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This paper is made up of responses to the papers in this volume. The first section is concerned with the philosophy of linguistics, particularly with the linguistic conception of grammars and the psychological reality of language. The second section is concerned with the theory of reference for proper names, including issues of reference borrowing, grounding, the qua-problem, and causal descriptivism. The third section is concerned with the theory of meaning, particularly the matters of direct reference, the contingent a priori, rigidity for kind terms, narrow meaning, and the use theory. The fourth section is concerned with methodology, particularly with “putting metaphysics first”, the role of intuitions, and the contribution of experimental semantics. The fifth section tackles two issues in metaphysics: the definition of scientific realism and biological essentialism.

This paper explores, develops, and evaluates Waismann’s six papers on the analytic/synthetic distinction, which were published in Analysis between 1949 and 1953. Although the sequence is unfinished, Waismann develops a view of analyticity on which it can be defined in terms of definitions. Definitions, however, are a diverse group of things which cannot be given a definition themselves. Much like a family resemblance expression, definitions are irregular, incomplete, and their extensions are subject to our choices. Analyticity—being defined in terms of definitions—inherits these properties. Given the foundational importance of analyticity in the linguistic approach to philosophy popular at the time Waismann was writing, the view turns out to have far-reaching consequences for Positivism, for Ordinary Language Philosophy, for the epistemology of logic, and for the way we pursue philosophy.

This chapter argues that many of the conventions that determine the form and scope of Literary Studies have evolved to serve the interests of academic critics as a professional community rather than their subject as an intellectual discipline. These conventions serve to entrench that community’s power relations and justify Literary Studies’ existence as a subject suitable for incarnation in a university setting. The contradictions, omissions and repressions of Literary Studies should be understood in terms of the subject’s professional contexts, including those imposed “from above” (e.g. by governments and funders) and “from below” (by its constitution as a subject to be taught and assessed in universities). The chapter illustrates this thesis with brief examples and sets out the structure of the book.

Everyone has experienced emotions and everybody knows what they are – at least, we think we know. Asked for an explanation, the response will likely be something along the lines of “happiness is an emotion” or “if I’m scared of something, it is also an emotion.” Such imprecise and in the narrower sense incorrect definitions are entirely sufficient for everyday use. But this is obviously not the case in science as well as in corporate practice. After all, important recommendations for the economy should be derived from well-founded studies. As a first step, this requires that the term “emotions” means the same to everybody. At the present time, this is wishful thinking. A steadily rising number of publications are produced within the HCI community, in which in part elaborate measuring techniques are used to account for emotions with different study designs. However, this approach appears to be problematic, because a standard definition of “emotions” has yet to be established. The purpose of this publication is to draw the attention of the HCI community to this issue and to start a worthwhile conversation with an attempt at providing a definition. It concludes with a specific recommendation as to which physiological measuring methods would be conducive for answering corporate research questions.

All spatio-temporal events or happenings or states or properties of things or things themselves, of whatever event or duration without exception, are effects or lawful correlates. That is to say each has a fundamental explanation. Furthermore, both the historical doctrines of traditional Compatibilism and Incompatibilism about determinism and freedom, after some centuries of philosophical and other attention, have been falsified, demonstrably so. I claim a little old credit here. Hume was wrong in taking our freedom as we understand it to be consistent with causation. Kant was wrong in taking our freedom as we understand it to be inconsistent with causation. There is both incompatible freedom (origination, free will where that doesn’t just mean freedom, lawless and unexplainable control and responsibility) and compatible freedom (voluntariness—choice and action according to desire, embraced desires, not being in jail, etc., and, thus, quite unfated). There is a related, but alternative, true-enough story called Attitudinism, about our life-hopes. The real problem of determinism has been that of accommodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes—at bottom, certain desires and things within Affective Consciousness. Here, I remark on comments and criticisms of my views by Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, Kevin Timpe, and Gregg D. Caruso.

Anyone who has written one knows how frustratingly difficult it can be to perfect a computer program. Some of the founding fathers of computing set out ideas for reasoning about software — one would say today ‘techniques for proving that a program satisfies its specification’. Alan Turing presented a paper entitled Checking a Large Routine that laid out a workable method for reasoning about programs. Sadly his paper had little impact. Understanding the problem faced, Turing’s proposal and what followed provides insight into how ideas evolve. Comparing three contributions from the 1940s with the current state of the art clarifies a problem that still costs society a fortune each year.

Naples, “a city where a splendid school of mathematics once flourished, but whose only link with physics was its regret for the disappearance of Ettore Majorana”.

R. M. Chisholm begins by reporting that Lucey has expounded his views perfectly accurately. Chisholm says that Lucey has attributed to him a view that he did not intend to endorse. The key issue lies in Chisholm's characterization of what it is to be “purely psychological”. Lucey has provided a counter-example to Chisholm's theory, and Chisholm basically accepts the counter-example and abandons the terminology of calling any states “purely psychological”. Chisholm uses the occasion of his response to Lucey for further developing his theory to distinguish three types of psychological property which he calls “Cartesian properties”. Chisholm stresses that Cartesian properties are properties to which we have privileged access but that he is not defining them in terms of such access. Chisholm concludes his response by giving a characterization of what it is for a person to be in a conscious state.

This chapter takes an on-going reconciliation process in Sweden, the case of the Church of Sweden and its historical relations to the indigenous Sami people, as a point of departure for analysing official white paper projects and truth commissions from the perspective of generating and disseminating historical knowledge. What happens with historical knowledge when historical problems are formulated, researched, and published within a reconciliation process driven by an ideological agenda? How can such a process be analysed from a theoretical point of view? This chapter argues that the examined process follows a general pattern that can be divided into at least three distinguishable phases. Each phase is marked by distinctly different characteristics with regards to the (scientific) shape of historical knowledge, the main agents and audiences involved in the process, and the specific media that history is filtered through. All phases also display different characteristics concerning their educational scopes. Through this analysis, the authors aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of how historical knowledge is generated within official historical justice processes and how it is transformed through processes of educationalisation, recontextualisation, and remediation.

The brief reviews and essays that make up this final chapter are intended to provide some detailed information and reference material on recent research topics in astronomy and astrophysics. It is hoped that the material will be of use with respect to term paper ideas. References are given to full research papers, not so much because their content is readily accessible to the reader (at this stage), but because they will give some idea of how science communication works. Indeed, one of the most important aspects of being (and becoming) an astronomer is to know the literature—what are other researchers doing, where are their arguments weak, where are they strong; where have other researchers gone wrong in the interpretation of the data, where have they made the right choices, etc.

The final chapter is, of course, not a final conclusion concerning the “fruition” of the mathematics of paper folding: this domain is in a process of continuous development, and its interweaving with computer sciences and computer modeling becomes more and more apparent and prominent. This, of course, raises the question as to how materiality, which earlier functioned partially as a hindering element, is considered; one may wonder, for example, as to the epistemological implications and differences between the twenty-first century mathematical computer models and the nineteenth century mathematical material folded models, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. What this chapter will attempt to describe is that which can be called the first step of this new, modern movement concerning mathematics and folding-based geometry: the complete axiomatization of this geometry. Though not the single modern point of view with which the mathematics of paper folding has been considered, the attempt to find axioms or basic operations for this geometry, started at the beginning of the twentieth century, bore fruit only towards the end of the 1980s. If Beloch’s interest lay in proving that folding-based geometry is at least as powerful as straightedge and compass geometry, from an algebraic point of view as well as construction-wise, during the mid-1980s, one was interested in finding the basic, fundamental operations from which a folded figure was composed, and by this means, giving this geometry a logical sound basis, the same that straightedge and compass geometry had for centuries.

We present a position paper advocating the notion that Stoic philosophy and ethics can inform the development of ethical A.I. systems. This is in sharp contrast to most work on building ethical A.I., which has focused on Utilitarian or Deontological ethical theories. We relate ethical A.I. to several core Stoic notions, including the dichotomy of control, the four cardinal virtues, the ideal Sage, Stoic practices, and Stoic perspectives on emotion or affect. More generally, we put forward an ethical view of A.I. that focuses more on internal states of the artificial agent rather than on external actions of the agent. We provide examples relating to near-term A.I. systems as well as hypothetical superintelligent agents.

This position paper offers an answer to the question about the difference between artificial and natural. By building up a dichotomy between physis and logos, it argues that this difference is given by language and by what can be grasped with words. It concludes with an assertion that Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) cannot create anything natural, whereas emergent AI can, because emergent phenomena are intrinsically natural, which is a very important fact for the AI field. The paper also offers a view on the difference between the roles of an AI engineer in GOFAI and in emergent AI.

This short paper was originally published in the Annalen der Physik, 36 (1939). I include it here because it is the first and most systematic discussion of an idea to which the other essays often allude: the idea of basing irreversibility on the structure of time. When I wrote the paper I was under the impression of having stated a fairly obvious matter, obvious especially to every empiricist or positivist, since I merely pose the question of in what manner temporal processes are given to us. I was somewhat astonished to find that the idea seemed rather foreign to most physicists. It plays a decisive role in the course of our further arguments (cf. II.5b).

This short paper is a rather personal account on the process, which in the end led to the effect that the author moved from a scholar of an influential person to a colleague of him. It tries to tell the story how a new organizational backbone for the Institute of Informatics at LMU was created by predictive thinking, and it is a hommage to the ability to switch from technical detail to a very broad but nevertheless precise analysis of development opportunities for an organization.

Structural Realism (SR) is typically rated as a moderate realist doctrine about the ultimate entities of nature described by fundamental physics. Whether it must be extended to the higher-level special sciences is not so clear. In this short paper I argue that there is no need to ‘structuralize’ the special sciences. By mounting concrete examples I show that structural descriptions and structural laws certainly play a role in the special sciences, but that they don’t play any exclusive role nor that they give us any reason to believe that all that there is on the various levels is structure. I fortify my points by arguing that structures are global entities (in order for SR not to collapse into a bundle ontology) and that the assumption of higher-level structures as genuinely global or holistic entities is even more arcane.

All four sections of your paper (Introduction, Methods, Results, Discussion) need to work together as one coherent paper. Unfortunately, some researchers never look at their overall paper. First, they bring up three different issues in the Introduction. Next, they describe Methods that are poorly suited to addressing any of the issues they mention in the Introduction. Then they present Results that only partially correspond to the Methods they just described and do not really answer any of the issues raised in the Introduction. Finally, they write a rambling Discussion that brings up new issues not mentioned in the Introduction and spends less time discussing their current Results than they do talking about results from other researchers or their own clinical observations not from the present study. Probably the most common cause of this kind of mess is failure to write an outline prior to writing the paper. Lack of coordination between multiple co-authors drafting the paper may also sometimes be a contributing factor. But regardless of how this discordance between the four sections comes about, it does not work, and the paper will not make much sense.

Science is not scientific unless it is based on the scientific literature. Regrettably, many authors make all kinds of vague assertions without supplying references [1–3]. Consequently, these assertions are often misinformed or outright wrong, thus weakening the papers’ positions and the authors’ credibility. So look at each single sentence of your paper (especially in the Introduction and Discussion) to identify any such assertions without supporting references. Whenever you make an assertion about something, you should verify it against the scientific literature and provide adequate citations to back up that assertion [4, p. 110–112]. For major points in your paper, provide more than one reference, if possible. Yet you should not cite numerous references at any one point [5]. If many papers are available as possible citations, choose the few that are the best (i.e. are the highest quality evidence, most recent, most relevant, etc.)

Over the past several decades, accessibility has been increasingly pervading a vast range of fields, producing a large number of new ideas, theories, and innovations that have already proven to be quite fruitful. A closer look at how accessibility has entered and developed in various research fields shows that said fields have experienced fundamental changes: a shift from particularist accounts to a universalist account of access, a shift from maker-centred to user-centred approaches, and a shift from reactive to proactive approaches. Through these processes, accessibility has birthed new areas within those fields, that have been gradually converging to constitute the wider field of accessibility studies. The nature and position of accessibility studies has now become a central topic. This ongoing progression of conceptual clarification may bear some misunderstanding and misinterpretations along the way. In the paper, I first briefly review the principal traits of the process of formation of accessibility studies; then address some possible misconceptions; and finally, introduce a first, very general sketch of poietic design, a method proper to accessibility studies.

The introductory chapter of Youth and Permissive Social Change in the British Music Press, 1967–1983 first provides an overview of what music papers typically wrote about. It then locates music papers within the historiographical literature regarding youth. It goes on to offer a conceptual framework for ‘permissive social change’ that relies on a dynamic view of social change rather than one that implies a gradual, unassailable progress towards a more tolerant society or, for that matter, a ‘cultural revolution’. Finally the chapter outlines the scope and structure of the following chapters.

The paper is an investigation on how behaviour relates to norms, i.e. how a certain conduct acquires meaning in institutional terms. The simplest mechanism determining this phenomenon is given by the ‘count-as’ relation, generally associated with constitutive rules, through which an agent has the legal capacity, via performing a certain action, to create, modify or destroy a certain institutional fact. In the analytic literature, however, the ‘count-as’ relation is mostly approached for its classificatory functions, mapping entities to categories whose members carry institutional properties. Besides making explicit this double function, the paper reconsiders the relation between constitutive rules and regulative rules, and introduces a proposal on the ontological status of constitution.

During the second half of the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt’s writings have fundamentally shaped critical approaches to political theory. Widely recognized as a thinker of a rational political order, the place of emotions and affects in Arendt’s work is mostly ignored in the reception and interpretation of her theory. This paper focuses on the connection between affectability and political judgment. It shows how Arendt uses the method of enlarged mentality in order to make the plurality of lived experience visible. Arendt has often written down the question “How would I feel […] if I were in their place?” and established a political judgment by taking other people’s standpoints, not only in terms of abstract thinking but also affectively. This paper claims that plurality does not only mean differences in arguments or judgements but also in people’s affective response to the world. Arendt tried to grasp this affective dimension via representative thinking – and failed more than once. By analyzing her essay “Reflections on Little Rock” and its aftermath, the paper is going to show the limits of representing affective experiences’ plurality and how ignoring these limitations led Arendt to a wrong political judgment.

The paper is devoted to the problem of creativity and its main ethical aspects: the Omnibenevolence Paradox and the Education Paradox. The first relates to the idea of God the Creator, who wishes only good, but permits a great deal of evil. The second relates to the first and is that any spiritual culture which educates for the inculcation of certain virtues in society inevitably inculcates with those virtues a number of corresponding vices. If the first paradox has still been considered as a purely theological problem and was repeatedly investigated by various philosophers, the second one, on the contrary, has been studied little, though in practice any spiritual culture constantly faces such an issue. The paper demonstrates that both paradoxes share the same general basic principle, and, therefore, are eliminated with the same method. To search out that method is the practical goal of this work. At the same time there are the following problems to be solved: to present the idea of God not in a tightly religious value, but in its broadest common cultural one, to investigate the general nature of the Omnibenevolence Paradox and the Education Paradox, to demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional attempts to solve the problem, to adopt the solution that remains after all the others have been rejected.

This paper looks at ancient lineages that have studied consciousness, thoughts, for answers towards understanding non-linearities that have eluded the logical thinking provided by computers and machines. This paper argues that mind and consciousness are examples of Gray Matters and can be framed as complex systems. Nonlinearities, and sensitivity to initial conditions, makes predictions difficult. Similar to Darwin’s work based on laws of natural selection, perhaps the answer lies in studying emergence, adaptations, and adoptions arising from interacting parts and its’ surrounding environment. In particular, our research emphasizes that the idea of attention could be a major key towards understanding primordial nature of the mind and the consciousness.

Ernest Nagel played a key role in bridging the gap between American philosophy and logical empiricism. He introduced European philosophy of science to the American philosophical community but also remained faithful to the naturalism of his teachers. This paper aims to shed new light on Nagel’s intermediating endeavors by reconstructing his philosophical development in the late 1920s and 1930s. This is a decisive period in Nagel’s career because it is the phase in which he first formulated the principles of his naturalism and spent a year in Europe to visit the key centers of logical empiricism. Building on a range of published and unpublished papers, notes, and correspondence—including hundreds of pages of letters to his close friend Sidney Hook—I reconstruct Nagel’s philosophical development, focusing especially on the philosophical influence of John Dewey, Morris R. Cohen, Rudolf Carnap, and Hans Reichenbach.

This paper proposes an analytic framework for political discourse that takes place over digital social media. It focuses largely on hostile or acrimonious discourse and why much of that discourse should be considered dysfunctional. The framework applies principles of epistemic frame theory and quantitative ethnography to classify and investigate relationships in political discourse patterns, to situate and visualize broad discourse patterns, and to facilitate ethnographic analysis that incorporates emotion as paramount to explaining these patterns. Commentary threads following political articles from two legacy news outlets are modeled with the Epistemic Network Analysis (ENA) software tool, for purposes of illustrating the viability of a political discourse coding system for the proposed framework. The paper also introduces the constructs of discursive transactions and emotional grammars to extend the explanatory value of the proposed framework. The framework is meant to contribute to a broader dialog on functional discourse patterns, and to help researchers articulate both the spiraling nature of dysfunctional political discourse and the profound damage it inflicts on social goals of fairness, well-being, and prosperity.

This paper aims to pursue two goals: first, it will explore the encounter and dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s thinking toward medicine, and in particular, psychiatry. Second, it will look toward understanding how this encounter can illuminate clinical practices and provide significant contributions within the fields of medical education and healthcare. The broader horizon of this paper is to underline how embracing a different approach to health can be of interest to both a medical and philosophical audience, inviting the former to progress in their scientific skills and de-personalize texts toward a more genuine and humanistic encounter with patients, while also engendering the latter to leave the dark and dusty halls of metaphysical thinking to move into the greener pastures of the social dimension.

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the concepts of moral responsibility and moral agency in the context of relationships between human and artificial intelligence. An active application of artificial intelligence in contemporary world questions accepted assumptions of moral responsibility for actions. If an autopilot driven car crashes due to a driver’s fault, can an autopilot be considered morally responsible? If the autopilot is not considered to be responsible, then who does: the passenger who was supposed to take control, or the developer who set the algorithm for the autopilot. In other words, who is considered to be a moral agent in such situations? Both options seem problematic therefore the notion of moral responsibility should be reconsidered. Technological progress leads to the situation where only the integrational system which includes both human and artificial intelligence could be morally responsible. The paper contains an analysis of some arguments against such kind of moral agency. As a conclusion paper says that only cyborg-like joint human-AI system could be recognized as moral agent.

Considering the increasing reliance on technology during the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemics, the aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the specific state of isolation and the possibility of using digital technologies being percieved as the then-dominant free space for acting. Starting with the assumption that virtual space is not given by itself, but rather diabolical in the middle of reflecting the existing power relations and the parallel inscribing of the potential for their resolution, the paper seeks to examine the (im)possibility of anticipating wider socio-political alternatives with the emphasis of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the pandemics. In other words, acting on the Web is both immobilizing and emancipatory. Based on the attempt to read chaos theory from a dialectical perspective, the significance of this paper is reflected in the application of theoretical assumptions about the influence of technology towards the affirmation of radical democratic practices. The interdependence of liberating and limiting as emancipating and immobilizing in the context of information and communication technologies will show that emancipation is not to be seen as a linear, eschatological process. Instead, it depends on different, unpredictable, and nonlinear outcomes, as well as the complexity of the interpenetration of global and localized phenomena.

Technology designers and developers can be understood as social experience (SE) mediators. In user experience (UX), notions of SE have served to identify and define the factors contributing to human-technology interaction (HTI). Three dominant perspectives have been promoted in UX discourse: 1) SE of brand, brand value and consumer culture; 2) technology design as mediator of human-to-human interactions; and 3) meaning generation through action and interaction between actors. Symbolic interactionalism understands meaning as occurring through dialogue, in the construction of the social self, promoting self-reflection as a social construction. This theorisation of social experience is valuable in the context of HTI as it allows for greater insight into the immaterial dimensions of technology integration in human societies. The purpose of this paper is to break down the factors contributing to social emotional experience of technology through illustrating how it operates according to fashion – temporality and spatiality in culture. This is a theoretical paper that presents a review of social experience, social emotional and collective emotion based literature in light of fashion and design. The result is a presentation of a proposed fashion framework of social emotions in technology interaction design (FASHEM). Based on symbolic interactionism, FASHEM helps break down emotional technology experience into a matrix of self, other, design, and semiotic interactions. peerReviewed

When building artificial agents that have to make decisions, understanding what follows from what they know or believe is mandatory, but it is also important to understand what happens when those agents ignore some facts, where ignoring a fact is interpreted to stand for not knowing/not being aware of something. This becomes especially relevant when such agents ignore their ignorance, since this hinders their ability of seeking the information they are missing. Given this fact, it might prove useful to clarify in which circumstances ignorance is present and what might cause an agent to ignore that he/she is ignoring. This paper is an attempt at exploring those facts. In the paper, the relationship between ignorance and beliefs is analysed. In particular, three doxastic effects are discussed, showing that they can be seen as a cause of ignorance. The effects are formalized in a bi-modal formal language for knowledge and belief and it is shown how ignorance follows directly from those effects. Moreover, it is shown that negative introspection is the culprit of the passage between simply ignoring a fact and ignoring someone’s ignorance about that fact. Those results could prove useful when artificial agents are designed, since modellers would be aware of which conditions are mandatory to avoid deep forms of ignorance; this means that those artificial agents would be able to infer which information they are ignoring and they could employ this fact to seek it and fill the gaps in their knowledge/belief base.

This paper argues that the cultural psychology of Jaan Valsiner is permeable to the dialogue with Amerindian cosmologies in the sense that it presents a sort of relational ontology. Amerindian relationalism apprehend or reflect about the environment that surrounds us without assuming the unity of nature given by the objective universality of body and substance. Besides, the relation between human beings and societies as based on the plurality of cultures, subjective particularity of psyche and meaning is reflectes as multinaturalism. We find in the psychological frame, that Valsiner rejects a rigid ontology, claiming that cultural psychology approaches how a concrete person feels, thinks, and acts constructing and using signs, the experienced phenomenon is approached as elaborated through semiotic mediation. From the relationalism of Jaan Valsiner, this paper proposes some issues addressing cultural psychology to advance further in its criticism to the idea of an essential and static nature and the objectivity of psychological phenomena.

In this paper I present Popper’s three worlds, the theory of creative evolution and the emergence of new forms. I further analyse Popper’s concept of emergence and his claim about the strong relationship between novelty and unpredictability. I analyse two different senses in which Popper uses the concept of emergence: (1) emergence as the unpredictability/nonderivability/nondeducibility of properties, and (2) emergence as the absolute unpredictability of events (Stephan 1992). This distinction parallels the distinction between the epistemological and ontological concepts of emergence. I argue that Popper, despite some examples which point to an epistemological notion, suggests ontological emergentism with “downward causation”. In this way consciousness possesses its own independent causal power. This enables Popper to see humans as autonomous and free. However, it is also vulnerable to the problems of interactionist dualism, particularly the question of its compatibility with some basic principles of physical science. This paper concludes with a discussion of how Popper’s position differs from the weaker emergentism present in various theories in cognitive science, such as the theories of emergent properties in connectionism and neural networks.

The research aims to explore Pavel Janak’s design techniques through studying his formal expression, which in this paper is conceived as a sort of language. Inspired by Cubist paintings, Janak’s building work is composed logically by geometric forms, representing a complex figure. The techniques he used are considered as the grammar to decode this complexity. So, by means of extracting the geometry archetypes as the solid alphabet from the language, the research will interpret his ever-changing formal expression from Cubism to functionalism and inspect his design techniques and their evolution process. The research method is to analyse the built works of Pavel Janak in different creative stages. Taking his theoretical works as a breakthrough, firstly, the paper will try to dissect the Janak’s philosophy background and then analyse the formation and transformation of his grammatic structure of formal expression from a height of aesthetic conception. More profoundly, by studying his personal diary, the paper will inspect his self-reflection and deep thought.

This paper examines the legitimacy of African knowledge system, in the light of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism, with a view to assessing whether or not African knowledge system is capable of legitimate science. Popper defended an attitude of Critical Rationalism as a mark of the natural sciences and formulated a suitable characterization of the empirical sciences. However, in African epistemic system, the dichotomy between science and non-science collide. The paper demonstrates that the current state of African knowledge system delineates it as yet non-science and that African epistemic system, though not yet science in the strict sense, is only capable of legitimate science, if African scientists could adopt the critical attitude proper to science and apply Popper’s falsifiability method of testing of ideas. This paper concludes that Popper’s Critical Rationalism can provide credible ground for development of African epistemic worldview. This paper adopts hermeneutical, expository and textual analytical methods.

Over the course of this paper, I will consider categories of thought within architectural discourse from the poststructuralist paradigm as a primary resource. The texts and authors referred to are specifically those that discuss and critically analyse matters of authorship and origination among the arts and architecture. The poststructuralist paradigm offers a body of commentary on the primacy of written text over speech and its problematic with respect to appropriation and translation of form as well as content. A particular discrepancy to be disentangled in my research is the nature of the theoretical basis established by architectural authors of the period with respect to an anticipation of digital modes of design. The architectural projects during the period can be considered early statements that also attempt to establish the limits of tools available to architectural production, specifically where this concerns architectural representation. And, thus, can be read as having embedded within them a tendency for or maybe an exposition of those limits. The paper aspires to uncover and elaborate the modes of thinking and the consequent problems of translation, into an aesthetic, i.e. considerations of form and content or the lack of clarity on any such legible distinctions.

In this paper, a new kind of opposition relations is presented. Taking privation as a main negative operation on predicates, in this paper is presented a relative opposition theory, i.e., a sub-theory of oppositions.

Hubert Dreyfus is one of the professionals who has done some research on epistemology in the field of artificial intelligence research. He made an epistemological assumption in the field of artificial intelligence. As artificial intelligence develops, it becomes more connected to the field of knowledge. In the field of knowledge, the more you will connect with the field of philosophy that emphasizes knowledge. In this paper, we examines the epistemological assumption in the philosophy of artificial intelligence and attempts to identify some key questions. The purpose of this paper is to provide a close, detailed analysis of the frequency, nature, and depth of visible use in an epistemological assumption and artificial intelligence of Hubert Dreyfus’s early works “What computers can’t do”. This research investigates the trend as the consequences of the epistemology assumption concerns and experiment of epistemology assumption experience are analyzed. The results show that contrary to initial expectations, the epistemology assumption related works in question are relatively little used by AI scholars in journal articles, and where they are used, such use is often only vague, brief, or in passing. The need to intensify human-centred research in artificial intelligence research is clear from Hubert Dreyfus’s epistemological assumption. Furthermore, in order to develop artificial intelligence, it is necessary to develop brain function and physical body interaction together.

In this paper, I am concerned with certain phenomenological contributions to person-centred practices in healthcare. I propose a meaning-centred phenomenological approach to illness and contrast it with certain body-centred and feeling-centred accounts. I suggest that the proposed approach complements, rather than competes with, these other accounts in the area of phenomenology of illness. This is illustrated, for example, by the way the proposed meaning-centred approach tackles certain general challenges to the phenomenology of illness. I pursue this approach to develop an account of illness as involving a loss of meaning. However, I point out that at the heart of illness lies the possibility of resilience. Resilience is existentially understood as enacting a reconstruction of meaning. I point out that resilience and certain related cognitive mechanisms make well-being possible. Here, to be well is existentially understood as being able to find meaning in life. The phenomenological analysis of existential resilience and well-being I offer in this paper indicates that resilient ways of being which enable well-being can be learned; the analysis thus brings to light deep motivations for supporting resilient learning through healthcare practices and policies.

The following essay serves as a general introduction to the idealism-realism debate at the core of the schism between Edmund Husserl and the early adherents of his phenomenology. This debate centers around two core issues: (i) whether the “real” world exists independent from the mind, and (ii) whether epistemological idealism leads to metaphysical idealism. Husserl’s early critics saw his transcendental phenomenology as a denial of the existence of mind-independent reality and as a solipsistic form of idealism. Husserl considered many of these arguments to be predicated on misinterpretations. After contextualizing the idealism-realism debate as it unfolded within the phenomenological movement, I introduce the papers that comprise the present volume. These papers revive the debate concerning Husserl’s idealism among his mentors, peers, and students.

This paper critically examines two views on the evolution of argumentation, represented by Tomasello (2014) and Mercier and Sperber (2017). These agree that the niche for individual human reasoning is argumentation and argumentation in turn is a form of social interaction. But there are two important differences. First, Tomasello restricts the emergence of argumentation to a second late phase in the evolution of human communication, that of public, community wide communication, preceded by a phase of cooperative dyadic communication; Mercier and Sperber do not recognize such a distinction in phases. Second, Mercier and Sperber take the role of argumentation to be to benefit the individuals engaged in social interaction; Tomasello sees it as specifically adapted to collective decision making, adopting a version of the theory of cultural group selection. On the basis of an even wider range of evidence and considerations, especially concerning the evolution of language, this paper argues that the (presently) best view combines Mercier and Sperber’s position on the first point with Tomasello’s on the second: Argumentation, crucially based on language, primarily benefits community wide coordination of action; it has not evolved in a separate late phase, but at least in tandem with dyadic collaboration and communication.

This paper attempts to shed light on Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology. It begins by reviewing Heidegger’s basic criticisms of Husserl’s philosophical approach as well as his ambivalence towards it, an ambivalence that raises the question of whether Heidegger shares Husserl’s idealist trajectory. The paper then examines how Heidegger appropriates what he regards as two of Husserl’s “decisive discoveries,” namely, Husserl’s accounts of intentionality and categorial intuitions. Regarding the first discovery, the paper demonstrates how Heidegger tweaks the method of phenomenological reduction for the purpose of describing intentional experience in terms of being-in-the-world. As for the second discovery, the paper shows how Heidegger adapts the basic sense of categorial intuitions, both pre-thematically and thematically, into his existential analysis. In conclusion, the paper discusses how the role of horizons in Heidegger’s analysis of temporality provides him with firm reasons to resist an idealist interpretation of phenomenology.

When creating (open) agent systems it has become common practice to use social concepts such as social practices, norms and conventions to model the way the interactions between the agents are regulated. However, in the literature most papers concentrate on only one of these aspects at the time. Therefore there is hardly any research on how these social concepts relate. It is also unclear whether something like a norm evolves from a social practice or convention or whether they are complete independent entities. In this paper we investigate some of the conceptual differences between these concepts. Whether they are fundamentally stemming from a single social object or should be seen as different types of objects altogether. And finally, when one should which type of concept in an implementation or a combination of them.

Developing autonomous agents that can reason about the perspective of their (human or artificial) peers is paramount to realistically model a variety of real-world domains. Being aware of the state of mind of others is a key aspect in different fields—e.g., legal reasoning, business negotiations, ethical AI and explainable AI. In particular, in the area of Multi-Agent Epistemic Planning (MEP), agents must reach their goals by taking into account the knowledge and beliefs of other agents. Although the literature offers an ample spectrum of approaches for planning in this scenario, they often come with limitations. This paper expands previous formalization of MEP to enable representing and reasoning in presence of inconsistent beliefs of agents, trust relations and lies. The paper explores the syntax and semantics of the extended MEP framework, along with an implementation of the framework in the solver Epistemic Forward Planner (EFP). The paper reports formal properties about the newly introduced epistemic states update that have been also empirically tested via an actual implementation of the solver.

In this paper we will be discussing the ethical risks of the transcendental quality of virtual spaces as they apply to digital health, especially in relation to new attempts to construct a “social mediome.” As we will discuss in the following section, phenomenology has raised criticisms against the context-lessness and ethical opacity of technology. The creation of a social mediome seems to come as an answer to this criticism as it creates a context that gives voice and flesh to human beings within their virtual lives. Yet, as we will discuss in this paper, the transcendental quality of this social mediome might involve the risk of normalizing health in a way that would prevent individuals from achieving well-being according to the meaning that they personally attribute to it.

The phenomenon of emergence has been studied in a variety of fields. Each of these fields has their own understanding and interpretation of what emergence means. Thus far, there is no agreed-upon definition of emergence. In fact, the debate about what emergence is and its validity in scientific understanding is still continuing. Having a clear understanding concept of emergence is critical for analysis of such behaviors. In this work-in-progress paper, we discuss our approach for developing an ontology of emergence which can be viewed as a descriptive theory of emergence. The ontology will create a foundation which will support the understanding of the meaning and implications of emergence. A side benefit of this ontology will be the taxonomy of both the emergent behaviors and the emergence research. Thus researchers in this field will be able to identify which aspects of emergence are covered by the various research works and which aspects are not covered and thus open for investigation. Conceptually, the ontology will be a meta-theory of emergence. By raising the level of abstraction, the meta-theory of emergence will allow to express various theories of emergence within one framework, thus allowing multiple theories that may contradict each other to live in the same place. This will allow one to query the ontology about both the commonalities and differences between the theories. We discuss the development of such ontology and evaluation approach in this paper.

The term Science|Environment|Health (S|E|H) stands for a pedagogy of mutual benefit between science education, environmental education, and health education. Complexity is an important aspect of most S|E|H issues. In the natural sciences, and thus in science education, prediction plays a central role. Yet, complex systems usually do not allow for full prediction. “Don’t predict, adapt!” is a famous slogan in complexity talk. But what does adaption look like in complex systems and what role can scientific knowledge play in it? This paper features a symposium where three S|E|H examples were presented in which the relationship between prediction and adaption is important. The paper also includes a theoretical contribution that discusses the concept of dual-process theories as a potential theoretical framework. The main outcome of the symposium is that while understanding “as prediction” plays the central role in traditional science, understanding “as interpretation” is at least as equally important in S|E|H contexts. In terms of dual-process theories, the first is a type 2 process, while the second is type 1. Good decision-making in S|E|H contexts involves a complementary interplay between these two types of understanding science.

Scholarship on the philosophy of the Late Middle Ages has tended to overlook certain subject matters, especially some pertaining to ethics and political philosophy. My object of study in this paper is one of these overlooked notions, the idea of craft (ars) as an intellectual virtue. While recent publications have focused on sapientia, and scientia, this paper aims to rehabilitate ars as a virtue, in particular John Buridan’s understanding of craft as an intellectual virtue in his Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum. My goal is to examine Buridan’s analysis of craft as expounded in this commentary. Once the Picardian master’s theses have been presented, and the objections he raises have been reviewed along with the solutions proposed to those objections, I briefly suggest why craft might have been overlooked as a virtue.

This paper examines the two different modalities of finitude identified by Heidegger, i.e. perishing and dying, respectively attributed to animals and to human beings. The first goal of the paper is to bring to light the structural link in Heideggerian philosophy between death and language, by virtue of which Dasein dies properly only within the symbolic space originated by the word. The second goal is to assess the extent to which the Heideggerian distinction between perishing and dying has held up in the environment of contemporary philosophy: despite some unavoidable limitations, recent scientific outcomes seem provide its validation.