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We design a laboratory experiment to test the importance of wealth as a channel for financial contagion across markets with unrelated fundamentals. In a sequential global game, we analyze the decisions of a group of investors that hold assets in two markets. We consider two treatments that vary the level of diversification of these assets across markets. In both treatments, we find evidence of financial contagion. When investors have completely diversified portfolios, we provide evidence of contagion due to a wealth effect: for certain ranges of fundamentals, we show that a decrease in wealth from the investment in the first market makes withdrawals more likely in the second, thereby increasing the probability of a crisis. When portfolio diversification is small, then social imitation is relevant in explaining contagion.

We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, the choice of optimal rewards entails optimal screening. This leads to a distribution of anti-regime actions. A key result is the emergence of a vanguard, consisting of citizens who engage in the endogenous, maximum level of action. Other citizens participate at varying degrees, with less optimistic citizens contributing less. We explore how the regime’s strength or the maximum reward available to the leader influences the distribution of actions. Moreover, we show that more heterogeneity (e.g., higher inequality) among potential revolutionaries reduces the likelihood of regime change. Our methodological contribution is that we deliver a sharp and novel marriage of screening and global games.

Players receive a return to investment that is increasing in the proportion of others who invest and the state and incur a small cost for acquiring information about the state. Their information is reflected in a stochastic choice rule, specifying the probability of a signal leading to investment. If discontinuous stochastic choice rules are infinitely costly, there is a unique equilibrium as costs become small, in which actions are a best response to a uniform (Laplacian) belief over the proportion of others investing. Infeasibility of discontinuous stochastic choice rules captures the idea that it is impossible to perfectly distinguish states that are arbitrarily close together and is both empirically documented and satisfied by many natural micro-founded cost functionals on information. Our results generalize global game selection results and establish that they do not depend on the specific additive noise information structure.

We experimentally test the effects of information quality in a global game of regime change. The game features a payoff structure such that more dispersed private information induces agents to attack more often and reduces regime stability in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We show that subjects in the lab do not play as predicted by equilibrium theory. Instead, more dispersed information makes subjects more cautious, increasing regime stability. We show that this finding is consistent with a modified global game model in which agents engage in level- k thinking. In the level- k model, information quality affects agents’ actions through a novel channel, that enables a strategic attenuation effect. As information quality worsens, strategic complementarities between different level- k types weaken, generating a force that is capable of reversing the comparative statics from the equilibrium model.

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. This second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings. (JEL C70, D11, D82, D83, D91)

We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games.

Chinese fans of domestic sports clubs have received scant scholarly attention. This study addresses this literature gap by exploring the fan culture associated with supporters of Guangzhou Football...

Enhancing individuals’ preparedness to work across borders is of growing importance. This study explores the role of Cultural Intelligence and Psychological Empowerment in enhancing Task Performanc...

Despite events such as the Paralympics, global games, and Special Olympics, sport is generally structured in a way that provides limited or no categories for people with disability to take part in a fair contest. The exclusion of children with disability from sporting opportunities result from the approach that sport is fixed and has a traditional structure, designed to identify the most able at certain activities. It is therefore often accepted that sport is simply something that children with disability may not be able to take part in. This article examines the appeal case of Holzmueller v Illinois High School Association, in which a High School track and field athlete challenged the structures of an athletics competition that did not provide separate categories for athletes with disability, other than wheelchair events. While the case is specific to the United States it represents a useful example of the complexities in the discrimination of children with disability when it comes to sport. By analysing Holzmueller using critical disability theory, this article demonstrates the challenge the law—statute and the judicial interpretation of it, has in preventing discrimination against people with disability in competitive sport.

We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects' behavior approximates the efficient equilibrium of the game, not the risk dominant one. We hypothesize that sentiments in the perception of strategic uncertainty could drive our results. To formalize this hypothesis we extend the standard model by introducing sentiments and we test this mechanism experimentally by eliciting beliefs. We find empirical support for our hypothesis: Subjects are over-optimistic about the actions of others when the signal precision is high and over-pessimistic when it is low. Thus, we show how changes in the information structure can give rise to sentiments that drastically affect outcomes in coordination games.

We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary‐action, N‐player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile ; players employ switching strategies at different cutoff signals, the order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We provide examples that illustrate our result and its connection with dominance solvability. We extend the global game literature, which has thus far been developed for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc .

Video game development is a complex endeavor, often involving complex software, large organizations, and aggressive release deadlines. Several studies have reported that periods of "crunch time" are prevalent in the video game industry, but there are few studies on the effects of time pressure. We conducted a survey with participants of the Global Game Jam (GGJ), a 48-hour hackathon. Based on 198 responses, the results suggest that: (1) iterative brainstorming is the most popular method for conceptualizing initial requirements; (2) continuous integration, minimum viable product, scope management, version control, and stand-up meetings are frequently applied development practices; (3) regular communication, internal playtesting, and dynamic and proactive planning are the most common quality assurance activities; and (4) familiarity with agile development has a weak correlation with perception of success in GGJ. We conclude that GGJ teams rely on ad hoc approaches to development and face-to-face communication, and recommend some complementary practices with limited overhead. Furthermore, as our findings are similar to recommendations for software startups, we posit that game jams and the startup scene share contextual similarities. Finally, we discuss the drawbacks of systemic "crunch time" and argue that game jam organizers are in a good position to problematize the phenomenon., Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Games

Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore her after a palace coup. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime-change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against her. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing her to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

China's domestic mobile gaming firms, such as Tencent, which has developed into the world's biggest gaming firm by revenues in a short span, have outweighed the leading counterparts in the Western advanced economies. Despite an increasing attention has been paid to the global investment of Chinese gaming firms, this paper argues that their market expansion has focused on the selected Southeast Asian countries. This arguement is developed through the aurthors' extensive field investigation and personal interviews with games developers and publishers in Shenzhen, where Tencent is located, during the early 2017 and late 2019. We showcase that the protective multi‐scalar institutions in which the Chinese gaming firms have dominated in the domestic market, have prevented the overseas market expansion of these firms. Although the government‐designated extra‐local inter‐firm collaboration has helped narrow the technological gaps and articulate China’s firms into the global production networks, the market gaps between the domestic and western economies have not been overcome in the expansion to overseas markets. This study sheds light on that the market expansion of Chinese gaming firms has stucked in a dilemma between globalization and regionalization. While China’s domestic gaming firms, particularly Tencent, have been evolving into lead firms in the global games production networks, their market power has been confined at domestic and regional levels.

This article studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors’ actions, choose whether to roll over funding, or not. The unco-ordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies this co-ordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analysed.

The use of global games and global education is certainly not a new concept and one that fits nicely within the domain of physical education. It is the authors’ hope that the addition of global gam...

Kevin Moore was director of the National Football Museum in England, first at Preston’s Deepdale Stadium and then in Piccadilly, Manchester, where it generated £8 million for the city despite not c...

In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others’ previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates. (JEL C72, D82, G21)

Two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion. One is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies, and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets. Using global games, I present a two‐country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and I test its predictions experimentally. The experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally, which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly. Base‐rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior, and thus weakens the fundamental channel. An overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel, since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others, even when this information is irrelevant. These results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior.

We model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures. We establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure. A stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news, but also leads to negative conditional updates. Our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate. Neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over- or under-interventions. Moreover, saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs.

This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary‐action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type spaces, when the underlying game has a monotone potential. Conversely, when the game has no monotone potential, we construct a type space with an arbitrarily high probability event in which players never have common belief about that event. As an implication of these results, we show for generic binary‐action supermodular games that an action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. Our study offers new methodology and insight to the analysis of global game equilibrium selection.

FIFA’s recent (rhetorical) embrace of human rights prominently includes commitments to address gender discrimination and promote gender equality both on and off the pitch. What promise does FIFA’s ‘first-ever global strategy for women’s football’ hold as a means of fulfilling such commitments? A feminist institutionalist approach to this question offers insights into the bounded model of change endorsed by the Women’s Football Strategy. It reveals that the Strategy’s three key objectives serve as ‘common carriers’ for both long-standing institutional interests (in power, profit, and prestige) and newer institutional interests (in women footballers, women’s football, and women in football governance). The assumption that these two sets of interests are mutually reinforcing is brought into question by exposing the ways in which FIFA’s mainline institutional priorities, combined with certain structural features of football governance, blunt the reformist potential of the Women’s Football Strategy. Bounded by old institutional features, the Strategy reflects a partial and incremental, rather than comprehensive and revolutionary, approach to addressing gender discrimination. FIFA’s commitment to human rights therefore remains unfulfilled vis-à-vis women in football.

This oral and written history examines three generations of pioneering women game developers from Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile—the South American region known as the Southern Cone. Each of the individuals interviewed—Marcela Nievas, Sofía Battegazzore, Maureen Berho, and Martina Santoro—offers insight on female leadership over three generations of precipitous growth in regional game development. Together, their personal and professional trajectories demonstrate how the embodied and material conditions of game production condition diverse histories of game development, challenging universalizing myths of a global game industry in which “anybody can make games.” At the same time, these four developers' histories working outside the conventional centers of the global game industry reflect the transformative role of women developers and game designers across the Global South in shaping three generations of global game culture.

We extend the global games method to the class of finite player, finite action games that includes games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and arbitrary combinations of the two. Our result is based on common order properties present in both strategic complements and substitutes, the notion of p-dominance, and the use of dominance solvability as the solution concept. In addition to being closer to the original arguments in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , our approach requires fewer additional assumptions. In particular, we require only one dominance region, and no assumptions on state monotonicity, or aggregative structure, or overlapping dominance regions. As expected, the p-dominance condition becomes more restrictive as the number of players increases. In cases where the probabilistic burden in belief formation may be reduced, the p-dominance condition may be relaxed as well. We present examples that are not covered by existing results.

Key events and episodes in football’s history are central to the making of personal and collective understandings of the global game at local, national and transnational levels. To explore these th...

We present a theory in which deficiencies in risk management arise from a coordination failure. Firms choose privately optimal risk management regimes to be competitive in a market with shortlived trading opportunities but in aggregate can find themselves in a constrained inefficient “race to the bottom,” with their best responses to time pressure exhibiting strategic complementarities reminiscent of bank runs. Comparative statics based on global games suggest that greater market access or faster search (or trading) technologies may improve certain aspects of liquidity but at the same time generate excessive trading that undermines the allocative function of markets. We identify two sources of market failure operating through opportunity costs and agency rents, and discuss approaches to regulating risk management as a governance problem or as a public goods problem. ∗McGill University, Desautels Faculty of Management. E-mail: matthieu.bouvard@mcgill.ca †New York University, Stern School of Business, ECGI, and SIEPR. E-mail: slee@stern.nyu.edu.

Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. We develop a model of top-level diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a global game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between diplomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bolster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect). The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium, as citizens coordinate on the foreign leader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders are so eager to receive state visits from major world powers.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the shifting nature of governance reforms, both at global and national levels, in the increasingly commercialised game of cricket. The authors explore the inter-relationship and linkages between governance and commercialism, and in the process, question the contemporary reliance placed on governance as a generic counter-commercialist force and accountability aid. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on a comprehensive analysis of cricketing archives, newspapers and online media. The authors specifically utilise a range of review reports, governance and accounting information from annual reports and websites of the International Cricket Council (ICC) as well as different national cricket governing bodies (NCBs). Findings The paper vividly demonstrates the importance of recognising the specific significance of different cultural traditions and modes of organising – and not presuming a particular form of impact. The findings highlight that the adoption of a dominant market logic by cricket administrators has resulted in a shift in the balance of power in favour of non-western nations. India has emerged as the clear leader and driving force shaping the way cricket is globally governed. The consequences have been profound but not in terms of delivering, enhanced standards of transparency and accountability. Drawing on institutional theory, the paper argues that the scale of the Board of Cricket Control of India’s financial and operational control over the ICC has not only led to an increasingly commercialised game but engendered divergent and highly questionable standards of governance at the level of NCBs. Originality/value Unlike other global games, cricket has an imperialistic root, and has gone through the process of globalisation in relatively recent times. Also, the commercialisation of cricket has resulted in the global economic and power base shifting from the West to the East, giving us the opportunity to study the dynamics between commercialisation and governance in a quite different globalisation context that allows an assessment to be made of the culturally contingent nature of governance as a substantive organising force.

Rapidly advancing mobile technology has made mobile games a leader in the global games market. As the market size of mobile games has grown, the competition has also accelerated enormously. Thus, in order to ensure success, mobile games must sustain their initial boom for a long time, as well as attract enough users to solidify their installed base. The purpose of this research is to detect diffusion patterns and identify the determinants of mobile games' growth and decline hazards. The results show that mobile games have a distinctive brand-level life cycle in which the growth possibility decreases monotonically over time after the release, while the decline possibility rises after reaching the peak and then later begins to fall. This paper shows how the games' characteristics affect their attracting/holding power. The study provides implications for developers and distributors in terms of how to design, market, and manage mobile games.

Could a less conservative central bank, that is, one with a smaller aversion to inflation, be more likely to withstand pressure on its currency peg? Traditional currency-crisis models provide an unambiguous answer: No. We argue that this answer stems from the models' narrow focus on how a central bank's resistance to private-sector pressure affects output and inflation in the short run. The answer may reverse if pegging is a commitment device, serving to address domestic credibility issues in the long run by transferring the conduct of monetary policy abroad. As a less conservative central bank stands to benefit more from such a transfer, it should find a peg more valuable.

We elicit a measure of strategic uncertainty from growers by using an experimental game grounded on the theory of global games. This allows us to achieve the following: propose a mechanism for measuring strategic uncertainty aversion; compare growers’ risk aversion to their strategic uncertainty aversion; explore how growers’ strategic uncertainty aversion is affected by changes in group size and coordination requirement; and relate a strategic uncertainty aversion measure to growers’ actual decisions to participate in an area-wide pest management program. In our experimental setting, we found that when the coordination requirement for a successful outcome is low, most growers see the strategic uncertainty posed by human interaction as more favorable in terms of expected payoffs relative to a game against nature. In contrast, when the coordination requirement is high, most growers expect lower payoffs and choose to coordinate less. We also found evidence that growers’ strong beliefs about neighbors not coordinating negatively impacted their choices to coordinate. Our measure of strategic uncertainty was also found to influence the likelihood of growers to actually coordinate sprays. Our findings help explain why participation in area-wide pest management to control the vector of citrus greening across Florida has not been as widespread as expected; the strategic uncertainty involved in relying on neighbors has made many growers choose self-reliance in spraying despite the lower payoff.

We study the potential role of correlated refinancing abilities among different countries for the disruption of government bond markets in a currency union. Following Morris and Shin (2004) we use a global games framework and model the simultaneous investment decision into two assets, which are subject to correlated fundamental states, as a coordination problem with correlated imperfect information. Based on this model we evaluate the role of information about one country for the coordination of creditors of another country. We find, however, that the contagious effects on the price of debt precipitated through correlation are modest. Hence, assuming that investors behave as modeled in the global game, we conclude that correlated fundamentals that precipitate informational spillovers appear to be unlikely to play a major role for e.g. the disruption of some Eurozone government bond markets in the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crisis.

Gulshan Dietl, India and the Global Game of Gas Pipelines. London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2017, pp. 213, ₹695 (HB). ISBN 978-1-138-74401-1.

Game jams bring all kinds of creators together to make games from scratch in a relatively short time, often based on shared design constraints. The most influential game jam, Global Game Jam (GGJ) was established in 2009 as an annual event connecting game makers around the globe with shared theme and time-space. The growth of the GGJ indicates the establishment of game jam era: in ten years GGJ expanded from 1 600 to 47 000 participants and diverse set of other game jams are organized modelling GGJ or its online counterpart, Ludum Dare (LD). Even though many game jams are directed towards hobbyist creators or game development students, also professionals take part on these events. Game companies run their internal game jams for various reasons from experimentation and recreation to recruitment and education. Game jams are so widely spread, that they are destined to impact the game making cultures at large. In this paper, I am proposing that we live in the era of game jams and the generation of game makers that have started their development careers within this era are native to game jams.

Global Game Jam was organized fully online for the first time in 2021. This event report presents a walkthrough of the Global Game Jam weekend for the FGJ Tampere Online site, and proposes guidelines for online game jams based on what was learned from organizing the event acceptedVersion

Game Jams are game development marathons limited by time, usually lasting 48 hours. These events bring people together not only to make games in a short period of time but to connect beginners, amateurs and professionals. Although seen as a diverse environment, in Games – either as a technology culture or as a professional occupation – we can find prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQIA+. This paper is an exploratory study about diversity in game jams, specifically about the participation of LGBTQIA+ in some hubs at Global Game Jam 2021. We investigated the participation of LGBTQIA+ people at the Global Game Jam 2021, aiming to understand their perspectives and the potential challenges around any prejudice or discrimination they may face during the game jams. We combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. First, we used a survey to collect quantitative (closed-ended questions) and qualitative (open-ended questions) data. The second part consisted of online interviews with some of the respondents from the survey. After analyzing the collected data, we provided a set of recommendations for structure and organization, aiming at a more inclusive and welcoming environment to LGBTQIA+ participants, besides increasing the participation of this public. The recommendations are: Organize diversity-focused game jams and diversity-focused Global Game Jam hubs; make every participant aware of the code of conduct; foster collaboration over competition; introduce aspects that the LGBTQIA+ community can relate to; and promote learning activities.

Drawing on the author’s research into fragmented, heterogeneous ‘local’ contexts, this chapter explores analogies between local/global game histories and micro and macro (or global) approaches to history, to imagine a heterodox game historiography, conceived as one which undermines old orthodoxies whilst refusing new ones.

We explore the economics and optimal design of “permissioned” distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game. Without giving proper incentives to validators, however, their records cannot be trusted because they cannot commit to verifying trades and they can accept bribes to incorrectly validate histories. Both frictions challenge the integrity of the ledger on which credit transactions rely. In this context, we examine the conditions under which the process of permissioned validation supports decentralized exchange as an equilibrium, and analyze the optimal design of the trade and validation mechanisms. We solve for the optimal fees, number of validators, supermajority threshold and transaction size. A stronger consensus mechanism requires higher rents be paid to validators. Our results suggest that a centralized ledger is likely to be superior, unless weaknesses in the rule of law and contract enforcement necessitate a decentralized ledger.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some goods suddenly became scarce due to panic purchases and stockpiling. The decision to hoard is influenced by higher-order beliefs. If an agent believes that other agents think that a good will become scarce, she concludes that these other agents will hoard, and thus tries to preempt them by hoarding herself. To capture such behaviour, we construct a model with a global game. Agents receive noisy information about some variable that influences supply or demand. They then form higher-order beliefs, and possibly panic and hoard the product. We analyze determinants of such panics. Endogenizing prices and quantities, we show that producers with market power set prices strategically to induce panics and thus boost demand. Absent market power, strong competition leads to low prices and thus little overproduction, also causing panics. We also consider firms who need the scarce good as an intermediate product in their production chain, and show that a regulator would require such firms to stockpile the product, thus increasing resilience.

We formalize Tilly's (1978, 2006, 2008) concept of repertoires of contentious actions, and analyze how the structure of state repression affects the variety of observed contentious actions. Introducing the notion of repertoire width, we show that when state repression accelerates with higher levels of anti-regime actions, opposition leaders tend to call for many different forms of contentious actions, thereby generating a wider repertoire. In contrast, when repression decelerates with higher contentious actions, opposition leaders tend to call for few different forms of contentious actions, thereby generating a narrower repertoire. This result applies to both Tilly’s "bounded rationality mode," in which opposition leaders must choose from a predetermined set of contentious actions (rigid/strong repertoire); and to his "efficiency model," in which leader can freely innovate and design contentious actions (weak/no repertoire). Methodologically, citizen interactions is modeled as a multi-action global game, and the leader’s problem is a simple mechanism without transfers.

В статье предпринимается попытка проанализировать обучающий и воспитательный потенциал, которым может обладать синергия качественно организованной самостоятельной работы студентов и расширенного за ее счет учебного процесса, построенного на игровой методике, в рамках изучения иностранных языков в неязыковом вузе. Автор дает перечень профессиональных навыков и личностных качеств, которые студенты могут приобрести в ходе данного учебного формата, и которые в значительной степени помогут им в их дальнейшем пути по карьерной лестнице в национальных и международных компаниях. В заключение автор высказывает глубокую уверенность в том, что качественно построенный опытным преподавателем учебный процесс даже по непрофильной дисциплине в вузе, может в будущем оказать огромное положительное влияние на общество, если хотя бы некоторые студенты воспримут полученные в вузе знания в полной мере с чувством сознательности., The article makes an attempt to analyse the teaching and educational potential that can be possessed by the synergy of well-organized students’ independent work and the educational process, expanded at its expense, built on a game methodology, within the framework of studying foreign languages in a non-linguistic university. The author gives a list of professional skills and personal qualities that students can acquire in the course of this educational format, and which will greatly help them in their further career path in national and international companies. In conclusion, the author expresses deep confidence that the educational process, even in a non-core discipline at a university, which is well-structured by an experienced teacher, can have a huge positive impact on society in the future, if at least some students will fully perceive the knowledge acquired at the university with a sense of consciousness.

This paper studies a coordination game with incomplete information and the option to delay. The delay option enables the agents to observe a binary signal depending on whether the early actions (e.g., investment) surpasses a threshold. The anticipation of information incentivizes agents to wait and free-ride on the information, whereas acting early can help to generate good news, and consequently induce more coordination. Relying on this trade-off, we find the unique monotone equilibrium, which features the inability of the delay option in facilitating coordination. If the waiting period is sufficiently short or the interest rate is sufficiently low, the delay option induces more inaction and makes coordination more difficult to achieve, as compared with the static case. We further discuss the theoretical implications for understanding the impact of monetary policy on economic recovery and how the accessibility of information affects financial stability.

The article attempts to synchronize the processes of teaching specialized disciplines and a foreign language in a non-linguistic university. According to the author, the transition to bilingual education is only a matter of time. To make it gradual and harmonious, intermediate stages are required, including symbiotic forms of working with educational material in two languages. The options for cooperation between teachers proposed by the author are predominantly creative and practice-oriented, which should help motivate students and improve the quality of the transforming educational process as a whole. The author pays special attention to the role of students' independent work, without the high-quality organization of which, during the period of global distancing, it is impossible to carry out such important and promising changes for students and society. The preferred outcome of the above changes should be the educational process where there is no rigid framework between teaching formats, languages, theory and creative practice.

The video game industry has experienced profound socio-technical changes during the last decade: a significant demographic growth, production of games as service, democratization of game design know-how and tools, and extended access to globalized markets due to dematerialization of distribution networks. Based on a large ongoing survey, including 40 in-depth interviews, our chapter discusses the current situation of video game production in France. A narrow labour market is here combined with a very high turnover, probably due to early career exits, and with a paradoxically overwhelming training offer. By looking at career trajectories, our biographical approach explores the circulation of game workers in the intertwining of local and global, national and international, mainstream and indie game production worlds.

During the Bretton Woods era, OECD countries grew at historically unprecedented rates. This Golden Age has many possible explanations, ranging from the return to liberal policies in international trade to a backlog of profitable growth opportunities after the neglect of the 1930s and war-time damage. Eichengreen (1996) has argued that the proximate cause of the rapid growth was high investment, and that this high investment was made possible by certain institutions that were particularly well suited to reconstruction and growth. On the domestic side, these institutions led to high investment rates and moderate wage claims. This paper interprets the interaction between unions and firms as a coordination game. The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected via a global game argument. Only small changes to the payoffs are necessary to explain a change in the selected equilibrium, and therefore, the growth slowdown.

Mobile game market is the fast-growing game market and accounted for more than a half of the global game market’s revenue. Because of the promising future many game developers develop monetization strategy to gain more profit from the mobile game market. Thus, by knowing what drivers that influence gamer’s purchase intention and loyalty expected to help game developer to expand their market share. Then, this study uses conclusive descriptive to gain insight by analyzing effect of perceived value toward game loyalty and in-app purchase intention. Moreover, this study also aims to investigate the effect of game loyalty toward user’s intention to make in-app purchase. This research used purposive sampling and involved 240 Mobile Legend gamers in Indonesia. Data is processed with SEM using LISREL software version 8.8. The result shows perceived playfulness, perceived connectedness, perceived good price, and perceived reward are significantly influence mobile game loyalty. While perceived connectedness and perceived good price significantly influence in-app purchase intention. In the other side, Mobile game loyalty also has significant influence on in-app purchase intention. In addition, the result also found that perceived connectedness and perceived reward significantly influence perceived good price.

Time-bounded collaborative events in which teams work together under intense time pressure have become popular in the last few years and are being used in many contexts. In this article we explore the Global Service Jam (GSJ), which has a format similar to other global jamming events such as the Global Game Jam. In this type of event, the activities are centered on service prototyping, encompassing the design process of a service. In this article we perform a mixed-method study to understand the motivation of participants in the local edition of GSJ and compare those motivations to the data we gathered from other cities around the world. We also collected data about the main lessons learned and difficulties found by participants during the GSJ.