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open access article Aims To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign-trained nurses. Design Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer-reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign-trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, ‘referring to the original philosophy is not enough’ and ‘phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological’. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy.

This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of “structure marginalization”. Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or “just the way things are” (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one’s powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects.

In recent neuroaesthetic discussion, neuroscientists have linked aesthetic pleasure to the brain’s reward systems, but they have also attempted to dissociate it from utilitarian rewards and ultimately explain it as a disinterested state of mind. This paper examines this neuroaesthetic approach, juxtaposing it with elements of phenomenological thought on the subject of aesthetic disinterestedness, to present three interrelated concerns that can be raised from a phenomenological perspective, as well as to outline how to overcome these problems phenomenologically. The paper ends with the suggestion that neuroaesthetics, if it is ever going to offer something important or useful regarding our understanding of aesthetic experience, has to become phenomenologically sensitive and informed.

The paper follows the track of a previous paper "Natural cybernetics of time" in relation to history in a research of the ways to become mathematical regardless of being a descriptive humanitarian science with investigating unique events and thus rejecting any repeatability. The pathway of classical experimental science to be mathematized gradually and smoothly by more and more relevant mathematical models seems to be inapplicable. Anyway quantum mechanics suggests another pathway for mathematization; considering the historical reality as dual or "complementary" to its model. The historical reality by itself can be seen as mathematical if one considers it in Hegel's manner as a specific interpretation of the totality being in a permanent self-movement due to being just the totality, i.e. by means of the "speculative dialectics" of history, however realized as a theory both mathematical and empirical and thus falsifiable as by logical contradictions within itself as empirical discrepancies to facts. Not less, a Husserlian kind of "historical phenomenology" is possible along with Hegel's historical dialectics sharing the postulate of the totality (and thus, that of transcendentalism). One would be to suggest the transcendental counterpart: an "eternal", i.e. non-temporal and non-spatial history to the usual, descriptive temporal history, and equating the real course of history as with its alternative, actually happened branches of the regions of the world as with only imaginable, counterfactual histories. That universal and transcendental history is properly mathematical by itself, even by a neo-Pythagorean model. It is only represented on the temporal screen of the standard historiography as a discrete series of unique events. An analogy to the readings of the apparatus in quantum mechanics can be useful. Even more, that analogy is considered rigorously and logically as implied by the mathematical transcendental history and sharing with it the same quantity of information as an invariant to all possible alternative or counterfactual histories. One can involve the hypothetical external viewpoint to history (as if outside of history or from "God's viewpoint" to it), to which all alternatives or counterfactual histories can be granted as a class of equivalence sharing the same information (i.e. the number choices, but realized in different sequence or adding redundant ones in each branch) being similar and even mathematically isomorphic to Feynman trajectories in quantum mechanics. Particularly, a fundamental law of mathematical history, the law of least choice of the real historical pathway is deducible from the same approach. Its counterpart in physics is the well-known and confirmed law of least action as far as the quantity of action corresponds equivocally to the quantity of information or that of number elementary historical choices.

This paper: a) offers a phenomenology of the religious that challenges the assumption that “religious experience” is primarily to be understood as a type of experience, called ‘religious’ experience, which is distinct from other (i.e., ‘non-religious’) experiences; and b) traces out some implications of this for phenomenological and other scholarly approaches to religion. To achieve these aims, the paper begins by explaining the phenomenological claim-found most explicitly in Husserl and Merleau- Ponty-that all experiences are expressive of a certain kind of spirit. This account of spirit, when applied to the phenomenological understanding of the ‘religious,’ allows us to distinguish between religiosity (as a transcendental structure), religions (as dynamic forces that express that structure), and religious phenomena (as concrete phenomena that express religions). In turn, this tri-partite distinction allows us to explain how religiosity leads to the development of religion in a way that suggests that ‘the religious’ is best conceived as a particular dimension of all experience. In that light, two major implications for the study of religion emerge from the phenomenology of the religious provided in this paper: 1) the realm of possible subjects of study is greatly expanded; while 2) the proper object of study is narrowed and clarified

El propósito de este artículo es analizar tanto el lado que se orienta al campo de posibilidades como el lado que se dirige al momento de una acción particular en la formulación husserliana del imperativo categórico: "¡Haz en todo momento lo mejor entre lo alcanzable!" En primer lugar, el autor examina el alcance de las posibilidades que Husserl considera a fin de delinear el mejor curso de acción. Este análisis desemboca en una doble ampliación del horizonte práctico. Por un lado, un horizonte personal de vida implica tanto una habitualidad o estilo unitario como una decisión que elige una profesión o vocación; por el otro, un horizonte intersubjetivo implica el logro de una comunidad del amor como la más alta forma de comunidad. En segundo lugar, el artículo explora la evolución del imperativo categórico con el objeto de subrayar su subordinación a los valores del amor y su orientación teleológica hacia una realización más perfecta de lo que solo ha sido alcanzado parcialmente. Se sostiene que, mientras la determinación en el horizonte de posibilidades prácticas lleva al examen de la mejor acción posible dentro de una esfera limitada, la indeterminación motiva la mejor aproximación posible a un ideal teleológico. Por último, se analiza el momento de una acción particular a fin de mostrar cómo la noción de kairós desempeña un papel en diferentes estadios en el desenvolvimiento del imperativo categórico que encierran un momento crítico de oportunidad.The aim of this paper is to analize both the side that points to a field of possibilities and the side that points to the moment of a particular action in Husserl's formulation of the categorical imperative: "Do at every moment the best that is attainable!" First, the author surveys the range of possibilities considered by Husserl in order to delineate the best course of action. This analysis leads to a twofold enlargement of the practical horizon. On the one hand a personal life-horizon involves both a unified style or habituality and a decision endorsing a profession or vocation, on the other hand an intersubjective horizon entails the attainment of a community of love as the highest form of community. Second, the paper explores the development of the categorical imperative with the purpose of stressing its subordination to the values of love and its teleological orientation toward a more perfect accomplishment of what is only partially attained. It is argued that, whereas determinateness in the horizon of practical possibilities leads to a discussion of the best possible action within a limited sphere, indeterminateness motivates the best possible approximation to a teleological ideal. Finally, the paper examines the moment of a particular action in order to show how the notion of kairós plays a role in different stages in the development of the categorical imperative that involve a critical moment of opportunity.

It is generally acknowledged that there were two schisms in the early historyof the phenomenological movement. The first, the Great Phenomenological Schism, started between 1905 and 1913, as many of his younger contemporaries, for example Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/19011) into the transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). The second, the Phenomenological-Existential Schism, happened between 1927 and 1933, as it emerged that with Being and Time (1927) Heidegger’s philosophy had moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological analytic of human existence as the way to an interpretation of the question of the meaning of Being. This paper is about neither the first schism per se nor the second schism per se but about the relationship between the two. It suggests that the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first, so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did without the first. It also indicates that the second schism lies temporally much closer to the first schism than has been hitherto appreciated. Above all, the paper seeks an answer to this question: How do the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism illuminate one another philosophically? Se reconoce generalmente que hay dos cismas en la historia temprana delmovimiento fenomenológico. El primero, el “gran cisma fenomenológico”, comenzó entre los años 1905 y 1913 y, como muchos de sus jóvenes contemporáneos, por ejemplo Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein e Ingarden, rechazó la transformación husserliana de la fenomenología de las Investigaciones lógicas (1900/1901) –esto es, de la fenomenología como psicología descriptiva– a la fenomenología de Ideas 1 (1913) –esto es, lafenomenología como idealismo trascendental. El segundo, el “cisma fenomenológicoexistencial”, tuvo lugar entre 1927 y 1933, desde que en Ser y tiempo (1927) la filosofía heideggeriana se apartó de la fenomenología transcendental husserliana de la conciencia y se encaminó hacia una analítica ontológica de la existencia humana como la vía hacia una interpretación de la pregunta por el sentido del Ser. Este ensayo no gira en torno ni al primero ni al segundo cisma per se, sino que trata de la relación entre los dos. Se sugiere que el primer cisma anticipa al segundo y que el segundo recapitula al primero,de manera que, aunque el primero pudiera haber ocurrido sin el segundo, el segundo no habría ocurrido, como fue el caso, sin el primero. Se indica que el segundo cisma yace temporalmente de manera más próxima al primero de lo que hasta la actualidad se ha apreciado. Con todo, el ensayo busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿cómo es que el “gran cisma fenomenológico” y el “cisma fenomenológico-existencial” se iluminan el uno al otro filosóficamente?

The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences.

This paper pursues a Kantian critique of Husserl’s theory of moral consciousness as it is found in his lectures on ethics and other shorter pieces on political and moral philosophy from the interwar period. The critique centers on Kant’s conception of moral personality (Persönlichkeit), arguing that Husserl fails to appreciate the force of this idea, subsequently leaving himself open to the charge of moral perfectionism. The paper ends with a positive assessment of Husserl’s thought, however, arguing that Husserl provides important resources for understanding moral consciousness as a sensibility for the possible, adding an important dimension to approaches in ethics that tend to center exclusively on questions of motivation and principle.

One of the symptoms of trauma is said to be a ‘sense of foreshortened future’. Without further qualification, it is not clear how to interpret this. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological account of what the experience consists of. To do so, we focus on the effects of torture. We describe how traumatic events, especially those that are deliberately inflicted by other people, can lead to a loss of what might be termed ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ in the world. This undermines the intelligibility of one’s projects, cares and commitments, in a way that amounts to a change in the structure of temporal experience. The paper concludes by briefly addressing the implications of this for how we respond to trauma, as well as offering some remarks on the relationship between trauma and psychosis.

Husserl’s phenomenology can be apprehended on the whole as a teleology of reason which consists of the aspiration to the greatest possible rationality in the cognitive, practical-individual and practical-communitarian or historic field. Following this tripartite division this paper analyzes the appearances of this concept in several texts of Husserl’s thinking: Logical Investigations (1900-1901), Renewal of human being and of culture (1932-1937), some manuscripts of the 30’s about teleology, the Crisis (1936) and the complementary text to the Crisis number 32 «Teleology in the history of philosophy»(1936). Finally the paper deals with an introduction to a possible analysis of the divine from the concept of teleology and a discussion about how far the concept of teleology can be tackled by phenomenology or would have to be studied exclusively by theology.(1932-1937), some manuscripts of the 30’s about teleology, the La fenomenología de Husserl puede ser aprehendida en su conjunto como una teleología de la razón entendida como la aspiración a la mayor racionalidad posible en los campos cognoscitivo, práctico-individual y práctico-comunitario o histórico. Siguiendo esta división en tres partes este artículo analiza la evolución de dicho concepto en diferentes textos de su pensamiento: las Investigaciones Lógicas (1900-1901), Renovación del ser humano y de la cultura (1932-1937), ciertos manuscritos de los años treinta sobre teleología, la Crisis (1936) y el texto complementario a la Crisis número 32 «Teleología en la historia de la filosofía» (1936). Finalmente se lleva a cabo una introducción a un análisis posible de lo divino a partir de la teleología y una discusión acerca de en qué medida el concepto de teleología puede ser abordado por la fenomenología o debería ser estudiado exclusivamente por la teología.

Today the phenomenological concept of the lived body figures centrally in several philosophical and special scientific debates. In these wide and widening fields, the concept is used with multiple different meanings. In order to clarify and delineate the debates, this paper provides an explication of the phenomenological-transcendental methods. It argues that these methods help us remove the most fundamental ambiguities of the concept of embodiment by distinguishing between the main constituents of the lived body and by illuminating their mutual relations.

espanolEl proposito de este articulo es arrojar luz sobre el peculiar modo de intencionalidad de la alegria. Para ello me referire, en primer lugar, a los dos sentidos principales de alegria. En segundo lugar, aludire al objeto de la alegria y a la cuestion de la correccion o legitimidad de la misma. En tercer lugar, hare referencia a las “leyes de la alegria”. Por ultimo, aludire a la relacion entre alegria y alteridad. EnglishThe aim of this paper is to offer a basic analysis of the peculiar kind of intentionality involved in the experience of joy. First, I deal with the two meanings of joy. Secondly, I point out some questions related to the object of joy and with the rightness or legitimacy of this experience. Thirdly, I refer to the so-called “laws of joy.” Lastly, I offer some thoughts on the relation between joy and alterity.

In "On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem" (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl's account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl's work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and after of the self as ego or I and egoic experience as attentive experience. I specifically aim to sketch the beginning of a response to three questions I take Crowell to be posing to a Husserlian account of the person and personal identity: (1) What more than pre-reflective self-awareness can be attributed to the self on phenomenological grounds so that we can understand, phenomenologically speaking, how selves become persons? (2) How can what characterizes the self in addition to pre-reflective self-awareness be discerned in both our commitment to truth and our feeling bound by love and other emotive commitments that cannot be fully rationally justified, which Husserl acknowledges are both sources of personal self-constitution? And (3), do all selves become persons? In the paper I elaborate how my answers to the first two questions turn on the self not just being self-aware but active in a particular sense. And to begin to address the third question, I suggest that while any form of wakeful conscious experience is both self-aware and active, this activity of the self makes a difference for those who are socio-historically embedded in the way we are. Specifically, on the proposed Husserlian account, selves that are socio-historically embedded become persons in and through their active relating to what they attentively experience. In concluding, I indicate how this Husserlian account might compare to Crowell's claim that "self-identity (ipseity) is not mere logical identity (A=A) but a normative achievement [ horizontal ellipsis ] which makes a 'personal' kind of identity possible" (2020).

espanolLas Lecciones de fenomenologia de la conciencia interna del tiempohan sido caracterizadas tanto por su enigmatica belleza textual como por su dificultades e inconsistencias. El objetivo de esta comunicacion es intentar establecer algunos puntos centrales de la teoria del tiempo husserliana en sus textos tempranos, conducido por el texto de las Leccionesyacompanado por la totalidad de escritos del periodo y las discusiones mas relevantes que se han hecho al respecto. EnglishThe Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 1905 were characterised both byits enigmatic beauty and its difficulty and inconsistency. The aim of this paper is to try to establish someof the central points of the Husserl’s theory of time in his early writings, guided by the Lectures but withthe support of all texts from the period and the most relevant discussions on the matter.

Resumen El artículo examina el proceso de configuración del concepto de destrucción en las lecciones tempranas de Martin Heidegger entre 1919 y 1920. En este texto se sostiene que a través del establecimiento del marco fenomenológico del que este concepto surge se puede llegar a comprender mejor el proyecto filosófico de Heidegger y, sobre todo, la relevancia o vigencia que este proyecto tiene hoy. Primero, se establecen algunas de las fuentes de este concepto, particularmente en lo que se refiere al concepto de Abbau en Husserl. Luego, se aborda la articulación en las lecciones de 1919 y 1920 y, finalmente, se plantean algunas consideraciones críticas. Abstract This article examines the genesis of the concept of destruction in the early lectures of Martin Heidegger between 1919 and 1920. The article claims that, by analyzing the phenomenological framework from which that concept arises, it is possible to reach a better understanding of Heidegger’s philosophical work and its relevance today. The article traces some of the sources of this concept, in particular with reference to Husserl’s concept of Abbau. Subsequently, the paper studies the articulation in the lectures of 1919 and 1920, and finally it puts forward some critical remarks.

L’article est une exploration systématique de la dualité des figures du Mind et du Geist, le premier étant entendu comme l’esprit en tant que partie de la nature scientifiquement objectivable, le second comme l’esprit en tant qu’acteur immatériel insaisissable de la pensée. De plus, cette dualité est étudiée du point de vue de l’interférence de la mathématique avec elle, dans plusieurs contextes. Sont ainsi successivement analysés : le conflit entre les deux « modèles » du Mind, le computationnaliste et le dynamiciste; la définition philosophique et la définition épistémologique du Geist ; le jeu entre Mind et Geist dans les recherches cognitives contemporaines ; l’ambivalence de la logique et des mathématiques vis-à-vis de l’opposition Mind/Geist. Dans la partie finale, on propose une définition personnelle du Geist–en termes d’adresse et de sujet–dont dérive une détermination du Mind. Revenant sur ces nouvelles bases à l’interférence avec la mathématique, on conclut sur la question essentielle et délicate de la paramétrisation de la conscience. This paper systematically investigates the conflicting figures of Mind and Geist : Mind has to be understood as some part of nature likely to become the object of science, while Geist names the unmaterial unseizable protagonist of thought. Further, the opposition of the two figures is studied in the light of the way mathematics interfere with it, in several contexts. This leads to following analyses : how computational and dynamicist models of Mind compete within cognitive science; how Geist may be defined philosophically and epistemologically ; how Mind and Geist differently come to be considered or to be aimed at within contemporary cognitive research ; how mathematics and logic play an ambivalent part with respect to the Mind/Geist opposition. In the final section of the paper, a personal definition of the Geist–in terms of address and subject–is proposed, which also leads to some conceptual determination of the Mind. Coming back to the interference with mathematics on this new basis, the paper concludes by an examination of the difficult question of the parametrization of consciousness.

O estatuto da ideia de Filosofia Primeira na Fenomenologia de Husserl Resumo: O objetivo do artigo que se segue é se dedicar a uma leitura e interpretação dos textos de Edmund Husserl que fazem uso do conceito de “Filosofia Primeira” para se referir em geral à fenomenologia e propor a tese de que a ideia de “primeira” surge de início na obra husserliana como uma privilegiada chave de demarcação do projeto fenomenológico em relação à hierarquia das ciências, e que ele traduz no final, com a evolução e o alargamento dos horizontes abertos por esse projeto, o duplo sentido da fenomenologia como “ciência de rigor” e como “filosofia”, e o esforço de elevar a fenomenologia pura ao estatuto de uma filosofia fenomenológica. Palavras-chave: Husserl; Filosofia Primeira; Fenomenologia pura; Filosofia Fenomenológica. The status of the First Philosophy idea in Husserl’s Phenomenology Abstract: The aim of the following paper is to read and to interpret Edmund Husserl's texts that make use of the concept of “First Philosophy” to refer in general to phenomenology and propose the thesis that the idea of “first” arises from the beginning in Husserlian work as a privileged key of demarcation of the phenomenological project in relation to the hierarchy of sciences, and that it finally translates, with the evolution and broadening of the horizons opened by this project, the double meaning of phenomenology as “rigorous science” and as “philosophy”, and the effort to rise pure phenomenology to the status of a phenomenological philosophy. Keywords: First Philosophy; Pure Phenomenology; Phenomenological Philosophy. Die Stellung der Idee von der Ersten Philosophie in Husserls Phänomenologie Zusammenfassung: Der begreiffende Text handelt sich um die Vorstellung, deren Grund des folgenden Abschnitt darin besteht, die Texte von Edmund Husserl zu lesen und zu interpretieren. Dies verwenden den Begriff der „Ersten Philosophie“, um allgemein auf die Phänomenologie zu verweisen und die These aufzustellen, sodass die Idee von „Ersten“ von Anfang an in Husserlian Arbeit entsteht als privilegierter Abgrenzungsschlüssel des phänomenologischen Projekts in Bezug auf die Hierarchie der Wissenschaften. Laut Husserl wird die doppelte Bedeutung der Phänomenologie schließlich durch die Entwicklung und Erweiterung des vom Projekt verbreitenden Horizons verwirklicht. Er hält die als „strenge Wissenschaft“ und als „Philosophie“ und fasst den Entschluss, die reine Phänomenologie in der Stellung einer phänomenologischen Philosophie zu erheben. Stichworte: Husserl; Erste Philosophie; Reine Phänomenologie; Phänomenologische Philosophie. Data de registro: 26/07/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021

This paper seeks to clarify Husserl’s critical remarks about Kant’s view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl c...

espanolEl presente articulo desarrolla un analisis critico de papel metodologico que desempena lalibre fantasia en Ideas I. Haciendo visible la estrecha relacion entre las modalizaciones de conciencia y laestructura noetico-noematica de los actos intencionales, se demostrara la necesaria complementariedadde los metodos de las reducciones eidetica y fenomenologica para el proyecto de Husserl de una criticafenomenologica del conocimiento. Con ello se busca poner de relieve que el rendimiento de la fantasiatuvo un impacto metodologico decisivo para la conversion trascendental de la fenomenologia. EnglishThis paper carries out a critical analysis of the methodological role played by free phantasy inthe first book of Ideas. Putting forward the close relation between consciousness modalization and thenoetic-noematic structure of intentional acts, the aim is to demonstrate the complementarity betweenthe methods of eidetic and phenomenological reductions for Husserl’s project of a phenomenologicalcritique of knowledge. By this, it will be stressed the decisive impact that the phantasy performance hadfor the transcendental turn of phenomenology

The article discusses the linguo-philosophical novations of Vyach. Ivanov and A.F. Losev in the interpretation of L.A. Gogotishvili, aimed to identify the underlying connections between the two theorists of symbol, myth, and language. It analyzes conceptual approach of the interpreter including the methods and techniques she used. The paper reveals likewise the logic and sequence of the ways these interpretations have been constructed, as well as their nature, originality, and scholarly importance. Gogotishvili’s research contribution to the study of Russian symbolism and onomatodoxy, with its doctrine of language, consists in her seminal understanding of their philosophy of language, as well as of the intellectual “techniques” used by Losev. This understanding helped Gogotishvili to develop her own theoretical approaches to the problem of reception of Ivanov’s symbolism and Losev’s work. In her study of symbolism, Gogotishvili moved from describing the religious status of language in onomatodoxy as well as , its communicative and predicative interpretations, to examining the predicative concept of symbol in Vyach. Ivanov, and then returning to Losev. As a result, here conclusions concerning general features of Ivanov’s and Losev’s novations have undergone some important changes.

A partir de los manuscritos tardíos de Husserl sobre ética, donde la dimensión afec- tiva de la experiencia del deber es reconocida con un estatus ético pleno, se busca analizar la concepción husserliana del amor como fuente de normatividad ética. Se aborda el amor ético y su distinción frente a las formas naturales e instintivas en las que arraiga, y se examina el tratamiento del mandato ético de amor al prójimo, con énfasis en lo relativo a su extensión universal. The article seeks to analyze the Husserlian conception of love as a source of ethical normativity. To that effect, it discusses Husserl’s late writings on ethics, in which the affective dimension of the experience of duty is awarded full ethical status. The paper addresses ethical love and its differences with the natural and instinctive forms in which it is rooted, and examines how Husserl deals with the ethical mandate to love one’s neighbor, emphasizing its universal scope. Fil: Cabrera, Celia Olga. Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos "Eugenio Pucciarelli". Sección de Investigaciones sobre Pensamiento Argentino; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina

The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality’s giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and ‘ultimate’ in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl’s analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge.

Opening with a consideration of the methodological stakes, the paper examines, in a preparatory way, the phenomenon of the startle as a limit case for phenomenological analysis. Taking a bearing from a traditional Husserlian schema, the analysis quickly finds itself twisting and turning, contorting the received phenomenological method in order to remain with the phenomenon. Elements of Heidegger’s “fundamental analysis of Dasein” are also tried out, but similarly find themselves dislocated by the peculiar phenomenological content of the startle. Thus unsettling the basic structures of phenomenology and temporality, the paper concludes by setting the scene for an encounter with Levinas’ perturbing notion of the il y a.

In my book Eigenname und Bedeutung (1996), I started from the observation that modern theories of proper names fail to do justice to the specific and complex semantic nature of proper names. Since the 1960’s and 1970’s, theorizing about proper names has been dominated largely by scholars working in the traditions of analytic philosophy and logic, in particular John R. Searle and Saul Kripke. I argued, however, that the highly specific kind of meaning typical of proper names should be studied within a theory more in touch with general linguistics proper. The main philosophical (especially referential) and logical (especially formal) accounts start from the assumption that a proper name is “backed up” by encyclopaedic information held by speakers of the referents (Searle), or that a proper name is a meaningless, yet rigidly designating sign (Kripke). In contrast to these views, I argue that a general linguistic definition of the proper name has to focus not only on logical and philosophical issues, but also on the specifically linguistic semantic function of the proper name as a “part of speech” in actual utterances. This approach has nothing to do with pragmatics or discourse analysis, but aims at describing proper names and appellative nouns as categories of speech in language use, bringing into play a functional focus on proper names that has largely been lacking in definitions of the proper name so far. An outline of a semantic theory of proper names is then proposed based on some aspects of a “phenomenology of language and linguistics” as found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Eugenio Coseriu. Roughly speaking, Husserl represents the general epistemological implications of the paper and Coseriu its specifically linguistic aspects.

The paper deals with the issue of the phenomenological foundations of polyculturalism on the basis of the categories of the following concepts: multi-layer being, concretization, intentionality, life world, and epoché. A comparison of phenomenology with eastern psychotechnics allows us to stress the importance of Husserl’s break with the tradition of speculative philosophy. Phenomenology is a pure experience of selfobservation. Such a radical intellectual position is similar to that of yoga and Buddhism which is also built after breaking with past traditions. They all reformat the cultural shell in order to reset and justify the experience of transcendental meditation. The achievement of the phenomenology lies not only in its reformist direction in philosophy, but also in that it solves the problem of overcoming the crisis of social sciences in Europe due to breaking the deadlock of speculative philosophy and positivism. Its universal value is in the development of cross-cultural research methodology, with the help of which such systems as Vedanta, yoga, Buddhism and phenomenology itself can be in a single intersubjective field. Keywords: phenomenology of culture, phenomenology of education, multiculturalism, Husserl, life world.

El presente trabajo tiene por propósito exponer un diálogo crítico entre Marx, Husserl, Heidegger y Marcuse, con el objetivo de esbozar algunos límites tentativos de la ciencia y la técnica. Se destacará en este diálogo crítico: i) La no neutralidad de la ciencia y la técnica, en tanto que cuentan con un a priori de dominación. ii) El concepto de valor como un modo de matematización-abstracción que completa la cuantificación de las ciencias exactas. iii) El dominio técnico como dominio político-económico. iv) La posibilidad de una alternativa The purpose of this paper is to show a critical dialogue between Marx, Husserl, Heidegger and Marcuse, with the aim of outlining some tentative limits of modern science and technique. In this critical dialogue the following will be highlighted: i) The non-neutrality of science and technology, because they have a domination’s a priori. ii) The concept of value as a mode of mathematization-abstraction that completes the quantification of the exact sciences. iii) The technical domain as a political-economical domain. iv) The possibility of an alternative.

In this paper I will try to systematically lay out and describe the multiple dimensions of the embodied experience of illness, which until recently has been the main focus within the field of the phenomenology of medicine. In order to do this, I will turn to analysis of the nature of embodiment in Husserl’s phenomenology. I will argue that based on Husserl’s phenomenology of the body, one can distinguish four ways of experiencing one’s body, or four dimensions of embodiment. I will distinguish between experience of one’s body as 1) a bearer of sensations (the affective dimension of embodiment); 2) a seat of free movement, characterized by the faculty of “I can” (the functional dimension of embodiment); 3) a material thing in a causal relationship with the material world (the material dimension of embodiment); 4) a material thing embedded in a social context (the social dimension of embodiment). I will then apply the proposed classification of dimensions of embodiment to the experience of illness, focusing on the various ways these dimensions have been used within the phenomenology of medicine. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides a framework for classification of the existing interpretations of the experience of illness; secondly, it opens up a way for a comprehensive analysis of the experience of illness which includes both individual and social aspects of embodiment as well as their mutual intertwining.

This paper deals with the hierarchical organization of the subject’s acts and their foundational ranking according to Husserl and Scheler, emphasizing emotional acts and their correlative objects –values. Husserl argues that cognitive (objectifying) acts (perception, thought-acts) found emotional acts (the evaluation or feeling of values), whereas Scheler holds that emotional acts found representations or objectifying acts. This difference refers back to key points in their own conceptions of the phenomenological method and the status of objective correlates. El presente artículo aborda las clasificaciones de los actos del sujeto y sus órdenes de fundación según Husserl y Scheler, con especial énfasis en los actos emocionales, y sus correlatos, los valores. Mientras que Husserl defiende que los actos cognitivos (objetivantes) (como la percepción o los actos de pensar) fundan a los emocionales (la evaluación o sentir de los valores), Scheler considera, más bien, que los actos emocionales fundan a los objetivantes o representativos. Esta diferencia nos remite a puntos clave de sus propuestas sobre el método fenomenológico y al estatus de sus correlatos objetivos.

This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I examine in detail Edmund Husserl’s earliest philosophy of surrogates, as it is found in his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. I analyze his psychological and logical investigations of surrogates, where the former is concerned with explaining how these signs function and the latter with how they do so reliably. His differentiation of surrogates on the basis of their genetic origins and degrees of necessity is discussed. Second, the historical importance of this text is disclosed by showing how Semiotic serves as both the inspiration for, and the foil to, Husserl’s 1901 First Logical Investigation. Husserl not only adopts the idea that linguistic signs can function via association, but also maintains that such signs can motivate me to execute one of two experiences. The key difference between the texts is that Husserl abandons his theory of surrogates in 1901, instead holding that I can experience absent objects by means of empty intentions. The reasons why Husserl found it necessary to transform this tenet of his philosophy are discussed at length. ispartof: Husserl Studies vol:33 issue:3 pages:211-227 status: published

This paper carries out a critical analysis of the methodological role played by free phantasy inthe first book of Ideas. Putting forward the close relation between consciousness modalization and thenoetic-noematic structure of intentional acts, the aim is to demonstrate the complementarity betweenthe methods of eidetic and phenomenological reductions for Husserl’s project of a phenomenologicalcritique of knowledge. By this, it will be stressed the decisive impact that the phantasy performance hadfor the transcendental turn of phenomenology El presente artículo desarrolla un análisis crítico de papel metodológico que desempeña lalibre fantasía en Ideas I. Haciendo visible la estrecha relación entre las modalizaciones de conciencia y laestructura noético-noemática de los actos intencionales, se demostrará la necesaria complementariedadde los métodos de las reducciones eidética y fenomenológica para el proyecto de Husserl de una críticafenomenológica del conocimiento. Con ello se busca poner de relieve que el rendimiento de la fantasíatuvo un impacto metodológico decisivo para la conversión trascendental de la fenomenología.

This paper focuses on two important notational devices that were embedded in Husserl’s and Peirce’s notations, the sign of inclusion and the sign of assertion. Husserl first criticizes, then follows Schröder in taking inclusion to be a simpler concept than equality, and endows his logical notation with a sign of inclusion. This was due to Peirce’s notational innovations and arguments, by which Husserl is indirectly influenced through of Schröder. Further, like Frege Husserl endows his notation with a sign of assertion, claiming that without some such sign it would be impossible to distinguish the assertion of a propositional content from its occurrence unasserted in some larger propositional context. Against this idea of Frege and Husserl, Peirce had a powerful argument—the compositional structure of a formula is de facto the sign of its assertion—, and Peirce’s algebraical and graphical notations can be seen as notational realizations of this principle.

The paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on (intentional) consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl's dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures - "dynamic intentional structures" - in which one and the same object is intended throughout a period of time (during which the subject's cognitive perspective upon that object is constantly changing) and by his conception of consciousness in terms of internal time-consciousness (temporal awareness). (2) It combines a dispositionalist higher-order judgment theory about the structure of (intentional) consciousness with the claim that the contents of these judgments are such that they can be expressed by essentially indexical sentences containing the temporal indexical "now," thus accommodating the basic role of internal time-consciousness. (3) It is immune against the "objection from lack of mental concepts" raised, e.g., by Dretske against any higher-order representation theory, as it employs counterfactuals in the framework of a disjunctive account of (intentional) consciousness. (4) It explains the unity of consciousness at a time as well as across time.

Este trabajo aborda una serie de problemas relacionados con la noción de mundo de la vida o Lebenswelt en Husserl. Analiza la descripción husserliana del mundo de la vida ofreciendo dos opciones de interpretación para dar salida a los problemas que plantea su definición: una de ellas concibe el mundo de la vida como ámbito intuido inmediato, anterior a cualquier forma de objetivación. Una segunda interpretación comprende el mundo de la vida como un ámbito estructurado categorialmente en el que la realidad se presenta ya como el resultado de una objetivación realizada. Conforme a esta segunda interpretación, el mundo de la vida es un espacio antrópico y ello conduce finalmente a la comprensión de la propia fenomenología como una forma de antropología, This paper addresses a series of problems related to Husserl´s notion of lifeworld or Lebenswelt. It analyzes Husserl ´s description of the lifeworld, offering two options of interpretation to solve the problems posed by its definition: one of them conceives the lifeworld as a fully immediate intuited environment, prior to any form of objectification . A second interpretation understands the lifeworld as a categorically structured environment in which reality is already presented as the result of a realized objectification. According to this second interpretation the lifeworld is an anthropic space and that finally leads to a reduction of phenomenology to an anthropology

International audience; Philosophical systems have developed for centuries, but only in the nineteenth century did the notion of scientific philosophy emerge. This notion presented two dimensions in the early twentieth century. One dimension arose from scientists' concern with conceptual foundations for their disciplines, while another arose from philosophers' appetite for more rigorous philosophy. In the current paper, I will focus on David Hilbert's construct of "critical mathematics" and Edmund Husserl' and Jules Vuillemin's systematic philosophy. All these three thinkers integrated Kant's legacy with the axiomatic method. However, they did so in different ways, with Hilbert's goal being the opposite of that of Husserl or Vuillemin. Specifically, I will show how the scientism of Hilbert's mathematical epistemology aimed at shattering the ambition of philosophy to submit mathematical practices and problems to philosophy's own principles and methods, be they transcendental or metaphysical. On the other hand, phenomenology promoted the idea of a non-exact philosophical rigour and highlighted the need of a point of view encompassing positive sciences, ontology, and ethical values in connection with the dominant category of sense/meaning, and Jules Vuillemin built on from the inseparability of thought-scientific or philosophical-from the metaphysics of free will and choice.

This paper deals with the methodological role played by the term «motivation» in young Heidegger’s early hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology. To that effect, I shall start analyzing the concept of motivation in Husserl’s phenomenology so as to better understand its hermeneutical variation in young Heidegger’s philosophy. Subsequently, I will pay special attention to the relevance exhibited by motivation in the emergence of the most important methodological notions of hermeneutical phenomenology as «destruction» (Destruktion), «formal indication» (formale Anzeige) and «preconception» (Vorgriff). To conclude, I shall explore the possibility of reshaping the phenomenological problem of the motivation to reduction in hermeneutical terms. That is to say: a motivation to reduction in factical life experience is always needed to access to the primordial sphere of meaning. Accordingly, I will finally suggest that the philosophical basic experience of radical questioning (Fraglichkeit) can be read as a hermeneutical epoche, which is, however, directly linked to the concern for one’s own existence. El presente artículo elucida el papel metodológico que juega el término «motivación» en la transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología llevada a cabo por el joven Heidegger. A tal efecto, comenzaré con el análisis del concepto de motivación en la fenomenología de Husserl para apreciar después su inflexión hermenéutica en la filosofía de Heidegger. En un segundo momento, prestaré una especial atención a la importancia que tiene la motivación en el surgimiento de las nociones metodológicas más importantes de la fenomenología hermenéutica, como son la «destrucción», la «indicación formal» y la «preconcepción». Todo ello me conducirá, finalmente, a reformular el problema fenomenológico sobre la motivación de la reducción en términos hermenéuticos; esto es: a mostrar la necesidad de que exista una motivación en la experiencia fáctica para acceder a la esfera originaria del sentido. De tal modo que la experiencia filosófica fundamental del cuestionamiento radical (Fraglichkeit) pueda ser leída en términos de una epoché hermenéutica, la cual, a diferencia de la reducción, concierne directamente a la existencia misma del que pregunta.

El presente artículo elucida el papel metodológico que juega el término «motivación» en la transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología llevada a cabo por el joven Heidegger. A tal efecto, comenzaré con el análisis del concepto de motivación en la fenomenología de Husserl para apreciar después su inflexión hermenéutica en la filosofía de Heidegger. En un segundo momento, prestaré una especial atención a la importancia que tiene la motivación en el surgimiento de las nociones metodológicas más importantes de la fenomenología hermenéutica, como son la «destrucción», la «indicación formal» y la «preconcepción». Todo ello me conducirá, finalmente, a reformular el problema fenomenológico sobre la motivación de la reducción en términos hermenéuticos; esto es: a mostrar la necesidad de que exista una motivación en la experiencia fáctica para acceder a la esfera originaria del sentido. De tal modo que la experiencia filosófica fundamental del cuestionamiento radical (Fraglichkeit) pueda ser leída en términos de una epoché hermenéutica, la cual, a diferencia de la reducción, concierne directamente a la existencia misma del que pregunta. This paper deals with the methodological role played by the term «motivation» in young Heidegger’s early hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology. To that effect, I shall start analyzing the concept of motivation in Husserl’s phenomenology so as to better understand its hermeneutical variation in young Heidegger’s philosophy. Subsequently, I will pay special attention to the relevance exhibited by motivation in the emergence of the most important methodological notions of hermeneutical phenomenology as «destruction» (Destruktion), «formal indication» (formale Anzeige) and «preconception» (Vorgriff). To conclude, I shall explore the possibility of reshaping the phenomenological problem of the motivation to reduction in hermeneutical terms. That is to say: a motivation to reduction in factical life experience is always needed to access to the primordial sphere of meaning. Accordingly, I will finally suggest that the philosophical basic experience of radical questioning (Fraglichkeit) can be read as a hermeneutical epoche, which is, however, directly linked to the concern for one’s own existence.

In the first place, I discuss the main papers and books on Durkheim published in recent years, where no attention is given to the phenomenological interpretations of his work. Then I expose different phenomenological readings of Durkheim, some of them positive (for instance, Tyriakian’s), some negative (Monnerot and others), some ambivalent (like Schutz’s). Later I find that there is in Durkheim an implicit practice of phenomenology, inspired by Descartes’ Meditations on first philosophy. Consequently, I support Tyriakian’s thesis that there is in Durkheim an implicit phenomenological approach, despite his positivism. Then I wonder whether this tacit approach produces a phenomenological ontology of the social world. I find that it actually does, especially in what regards to social facts considered as things. I argue that Durkheim’s conception of social things is consistent with Husserl’s notion of ideal objectivities. I conclude that Durkheim’s rule of considering social facts as things is part of his phenomenological legacy and that it does not contradict the idea that they also are “states lived”. Fil: Belvedere, Carlos Daniel. Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

Made available in DSpace on 2022-04-28T19:01:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2016-06-01 In the first year of the twentieth century, in Gottingen, Husserl delivered two talks dealing with a problem that proved central in his philosophical development, that of imaginary elements in mathematics. In order to solve this problem Husserl introduced a logical notion, called “definiteness”, and variants of it, that are somehow related, he claimed, to Hilbert’s notions of completeness. Many different interpretations of what precisely Husserl meant by this notion, and its relations with Hilbert’s ones, have been proposed, but no consensus has been reached. In this paper I approach this question afresh and thoroughly, taking into consideration not only the relevant texts and context, as others have also done before, but, more importantly, Husserl’s philosophy, his intuition-based epistemology in particular. Based on a system of clearly defined concepts that I here present, I reinforce an interpretation—definiteness as a form of syntactic completeness—that has, I believe, some advantages vis-à-vis alternative interpretations. It is in conformity with the available texts; it makes clear that Husserl’s notion of definiteness is indeed close to Hilbert’s notions of completeness; it solves the important problem of imaginaries for which it was created; and last, but not least, it fits naturally into Husserl’s system of concepts and ideas. Department of Mathematics University of the State of São Paulo, Av. Quatro, 436, apt. 52

This essay aims to point out the differences that exist between Lockean theory of personal identity and the conception based on genetic analysis in Husserlian constitutive phenomenology. Starting from a reconstruction of the notions characterizing the modern Lockean invention of personal identity, the paper tries to show how this view remains tied to a sense of individuality that involves an indissoluble bond between self-consciousness and the consciousness of personal continuity. In particular with regard to its practical or forensic aspect, Locke’s account ascribes to consciousness and memory a decisive role in the constitution of personal identity. In contrast, Husserl’s account of personal identity is based on the idea of functioning and impressional intentionality, which provides an appropriate account of our identity through time, clarifying the nature of the teleological perspective of becoming a person, within the framework of the transcendental phenomenology of otherness and intersubjectivity.

This paper intends to reflect on the genesis of the deleuzian notion of sense. I will start by demonstrating that Deleuze’s project, as well as Husserl’s, tries to revert Platonism by means of the concept of immanence. Secondly, I will criticise the concept of noema as exposed in Ideas I, in order to elucidate the features that Deleuze seeks to reformulate: good sense and common sense. Finally, based on the previous critique, I will carry out a description of sense as event. El siguiente trabajo busca reflexionar sobre la génesis de la noción deleuzianade sentido. Se comenzará por demostrar que el proyecto de Deleuze, como el de Husserl, busca revertir el platonismo a partir del concepto de inmanencia. En segundo lugar, se hará una crítica de la noción de noema tal como está expuesta en Ideas I, con el fin de elucidar los rasgos que Deleuze pretende reformular: el buen sentido y el sentido común. Por último, se construirá sobre la crítica previa una descripción del sentido como acontecimiento.

In this paper I develop a phenomenology of religious experience through the notion of keyphenomenon. My analysis moves from a general phenomenology of situation, in which we have to relate different phenomena according to a sense. What does “according to a sense” mean? My suggestion is that we should look for a relationship among these data when we find a key-phenomenon (among a series of phenomena) that would enlighten all the others. This key-phenomenon would show a non-phenomenal meaning which would make all the others understandable. Each other datum, therefore, becomes the witness of invisible meaning through a key-witness. The key-phenomenon we choose determines the role (i.e., the truth) of each datum within its situation. This phenomenological relationship belongs to both the sense of day-life situations, and that one of possible religious situations. If the religious interpretation of a situation depends on our choice of key-phenomenon, or key-witness, we have to define what kind of keyphenomenon constitutes a religious intuition.

The development in Ricoeur’s concept of time did not receive as much attention as his move from eidetic to hermeneutic phenomenology and his Time and Narrative, with which it coincided. This paper attends to the lacuna, specifically departing from Ricoeur’s Husserlian eidetics and moving towards the influence of Augustine’s discussion of the main aporias of time. Initially, Paul Ricoeur’s philosophic approach can be described as a Husserlian eidetic phenomenology, which influenced the way in which he understood time. This changed somewhat when Ricoeur moved from eidetic to hermeneutic phenomenology. Ricoeur has developed his understanding of the concept of time since his initial writings up to the end of his academic career of 70 years. This article focusses on Ricoeur’s initial eidetic approach in Freedom and Nature and, in more existential terms, in Fallible man, but also focusses on the initial phase of his turn to hermeneutics in Volume 1 of Time and Narrative with his exposition of Augustine’s views on time. His eidetic approach stems from his appreciation for and extension of the work of Husserl, Marcel and Kant, while he also drew much from Heidegger and Gadamer after his hermeneutic turn. His initial arguments on the hermeneutic phenomenology of time flow from Augustine’s discussions of the aporias of time. The later extension of his understanding of time to include emplotment was a logical next step.

Este trabajo, presentado como material de investigación de mi tesis doctoral sobre la fenomenología de Husserl, su recepción en la filosofía contemporánea y sus derivas actuales, ofrece algunas reflexiones críticas en torno a estas cuestiones, a propósito de una publicación actual: Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger. Un comentario fenomenológico, estudio coordinado por Ramón Rodríguez. Tras exponer las ideas fundamentales de los tres primeros capítulos -al hilo de la relación entre Husserl, Heidegger y la fenomenología-, realizo un comentario crítico de los mismos. The present paper, which comprises part of the research for my Ph.D. about Husserlian phenomenology, its reception in contemporary philosophy and current drifts, offers some critical remarks on aforementioned issues. The occasion to explore their complexity is a recent publication: Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger. Un comentario fenomenológico, collective study coordinated by Ramón Rodríguez. After explaining the main ideas of the three first chapters: namely, the relationship among Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenology, I shall expose some critical remarks about them.

In this paper I shall try to clarify Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness. In particular, I try to explain what exactly the asymmetry between protention and retention consists in. I argue (i) that Rodemeyer’s understanding of the protention-retention relationship, as developed, seems misleading, mainly for two reasons: first, it does not take into account that the ‘now’ has duration; second, she conceives the relation between protention and retention as symmetric, (ii) that the asymmetry between protention and retention could be better understood if we could not only take into account the influence that retention and affect have on protention, but also if we could take into consideration the conceptual difference between surprise and disappointment. This difference, I suggest, reveals new ways to understand the protention-retention asymmetry. Resumen En este artículo intentaré clarificar la concepción del tiempo-consciencia que defiende Husserl. En particular, intentaré explicar en qué consiste exactamente la asimetría entre retención y protención. Argumento (i) que la explicación que ofrece Rodemeyer de la relación entre protención y la retención es errónea, básicamente por dos razones: en primer lugar, no tiene en cuenta que el ‘ahora’ tiene duración. En segundo lugar, asume que la relación entre protención y retención es simétrica, lo cual es falso. (ii) Que la asimetría entre protención y retención podría entenderse mejor si tomamos en cuenta no sólo la influencia que la retención y el afecto tienen sobre la protención, pero la diferencia conceptual que existe entre la sorpresa y la desilusión. Esta diferencia, sugiero, revela nuevas maneras de entender la asimetría entre protención y retención.

This paper focuses on the methodical disclosure of the lowest level of the constitution of time in Husserl’s phenomenology of time (especially in the C-Manuscripts), following this leading question: is it at all possible to disclose phenomenologically the primal-phenomenal constituting stream of consciousness? First, I address the different levels of constitution in order to focus on the ultimate level. Second, I analyse the “intentionality” of the primal-stream, by means of differentiating it from act-intentionality. Third, I outline the methodical function of the reduction and of the phenomenologizing ego. Fourth, I present Abbau as the methodical possibility of reaching primal-phenomenality. Fifth, I address the problem of grasping the primal-phenomenal dimension in its originality. I will argue that we can grasp this fundamental dimension by means of a “phenomenological deconstruction” of constituted experience and at the same time by putting this dimension in an intentional relationship with the phenomenologizing ego. Fil: Niel, Luis Ignacio. Universidad Nacional del Litoral; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Santa Fe; Argentina

En el presente artículo, se ofrecen algunas claves de interpretación de la fenomenología husserliana como heredera de un modo de pensamiento al que se ha denominado, tras Kant, «filosofía trascendental». Para ello, en primer lugar, se ofrece una breve definición de lo que es la filosofía trascendental, sus objetivos, problemas y características, a fin de situar la obra de Husserl en este contexto. A continuación, se analizará la herencia kantiana y cartesiana de la fenomenología, a fin de deslindar las semejanzas y diferencias entre sus propuestas filosóficas respectivas. En una tercera sección, se analizará el rol central que cumple la «reducción» en la filosofía de Husserl con respecto a la intencionalidad y la correlación entre mundo y conciencia. Finalmente, se preguntará por el lugar y la importancia que la fenomenología trascendental tiene en el pensamiento contemporáneo, así como también por los límites y las posibilidades que una filosofía trascendental como la fenomenología husserliana ofrece en la actualidad. En aquest article s'ofereixen algunes claus d'interpretació de la fenomenologia husserliana com a hereva d'un mode de pensament que s'ha anomenat, després de Kant, «filosofia transcendental». Per fer-ho, en primer lloc, s'ofereix una breu definició del que és la filosofia transcendental, dels seus objectius, problemes i característiques, a fi de situar l'obra de Husserl en aquest context. A continuació, s'analitzarà l'herència kantiana i cartesiana de la fenomenologia, a fi de distingir les semblances i les diferències entre les seves respectives propostes filosòfiques. En una tercera secció, s'analitzarà el paper central que té la «reducció» en la filosofia de Husserl respecte de la intencionalitat i la correlació entre món i consciència. Finalment, es preguntarà pel lloc i la importància que la fenomenologia transcendental té en el pensament contemporani, com també pels límits i les possibilitats que una filosofia transcendental com la fenomenologia husserliana ofereix en l'actualitat. In the present article, I offer some key interpretations of Husserl's phenomenology as heir to a way of thinking that has been named "transcendental philosophy" after Kant. Firstly, a short definition is given of what transcendental philosophy is, its objectives, problems and characteristics in order to place Husserl's work within this context. Secondly, the Kantian and Cartesian legacy of phenomenology are analyzed with the objective of delineating the similarities and differences between their respective philosophical proposals. In a third section, the central role of the "phenomenological reduction" is put under review in order to stress its function in Husserl's philosophy regarding intentionality and the correlation between world and consciousness. Finally, the place and the importance of transcendental phenomenology for contemporary thought will be analyzed, as well as the limits and possibilities that a transcendental philosophy as the Husserlian phenomenology can offer nowadays.

En este trabajo, centrado en los Seminarios de Zollikon de Martin Heidegger, abordo la ambigua y compleja relación entre Heidegger, Husserl y la fenomenología, mediada por la problemática del método fenomenológico. La tesis que pretendo mostrar es que, a pesar de la postura explícita de Heidegger, en la que se muestra crítico con su maestro, Heidegger estaría asumiendo, implícitamente, tanto el método como la fenomenología de Husserl, la cual es puesta en práctica en estos Seminarios. Para mostrar esta tesis, analizo dos nociones fundamentales de la fenomenología de Husserl, en las que Heidegger basa toda su argumentación: cuerpo (Körper) y cuerpo vivido (Leib). In the present paper, focused on the Zollikon Seminars by Martin Heidegger, I will explain the ambiguous and complex relationship among Heidegger, Husserl, and the phenomenology, through the analysis of phenomenological method. The idea that I want to show is that, despite the explicit attitude of Heidegger, which shows his differences with his master, Heidegger seems to be assuming, implicitly, both the method and Husserl ́s phenomenology. This is evidenced in the aforementioned text. In order to support this thesis, I analyze two fundamental ideas of Husserl ́s phenomenology, on which Heidegger based all his arguments: Body (Körper) and lived body (Leib).

The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.

ENG: Husserl, Bolzano, Brentano, Twardowski, Marty, Sign, Expression, Meaning, Existence, Judgment, In the First Logical Investigation Husserl maintains that in order to achieve a phenomenological, subject-related and yet non psychological theory of meaning, one must begin by drawing an «essential distinction » between expressive and indicative signs. As a consequence, Husserl maintains that «sign » is an equivocal term. In this paper, I will set out and elaborate the historical background of this claim tracing it back to Bolzano’s theory of signs and situating it within the broader context of the Brentano’s School. This will lead me to (1) flesh out the role of semiotics in Husserl’s critique of psychologism and (2) emphasize its meaning and scope in contrast with the widespread contention according to which «sign » is an univocal term whose structure can be captured by the medieval formula «aliquid stat pro aliquo » ., Majolino Claudio. Structure de l’indice et équivocité du signe. A l’origine du partage Anzeigen/Ausdrucken dans les Recherches logiques. In: Histoire Épistémologie Langage, tome 32, fascicule 2, 2010. Sciences du langage et psychologie à la charnière des 19e et 20e siècles. pp. 75-91.