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PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to find out how the influence of the disclosure of sustainability reporting on the value of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)., RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: The research approach used quantitative. This research sample selection method uses a purposive sampling method with a total of 8 SOEs listed in IDX that meet the criteria., RESULTS: sustainability reporting has a significant negative effect on firm value, this indicates that the disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by the company reduces the value of state-owned companies listed on the BEI. Most companies only focus on financial factors and companies pay less attention to non-financial factors such as CSR, it can be seen that the level of CSR disclosure made by the company is very low., LIMITATIONS: Data limitations then this study only uses a sample of SOEs listed in IDX and does not add good corporate governance variables to improve the relationship between sustainability reporting and company’s value., CONTRIBUTION: based on stakeholder theory to improve the relationship between stakeholder and company, SOEs must disclose CSR activities to improve the organization image and impact on the increasing value of the firms. Adding GCG as a moderation variable can maximize sustainability reporting in SOEs., peer-reviewed

La implementación de sistemas de gestión que mejoren la función administrativa, ha sido una de las herramientas adoptadas en el sector público con el fin de orientar las actuaciones de las entidades estatales conforme a los principios constitucionales, en particular, los referentes a la buena fe, igualdad, moralidad, celeridad, economía, imparcialidad, eficacia, eficiencia, participación, publicidad, responsabilidad y transparencia, con el fin de fortalecer la capacidad administrativa y el desempeño institucional y de este modo obtener mejores resultados frente a los bienes y servicios que se ofrecen a los ciudadanos. Por este motivo desde la emisión de la Ley 872 de 2003, por medio de la cual se crea el sistema de gestión de la calidad en la rama ejecutiva del poder público, las diferentes administraciones han procurado promover el desarrollo de sistemas de gestión que permitan “dirigir y evaluar el desempeño institucional, en términos de calidad y satisfacción social con el suministro de productos y/o con la prestación de servicios a cargo de las entidades”. Maestría

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increasingly engaged in cross-border acquisitions. However, they face challenges related to regulatory approval in host countries, especially when they aim to acquire companies with rich R&D resources. Regulatory debates around the legitimacy of SOE acquisitions prolong acquisition duration and may also prevent acquisitions from being completed.

China has become the world’s third largest outward investor, behind the United States and Japan. A growing body of literature suggests that China’s regulatory framework for outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) is a determinant of the country’s rising OFDI. This paper presents a holistic review of that framework, including some possibilities for its improvement. Overall, China’s framework serves two objectives: to help Chinese firms become more competitive internationally and to assist the country in its development effort. In pursuing these objectives, the regulatory framework has moved from restricting, to facilitating, to supporting, to encouraging OFDI; but there are still strong elements of administrative control that make it cumbersome. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) seem to benefit particularly from the current framework when internationalizing through FDI.

This study explored the role of public sector investment in the process of economic growth in Zimbabwe over the period 1980-2013, using the restricted Vector Auto regression (VAR) Approach. Five variables were used in the analysis, with the dependent variable being economic growth, measured by real gross domestic product. Independent variables were public sector investment, private sector investment, labour force and public consumption.The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was employed to test the time series for stationarity while the JohansenMaximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method was utilized to test for the existence of cointegration among the variables. Empirical results obtained from the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and Wald test coefficient restrictions reveal that public sector investment, private sector investment, labour force and public consumption have positive and significant effects on economic growth in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, findings from the Pairwise Granger causality test disclose the existence of unidirectional causality running from public sector investment to economic growth.The study therefore recommends that the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) channels adequate financial resources towards public sector investment in order to exploit its full economic benefits. Moreover, given the limited fiscal space and the current macroeconomic conditions faced by Zimbabwe, it is recommended that the government looks for alternative ways of financing public sector investment in order to fully realize its short term and long term growth effects.

Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013.

The relevance of entrepreneurship in the public sector is considered. In investigating relationships a review of the literature is undertaken and a model is proposed to examine the effects of certain environmental variables and centralisation on entrepreneurship and ultimately, performance. The proposed model is based on work conducted by Covin and Slevin [1991], reconsidered within a public sector context. Research is conducted among Australian public sector entities. A structural equation model is used to examine the hypothesised linkages. Implications of the findings are discussed, limitations are noted and directions for future research are outlined., peer-reviewed

China's once dilapidated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have grown into powerful giants. After three decades of reform, China's SOEs now comprise over 60 percent of the largest 500 companies in China and more than 15 percent of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world. Pervasive state ownership continues with no sign of vanishing as a salient feature of Chinese corporate governance. Despite their economic importance, the SOEs' organizational structure and governance remain obscure to outsiders. The obscurity is attributable partly to the secretive culture of the Chinese government but also more importantly to the way scholars have approached this topic. Scholars of Chinese corporate governance have focused on listed firms, but China's listed SOEs are embedded in business groups which have extended ties with various corporate and non-corporate entities. To fully understand the governance and behavior of China's SOEs, it entails an approach that looks beyond the listed firms and considers the complex organizational relations surrounding the SOEs. This dissertation shows that China's large industrial SOEs are organized as vertically integrated corporate groups under the government ownership agency (SASAC) with strategic linkages to other business groups as well as to various governmental organs. The vertical ownership structure helps power centralization and masks many actual governance practices from the public eye. There are many hidden institutionalized connections to various state/party organs that play a more influential role than visible shareholding ties. The SOEs also have constructed intergroup strategic ties that facilitate cross-group collaboration to achieve their globalization ambition. Furthermore, the making of the managerial elite presents a high degree of cohesion and closure, which strengthens the relations across SOEs themselves and with other government organs. The party-state uses such various connections to embed SOEs in a control network that facilitates resource collaboration across multiple spheres of the state system and maintains the economic foundation of the Party's ruling. The anatomy of the relations surrounding China's large SOEs provides contextualized explanations for the malfunction of many governance institutions such as the board of directors, independent directors and executive compensation The density of the state's control network also suggests the limitation of reforming SOE governance through partial privatization and internationalization.

Since China adopted its "going out" policy in 2001, her outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows have grown rapidly, reaching US$84 billion in 2012 (although the stock remains small). That year, China was the world's third largest outward investor (after the US and Japan). This performance raises all sorts of issues, especially because state-owned enterprises (SOEs) control some three-quarters of the country’s OFDI stock. Three challenges are addressed in this Perspective.

中国自 2001 年采取“走出去”政策以来，对外直接投资(OFDI)流量迅速增长， 2012 年达到了 840 亿美元（尽管其存量依然较小）。2012 年，中国成为世界第三 大对外投资者（仅次于美国和日本）。这一成果也暴露了各种问题，尤其是由于 国有企业(SOEs)控制了中国 OFDI 存量的四分之三左右。本期展望提出了三大挑 战及其应对措施。

M.Comm. The primary purpose of the present study was to identify whether the organisational culture of the Transmission Division of Eskom is aligned to its stated values. In seeking to reach this objective, it was necessary to assess the gap between espoused and practised organisational values. The study also sought to identify the Transmission Division’s organisational culture. A correlation between the stated values and identified organisational culture was calculated and this was used to infer whether the values that the organisation espouses are aligned to the current organisational culture. The study made use a self-administered questionnaire sent via email to all the Transmission Division employees (N=1793) of whom 182 responded. The questionnaire comprised sections covering biographical aspects, organisational values as well as questions on organisational culture. In the questionnaire, biographical aspects were provided by the Transmission Division’s human resources department and those for organisational values were derived from both literature and Eskom’s value statement. Questions on organisational culture were taken from Cameron and Quinn’s (2006) Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI). Data on organisational values was subjected to quantitative analysis whilst data relating to organisational culture was interpreted by following Cameron and Quinn’s (2006) Competing Values Framework (CVF). The present study found that there is a gap between observed and espoused or stated organisational values. By using the Cameron and Quinn (2006) framework of organisational culture, which identifies hierarchy, ‘adhocracy’, market and clan’ as the ‘four distinct organisational culture types, the study found that respondents experience the current Transmission Division’s organisational culture to be predominantly hierarchical. A general inference drawn in this study is that the current hierarchical organisational culture is misaligned to the espoused organisational values of ‘integrity’, ‘customer satisfaction’, ‘innovation’ and ‘excellence’. The study makes recommendations to the Transmission Division about how to address this misalignment and areas that require further investigation are suggested.

State-controlled entities (SCEs) -- especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs) -- are important players in the world FDI market. Among the 100 largest MNEs from developed countries and the 100 largest from emerging markets, at least 49 are SOEs. They control nearly US$ 2 trillion in foreign assets, the bulk of them by MNEs headquartered in developed countries. Care needs to be exercised that regulatory initiatives regarding SCEs do not lead to a fragmentation of the international investment law regime.

A review of the definition of "investor" and investor-state dispute resolution clauses in 851 international investment agreements (IIAs) reveals that, except in two cases, state-controlled entities (SCEs) (including sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises) have equivalent standing to their purely private counterparts as "investors" under such IIAs. This article highlights the various ways in which SCEs are covered under the definition of "investor".

This paper looks at the use of institutionalised public‐private partnership (PPP) arrangements by local governments for the delivery of different types of infrastructure. It starts by analysing the mixed company model from a theoretical point of view, in particular the potential for internal regulation and the achievement of relational agreements. Then, after discussing the practicalities of crafting this type of governance structure, the examination of four Portuguese case‐studies is provided. The empirical evidence on mixed companies operating in the water, waste, transportation and education sectors shows that the extreme complexity involved in the whole life‐cycle management of these companies, usually leads to poor outcomes from a social welfare point of view.

International investment by State-controlled entities (SCEs) is on the rise. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially from Europe, have long been active players in the world FDI market. They have been joined, in the past few years, by a wide range of SOEs and sovereign wealth funds from emerging markets, including from China, Russia, and Singapore. Parallel to the rise of international investment, investors have become more assertive in pursuing their rights under international investment agreements. The result has been a rise in treaty-based international investment disputes. It can be expected that the number of international arbitrations initiated by SCEs, while currently limited, will likely grow in coming years as well. This, in turn, leads to the question as to what specific issues may arise in international arbitrations if a claimant is a State or a State-controlled entity. On March 19, 2010, CCSI hosted a Roundtable on States and State-Controlled Entities as Claimants in International Investment Arbitration. The Roundtable reviewed cases brought in the past by SCEs and the issues that were discussed in their context, and it looked at the experience gained in commercial arbitrations as regards SCEs. From there, the Roundtable moved on to a number of specific issues that appear to be most relevant in the context of SCEs as claimants, namely issues related to the initiation of claims, forum selection, parallel proceedings, counterclaims, and third-party financing. Understanding the new environment in which SCEs may operate as parties to international arbitrations, as well as the principal issues relating to disputes involving them, becomes an increasingly important matter for anyone interested in international investment law and arbitration.

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party., Arrel de la Gran Depressió la propietat pública va créixer al països capitalistes occidentals. Alemanya no va ser una excepció; els darrers governs de la República de Weimar van agafar el control d¿empreses en diferent sectors. Més tard, el règim Nazi va transferir propietat pública i serveis públics al sector privat. Amb això, els Nazis es situaven contra les tendències habituals als països capitalistes occidentals, puix cap altre país va reprivatitzar sistemàticament en la dècada dels 1930s. La privatització a l¿Alemanya Nazi també va ser única en la mesura en què es va transferir a organitzacions privades la producció de serveis públics que abans havien estat produïts per l¿administració pública. Les empreses i serveis transferits al sector privat pertanyen a diferents sectors. La privatització va ser part d¿una política intencional amb múltiples objectius, i no va tenir un caràcter marcadament ideològic. Igual que en moltes privatitzacions recents, especialment a la Unió Europea, la motivació principal procedia de les fortes restriccions financeres dels pressupostos públics. A més, la privatització va ser usada com un instrument polític per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partit Nazi.

Documento de Trabajo 02/04 perteneciente a la colección de documentos de trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas", dentro del Máster en Investigación en Economía y Empresa., [ES] Frente a la tendencia a la privatización del sector público español y europeo en las últimas décadas, destaca una evolución inversa en el ámbito regional, concretamente en Castilla y León. En este contexto, el objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la influencia de la participación pública en la eficiencia de estas empresas, y la posible inexistencia de justificación para las mismas desde el punto de vista económico. Pretende también comparar las diferencias de eficiencia entre empresas públicas y empresas participadas. Igualmente trata de estudiar la importancia del nivel de competitividad del sector, independientemente del grado de participación pública en el capital., [EN] Against the trend towards privatization of the Spanish and European public sector in recent decades, features a reverse trend at the regional level, particularly in Castile and Leon. In this context, the objective of this study is to analyze the influence of public participation in the performance of these companies, and the possible absence of justification to them from the economic point of view. It also aims to compare the differences in efficiency between public companies and subsidiaries. Another study is the importance of competitiveness of the sector, regardless of the degree of public participation in the capital.

[spa] Se trata de establecer la actual situación del control parlamentario en Francia, Italia y España, basándose fundamentalmente en cómo las diferentes asambleas legislativas abordan el control de la empresa pública. El doctorado plantea la posibilidad de que los nuevos mecanismos que el Parlamento pone en pie para convertir en realmente efectivo e incisivo el control del sector empresarial público son un epifenómeno del proceso de transformación que sufren las Cámaras. Este proceso que demuestra el cambio de relaciones entre Gobierno y parlamento y la voluntad de conseguir una mayor información de la actividad del Gobierno, conseguir orientarla y verificar su actividad.

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix, Un juego secuencial formado por dos subastas débilmente eficientes, donde las valoraciones de los objetos son interdependientes, con dos posibles compradores bajo el supuesto de Valoración Privada Independiente (IPV), se presenta en este trabajo para dar algunas predicciones teóricas sobre los efectos de las economías de escala de tipo geográfico sobre el nivel de éxito en las privatizaciones de servicios de provisión pública local. Se demuestra que el vendedor del primer objeto se beneficia netamente de la interdependencia entre objetos. Esta interdependencia alienta la competencia efectiva por el primer objeto, expresada en términos de probabilidad de tener más de un comprador ex post. Además, si hay más de un comprador en la primera subasta, el vendedor consigue extraer enteramente el diferencial de excedente neto esperado futuro entre el hecho de haber ganado la primera subasta y el de haberla perdido. Las consecuencias para el vendedor del objeto que se subasta en segundo lugar son menos claras, lo cual refleja la naturaleza contradictoria de los efectos principales de la interdependencia entre objetos. Por un lado, el ganador de la primera subasta se hace 'fuerte', al valorar más el segundo objeto, y por lo tanto los pagos esperados aumentan si la competencia es suficiente. Por otro lado, el perdedor de la primera subasta se 'debilita' con respecto al ganador, con lo cual probablemente se reduce el nivel de competencia por el segundo objeto, en términos de probabilidad de participación de ambos compradores. En el apéndice a este trabajo, adicionalmente, se presentan avances teóricos relacionados relativos a la teoría de subastas con costes de entrada y compradores asimétricos

Com en la majoria dels casos, els projectes de consultoria pel sector públic busquen donar resposta a necessitats que l’administració no és capaç de cobrir amb els seus propis mitjans.En aquest cas, al llarg del projecte següent, es trobarà l’anàlisi del funcionament d’una empresa pública dedicada als serveis municipals, amb l’objectiu de trobar punts de millora que permetin optimitzar el seu funcionament en tres grans blocs: Organització i persones, Processos i Sistemes d’Informació.D’aquesta forma, es seguirà la metodologia seguida per les empreses de consultoria pels projectes de reenginyeria de processos mitjançant la qual es presentarà la situació actual de l’empresa, es proposaran possibles alternatives de futur que inclouran millores aportades i ajustades a les necessitats de l’empresa i s’establirà un pla d’acció d’implementació dedicat a assegurar una perfecte adaptació a l’organització.Així doncs, tot i tractar-se d’un projecte enfocat a un cas pràctic, es podran extreure informacions interessants de cara a realitzar projectes similars per empreses de sectors totalment diferents