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Religion and mathematics are perceived as two things that are very reciprocally exclusive; this is due to the opinion asserting that mathematics is considered as valid and objective knowledge. On the other hand, religion is something interpretive and subjective. Historically speaking, religion and mathematics have a strong association and in certain aspects, both of them have points of contact that can permeate each other. The forms of intersection between mathematics and religion need to be analyzed so that we will be able to see more clearly the current religious phenomenon. This study investigates and discovers a potential encounter between religion and mathematics. To see the relationship between religion and mathematics, and even their fusion, the first thing to do is determine the definition of religion and mathematics. With a clear understanding of both, the encounter points will be easier to recognize. The research method used in this study is a literature review. This study collects systematically a variety of literature related to the theme under study. The encounter between religion and mathematics undergoes at five dimensions, they are ontological, epistemological, teleological, theoretical and application dimension. This study more focused on similarities to reveal the connection between religion and mathematics.

The article focuses on the theoretical and methodological status of the concept of religion in the essentialist interpretation of ethnic community by analyzing the material of foreign researches. The key effort is to reveal whether the essentialist views on ethnic communities are compatible with the constructivist paradigm of religion. The essentialist approach to the notion of an ethnic community now develops in the frame of primordialism, which can be divided into two main directions: cultural and socio-biological. Proponents of the former concentrate on a detailed description of cultural differences between ethnic communities, with cultural diversity being accepted only to describe the essence of a particular ethnic community. Sociobiological primordialists deny cultural features’ status at the face of biological evolution. The common theoretical assumption of primordialisms turns out to be the essentialist vision: an ethnic community is endowed with the essence defined by a number of attributes, including religion. The constructivist approach, however, suggests that religion has no referent in reality and its notion is defined conventionally and empirically. Accepting this approach would deprive religion of its essence. Rendering the essence of religion relative, therefore, means blurring the boundaries defining the essence of an ethnic community. This consequence clearly contradicts the essentialist approach to an ethnic community. Thus, embracing an essentialist approach to ethnic community leads to the need to adopt the essentialist interpretation of religion.

During the COVID-19 lockdown the initial British Government mantra of ‘Stay home. Protect the NHS. Save lives’, the ritualistic weekly public clapping for the National Health Service (NHS) and the overall tone of the media coverage led several commentators to raise the question of whether the NHS had become a religion. This question is legally significant. The question of whether the lockdown breached Article 9 has already been the subject of litigation. R (on the application of Hussain) v Secretary of State for Health [2020] EWHC 1392 (Admin) concerned the then prohibition on private prayer in places of worship. Swift J refused an application for interim relief to allow Friday prayers at Barkerend Road Mosque. Lockdown did infringe the claimant's Article 9 rights but this interference was only with one aspect of religious observance and the interference had a finite duration. The legitimate difference of opinion between the claimant and the British Board of Scholars and Imams was relevant to the question of justification. There was no real prospect that the claimant would succeed at obtaining a permanent injunction at trial because the pandemic presented ‘truly exceptional circumstances’ that meant that the interference would be justified on grounds of public health. Swift J was satisfied that there was a sufficiently arguable case to grant permission to apply for judicial review but he did not order that the claim be expedited. In Dolan, Monks and AB v Secretary of State for Health [2020] EWHC 1786 (Admin), an application of a judicial review of the lockdown regulations and schools closure was refused. However, in relation to Article 9, Lewis J adjourned consideration of this discrete issue because regulations had just been made that allowed communal worship which may have made the argument academic. English law provides the right to manifest religion or belief under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment and the provision of goods and services under the Equality Act 2010. This raises the point: during the lifting of lockdown, when authorities require people to go back to their workplace or send their children to school, could individuals who refuse say they were legally entitled to decline on the basis that such a requirement breached their belief in protecting the NHS?

This article advocates for the production of stipulative definitions of religion, a type of nominal definition that articulates new ways of applying a word to a thing. I propose that scholars look to sites where phenomena historically have been labeled “religion” on lexical or real understandings of the term, this to query how religious agents there chose, implicitly or explicitly, to systematize thought, speech, emotion, and action. Such self-consciously ordered systems, I argue, may properly be labeled “religion.” Next, I apply this method to premodern South Asia, suggesting “religion” refers to the second-order structuring there that links normative social relations to normative states of subjectivity, any innovation in the one demanding innovation in the other. I conclude by inviting other efforts at stipulative definition, all with an eye toward an inductive approach, allowing that the myriad locations of religion present mutually distinguishable systems that may all properly be so labeled.

In this reply I engage with the response articles by Kocku von Stuckrad, Katja Rakow, Eric Venbrux, Arjan Sterken, and Kees de Groot. Noting where we agree, disagree, and seem to talk past each other, I clarify what I consider to be the subject matter and the fundamental problems and methods in the systematic study of religion.

Timothy Fitzgerald’s critique of the category “religion” was based on two main objections: the study of religion as a distinct discipline has grown out of the historical collusion with colonial interests that has culminated in the modern division between religion and the secular; by associating the term “religion” with sacred entities, theological assumptions have been smuggled into so-called scientific studies of religion. In this paper, I offer my own non-theological, sociocultural working definition of religion in an effort to separate “the sacred” from “religion.” I argue that religion consists of identifiable communities that adhere to traditions that are transmitted from generation to generation with an overwhelming authority. I conclude that Fitzgerald’s critique of religion does not require scholars to abandon the category, but to re-think how they use the academic findings they have extracted from their research subjects. To advance beyond Fitzgerald’s argument, I contend that academics need to work collaboratively with the religious communities they are researching by acknowledging them as the legitimate owners of the knowledge that is embedded in their authoritative traditions.

El objeto de esta investigación es analizar la definición de religión y de organización con fines religiosos en el ordenamiento jurídico estadounidense, así como la relación que existe entre dicha definición –o ausencia de la misma– y los principios que ordenan su modelo constitucional. Para ello, hemos estudiado las decisiones del Tribunal Supremo federal, en aquellos contextos en los que este se ha visto obligado a determinar quiénes son los sujetos pasivos del derecho de libertad religiosa, y en concreto en el terreno de la práctica de la oración en la escuela pública, la objeción de conciencia al servicio militar, la asistencia religiosa en prisiones, y el régimen fiscal de las organizaciones con fines religiosos.

Reflection on the future study of religion(s) poses three questions: What is the definition of religion? What should ‘study’ mean in the academic discourse about religion? And how about its...

Deconstructing the definitional boundaries between religion and non-religion is recognised as a fruitful area of investigation for scholars of religion. Taking a critical perspective in understanding the gatekeeping practices of legal institutions, norms and practices in shaping the boundary between religion and non-religion is an important aspect of this methodological approach. Investigating legal gatekeeping practices can prompt critical exploration of how they impact on category formation and facilitate analysis of whose interests are served by legally mandated acts of inclusion or exclusion. This discussion will identify recent instances, where the courts have been active in shaping the boundary between religion and non-religion. Firstly, it will consider recent developments in the definitional approach of domestic UK law. Secondly, it will discuss legal responses to the registration of religious groups in Europe and, thirdly, it will explore attempts to extend freedom of religion protections to commercial corporations. Finally, it will offer some concluding remarks on how this survey of recent developments highlights the contemporary configuration of the legal boundaries between religion and non-religion.

In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski (2018) argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to (i) define religion; (ii) assess the truth value of religion and; (iii) assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than religion more broadly construed. But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences.

The article touches upon different approaches to religion's conceptualization. The author makes an attempt to check the accuracy of the proposition according to which many ways of conceptualization of religion are reduced to two main approaches. One of them is the normative approach; which is associated with essentialism. Another approach is dimensionalism; which originates in constructivism. The author comes to the conclusion that this thesis is not correct. The article identifies other coordinates in the light of which it is possible to correctly typologize a wide range of existing approaches to religion's conceptualization. The author considers dimensionalist's models of religion to oppose to those ways of religion's conceptualization which involve explicit genetic definitions. The latter group of approaches can be divided into normative and non-normative.The author proves the thesis that essentialism is not a necessary part of approaches which based on generic definitions of religion. One of the arguments in favor of this statement is the existence of such religion's conceptualization strategies; which derived from the constructivist paradigm. Moreover; the essen tialistic traits have been found in dimensionalist's models of religion. This fact testifies to the incorrectness of reduction of dimensionalism to the sum of constructivist approaches to the definition of religion.The author comes to the conclusion that many approaches to the definition of religion can be considered in two independent dimensions: on the one hand; there is a pronounced controversy between supporters of using of an explicit generic definition of religion and supporters of dimensionalist's models of religion; on the other hand; there is a confrontation between essentialist and constructivist paradigms; which are implemented in a plenty of contemporary attempts to define a religion.

One can identify two central theses that underlie Why Tolerate Religion? Firstly, religious claims of conscience are not more important, from a moral point of view, than non-religious claims of conscience. Deontological, utilitarian and epistemic reasons do not make religion morally distinctive or special. Religious and secular conscience deserve equal legal treatment. Secondly, the legislators and courts shouldn’t allow exemptions to general laws with neutral purposes for all conscientious objectors. The legal accommodation of religious and non-religious claims of conscience is morally acceptable only provided that shifting burdens onto other citizens is not involved. At the core of the above mentioned theses stands the anticipated concept of religion. Leiter points out three features that all and only religions have. Religions formulate categorical demands on action that must be satisfied no matter what. Some religious beliefs in each religion are based on faith, i.e. they are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification. Finally, religious beliefs provide existential consolation in regard to essential issues of human life, such as suffering and death. Leiter’s definition of religion is unconvincing, specifically his shallow, taken for granted rejection of religion’s rationality. The incorrect characterization of religion puts into question the reviewed book’s conclusions.

This chapter presents case studies, which each in their own way illuminate possible modalities of religiosity. It also presents a theory of the extended sensorium as an alternative to the mentalism, and privileging of the brain and cognition, in the conventional Western "scientific" account of perception—including the theory of the extended mind. Just as the conventional "scientific" understanding of perception stands in need of revision from an anthropological perspective, so does the preoccupation with the transcendental or "metaphysical" in the conventional Western definition of religion. Donald Tuzin's analysis of the roots of religious experience in "Miraculous Voices" goes along with Meyer's material and sensual definition of religion. In The Sensual Icon, Bissera Pentcheva presents an extremely fine sensory analysis of the fabrication and veneration of religious images in medieval Byzantium. Pentecostalism belongs to the same Protestant tradition of Christianity as Quakerism, and places a similar emphasis on the "inner life" and spontaneity.

Attempts to define religion have been controversial and contested. Many competing definitions have been proposed by scholars and judges but no consensus has emerged. As religion is a fundamental term in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution, it is important to continue seeking an accepted definition of religion for the purposes of constitutional interpretation. This chapter identifies four challenges to defining religion and claims the problem has been further entrenched by persuasive arguments that the secular is also a kind of religion. The chapter consequently proposes a new definition which goes some way to addressing these challenges. The new definition is broadly similar to the approach taken by the Australian High Court, with some modifications in response to the four challenges and contemporary interpretations of the secular. It is hoped this chapter will restart what has been a languishing conversation in Australian constitutional law.

This essay responds to the three main position papers of the 2018 CIAS workshop, which were published in Religion & Theology 26, no. 1&2 (2019). The main thrust of the essay relates to the concept of hermeneutics and the location of the discourse of comparative hermeneutics. The essay defines the fundamental question at stake as a question of discourse. From this basis, the paper proceeds to consider four main issues that constitute the framework for conceiving a Centre for the Interpretation of Authoritative Scripture: to wit, historicising of scripture and tradition, the character of texts and textual traditions and canons, comparative religion and hermeneutics as discourse and the implied definition of religion (and of religion as social discourse). Firstly, comparative hermeneutics raises the problem of what a tradition is. What constitutes its essential identity? Secondly, it is possible, and this essay explores this line, to redescribe hermeneutics as a social discourse, that is, to understand interpretation as social interaction. It is when the concept of religion is historicised, and the complex and contestatious processes of social and identity-formation are investigated, that the social discursivity, authority construction and power-effects, and the ideological work performed by tradition-formation can be brought to light. In this manner, the essay argues for the de-essentialisation of religious traditions such that it is possible to think beyond narrowly delimited boundaries and rather see the common human activity of social discourse productions that bind adherents of different religious traditions in a given social aggregation together – which enables thinking common social purposes.

The relevance of religion within the discipline and practice of education remains paramount, not only in understanding how social control operates in contemporary society, but also in addressing draconian measures intended to combat radicalisation in schools. With this in mind this chapter draws upon Foucault’s analysis of governmentality to explore how religious schooling and education facilitates the ‘governing of the soul’. It also explores Gane’s analytical development of this concept, while broadening the definition of religion to include policies and practices related to violent religious extremism. Consequently, through the lens of neoliberal governmentalities, it can be seen that elements of religion and education have been appropriated to introduce repressive social controls, which benefit neoliberal markets. In conclusion, it is maintained that these practices need to be challenged through the introduction of radical and critical, religion and ethics education.

The concept of religion is a fundamental concept of religiological sciences. Still it is not devoid of difficulties. Its critics attempt to prove that plurality and variety of religious phenomena excludes the possibility to define religion. On the other hand the lack of the general concept of religion constitutes a serious problem for theology of religion since it is difficult to study relationships between Christianity and other religions not knowing what religion is and what its theological essence is. The present article consists of three parts. The first part analyses the history of the concept of religion (Latin religio). Second part considers the problem of the definition of religion. Third one presents some of contemporary attempts to specify the theological concept of religion. Finally the last part shows the significance of the concept of religion for theology of religion.

Religion and spirituality play a significant role as coping resources under stressful circumstances. Nursing professionals confront with a variety of stressors repeatedly and are found to employ religious/spiritual coping techniques in managing the negative impact of work stress. The present review explores different religious and spiritual coping strategies utilized by nurses of different socio-cultural and religious backgrounds and highlights the importance of treating religion and spirituality as two separate entities in studying their stress-buffering effect. The MEDLINE, CINAHL, PsycINFO, PsycArticles databases and Google Scholar were searched from 2006 to 2017 with the key words nursing, stress, religious coping, religiosity and spirituality. Various notions of the divine/transcendent aspect of life have led to lack of consensus over a functional definition of religion as well as spirituality. This is found to be the core element of methodological inadequacy in studying individuals’ reliance on religion and spirituality during stress. Further, most of the existing measures do not adequately explore spirituality as a construct independent of religion. Measures should be more culture sensitive to discover culturally enriched religious practices and rituals adopted by individuals belonging to different socio-cultural milieu to overcome stress. The role of religion and spirituality in stress resilience, emotion regulation and burnout among nurses around the globe needs further empirical support. Multiple levels at which religious and spiritual coping may moderate/mediate the relationship between work stress and behavioral/emotional outcomes among human service personnel who face high emotional labor demands should be more comprehensively analyzed.

The effects of religion on development in the area of gender equality have been considered substantial in academic work as well as in popular and political discourse. A common understanding is that religion depresses women’s rights in general and reproductive and abortion rights in particular. The literature on reproductive rights, however, is disproportionately focused on Western cases, and is limited in its definition of religion as a variable. What happens, though, when we switch to a more inclusive framework? To what extent do a variety of religious variables correlate with policy on reproductive rights outside of the Western context? We examine the relevance of the religion-abortion link in a broad comparative framework. We introduce the Comparative Abortion Index and test the effects of a wide range of denominations and religious characteristics on reproductive rights. Our study finds that reproductive rights correlate only with some religious denominations, while others have no significance. Additionally, while religiosity correlates with reproductive policy, variables such as religious freedom, separation of religion and state and religious diversity show no correlative effect. The comparative analyses suggest that the connection between religion and development in general—and in the area of women’s rights in particular—is far more nuanced than previously thought.

The guarantee of religious freedom appears in almost all modern constitutions. One critical constitutional question that has arisen relates to how the term “religion” or “religion or belief” should be interpreted. This definitional question is crucial as it determines which religion, religious beliefs, and practices would fall within the scope of constitutional protection. Where definitions are used to draw boundaries, this raises significant questions as to what would constitute an appropriate definition. It also raises issues concerning the competence of a non-religious court imposing its views on religion on religious adherents, especially where their subjective viewpoints differ. This article critiques this definitional conundrum using religious freedom cases in Singapore and Malaysia. It examines the use of a definition of religion as well as the essential practice test to exclude constitutional claims. Furthermore, this article advocates for a deferential approach to the definitional questions, albeit a limited one where constitutional claims are further subject to a second-stage inquiry as to the legitimacy or appropriateness of the state-imposed restrictions.

The paper first proposes a new definition of religion which features a novel four-layered element and which does not involve any circularity (as some definitions do); thereby, it allows to clearly distinguish the phenomenon of religion from certain other worldviews, in particular from certain political ideologies (a number of other definitions do not). Relying on the findings, the paper develops two structural conceptual models which serve to describe religious and non-religious belief systems. Further, the definition and the conceptual models allow to establish a clear criterion to distinguish pivotal structural differences between religious and non-religious belief systems. The criterion is based on the concept of two kinds of rationality: first-level and second-level rationalities. These will demonstrate to what degree religion can be a rational enterprise, and what role logic can play in it. The result is a clear-cut line in the structures of religious and certain consistent non-religious belief systems (e.g. a scientific theory).

Eliade’s sacred seems to refer to an autonomous entity but close inspection indicates a response to experiences to which we attribute sacrality. This allows the postulation of a natural ‘sacred’ that can be defined, and become the basis for an empirical definition of religion. Such ascriptions are commonly associated with art objects, from narratives and texts to dramas and architecture. Consideration of anthropology and ethology of art reveals a relationship between skill and the sacred, which clarifies the origin and function of 'sacrality' as a cognitive experience characteristic of, but not exclusive to, religious behaviour. The same trait is operative in other behaviours, such as art and sport, but it is less restricted in art and less comprehensive sport. Nonetheless, art and sport (and other secular behaviours) do have an affinity with religious behaviour. They are consanguineous with religion – descendants of a common ancestor.

In this article I rely on Tweed’s theory of religion as found in Crossing and Dwelling (2006) to inform my exploration of how transnational identities are negotiated through food. I show how food is an ideal lens through which to see Tweed’s theory at work on the ground, in the lives, and bodies, of transnational migrants. Focussing on the last five words of Tweed’s definition of religion, namely that religions “make homes and cross boundaries,” I address how food plays the same role that Tweed posits for religion in the processes of home making and boundary crossing. Using examples from my ethnographic fieldwork in Paris, France and Montréal, Canada I show how, for my informants, food (in place of religion in Tweed’s theory) designates “where they are from,” identifies “who they are with” and prescribes “how they move across” the various borders, both physical and psychological in their lives.

Keynes rejected religion in his youth but embraced it later in his life. This essay addresses Keynes’ peculiar definition of religion, his description of his “religion,” and the sources of his religion. Keynes characterised religion as not only a personal experience of communion, but also as the pursuit of a better world for all people, although he showed some ambivalence about how this better world might come about, ultimately adopting a position similar to that of the nineteenth-century Christian Socialist Movement, to which he was connected through the Cambridge Apostles.

Science that needs logical demonstration has failed to eliminate religious concepts. It is as if they have own validity that cannot be broken by scientific knowledge we trust the most at present. In this paper, I will attempt to establish a new cognitive theory to help explain the basis of belief in religious concepts. This form of cognition will be named simply unifying-induction or unifying-inductive cognition. As illustrations, I will consider some typical religious discourses involving concepts such as "all-in-one" or "one is everything." It is these typically religious discourses that science has not been able to easily sweep away by its logical scientific proofs. In the end, although we perhaps cannot know if the religious beings such as gods really exist or not, we may understand these concepts are very the creation of human cognition. It also has important implications for other disciplines such as robotics, developmental psychology, cognitive archaeology, the history of science, the study of religion and so on.

In this article the authors have done work on the analysis of the European and American model of stateconfessionalrelations. One of the problems associated with the activities of public authorities in relation toreligion and religious organizations of modern states is the problem of politico-legal realization of the secularstate. The problem of objective definition of religion and confession in the rule of law requires specialattention here. Despite the secularization of state and religious institutions, “the religious factor influencesthe economy, politics - and the state and society, and the interethnic relations, the family, to the culturalsphere through the activities of believing individuals, groups, and organizations in these areas.” Thus, thereis a certain reproduction of religious relations on the background of social relations.

Veganism, where adherents eschew the consumption of animals or their by-products, has seen a substantial increase in popularity in recent years. Vegans who follow the diet for moral or ethical reasons (ethical vegans) have argued in the United States, with limited success and, more recently, in the United Kingdom that they should be protected from discrimination on the grounds of their adherence to ethical veganism, contending that ethical veganism should be subject to similar protections as religion. In the United Kingdom, anti-discrimination legislation protects philosophical beliefs in addition to religion and it was recently held in a preliminary hearing in Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports that ethical veganism falls within the ambit of the relevant statute. The authors examine the situation in the United Kingdom and the United States and conclude that, given that Australian anti-discrimination statutes only refer to religion as a protected attribute, this outcome is unlikely to be replicated since veganism is highly unlikely to meet the current definition of religion.

O’Connor provides a working definition of religion as a theoretical foundation for the rest of the text. Surveying theology, anthropology, sociology, and popular culture, he adopts a polythetic perspective built from Geertz’s (The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973) definition of religion. This concept is divided into three focuses—observation, performance, and organisation—which work as a framework for the themes addressed in the remainder of the text. The topic is contrasted with existing work on religion and sport and also research in the domain of lifestyle sports. The chapter concludes with a discussion of skateboarding as a lifestyle religion, congruent with new forms of spiritual expression concerned with subjective experience, identity, and work on the self as a life project.

This paper analyzes Australian and Canadian approaches to rights conflict focusing on challenges between freedom of religion and equality in public life. The first section involves an historical and doctrinal analysis of rights frameworks in Australia and Canada and a comparative analysis of cases that test public boundaries of freedom of religion and equality. This section concludes that the Australian framework is an imperfect mechanism for resolving disputes about freedom of religion. A comparison to the Canadian framework demonstrates that principles of reconciliation and limitation of rights provide a more satisfying answer to challenges between religious freedom and equality rights. The argument put in the second section is that both states assert freedom of religion and equality as fundamental rights but in fact their competing scope remains unresolved. The second section applies political theory to the question of freedom of religion, building on the presumption that neither Australia nor Canada (as modern liberal states) has an agreed public ‘place’ for religion. This thesis proposes a theoretical solution of adopting a more inclusive definition of religion within an egalitarian liberalism framework and prefers the test of ‘ethical independence’ proposed by Ronald Dworkin for responding to claims of religious expression rather than a ‘special rule’ or exemption approach.

Schilbrack presents the data and methods of disciplinary philosophy as contributing positively to the academic study of religion and gives his understanding of religion and of its study based on this contribution. I suggest we go further—the methods of disciplinary philosophy should provide a centralizing paradigm around which the various contributory disciplines of the study of religion might be better and more sustainably organized. Schilbrack adopts an approach that focuses on practice and embodiment rather than doctrine and belief. Again, I recommend going even further, still avoiding eliminative behaviorism but adopting a “philosophical ethology,” and seeking to refine the “superempirical realities” of Schilbrack’s definition of religion with reference to behaviors that produce and surround certain elements of material culture. This, I believe, would advance Schilbrack’s theoretical understanding of both religion and the philosophy of religion, taking it to an even greater level of generality and utility.

David Sloan Wilson argues that religion has evolved in human beings as a group adaptation. Part of Wilson’s argument relies on an analysis of a randomized sample of religions that he selects fromThe Encyclopedia of Religion. One significant methodological problem with this strategy is that Wilson offloads the work of defining the boundaries of each religious tradition to the encyclopedia he uses and allows the category ‘religion’ to do the conceptual heavy lifting in his argument. An examination of the way this category is used by Wilson will demonstrate that an insufficient attentiveness to the use of the word ‘religion’ makes Wilson’s argument circular and invalid. Wilson’s argument would be strengthened by rejecting any causal role for the category ‘religion’ and examining specific practices, rituals, and other acts of identification for an adaptive advantage irrespective of their association with the category ‘religion’.

In order to develop understanding of the meaning of religion and spirituality to social workers, a survey was conducted of a diverse sample of 2,100 practitioners obtained through racial stratification of membership in the National Association of Social Workers. Findings indicate that while a majority of social work practitioners (70.4%–97.9%), regardless of racial group, has a belief in God or some other higher power, their definition of religion and spirituality was complex and individualistic. Religion/spirituality provide significant personal context to participants. This pervasiveness has important implications for social work educators and challenges current practice of separating worker and client beliefs.

In this article, I offer a decidedly philosophical response to Schaffalitzky de Muckadell's essay "On Essentialism and Real Definitions of Religion." I contend that her account is not appropriately motivated by the evidence supplied. Focusing nearly entirely on the first half of her essay, in which she sets up an exclusive disjunction regarding three forms of definition, I argue that this disjunction should not be understood as exclusive and, hence, her account of the necessity of “real definitions” is less compelling than it might otherwise be. Even though I am sympathetic to the importance of striving toward real definitions, in response to Schaffalitzky de Muchadell, I resituate how such striving might look when the exclusive disjunction is abandoned.

Who Says a Headscarf Emoji is Religious? (And Why?)

I review the book “Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years.” I discuss all the papers in the book and highlight some recurrent issues.

This text reproduces the jubilee lecture by Ramon Valdes del Toro, read in the auditorium of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the Autonomous University of Barcelona on June 2, 2000. Based on a rich selection of cases and ethnographic examples, the text analyzes different definitions of religion and leaves us, as a legacy, a refined definition of religion that confronts us with the question: do we know what it is to believe?

Purpose of the article is to examine the theoretical foundations of Paul Tillich's theology of culture, which affirmed the necessary postulate of "courage" – the powerful self-affirmation of man despite the Christian world values crisis. The methodology of the research consists in the application of analysis methods, synthesis, comparison, generalization, as well as in the use of terminological, ideological-content and historical-philosophical approaches. The mentioned issue allowed us to reveal the features of rethinking the values of Christian culture in the works of P. Tillich "Systematic Theology," "Theology of Culture," "Dynamics of Faith," "Courage," representing the organic representation of the theological and anthropocentric value of coordinates in the cultural plane. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that in the domestic history of philosophy, religious studies and cultural studies for the first time, the concept of the positive revitalization of Christian culture values are analyzed in the works of P. Tillich, and its specificity was substantiated. There were characterized the categories and concepts that form the basis of the Tillich theology of culture ("ethical ethics", "courage to be", "anxiety", "marginal interest", "ultimate concern", "new being", "new morality"). Conclusions. In the conclusions, it is proved that the conceptual conception of religion by Tillich consists of the disappearance of the distribution between the sphere of sacral and secular. The ratio of religion and culture is connected with P. Tillich with his definition of religion as a substance of culture, and culture is a form of religion. Culture should be described regarding movement, which is dominant in the time of the corresponding historical period. Trying to solve the problem of the value priorities of the authentic existence of man in the context of the transformation of her religious worldview, P. Tillich contrasts modern morality with the "new" morality of a religious, highly spiritual person; reanimates traditional, faith, love, justice, freedom, humanity; warns of the threat of mass conformism, which is increasingly formed under the influence of the ideology of liberal humanism in modern democratic countries.

It is beyond doubts, that the framework of freedom of religion, as a positive right, entitles people to conduct a wide range of activities. However, what is the proper assessment, when one refrains from a legal duty due to religious reasons, or one refuses to participate in compulsory commitments on religious grounds?It should be highlighted, that freedom of religion influences almost all areas of life worldwide, the issues which are raised, are quite similar in the different countries. As for demonstration, it is broadly accepted, that the free exercise of religion shall not violate disproportionately the fundamental rights of others. The definition of religion and church shall be precised. It is also questionable, whether there is a right to convert someone to one?s religion. Our contribution is dedicated to these issues.

Religion can be an elusive word to define, but the scope of the definition has important legal implications. As Latham CJ observed in the Jehovah's Witness case 'what is religion to one is superstition to another' and 'it would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise a definition of religion which would satisfy the adherents of all the many and various religions which exit, or have exited, in the world.' The difficulties with defining religion can be seen in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay Roll Tax (Vic) where, over 30 years ago, the High Court came up with not one definition, but three.

By an analysis of the Danish Humanist Society and the Danish Atheist Society, the aim of this contribution is to consider one aspect of the borderland of the Danish model of religion. On the basis of a relational approach to the study of religion, I conclude that the Humanist Society from an analytical point of view is a religion while the Atheist Society is not. In this manner, the Humanist Society should be regarded as part of the Danish model of religion while the Atheist Society should not. Therefore, it may be argued that the borderland of the Danish model of religion is located between these two organisations.Dette bidrag undersøger en del af den danske religionsmodels grænseflade gennem en analyse af foreningerne Dansk Humanistisk Samfund og Ateistisk Selskab. På baggrund af et relationelt religionsbegreb konkluderes det, at Humanistisk Samfund analytisk set er en religion og dermed en del af den danske religionsmodel. Med hensyn til Ateistisk Selskab konkluderer analysen, at denne forening analytisk set ikke er en religion men snarere en religionspolitisk forening. Ateistisk Selskab er dermed ikke en del af den danske religionsmodel. Den danske religionsmodels grænseflade kan dermed siges at befinde sig imellem disse to organisationer

In this response to Knut Melvær’s discussion of “The Spiritual Illusion: Constructive Steps Toward Rectification and Redescription,” I clarify some of the theoretical and methodological background that informed the original article, redress places where Melvær appears to have misread or miscast my positions, and offer some suggestions as to what may really be most at stake in this “spiritual” dispute.

Those of us who study the history and politics of the concept of religion and its related terms often find that our peers in adjacent disciplines or subdisciplines do not take into account our findings and continue to use the terms naively and unreflexively. Perhaps this is because they are unaware of the problematic norms knotted into the history of the concept or the contested political stakes involved in its use. Or, perhaps they are engaged in just the very sort of politics our subdiscipline documents. When discussing this with one of the editors of CRR, he asked me to outline why those not engaged in the historicization of the concept of religion should take our work into account. How or why would a contemporary sociologist of religion benefit from reading, for example, a discourse analysis of Reformation-era theologico-political rhetoric? To that end, here I put forward the following theses on the critique of the concept of religion, making the case, as boldly and as succinctly as I can, why our work is relevant to all who write on “religion,” and provide references to the essential literature on the subject for those who wish to pursue further reading on the matter.