with common opinions. Because, consciousness contains free will and the idea of free will contains the postulate that we can isolate persons from their actions. But, according to Nietzsche, this assumption is totally baseless. Because, considering persons responsible for their actions aims to block the strong ones to express their strength and it's originated from ressentiment. In case of humans, they don't have the freedom not to reveal the actions they carried out, there are instinctual determinations also behind seemingly the most conscious actions, so they are dependent on natural necessity. In our study, we scrutinise the connection Nietzsche founded between our ordinary comprehension about consciousness with the moral assumptions took form within this scope, and the counter-arguments he claimed to our opinions on this matter. In this context, the film we refer in our research will be The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser (Jeder für Sich und Gott gegen Alle, Werner Herzog, 1974). This film is suitable for our study, for having a protagonist, who's been isolated from society until the first years of his youth, thus became free from common conceptions and moral assumptions. From this point of view, aforesaid film is scrutinised with its aspects which deepen our examinations within the path we follow.