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Research has found strong links between past credit booms and adverse outcomes for macroeconomic aggregates like output and investment. However, are price impacts also seen more widely in broad asset classes such as equity and fixed-income markets? We document such a robust and significant connection using a large sample of historical data for many advanced countries since 1870. Credit boom periods with a high “leverage factor” tend to be predictably followed by unusually low returns to risky equities, in absolute terms and relative to a safe fixed-income portfolio. Fixed income is a safe haven at these times and has slightly higher than normal returns. We show these properties hold in-sample and out-of-sample. Return predictability because of the leverage factor is distinct from that because of momentum (lagged return) and value (cashflow relative to price). Trading strategies built on the leverage factor accrue meaningful excess profits out-of-sample. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance.

What are the medium- to long-term effects of pandemics? Do they differ from other economic disasters? We study major pandemics using rates of return on assets stretching back to the fourteenth century. Significant macroeconomic after-effects of pandemics persist for decades, with rates of return substantially depressed. The responses are in stark contrast to what happens after wars. Our findings also accord with wage and output responses, using more limited data, and are consistent with the neoclassical growth model: capital is destroyed in wars but not in pandemics; pandemics instead may induce more labor scarcity or more precautionary savings, or both.

Are financial crises a negative shock to demand or a negative shock to supply? This is a fundamental question for both macroeconomics researchers and those involved in real-time policymaking, and in both cases the question has become much more urgent in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Arguments for monetary and fiscal stimulus usually interpret such events as demand-side shortfalls. Conversely, arguments for tax cuts and structural reform often proceed from supply-side frictions. Resolving the question requires models capable of admitting both mechanisms, and empirical tests that can tell them apart. We develop a simple small open economy model, where a country is subject to deleveraging shocks that impose binding credit constraints on households and/or firms. These financial crisis events leave distinct statistical signatures in the empirical time series record, and they divide sharply between each type of shock. Household deleveraging shocks are mainly demand shocks, contract imports, leave exports largely unchanged, and depreciate the real exchange rate. Firm deleveraging shocks are mainly supply shocks, contract exports, leave imports largely unchanged, and appreciate the real exchange rate. To test these predictions, we compile the largest possible crossed dataset of 200+ years of trade flow data and event dates for almost 200 financial crises in a wide sample of countries. Empirical analysis reveals a clear picture: after a financial crisis event we find the dominant pattern to be that imports contract, exports hold steady or even rise, and the real exchange rate depreciates. History shows that, on average, financial crises are very clearly a negative shock to demand.

Studies of the effects of L1 glossing on L2 reading comprehension have shown varying results. The present meta-analytic study provides an update of the research of CALL glossing studies and examines key variables related to how CALL glossing can be effective. Findings revealed an overall effect size of .84, which suggests that most readers with CALL glosses should comprehend L2 text more effectively than students without CALL glosses. The present study also found that both productive and receptive tests can be effective in measuring L2 reading comprehension, large amounts of CALL glossing do not necessarily effectively facilitate L2 reading comprehension, and textual glossing with pictures may be the most effective means of CALL glossing.

What is the relationship between bank capital, the risk of a financial crisis, and its severity? This article introduces the first comprehensive analysis of the long-run evolution of the capital structure of modern banking using newly constructed data for banks’ balance sheets in 17 countries since 1870. In addition to establishing stylized facts on the changing funding mix of banks, we study the nexus between capital structure and financial instability. We find no association between higher capital and lower risk of banking crisis. However, economies with better capitalized banking systems recover faster from financial crises as credit begins to flow back more readily.

The trilemma of international finance explains why interest rates in countries that fix their exchange rates and allow unfettered cross-border capital flows are outside the monetary authority’s control. Based on this exogenous source of variation, we show that monetary interventions have large and significant effects using historical panel data since 1870. The causal effect of these interventions depends on whether: (1) the economy is above or below potential; (2) inflation is low; and (3) there is a credit boom in mortgage markets. Several novel control function adjustments account for potential spillover effects. The results have important implications for monetary policy.

Business cycles are costlier and stabilization policies more beneficial than widely thought. This paper shows that all business cycles are asymmetric and resemble mini “disasters”. By this we mean that growth is pervasively fat-tailed and non-Gaussian. Using long-run historical data, we show empirically that this is true for all advanced economies since 1870. Focusing on the peacetime sample, we develop a tractable local projection framework to estimate consumption growth paths for normal and financial-crisis recessions. Using random coefficient local projections we get an easy and transparent mapping from the estimates to the calibrated simulation model. Simulations show that substantial welfare costs arise not just from the large rare disasters, but also from the smaller but more frequent mini-disasters in every cycle. In postwar America, households would sacrifice more than 10 percent of consumption to avoid such cyclical fluctuations.

The fiscal “multiplier” seeks to measure how many additional dollars of output are gained or lost for each dollar of fiscal expansion or contraction. In practice, the multiplier at any point in time depends on the monetary policy response and existing conditions in the economy. Using the IMF fiscal consolidations dataset for identification and a new decomposition-based approach, we show how to quantify the importance of these monetary-fiscal interactions. In the data, the fiscal multiplier varies considerably with monetary policy: it can be as small as zero, or as large as 2, depending on the monetary offset. More generally, we show how to decompose the typical macro impulse response function by extending local projections to carry out the well-known Kitagawa-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. This provides a convenient way to evaluate the effects of policy, state-dependence, time-variation, and the balance conditions for identification.

Financial crises have large deleterious effects on economic activity, and as such have been the focus of a large body of research. This study surveys the existing literature on financial crises, exploring how crises are measured, whether they are predictable, and why they are associated with economic contractions. Historical narrative techniques continue to form the backbone for measuring crises, but there have been exciting developments in using quantitative data as well. Crises are predictable with growth in credit and elevated asset prices playing an especially important role; recent research points convincingly to the importance of behavioral biases in explaining such predictability. The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis. Crises do not occur randomly, and, as a result, an understanding of financial crises requires an investigation into the booms that precede them.

Interest rates in major advanced economies have drifted down and in greater unison over the past few decades. A country’s rate of interest can be thought of as reflecting movements in the global neutral rate of interest, the domestic neutral rate, and the stance of monetary policy. Only the latter is controlled by the central bank. Estimates from a state space New Keynesian model show that central bank policy explains less than half of the variation in interest rates. The rest of the time, the central bank is catching up to trends dictated by productivity growth, demography, and other factors outside of its control.

What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes, including housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles.

We derive a new formula for the optimal uniform tariff in a small-country, heterogeneous-firm model with roundabout production and a nontraded good. Tariffs are applied on imported intermediate inputs. First-best policy requires that markups on domestic intermediate inputs are offset by subsidies. In a second-best setting where such subsidies are not used, the double- marginalization of domestic markups creates a strong incentive to lower the optimal tariff on imported inputs. In a 186-country quantitative model, the median optimal tariff is 10%, and negative for five countries, as compared to 27% in manufacturing from the one-sector, optimal tariff formula without roundabout production.

We introduce a new dataset on British exports at the bilateral, commodity-level from 1700 to 1899. We then pit two primary determinants of bilateral trade against one another: the trade-diminishing effects of distance versus the trade-enhancing effects of the British Empire. We find that gravity exerted its pull as early as 1700, but the distance effect then attenuated and had almost vanished by 1800. Meanwhile the empire effect peaked sometime in the late 18th century before significantly declining in magnitude. It was only after 1950 that distance would once again exert the same influence that it has today.

Population aging has been linked to global declines in real interest rates. A similar trend is seen for equity risk premia, which are on the rise. An existing literature can explain part of the declining trend in safe rates using demographics, but has no mechanism to speak to trends in relative returns on different assets. We calibrate a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with equity markets and aggregate risk, and we show that aging demographics can simultaneously account for both the majority of a downward trend in the risk free rate, while also increasing the return premium attached to risky assets. This is because the life-cycle savings dynamics that have been well documented exert less pressure on risky assets as older households shift away from risk. Under reasonable calibrations we find declines in the safe rate that are considerably larger than most existing estimates between the years 1990 and 2017. We are also able to account for most of the rise in the equity risk premium. Projecting forward to 2050 we show that persistent demographic forces will continue to push the risk free rate further into negative territory, while the equity risk premium remains elevated.

What are the medium- to long-term effects of pandemics? How do they differ from other economic disasters? We study major pandemics using the rates of return on assets stretching back to the 14th century. Significant macroeconomic after-effects of pandemics persist for about decades, with real rates of return substantially depressed, in stark contrast to what happens after wars. Our findings are consistent with the neoclassical growth model: capital is destroyed in wars, but not in pandemics;pandemics instead may induce relative labor scarcity and/or a shift to greater precautionary savings.

In our book, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth, we traced out the evolution of the international monetary system using the framework of the “international monetary trilemma”: countries can enjoy at most two from the set {exchange-rate stability, open capital markets, and domestic monetary autonomy}. The events of the past decade or more highlight the further complications for this framework posed by financial stability issues. Here we update and qualify our prior analysis, drawing on recent experience and research. Under the classical gold standard, scant attention was paid to macro management, either to stabilize output and employment or to ensure financial stability. The interwar years highlighted the changing demands for modern central bank interventions in the economy. Financial instability, followed by WWII, left a world with sharply constricted financial markets and little private cross-border capital mobility. Due to this historical accident, the Bretton Woods system agreed in 1944 focused not at all on financial stability, and focused on issues like adjustment, exchange rate misalignment, and international liquidity (defined in terms of official, not private, capital-account transactions). Post 1970s floating rates permitted, but did not require, liberalization of the capital account. But the political equilibrium had shifted in favor of financial interests, signaled by the push toward European integration and the later reform process in emerging markets starting in the 1990s. This development, however, opened the door once again to domestic financial crises and their international transmission. Countries now become more susceptible to a new species of “capital account crises,” fueled by bank and bond lending, and its sudden withdrawal. These developments, in fact, made evident a different, “financial trilemma”: countries can pick at most two from {financial stability, open capital markets, and autonomy over domestic financial policy}. We distill the main lessons as to the interactions between the monetary and financial trilemmas, and policies that could best address the resulting weaknesses.

With business leverage at record levels, the effects of corporate debt overhang on growth and investment have become a prominent concern. In this paper, we study the effects of corporate debt overhang based on long-run cross-country data covering the near universe modern business cycles. We show that business credit booms typically do not leave a lasting imprint on the macroeconomy. Quantile local projections indicate that business credit booms do not affect the economy’s tail risks either. Yet in line with theory, we find that the economic costs of corporate debt booms rise when inefficient debt restructuring and liquidation impede the resolution of corporate financial distress and make it more likely that corporate zombies creep along.

Does monetary policy have persistent effects on the productive capacity of the economy? Yes, we find that such effects are economically and statistically significant and last for over a decade based on: (1) identification of exogenous monetary policy fluctuations using the trilemma of international finance; (2) merged data from two new international historical cross-country databases reaching back to the nineteenth century; and (3) econometric methods robust to long-horizon inconsistent estimates. Notably, the capital stock and total factor productivity (TFP) exhibit strong hysteresis, whereas labor does not; and money is non-neutral for a much longer period of time than is customarily assumed. We show that a New Keynesian model with endogenous TFP growth can reconcile these empirical findings. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

With business leverage at record levels, the effects of corporate debt overhang on growth and investment have become a prominent concern. In this paper, we study the effects of corporate debt overhang based on long-run cross-country data covering the near- universe of modern business cycles. We show that business credit booms typically do not leave a lasting imprint on the macroeconomy. Quantile local projections indicate that business credit booms do not affect the economy’s tail risks either. Yet in line with theory, we find that the economic costs of corporate debt booms rise when inefficient debt restructuring and liquidation impede the resolution of corporate financial distress and make it more likely that corporate zombies creep along. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Business cycles are costlier and stabilization policies could be more beneficial than widely thought. This paper introduces a new test to show that all business cycles are asymmetric and resemble “mini-disasters.” By this we mean that growth is pervasively fat-tailed and non-Gaussian. Using long-run historical data, we show empirically that this is true for advanced economies since 1870. Focusing on peacetime eras, we develop a tractable local projection framework to estimate consumption growth paths for normal and financial-crisis recessions. Introducing random coefficient local projections (RCLP) we get an easy and transparent mapping from the estimates to a calibrated simulation model with disasters of variable severity. Simulations show that substantial welfare costs arise not just from the large rare disasters, but also from the smaller but more frequent mini-disasters in every cycle. On average, and in post-WW2 data, even with low risk aversion, households would sacrifice about 15 percent of consumption to avoid such cyclical fluctuations. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Does monetary policy have persistent effects on the productive capacity of the economy? Yes, we find that such effects are economically and statistically significant and last for over a decade based on: (1) identification of exogenous monetary policy fluctuations using the trilemma of international finance; (2) merged data from two new international historical cross-country databases reaching back to the nineteenth century; and (3) econometric methods robust to long-horizon inconsistent estimates. Notably, the capital stock and total factor productivity (TFP) exhibit strong hysteresis, whereas labor does not; and money is non-neutral for a much longer period of time than is customarily assumed. We show that a New Keynesian model with endogenous TFP growth can reconcile these empirical findings.

Benchmark finance models deliver estimates of bond risk premia based on components of Treasury bond yields. Benchmark macroeconomic models deliver estimates of the natural rate of interest based on growth, inflation, and other macro factors. But estimates of the natural rate implied by the former are wildly inconsistent with those of the latter; and estimates of risk premia implied by the latter are wildly inconsistent with those of the former. This is the natural rate puzzle, and we show that it applies not only in the United States but also across several advanced economies. A unified model should not fail such consistency tests. We estimate a unified macro-finance model with long-run trend factors which delivers paths for a market-implied natural rate r* consistent with inflation expectations π* and bond risk premia. These paths are plausible and our factors improve the explanatory power of yield and return regressions. Trading strategies based on signals incorporating both r* and π* trends outperform both yield-only strategies like level and slope and strategies which only add trend inflation. The estimates from our unified model satisfy consistency and deliver a resolution to the puzzle. They show that most of the variation in yields has come from shifts in r* and π*, not from bond risk premia. Our market-implied natural rate differs from consensus estimates, and is typically lower, intensifying concerns about secular stagnation and proximity to the effective lower-bound on monetary policy in advanced economies.

Research finds strong links between credit booms and macroeconomic outcomes like financial crises and output growth. Are impacts also seen in financial asset prices? We document this robust and significant connection for the first time using a large sample of historical data for many countries. Credit boom periods tend to be followed by unusually low returns to equities, in absolute terms and relative to bonds. Return predictability due to this leverage factor is distinct from that of established factors like momentum and value and generates trading strategies with meaningful excess profits out-of-sample. These findings pose a challenge to conventional macro-finance theories.

This paper develops a model that captures the key features of the Industrial Revolution and the Great Divergence between the industrializing \North" and the lagging \South." In particular, a convincing story is needed for why North-South divergence occurred so dramatically during the late 19th Century, a good hundred years after the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. To this end we construct a trade/growth model that includes both endogenous biased technologies and intercontinental trade. The Industrial Revolution began as a sequence of unskilled-labor intensive innovations which initially incited fertil- ity increases and limited human capital formation in both the North and the South. The subsequent co-evolution of trade and technological growth however fostered an inevitable di- vergence in living standards - the South increasingly specialized in production that worsened their terms of trade and spurred even greater fertility increases and educational declines. Biased technological changes in both regions only reinforced this pattern. The model high- lights how pronounced divergence ultimately arose from interactions between specialization from trade and technological forces.

The risk premium puzzle is worse than you think. Using a new database for the U.S. and 15 other advanced economies from 1870 to the present that includes housing as well as equity returns (to capture the full risky capital portfolio of the representative agent), standard calculations using returns to total wealth and consumption show that: housing returns in the long run are comparable to those of equities, and yet housing returns have lower volatility and lower covariance with consumption growth than equities. The same applies to a weighted total-wealth portfolio, and over a range of horizons. As a result, the implied risk aversion parameters for housing wealth and total wealth are even larger than those for equities, often by a factor of 2 or more. We find that more exotic models cannot resolve these even bigger puzzles, and we see little role for limited participation, idiosyncratic housing risk, transaction costs, or liquidity premiums. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Because of the use of human participants and differing contextual variables, research in second language acquisition often produces conflicting results, leaving practitioners confused and unsure of the effectiveness of specific treatments. This article provides insight into a recent seminal meta-analysis on the effectiveness of computer-mediated communication, providing further statistical evidence of the importance of its results. The significance of the study is examined by looking at the p values included in the references, to demonstrate how results can easily be misconstrued by practitioners and researchers. Lin’s conclusion regarding the research setting of the study reports is also evaluated. In doing so, other possible explanations of what may be influencing the results can be proposed.

This paper studies the synchronization of financial cycles across 17 advanced economies over the past 150 years. The comovement in credit, house prices, and equity prices has reached historical highs in the past three decades. While comovement of credit and house prices increased in line with growing real sector integration, comovement of equity prices has increased above and beyond growing real sector integration. The sharp increase in the comovement of global equity markets is particularly notable. We demonstrate that fluctuations in risk premiums, and not risk-free rates and dividends, account for a large part of the observed equity price synchronization after 1990. We also show that US monetary policy has come to play an important role as a source of fluctuations in risk appetite across global equity markets. These fluctuations are transmitted across both fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, but the effects are more muted in floating rate regimes.

This paper unveils a new resource for macroeconomic research: a long-run dataset covering disaggregated bank credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data show that the share of mortgages on banks’ balance sheets doubled in the course of the twentieth century, driven by a sharp rise of mortgage lending to households. Household debt to asset ratios have risen substantially in many countries. Financial stability risks have been increasingly linked to real estate lending booms, which are typically followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Housing finance has come to play a central role in the modern macroeconomy.

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, and after decades of relative neglect, the importance of the financial system and its episodic crises as drivers of macroeconomic outcomes has attracted fresh scrutiny from academics, policy makers, and practitioners. Theoretical advances are following a lead set by a fast-growing empirical literature. Recent long-run historical work has uncovered a range of important stylized facts concerning financial instability and the role of credit in advanced economies, and this article provides an overview of the key findings.

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet over the private and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policies. This paper studies the co-evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries since 1870. We find that in advanced economies financial stability risks have come from private sector credit booms and not from the expansion of public debt. However, we find evidence that high levels of public debt have tended to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after crises, leading to more prolonged periods of economic depression. Fiscal space appears to be a constraint in the aftermath of a crisis, then and now.

Is there a link between loose monetary conditions, credit growth, house price booms, and financial instability? This paper analyzes the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies. We exploit the implications of the macroeconomic policy trilemma to identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions: countries with fixed exchange regimes often see fluctuations in short-term interest rates unrelated to home economic conditions. We use novel instrumental variable local projection methods to demonstrate that loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices' bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era.

What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes, including housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles.

We document a new international stylized fact describing the relationship between real exchange rates and external asset holdings. Economists have long argued that the real exchange rate is associated with the net international investment position, appreciating as external wealth increases. This mechanism has been seen as central for international payments equilibrium and relative price adjustments. However, we argue that the effect of external assets held by the public sector—reserve accumulation—on real exchange rates may be quite different from that of privately held external assets, and that capital controls are a critical factor behind this difference. For 1975–2007, controlling for GDP per capita and the terms of trade, we find that a one percentage point increase in external assets relative to GDP (net of reserves) is related to an 0.24 percent real exchange rate appreciation. On the contrary, a one percentage point increase in reserve accumulation relative to GDP has virtually no effect on the real exchange rate in financially open countries (low capital controls), and is related to a 1.65 percent real exchange rate depreciation in financially closed countries (high capital controls). Results are stronger in developing countries and in more recent periods. Gross, rather than net, positions matter. We present a theoretical model to account for the stylized fact. The framework encompasses so-called precautionary and mercantilist motives for reserve accumulation, and also explains how the optimal capital account policy—the mix of reserve accumulation and capital controls—is determined. Further empirical support arises from evidence that reserve accumulation is associated with a trade surplus, along with higher GDP and TFP growth in countries with high capital controls, findings that are consistent with the mechanisms of our model.

What is the relationship between bank capital, the risk of a financial crisis, and its severity? This article introduces the first comprehensive analysis of the long-run evolution of the capital structure of modern banking using newly constructed data for banks’ balance sheets in 17 countries since 1870. In addition to establishing stylized facts on the changing funding mix of banks, we study the nexus between capital structure and financial instability. We find no association between higher capital and lower risk of banking crisis. However, economies with better capitalized banking systems recover faster from financial crises as credit begins to flow back more readily.

This study challenges the assertion that an increase in L1 glossing results in more L2 reading comprehension. The results of this study, a quantitative meta-analysis, indicate that there is a significant difference ( p = .04) in L2 reading comprehension between groups based on how much L1 glossing is provided. It was found that the group with the highest average effect size–which had all computer-assisted language learning (CALL) studies–included studies with 50% or more L1 glossing. However, the second largest mean effect size came from a group that contained 5% or less L1 glossing. In looking across groups in this meta-analysis, it was found that of the six studies with the largest effect sizes, five of them were CALL studies. In light of this finding, this paper will discuss the interaction of the variables of CALL glossing and percentage of text glossed in order to determine their possible influence on L2 reading comprehension.

China has prospered from its strategy of reserve accumulation and related export surplus. But the strategy has drawbacks. Open-ended reserve accumulation has left the the economy exposed to an eventual devaluation of the dollar, and reliance on exports has left it exposed to a downturn in rich-world consumption. China thus has an incentive to rethink both halves of its model�to accumulate fewer reserves, on the one hand, and to run a smaller current-account surplus on the other. Recent steps such as faster renminbi appreciation, the new Five-Year Plan, and announced shifts in reserve strategy will move China in this direction� and other emerging economies may well follow. This article analyzes the likely consequences of internationalization of the Chinese renminbi for the global monetary system and its possible ascension to reserve currency status. It argues that if the process proves feasible, despite the difficult hurdles along the way, the results of internationalization would be constructive, both for China and the rest of the world. If emerging-market central banks and other reserve managers (such as sovereign wealth funds) continue overwhelmingly to favor the dollar and a small set of other developed-market reserve currencies as a store of value, the world risks a third crisis of the global reserve system. This would be a rerun in a somewhat different guise of the well-known paradox described by economist Robert Triffin, whereby the demand for international liquidity, when loaded onto a small set of national currencies, ends up destabilizing the system as the key reserve suppliers issue more and more assets and hence build up unsustainable debts. (Such forces, Triffin argued, were a main cause of the 1930s crisis of the gold exchange standard; and as he predicted, those forces emerged again in the 1970s to destabilize the dollar-and goldbased Bretton Woods system.) In today's global monetary system, the emergence of the renminbi (along with other developed- and emerging-market currencies) as a potential reserve currency would expand and diversify the supply of reserve assets, enabling central banks to maintain large buffers against financial shocks while allowing the United States to stop issuing a large and growing bulk of the world's safe and liquid claims, and thus bearing the burden of an everexpanding, and ultimately questionable, debt to the rest of the world.