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Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-whe-10.1177_17455057221096240 for Cervical screening uptake: A cross-sectional study of self-reported screening attitudes, behaviours and barriers to participation among South Asian immigrant women living in Australia by Zufishan Alam, Judith Ann Dean and Monika Janda in Women’s Health

Additional file 1: Table A1. Cost of Conventional Testing Regime: Private General Practice Clinic Setting – (Funded by Federal Government – Medicare). Table A2. Cost of Conventional Testing Regime: Public Sexual Health Clinic Setting (Funded by State Government). Table A3. Cost of Parallel Testing Regime: Community Peer Organisation Bulk Billing GP Clinic Setting (Funded by Federal Government - Medicare and State Government). Table A4. Cost of Parallel Testing Regime: Community Peer Testing Service using Volunteer Peer Nurse Setting (Funded by Federal Government - Medicare and State Government). Table A5. Cost of Point of Care Testing Regime: Community Peer Testing Service Setting (Funded by State Government). Table A6a. Cost of Point of Care Testing Regime: Home HIVST Setting (Includes Private Costs) (Funded by Consumer). Table A6b. Cost of Point of Care Testing Regime: Home HIVST Setting (Excludes Private Costs).

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In recent debates, trade preference erosion has been viewed by some as damaging to developing countries, and by others as insignificant, except in a few cases. But little data have been available to back either view. The objective of this paper is to improve our measures of the size, utilization, and value of all U.S. nonreciprocal trade preference programs in order to shed light on this debate. Highly disaggregated data are used to quantify the margins, coverage, utilization, and value of agricultural and nonagricultural tariff preferences for all beneficiary countries in the U.S. regional programs and in the Generalized System of Preferences. Results show that U.S. regional tariff preference programs are generally characterized by high coverage of beneficiary countries'exports, high utilization by beneficiary countries, and low tariff preference margins (except on apparel). For 29 countries, the value of U.S. tariff preferences was 5 percent or more of 2003 dutiable exports to the United States, even after incorporating actual utilization. Most of this value is attributable to nonagricultural tariff preferences, and to apparel preferences in particular. These results suggest that preference erosion may be significant for more countries than many had thought.

One of the most contentious debates today is whether pollution-intensive industries seek locations with weak environmental standards, turning these locations into 'pollution havens." Empirical studies to date show little evidence to support the pollution haven hypothesis, but suffer potentially from omitted variable bias, specification, and measurement errors. This paper estimates the strength of pollution-haven behavior by examining the location choices of equity joint venture (EJV) projects in China. We derive a location choice model from a theoretical framework that incorporates the firm's production and abatement decision, agglomeration and factor abundance. We estimate conditional logit and nested multinomial logit models using new data sets containing information on a sample of EJV projects, effective environmental levies on water pollution, and estimates of Chinese emissions and abatement costs for 3-digit ISIC industries. Results from 2886 manufacturing joint venture projects during 1993-1996 show EJVs from all source countries go into provinces with high concentrations of foreign investment, relatively abundant stocks of skilled workers, concentrations of foreign firms, and special incentives. Environmental stringency does affect location choice, but not in the manner described by the pollution haven hypothesis. Relatively weak environmental levies are a significant attraction for joint ventures with partners from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian developing countries. In contrast, joint ventures with partners from industrial country sources (e.g., US, UK and Japan) are actually attracted by stringent environmental levies, regardless of the pollution intensity of the industry. We discuss the likely role of technological differences in explaining these results.

The few empirical studies which examine the effects of preferential trade liberalization on growth find no direct relationship between membership in a PTA and growth across countries. This is somewhat surprising, given the large literature which argues that trade liberalization is likely to encourage more rapid growth. However, sensitivity analysis has shown that this link between freer trade and growth may be indirect, as freer trade strongly increases investment, and higher investment strongly increases growth. This paper tests for both direct and indirect effects of preferential trade liberalization on growth and investment, by examining the impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act--a non-reciprocal PTA implemented by the U.S. in 1984 to encourage growth and development in Caribbean and Central American countries. A two-equation simultaneous system is estimated, using pooled data on twelve beneficiary countries, from 1970-1998. Results suggest that CBERA did not result in any "trade-induced investment-led growth." It may have had a direct impact on growth in the region, but the effect was small, and significant only when combined with trade and foreign exchange reforms on the part of the beneficiary countries themselves. However, preferential trade liberalization through the production-sharing program, and unilateral and regional trade reforms in beneficiary countries and in the US did lead to investment-led growth, and to higher growth directly, in the CBERA countries.

The recent revitalization of concern for environmental quality has generated many questions about the interaction between trade and the environment. Most of these questions have to do with the impact of environmental regulation on trade patterns and gains from trade. If a tradeoff is perceived, it is often argued that some intervention becomes appropriate: either a specific trade policy or the establishment of an international environmental standard. Present GATT policy then becomes an issue of debate. Should GATT revise its rules to accommodate the specific trade measures suggested? How can GATT ensure that the environmental objective is not a disguise for a trade barrier? Should GATT establish some international environmental standard with procedures to ensure compliance? The importance given to trade liberalization and exchange rate policy reform as part of adjustment for development has raised another set of questions: Is there a direct link between the removal of trade barriers and environmental degradation? If so, how should liberalization strategies incorporate this cost? Should trade policy be used to meet environmental objectives? The author surveys the literature on the main questions being debated in both of these areas. Among her conclusions: (1) More stringent regulations in one country are thought to result in reduced competitiveness and perhaps industrial flight and the development of pollution havens. The many empirical studies that have tried to test these hypotheses have shown no evidence to support them. (2) Countervailing duties or an international environmental standard have no place here. Both concepts ignore the reallocation of resources that must occur if externalities are to be efficiently incorporated into costs. They also ignore the fact that standards should be based on local calculations of marginal costs and benefits. Only if an exporter's standards are below what is locally optimal would a countervailing duty be justified. (3) Subsidies are likely to be trade barriers in disguise and should generally not be accommodated. They are not usually an efficient means of achieving an environmental objective and may hinder the efficient allocation of resources away from pollution-intensive industries. (4) Imposing a tariff when pollution spills over national boundaries can be no more than a second-best policy. If the tariff is based on damage to the victim country alone, it will not reduce trade in the polluting product enough; if it maximizes the welfare of the victim, it may reduce trade in the product too much. (5) There seems to be a case for establishing some international code of product standards, to prevent the use of such standards as nontariff barriers.