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Additional file 1. Details about methods and results.

Additional file 1. The appendix supporting the conclusions of this article is included within the article (“LLIN DCE Appendix”).

Additional file 1: Appendix 1. Instructions to caregivers on the use of the playpens.

Additional file 1: Table S1. Electronic search strategy. Table S2. Summary of key themes and associated key evidence. Table S3. Overlap of scoping review themes with Joint External Evaluation indicators.

Additional file 3: Figure S1. Selection of Sources of Evidence.

Table A-1-1. LEB sources, by country and year. Table A-2-1. List of countries included in the analysis, when HIV is not included as a control variable. Table A-2-2. List of countries included in the analysis, when HIV is included as a control variable. Table A-2-3. List of countries by strata using a representative year for each decade, during the analysis countries were re-stratified to each LEB stratum every single year. Table A-2-4. Summary statistics, Lowest Stratum (LEB

Definitions of criteria and levels in the BWS study. Table S2. The conditional logistic regression results among groups of respondents. (DOCX24Â kb)

Definitions of criteria and levels in the BWS study. Table S2. The conditional logistic regression results among groups of respondents. (DOCX24Â kb)

This paper was developed for World Bank task team leaders (TTLs) and teams designing results-based financing (RBF) programs in family planning (FP). It explores the rationale for introducing such incentives based on insights from classical and behavioral economics, to respond to supply- and demand-side barriers to using FP services. To help the reader understand why incentivizing FP requires specific attention in RBF, the evolution of incentives in vertical FP programs introduced from the 1950s to the early 1990s and the ethical concerns raised in these programs are described. RBF programs after the 1990s were also studied to understand the ways FP is currently incentivized. The paper also touches on the effects of the incentive programs for FP as described in the literature. Finally, it examines ethical concerns related to FP incentives that should be considered during the design, implementation, and evaluation of programs and provides a conceptual framework that can be of use for task teams in the decision making process for FP in RBF programs. It should be noted that the paper is concerned exclusively with developing a framework that can help design ethical programs to address the unmet need for FP.

The authors delineate two different algorithms for the purchase of AIDS vaccines, to show how differences in policy objectives can greatly affect projections of the number of courses of vaccine that will be needed. They consider a hypothetical vaccine costing ten dollars to produce, and offering sixty percent, seventy five percent, and ninety percent reductions in the risk of HIV for ten years. For each of the world's ten major geographic divisions, they sue published estimates of the risk of AIDS, the value of medical costs averted, and the value of potential productivity losses. Under the"health sector"algorithm - in which purchases are made to minimize the impact of AIDS/HIV on government health spending - 766 million courses of vaccine would be purchased. Under the"societal"algorithm - in which purchases are made to minimize the impact of AIDS/HIV on health spending and GDP - more than 3.7 billion courses of vaccine would be purchased. Under an"equity"model - allocating vaccines to everyone in the world at high risk, as if they had the financial resources of Western Europeans - vaccine would be offered to 4.7 billion people. For a Western European man, reducing the risk of AIDS/HIV would be a $789 concern; in Africa,the comparable risk would be a $48,577 crisis. The authors conclude that financing AIDS vaccines solely on the fixed budget of a ministry of health, means large vulnerable populations wouldn't receive the vaccine. Allocating the vaccine based on society's ability to pay would still exclude many poor infants who would probably be immunized if they were born in more developed regions. Policymakers concerned about equity in health care must redouble efforts to making the financing of development, and distribution of AIDS vaccines, a global, not a regional concern.