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Both Minsky's "society of mind" and Schmidhuber's "learning to think" inspire diverse societies of large multimodal neural networks (NNs) that solve problems by interviewing each other in a "mindstorm." Recent implementations of NN-based societies of minds consist of large language models (LLMs) and other NN-based experts communicating through a natural language interface. In doing so, they overcome the limitations of single LLMs, improving multimodal zero-shot reasoning. In these natural language-based societies of mind (NLSOMs), new agents -- all communicating through the same universal symbolic language -- are easily added in a modular fashion. To demonstrate the power of NLSOMs, we assemble and experiment with several of them (having up to 129 members), leveraging mindstorms in them to solve some practical AI tasks: visual question answering, image captioning, text-to-image synthesis, 3D generation, egocentric retrieval, embodied AI, and general language-based task solving. We view this as a starting point towards much larger NLSOMs with billions of agents-some of which may be humans. And with this emergence of great societies of heterogeneous minds, many new research questions have suddenly become paramount to the future of artificial intelligence. What should be the social structure of an NLSOM? What would be the (dis)advantages of having a monarchical rather than a democratic structure? How can principles of NN economies be used to maximize the total reward of a reinforcement learning NLSOM? In this work, we identify, discuss, and try to answer some of these questions., Comment: 9 pages in main text + 7 pages of references + 38 pages of appendices, 14 figures in main text + 13 in appendices, 7 tables in appendices

Goal-conditioned Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims at learning optimal policies, given goals encoded in special command inputs. Here we study goal-conditioned neural nets (NNs) that learn to generate deep NN policies in form of context-specific weight matrices, similar to Fast Weight Programmers and other methods from the 1990s. Using context commands of the form "generate a policy that achieves a desired expected return," our NN generators combine powerful exploration of parameter space with generalization across commands to iteratively find better and better policies. A form of weight-sharing HyperNetworks and policy embeddings scales our method to generate deep NNs. Experiments show how a single learned policy generator can produce policies that achieve any return seen during training. Finally, we evaluate our algorithm on a set of continuous control tasks where it exhibits competitive performance. Our code is public., Comment: Preprint. Under Review

Under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, behavioural variations can be attributed to different priors over generative model parameters. This provides a formal explanation for why individuals exhibit inconsistent behavioural preferences when confronted with similar choices. For example, greedy preferences are a consequence of confident (or precise) beliefs over certain outcomes. Here, we offer an alternative account of behavioural variability using R��nyi divergences and their associated variational bounds. R��nyi bounds are analogous to the variational free energy (or evidence lower bound) and can be derived under the same assumptions. Importantly, these bounds provide a formal way to establish behavioural differences through an $��$ parameter, given fixed priors. This rests on changes in $��$ that alter the bound (on a continuous scale), inducing different posterior estimates and consequent variations in behaviour. Thus, it looks as if individuals have different priors, and have reached different conclusions. More specifically, $��\to 0^{+}$ optimisation leads to mass-covering variational estimates and increased variability in choice behaviour. Furthermore, $��\to + \infty$ optimisation leads to mass-seeking variational posteriors and greedy preferences. We exemplify this formulation through simulations of the multi-armed bandit task. We note that these $��$ parameterisations may be especially relevant, i.e., shape preferences, when the true posterior is not in the same family of distributions as the assumed (simpler) approximate density, which may be the case in many real-world scenarios. The ensuing departure from vanilla variational inference provides a potentially useful explanation for differences in behavioural preferences of biological (or artificial) agents under the assumption that the brain performs variational Bayesian inference., 23 pages, 5 figures