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Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) is the most common form of interstitial lung disease. IPF is a complex disease, with environmental and genetic factors variably contributing to disease susceptibility and outcomes. A host of common gene variants with modest effect size impart disease risk in patients with sporadic IPF, while rare variants with large effect size influence disease risk in those with familial interstitial pneumonia. In this review, we highlight several common and rare variants underpinning IPF risk and call attention to recently published studies informing our understanding of this risk.

Ripsman and Levy’s argument merits attention for at least two related reasons. The arst is the renewal of interest in appeasement within the international relations and security studies aelds. Piqued by the repeated use (or misuse) of the appeasement analogy by the administration of George W. Bush, several scholars have recently turned their attention to the international politics of the 1930s to assess what lessons should be drawn from the events of the period for today’s decisionmakers. 2 More speciacally, they question whether appeasement is sometimes justiaed or is always misguided. The second reason is that many of these scholars embrace what might be called a “rational

Recent studies of ‘total war’ depict a process of inexorable expansion leading to an often nebulous linkage of everything to war. This article takes the study of ‘total war’ in the opposite direction by studying a specific example of strategic restraint. It examines how the French bombing strategy that was developed over the course of the First World War went to considerable lengths to maintain a distinction between the civilian and the military. The article studies France's restraint by highlighting the strategic, geographical, institutional, and economic factors upon which it was built. It then goes on to examine the political pressures for an expansion of bombing which proved incapable of overturning this policy. Finally, it contrasts French restraint with that of its key ally, Great Britain. There, bombing developed into a strategic weapon designed to destroy the ‘home front’. This study of restraint underscores the importance of limits, and the attendant choices government has to make, in understanding the course and intensity of a country's mobilization for modern war.

This article examines the conflicting French and British definitions and policies towards the enforced disarmament of Germany that was agreed upon by the Allies at Versailles. It contrasts the French definition of disarmament, ‘moral disarmament’, which required convincing controls over Germany's material capability for war and the country's desire to use force, with the much narrower British view, which sought the rapid dismantling of Berlin's physical armaments. These irreconcilable views further divided the two countries and fostered differences over intelligence estimates of German power and the role of the League of Nations in German disarmament.

(1995). A window on the ‘trust’: The case of Ado Birk. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 273-293.

L’experience de la Premiere Guerre mondiale se traduisit chez les Francais notamment par leur souci d’etudier la puissance militaire allemande durant les annees 1920. Apres la guerre, le « potentiel de guerre » d’un pays incluait des facteurs aussi importants mais difficiles a evaluer que l’unite et la cohesion nationales. Dans ce nouveau contexte, les sports organises furent consideres comme un indicateur supplementaire des intentions militaires et du potentiel de guerre d’un pays. Le Deuxieme Bureau francais a commence a prendre en compte les efforts de l’Allemagne visant a promouvoir les sports et l’education physique dans son analyse du revanchisme allemand et de son potentiel militaire. Les resultats de leur investigation s’avererent d’autant plus inquietants que la comparaison avec la situation en France leur etait defavorable.