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Cognitive tests sensitive to the integrity of the medial temporal lobe (MTL), such as mnemonic discrimination of perceptually similar stimuli, may be useful early markers of risk for cognitive decline in older populations. Perceptual discrimination of stimuli with overlapping features also relies on MTL but remains relatively unexplored in this context. We assessed mnemonic discrimination in two test formats (Forced Choice, Yes/No) and perceptual discrimination of objects and scenes in 111 community-dwelling older adults at different risk status for cognitive impairment based on neuropsychological screening. We also investigated associations between performance and MTL sub-region volume and thickness. The at-risk group exhibited reduced entorhinal thickness and impaired perceptual and mnemonic discrimination. Perceptual discrimination impairment partially explained group differences in mnemonic discrimination and correlated with entorhinal thickness. Executive dysfunction accounted for Yes/No deficits in at-risk adults, demonstrating the importance of test format for the interpretation of memory decline. These results suggest that perceptual discrimination tasks may be useful tools for detecting incipient cognitive impairment related to reduced MTL integrity in nonclinical populations.

Large-brained birds, such as corvids and parrots, tend to fail tests for self-recognition (mirror self-recognition [MSR]), but the limited positive evidence for MSR in these species has been questioned due to methodological limitations. In the present study, we aimed to investigate MSR in ravens by performing three mirror tests: a mirror exposure test, a mirror preference test, and a mark test. Across all three tests, the ravens' behavior was not consistent with MSR. Three out of six ravens infrequently interacted with the mirror and the nonmirror surfaces. Two birds explored the mirror and occasionally displayed contingent behaviors. Finally, the ravens made very few social displays toward the mirror, suggesting that at this stage they did not treat their reflection as a conspecific. These findings, along with the current evidence available, raise further questions on the validity of relying on one test to establish self-recognition and call for the development of methods beyond mirror tests to explore self-recognition in nonhuman animals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Funder: European Commission; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000780; Grant(s): Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship MENTALIZINGORIGINS Grant reference: 752373, Funder: FP7 Ideas: European Research Council; Grant(s): ERC Grant Agreement N 3399933, Eurasian jays have been reported to protect their caches by responding to cues about either the visual perspective or current desire of an observing conspecific, similarly to other corvids. Here, we used established paradigms to test whether these birds can – like humans – integrate multiple cues about different mental states and perform an optimal response accordingly. Across five experiments, which also include replications of previous work, we found little evidence that our jays adjusted their caching behaviour in line with the visual perspective and current desire of another agent, neither by integrating these social cues nor by responding to only one type of cue independently. These results raise questions about the reliability of the previously reported effects and highlight several key issues affecting reliability in comparative cognition research.

Animal cognition research often involves small and idiosyncratic samples. This can constrain the generalizability and replicability of a study’s results and prevent meaningful comparisons between samples. However, there is little consensus about what makes a strong replication or comparison in animal research. We apply a resampling definition of replication to answer these questions in Part 1 of this article, and, in Part 2, we focus on the problem of representativeness in animal research. Through a case study and a simulation study, we highlight how and when representativeness may be an issue in animal behavior and cognition research and show how the representativeness problems can be viewed through the lenses of, i) replicability, ii) generalizability and external validity, iii) pseudoreplication and, iv) theory testing. Next, we discuss when and how researchers can improve their ability to learn from small sample research through, i) increasing heterogeneity in experimental design, ii) increasing homogeneity in experimental design, and, iii) statistically modeling variation. Finally, we describe how the strongest solutions will vary depending on the goals and resources of individual research programs and discuss some barriers towards implementing them.

A "STRANGE" framework has been proposed to mitigate the effects of sampling biases in animal experiments (WebsterRutz, Nature, 582, 337-340, 2020). While sampling biases are likely a major cause of poor replicability and generalizability in animal behavior research, a more comprehensive and cautious approach is needed to effectively guide decision-making in animal research.

Previous research reported that corvids preferentially cache food in a location where no food will be available or cache more of a specific food in a location where this food will not be available. Here, we consider possible explanations for these prospective caching behaviours and directly compare two competing hypotheses. The Compensatory Caching Hypothesis suggests that birds learn to cache more of a particular food in places where that food was less frequently available in the past. In contrast, the Future Planning Hypothesis suggests that birds recall what-when-where features of specific past events to predict the future availability of food. We designed a protocol in which the two hypotheses predict different caching patterns across different caching locations such that the two explanations can be disambiguated. We formalised the hypotheses in a Bayesian model comparison and tested this protocol in two experiments with one of the previously tested species, namely Eurasian jays. Consistently across the two experiments, the observed caching pattern did not support either hypothesis; rather it was best explained by a uniform distribution of caches over the different caching locations. Future research is needed to gain more insight into the cognitive mechanism underpinning corvids’ caching for the future.

Twenty years after Povinelli’s “Folk Physics for Apes”, this paper assesses how researchers have made claims about animal physical cognition, and the statistical inferences that have been used to support them. These data are relevant in light of the current replicability issues facing science. We surveyed 116 published experiments from 63 papers on physical cognition, which included data from 43 different species of animals. Across these experiments most sample sizes were small, with often fewer than 10 animals being tested. However, in contrast to related psychological disciplines, we found that only 62% of our sample of physical cognition research made positive claims. This suggests that animal physical cognition does not have a strong publication bias towards positive results. Furthermore, we found evidence that researchers are making many true statistical inferences at the individual level, i.e. whether individual animals pass certain tests of physical cognition or not. In contrast, the strength of evidence of statistical effects at the group level was weaker and consistent with many effect sizes being overestimated. Overall, our analysis provides a cautiously optimistic analysis of reliability and bias in animal physical cognition research, however it is nevertheless likely that a non-negligible proportion of results will be difficult to replicate.

Fayet, Hansen and Biro (1) provide two observations of Atlantic puffins, Fratercula arctica performing self-directed actions while holding a stick in their beaks. The authors interpret this as evidence of tool use as they suggest that the stick was manipulated towards the birds’ plumage with the specific goal of scratching. While these are interesting observations, the authors do not address a simple and likely explanation of the self-directed actions that does not constitute tool use; that the observations occurred by chance. As such, their conclusions about tool use and cognition in seabirds are premature.

A prominent vein of comparative cognition research asks which cognitive abilities may be ascribed to different species. Here, we argue that the current structure of comparative cognition makes it near impossible to evaluate the accuracy of many of the claims produced by the field’s empirical research. We base this argument on six observations: i) the field is biased towards confirming more exceptional abilities in animals, ii) a likely high rate of false positive discovery, iii) the persistence of the bias towards more exceptional abilities, even in the presence of strong methodological criticism, iv) the absence of a formal method to assess evidence of absence of a cognitive ability, v) the ambiguity in definitions used to make claims, and vi) the small size of the research field. We then highlight how the widespread methodological and conceptual criticism in the comparative cognition literature does not facilitate scientific progress, rather it can impede it by creating an illusion of scientific rigour. Finally, we call for a reform of our research field that draws on recent developments in related fields and the Open Science movement.