Search

Questo articolo esplora la nascita della Fenomenologia americana nella "Nuova Fenomenologia" di Josiah Royce, proposta nel suo Thought Diary (1878-1880), in dialogo sia con il tema della pratica contemplativa di Husserl sia con la versione del pragmatismo di Peirce., This article explores the birth of American Phenomenology in Josiah Royce’s “New Phenomenology”, proposed in his Thought Diary (1878-1880), in dialogue both with Husserl’s Contemplative Practice and with Peirce’s version of pragmatism. &nbsp

In this contribution we first sketch an outline of the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt), to introduce the readers to the guest-edited collection of essays Varieties of the Lifeworld: Phenomenology and Aesthetic Experience, special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.” We trace back the origin of the concept of lifeworld to Husserl’s late phenomenology, although also explaining (on the basis of the careful historical-conceptual reconstructions offered by some distinguished scholars of Husserl and the phenomenological movement) that the development of Husserl’s phenomenology of the Lebenswelt was gradual and was connected, among other things, to the question of the natural world of experience. Then, quickly referring to Gadamer, Landgrebe, Fink and other authors belonging to the phenomenological tradition, we explain that different interpretations of the topic “Lifeworld” in Husserl’s thinking have been provided: In our view, this contributes to the fact that still nowadays this topic is a fascinating and philosophically stimulating one. Finally, making reference to more recent works by such authors as Figal, Gallagher, Zahavi and Shusterman (a pragmatist philosopher, whose somaesthetics is nonetheless very rich in insights that can be connected to phenomenological views of the body and its place in the world), we emphasize how the question concerning the lifeworld is still capable today to open a great variety of perspectives and plurality of paths for thinking, as testified by the essays collected in this guest-edited special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.”

open access article Aims To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign-trained nurses. Design Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer-reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign-trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, ‘referring to the original philosophy is not enough’ and ‘phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological’. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy.

In this autobiographical essay, introduced by Ernst Wolff, Paulin Hountonji gives an account of his relation to Paul Ricœur. A sketch of his own academic development and his experience of the Parisian philosophy milieu in the 1960s serves as background for his chosing Ricœur as his doctoral supervisor. The essay makes plain the proximities between Hountondji and Ricœur (especially the study of Husserl), but identifies also occasional and missed encounters.

This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of “structure marginalization”. Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or “just the way things are” (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one’s powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects.

Today the phenomenological concept of the lived body figures centrally in several philosophical and special scientific debates. In these wide and widening fields, the concept is used with multiple different meanings. In order to clarify and delineate the debates, this paper provides an explication of the phenomenological-transcendental methods. It argues that these methods help us remove the most fundamental ambiguities of the concept of embodiment by distinguishing between the main constituents of the lived body and by illuminating their mutual relations.

In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its...

La relación filosófica entre Husserl y Sartre es posible rastrearla no solo como maestro-discípulo (el mismo Sartre lo señala en 1940), sino también como un discípulo que intenta superar a su maestro. El presente artículo es un esfuerzo por mostrar la relación entre la lectura que Sartre hace de Husserl, advirtiendo hasta qué punto el filósofo francés comprende el proyecto del padre de la fenomenología, y el modo en que esta lectura permite a Sartre elaborar un auténtico pensamiento existencialista. Con ello ponemos de relieve la presunta deuda del existencialismo sartreano respecto de la fenomenología husserliana. The philosophical relationship between Husserl and Sartre can be traced back not only as a teacher-disciple, but also as a disciple trying to outdo his teacher. This article is an effort to show the direct relationship between Sartre’s reading of Husserl, noting to what extent the French philosopher understands the project of the father of phenomenology, and the way in which this reading allows Sartre to elaborate an authentic thought existentialist. With this we highlight the presumed debt of Sartrean existentialism regarding the Husserlian phenomenology.

In recent neuroaesthetic discussion, neuroscientists have linked aesthetic pleasure to the brain’s reward systems, but they have also attempted to dissociate it from utilitarian rewards and ultimately explain it as a disinterested state of mind. This paper examines this neuroaesthetic approach, juxtaposing it with elements of phenomenological thought on the subject of aesthetic disinterestedness, to present three interrelated concerns that can be raised from a phenomenological perspective, as well as to outline how to overcome these problems phenomenologically. The paper ends with the suggestion that neuroaesthetics, if it is ever going to offer something important or useful regarding our understanding of aesthetic experience, has to become phenomenologically sensitive and informed.

This article examines the relation between two key, but seemingly opposed concepts in Jan Patočka’s thought: epoché and the concrete institutional polis. In doing so it attempts to elucidate the inextricable relation between phenomenology and politics in the work of the Czech philosopher, and illustrate more broadly the possibilities for approaching the political from a phenomenological perspective. The article provides a phenomenological interpretation of “care for the soul” as closely linked to Patočka’s reformulation of the core phenomenological notion of epoché. It argues that in Patočka’s work, the epoché, traditionally conceived as a radical stepping back from the world must be rendered differently, not only as a negative freedom, but as the foundation of positive politics. Thus, the authors argue that there is a thematic and conceptual continuity between Patočka’s phenomenological studies and his political work.

espanolEl proposito de este articulo es arrojar luz sobre el peculiar modo de intencionalidad de la alegria. Para ello me referire, en primer lugar, a los dos sentidos principales de alegria. En segundo lugar, aludire al objeto de la alegria y a la cuestion de la correccion o legitimidad de la misma. En tercer lugar, hare referencia a las “leyes de la alegria”. Por ultimo, aludire a la relacion entre alegria y alteridad. EnglishThe aim of this paper is to offer a basic analysis of the peculiar kind of intentionality involved in the experience of joy. First, I deal with the two meanings of joy. Secondly, I point out some questions related to the object of joy and with the rightness or legitimacy of this experience. Thirdly, I refer to the so-called “laws of joy.” Lastly, I offer some thoughts on the relation between joy and alterity.

In "On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem" (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl's account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl's work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and after of the self as ego or I and egoic experience as attentive experience. I specifically aim to sketch the beginning of a response to three questions I take Crowell to be posing to a Husserlian account of the person and personal identity: (1) What more than pre-reflective self-awareness can be attributed to the self on phenomenological grounds so that we can understand, phenomenologically speaking, how selves become persons? (2) How can what characterizes the self in addition to pre-reflective self-awareness be discerned in both our commitment to truth and our feeling bound by love and other emotive commitments that cannot be fully rationally justified, which Husserl acknowledges are both sources of personal self-constitution? And (3), do all selves become persons? In the paper I elaborate how my answers to the first two questions turn on the self not just being self-aware but active in a particular sense. And to begin to address the third question, I suggest that while any form of wakeful conscious experience is both self-aware and active, this activity of the self makes a difference for those who are socio-historically embedded in the way we are. Specifically, on the proposed Husserlian account, selves that are socio-historically embedded become persons in and through their active relating to what they attentively experience. In concluding, I indicate how this Husserlian account might compare to Crowell's claim that "self-identity (ipseity) is not mere logical identity (A=A) but a normative achievement [ horizontal ellipsis ] which makes a 'personal' kind of identity possible" (2020).

espanolLas Lecciones de fenomenologia de la conciencia interna del tiempohan sido caracterizadas tanto por su enigmatica belleza textual como por su dificultades e inconsistencias. El objetivo de esta comunicacion es intentar establecer algunos puntos centrales de la teoria del tiempo husserliana en sus textos tempranos, conducido por el texto de las Leccionesyacompanado por la totalidad de escritos del periodo y las discusiones mas relevantes que se han hecho al respecto. EnglishThe Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 1905 were characterised both byits enigmatic beauty and its difficulty and inconsistency. The aim of this paper is to try to establish someof the central points of the Husserl’s theory of time in his early writings, guided by the Lectures but withthe support of all texts from the period and the most relevant discussions on the matter.

espanolEl presente articulo se propone explorar la nocion de mundo ficcional desde la filosofia de Edmund Husserl, destacando la potencialidad de la fenomenologia para los campos de la estetica y la teoria de la ficcion. Para ello, partire de la descripcion de las estructuras sobre las que se erige la vivencia ficcional, que aqui sera tratada como una vivencia de fantasia. Bajo este enfoque, el analisis muestra primero la correlacion entre conciencia de fantasia y mundo de fantasia, pasando a continuacion a explicitar las estructuras de cada uno de los polos de experiencia. Para Husserl, esta correlacion se sustenta logicamente en la doctrina del idealismo trascendental y en su concepcion del mundo de fantasia como mundo posible. EnglishThis article explores the notion of fictional world from the viewpoint of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, highlighting the potentiality of phenomenology for contributing to the fields of aesthetics and theory of fiction. To this aim, the analysis will depart from the description of the structures of the fictional experience, which here is going to be treated as a phantasy experience. From this standpoint, the analysis first makes visible the correlation between phantasy consciousness and phantasy world and, next, explains the structures of each of the poles of experience. For Husserl, this correlation is logically grounded on the doctrine of transcendental idealism and its conception of the phantasy world as a possible world.

En el presente artículo proponemos un abordaje de los análisis en torno al cuerpo en trabajos fundamentales de Husserl y Heidegger, a partir de una distinción de diferencias y continuidades. Buscaremos demostrar que las especificaciones de la corporeidad de Heidegger remiten a una aclaración del entramado comprensivo y de significación en el que también se hallan articulados los análisis fenomenológicos de su maestro. Para ello, en primer lugar, especificaremos las consideraciones de Husserl sobre la corporalidad y la inter-corporalidad, distinguiendo su perspectiva gnoseológica y ética. Luego, dedicaremos un apartado a las aclaraciones de Heidegger en la década de 1920 y otro, a sus descripciones específicas en sus seminarios de la década de 1960, donde desarrolla el carácter ontológico de la corporeidad. Finalmente, analizaremos algunas implicancias relativas a estas tematizaciones, distinguiendo sus enfoques y orientaciones comprensivas sobre el cuerpo., In the present article we propose an approach of the analyses around the body in fundamental works of Husserl and Heidegger, from a distinction of differences and continuities. We will try to demonstrate that the specifications of Heidegger’s corporeality refer to a clarification of the comprehensive and meaningful framework in which the phenomenological analyses of his teacher are also articulated. For this, first, we will specify Husserl’s considerations on corporality and inter-corporality, distinguishing his gnoseological and ethical perspective. Then, we will devote a section to Heidegger’s explanations in the 1920s and another, to his specific descriptions in his seminars of the 1960s, where he develops the ontological character of corporeality. Finally, we will analyze some implications related to these thematizations, distinguishing their comprehensive approaches and orientations about the body., Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

El presente artículo aborda las consideraciones de la alteridad del otro en las elaboraciones tempranas de Heidegger. Entendidas como condición de posibilidad para un abordaje propio de las cuestiones éticas, aquí analizamos tensiones y limitaciones en la tematización del otro, con el objetivo de dar cuenta de la transición hacia una comprensión radical de la alteridad en sus trabajos posteriores a 1930, más allá de las limitaciones antropológicas y subjetivas de las elaboraciones de Husserl. Para dar cuenta de ello, en primer lugar, analizamos los tratamientos respectivos en la fenomenología de Husserl, poniendo énfasis en los límites de su enfoque. En segundo lugar, abordamos las elaboraciones en torno a la alteridad del otro en los trabajos de Heidegger, para dilucidar el carácter transicional de la comprensión de base, a partir de sus desplazamientos y limitaciones propias. Finalmente, circunscribimos su enfoque sobre las estructuras relacionales, destacando algunas discusiones sobre implicancias éticas. De este modo, nos proponemos dar cuenta del carácter fronterizo de una comprensión filosófica del otro, en su empuje hacia su radicalización en el pensamiento contemporáneo., This article addresses the considerations of the otherness of the other in Heidegger’s early elaborations. Understood as a condition of possibility for a proper approach to ethical issues, here we analyze tensions and limitations in the thematization of the other, with the aim of accounting for the transition towards a radical understanding of alterity in his works after 1930, beyond of the anthropological and subjective limitations of Husserl’s elaborations. To account for this, we first analyze the respective treatments in Husserl’s phenomenology, emphasizing the limits of his approach. Secondly, we approach the elaborations around the otherness of the other in the works of Heidegger, to elucidate the transitional character of the basic understanding, from its own displacements and limitations. Finally, we circumscribe its focus on relational structures, highlighting some discussions about ethical implications. In this way, we propose to account for the border character of a philosophical understanding of the other, in its push towards its radicalization in contemporary thought., Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

Apresentamos aqui a primeira tradução para o português do célebre manuscrito D 17, escrito por Husserl entre 7 e 9 de maio de 1934, e publicado por M. Farber em 1940, no volume Philosophical Essays in Memory of E. Husserl. O manuscrito possuía em seu envelope o seguinte comentário descritivo: "Reversão da doutrina copernicana na interpretação da visão de mundo habitual. A arca-originária Terra não se move. Investigações fundamentais sobre a origem fenomenológica da corporeidade da espacialidade da natureza no sentido primeiro da ciência natural. Todas estas investigações iniciais necessárias". Escrito no estilo livre e vivaz que caracteriza os manuscritos de pesquisa da fenomenologia de Husserl, este texto pertence ao grupo de manuscritos produzidos no entorno da última obra publicada de Husserl, A Crise das Ciências Europeias e a Fenomenologia Transcendental (1936). Se no extensamente comentado §9 desta obra Husserl empreende uma análise da ciência moderna partindo da instituição originária da física de Galilei, o ponto de partida de A Reversão é a noção de natureza que caracteriza o mundo copernicano, a qual estabelece a Terra como um corpo físico situado no interior do universo infinito. A epoché (no sentido específico dado a este termo no interior da fenomenologia husserliana) da tese copernicana leva Husserl à investigação da Terra em uma outra função transcendental, a saber, sua constituição enquanto solo e fundamento de referência para a experiência do espaço, do movimento e do repouso. Ao lado deste primeiro aspecto ligado ao sentido de natureza, a investigação de A Reversão abarca um outro campo temático, onde o manuscrito toca as fronteiras da filosofia fenomenológica e desafia os limites teóricos estabelecidos pelas interpretações ortodoxas da fenomenologia transcendental: a relação entre Terra, historicidade e intersubjetividade. Assim, a parte final do texto é dedicada à exposição da Terra como elemento da "história originária" que vincula todas histórias relativas da humanidade, a qual se organiza em uma multiplicidade de territórios ou moradas. Nos termos de Merleau-Ponty, a Terra é, sob esta perspectiva, a reserva de onde pode provir toda a vida, todo futuro e toda história.Tradução de Gabriel Lago de Sousa Barroso ** Doutor em filosofia pela Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (2020), com estágio de pesquisa na Universidade de Freiburg (2017-2018). Foi professor substituto no departamento de filosofia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (2016; 2019-2021). Atualmente, é pesquisador assistente na Universidade de Wuppertal, na Alemanha, e nos Arquivos Husserl da Universidade Católica de Leuven, na Bélgica, com bolsa de pós-doutorado do programa DAAD-PRIME. Sua pesquisa atual trata da divisão entre natureza e cultura na fenomenologia (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) e sua relação com a antropologia contemporânea (Descola, Latour, Viveiros de Castro). Email: lagobarroso@gmail.com.

No presente artigo, examino a função transcendental do conceito de Terra para a constituição da espacialidade e da temporalidade na fenomenologia tardia de Edmund Husserl. Primeiramente, analiso o problema da bifurcação da experiência entre a apercepção das ciências naturais e a experiência do mundo da vida, mostrando como a epoché das ciências naturais resolve este paradoxo ao impor uma limitação à pretensão de hegemonia do naturalismo sobre a verdade e o conhecimento. A seguir, argumento que a limitação do naturalismo permite uma diferenciação eidética dos fenômenos, estabelecendo a possibilidade de uma análise da espacialidade segundo a relação genética entre corpo (Körper), corpo vivo (Leib) e Terra (Erde). Neste caso, a Terra não é simplesmente um objeto da experiência, mas um elemento pré-subjetivo das condições de possibilidade da experiência. Por fim, mostro as consequências da função transcendental da Terra para a análise da temporalidade e da historicidade. Por um lado, a fenomenologia tardia de Husserl se caracteriza por uma territorialização do sentido, na qual o campo da experiência é enraizado na intersubjetividade de uma pluralidade de territórios organizados em um mesmo espaço terrestre. Território e Terra são horizontes da experiência possível que se encontram em uma relação de coinclusão e entrelaçamento, indicando uma superação da divisão clássica entre natureza e cultura. Por outro, esta territorialização do sentido tem uma consequência importante para a filosofia fenomenológica, uma vez que permite formular o programa de uma arqueologia do sentido.

Representing altered states of consciousness, even through the most phantasmal of technical images, is an inherent contradiction; once we attribute a physical body, i.e. objectivity, to mental images, we deny what Husserl considers their very essence. Jean Mitry draws from this assumption when discussing filmic access to mental states from a phenomenological perspective. The following essay reconsiders Mitry’s contribution with specific reference to the role of projection, technically and metaphorically speaking, in the cinematic technique and imagination; this, with the intention of suggesting some crucial questions for the comparison between the filmic forms of the visible and those inaugurated by the technology of the virtual.

La revolución científica y filosófica de los siglos XVI y XVII fue descrita por Alexandre Koyré como el paso «del mundo cerrado al universo infinito», lo que supuso la unificación de lo celeste y lo terrestre bajo unas mismas leyes físico-matemáticas, la conversión de la Tierra en un planeta como cualquier otro y la división ontológica entre el orden físico y el orden humano. Sin embargo, en el siglo XX la humanidad adquiere por primera vez en su historia el poder de destruirse a sí misma, sea por las armas nucleares o por la crisis ecológica global. Paralelamente, se produce un cambio de paradigma en la concepción científica y filosófica de la naturaleza, y en particular de la Tierra como morada originaria de los seres humanos y de los demás seres vivos. En este artículo se analizan todas esas transformaciones a través de cinco autores muy diferentes: Husserl, Arendt, Lovelock, Margulis y Latour. The scientific and philosophical revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries was described by Alexandre Koyré as the passage «from the closed world to the infinite universe», which meant the unification of the celestial and the terrestrial under the same physical-mathematical laws, the conversion of the Earth into a planet like any other and the ontological division between the physical order and the human order. However, in the 20th century, the human race acquired for the first time in its history the power to destroy itself, either through nuclear weapons or through a global ecological crisis. At the same time, there has been a paradigm shift in the scientific and philosophical conception of nature and, in particular, of the Earth as the original dwelling place of human beings and other living beings. In this article, all these transformations are analyzed through the ideas of five very different authors: Husserl, Arendt, Lovelock, Margulis and Latour.

O estatuto da ideia de Filosofia Primeira na Fenomenologia de Husserl Resumo: O objetivo do artigo que se segue é se dedicar a uma leitura e interpretação dos textos de Edmund Husserl que fazem uso do conceito de “Filosofia Primeira” para se referir em geral à fenomenologia e propor a tese de que a ideia de “primeira” surge de início na obra husserliana como uma privilegiada chave de demarcação do projeto fenomenológico em relação à hierarquia das ciências, e que ele traduz no final, com a evolução e o alargamento dos horizontes abertos por esse projeto, o duplo sentido da fenomenologia como “ciência de rigor” e como “filosofia”, e o esforço de elevar a fenomenologia pura ao estatuto de uma filosofia fenomenológica. Palavras-chave: Husserl; Filosofia Primeira; Fenomenologia pura; Filosofia Fenomenológica. The status of the First Philosophy idea in Husserl’s Phenomenology Abstract: The aim of the following paper is to read and to interpret Edmund Husserl's texts that make use of the concept of “First Philosophy” to refer in general to phenomenology and propose the thesis that the idea of “first” arises from the beginning in Husserlian work as a privileged key of demarcation of the phenomenological project in relation to the hierarchy of sciences, and that it finally translates, with the evolution and broadening of the horizons opened by this project, the double meaning of phenomenology as “rigorous science” and as “philosophy”, and the effort to rise pure phenomenology to the status of a phenomenological philosophy. Keywords: First Philosophy; Pure Phenomenology; Phenomenological Philosophy. Die Stellung der Idee von der Ersten Philosophie in Husserls Phänomenologie Zusammenfassung: Der begreiffende Text handelt sich um die Vorstellung, deren Grund des folgenden Abschnitt darin besteht, die Texte von Edmund Husserl zu lesen und zu interpretieren. Dies verwenden den Begriff der „Ersten Philosophie“, um allgemein auf die Phänomenologie zu verweisen und die These aufzustellen, sodass die Idee von „Ersten“ von Anfang an in Husserlian Arbeit entsteht als privilegierter Abgrenzungsschlüssel des phänomenologischen Projekts in Bezug auf die Hierarchie der Wissenschaften. Laut Husserl wird die doppelte Bedeutung der Phänomenologie schließlich durch die Entwicklung und Erweiterung des vom Projekt verbreitenden Horizons verwirklicht. Er hält die als „strenge Wissenschaft“ und als „Philosophie“ und fasst den Entschluss, die reine Phänomenologie in der Stellung einer phänomenologischen Philosophie zu erheben. Stichworte: Husserl; Erste Philosophie; Reine Phänomenologie; Phänomenologische Philosophie. Data de registro: 26/07/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021

El filósofo Mario Bunge ha sido el más notable investigador de la epistemología en nuestros días. Su preferencia por la ciencia y su rechazo hacia la pseudociencia son evidentes. Así, se reconoce que la filosofía de Bunge fue analítica. En consecuencia, Bunge también manifestó su desacuerdo con aquellas filosofías (en su mayoría continentales) que son anticientíficas o que no hayan promovido el estudio de la ciencia. De este modo, se analizan las razones por las que Bunge rechazó a Hegel, Husserl y Heidegger. Este rechazo lleva a investigar las bases del negacionismo y la posverdad y, finalmente, se realiza un balance entre la postura de Bunge y el florecimiento de la desinformación en la actualidad.

Sammendrag Dagfinn Føllesdal har vært en avgjørende faglig kraft i norsk filosofi i den senere del av det 20 århundre. Denne artikkelen vil tegne et bilde av filosofen, og gi et lite dypdykk rundt det jeg mener er hans viktigste bidrag: hans arbeid rundt singulær referanse i modale og andre kontekster med utgangspunkt i hans doktoravhandling ved Harvard og mange senere publikasjoner rundt denne problematikken. Her vil jeg evaluere hans arbeid og vurdere dets betydning både historisk og systematisk. I tillegg vil artikkelen gi noen drypp om kollegaen og universitetsmannen og også mennesket Dagfinn. Jeg skal omtale filosofen og universitetsmannen som DF, ellers bruke fornavnet Dagfinn i det mer personlige.

Dans le présent article, nous allons exposer les différentes approches husserliennes de la conception de la nature. Husserl revient d’abord à la notion de nature dans le cadre de la critique formulée contre les sciences objectives. Il révèle la procédure idéalisante qui se trouve voilée dans leur définition théorique de la nature. Il en résulte d’abord un replacement de la « nature » dans le rapport à l’expérience, ainsi qu’une relativisation de son interprétation scientifique. Dans ce mouvement de la pensée husserlienne de critique et réinterprétation de la notion de nature, nous verrons que celle-ci occupe une place ambiguë dans les différentes analyses développées par Husserl. Cela ouvre la possibilité à différentes interprétations du rapport de la notion de « monde de la vie » à la « nature ». Nous aborderons ces différentes approches, car cette contradiction est d’autant plus intéressante qu’elle nous révèle certains aspects des analyses husserliennes sur l’originaire et l’originel. Par ailleurs, ces interprétations proposent différentes alternatives à l’objectivation de la nature par les sciences.

Resumen El artículo examina el proceso de configuración del concepto de destrucción en las lecciones tempranas de Martin Heidegger entre 1919 y 1920. En este texto se sostiene que a través del establecimiento del marco fenomenológico del que este concepto surge se puede llegar a comprender mejor el proyecto filosófico de Heidegger y, sobre todo, la relevancia o vigencia que este proyecto tiene hoy. Primero, se establecen algunas de las fuentes de este concepto, particularmente en lo que se refiere al concepto de Abbau en Husserl. Luego, se aborda la articulación en las lecciones de 1919 y 1920 y, finalmente, se plantean algunas consideraciones críticas. Abstract This article examines the genesis of the concept of destruction in the early lectures of Martin Heidegger between 1919 and 1920. The article claims that, by analyzing the phenomenological framework from which that concept arises, it is possible to reach a better understanding of Heidegger’s philosophical work and its relevance today. The article traces some of the sources of this concept, in particular with reference to Husserl’s concept of Abbau. Subsequently, the paper studies the articulation in the lectures of 1919 and 1920, and finally it puts forward some critical remarks.

This study aims, first, to delimit the seemingly synonymous concepts of “phenomenon” and “appearance” and second, to trace the functions of each in Kant’s philosophy and the phenomenological tradition. The analy­sis is based on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the central works of Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Kant does not explicitly distinguish the two terms and only speaks about phenomena when he deals with the categorial application of reason. With Husserl, appearance is linked with the area of the natural attitude while the phenomenon is absolute. Fink’s position is interesting in that it differs from the views of the main representatives of transcendental philosophy, Kant and Husserl. According to Fink, appearing is the foundation of the fact that what exists is and that appearing is being. Fink takes a different approach to the meanings of appearance as opposing the thing in itself which possesses true but unknowable being (Kant) and appearance as taking place in the “relative” sphere of the natural attitude (Husserl): with Fink, appearance (or, as Fink constantly writes, “appearing”) turns out to be the condition of the existence of objects. Appearance, understood through the prism of the human being which perceives something as Vorschein, implies an inherently open world. Following Fink, I analyse these provisions and examine, first, light as the metaphysical source of cognition, second, the human being as a special kind of being, third, the pre-Socratic treatment of being and, fourth, the formation of a distinct phenomenological idiom. I come to the conclusion that the metaphysical-ontological method of phenomenological analysis of appearance proposed by Fink affords a new insight into the a priori principle and the nature of Kant’s “thing in itself” and proposes a new grounding of Husserl’s thesis which questions Kant’s agnosticism.

According to Husserl, Plato played a fundamental role in the development of the notion of teleology, so much so that Husserl viewed the myth narrated in the Timaeus as a fundamental stage in the long history that he hoped would eventually lead to a teleological science of the world grounded in transcendental phenomenology. This article explores this interpretation of Plato’s legacy in light of Husserl’s thesis that Plato was the initiator of the ideal of genuine science. It also outlines how Husserl sought conceptual resources within transcendental phenomenology to turn the key elements of Plato’s creation myth into rigorous scientific ideas.

This paper seeks to clarify Husserl’s critical remarks about Kant’s view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl c...

Autor prezentuje własną interpretację fenomenologicznej zagadki „w sobie” przedmiotu rzeczywistego i samego świata. Rozwiązanie tej zagadki ma rozstrzygające znaczenie dla właściwego zrozumienia fenomenologii transcendentalnej. Według Husserla, rzecz transcendentna jest „w sobie” w odniesieniu do faktycznego doświadczenia, ponieważ jej esse nie rozpływa się w percipi i może istnieć nawet wtedy, gdy nie jest faktycznie doświadczana. „W sobie” przedmiotu realnego nie oznacza jednak jego istnienia poza wszelkim możliwym sposobem dania w świadomości, ale jest idealną jednością daną w nieskończonej wielości rzeczywistych i możliwych przejawów tego samego dopuszczającego określenia x. Wszystkie przedmioty realne są jednostkami sensu, ale sens nie przenika przedmiotu w nieskończoności jego przejawów, a w konsekwencji niewyczerpywalne x jako nosiciel tożsamości przedmiotu zawiera nadwyżkę wykraczającą poza sens. Zasadnicza teza artykułu brzmi, że „w sobie” rzeczy transcendentnej i świata realnego odpowiada czystemu x i jego nadwyżce przekraczającej sensy noematyczne.

Husserl claimed that reduction is the true starting point of phenomenological research, but to figure out how this deed should actually be accomplished has turned out to be a very challenging task. In this study, I explicate how Husserl accomplished reduction during his series of lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology. He does not state it explicitly, but what actually happened on the last day of the lectures can be seen as consistent with his descriptions of reduction as an act. Understood in this way, reduction is the model of how to do philosophy. The result of Husserl’s reduction is the correlation between appearance and “that which appears” or, to use Husserl’s later terminology, between noēsis and noēma. When this correlation is understood as an outcome of reduction and not as a result of an analysis, we, asreaders of Husserl, will be in a better position to avoid natural attitude in our interpretations.

espanolEl presente articulo desarrolla un analisis critico de papel metodologico que desempena lalibre fantasia en Ideas I. Haciendo visible la estrecha relacion entre las modalizaciones de conciencia y laestructura noetico-noematica de los actos intencionales, se demostrara la necesaria complementariedadde los metodos de las reducciones eidetica y fenomenologica para el proyecto de Husserl de una criticafenomenologica del conocimiento. Con ello se busca poner de relieve que el rendimiento de la fantasiatuvo un impacto metodologico decisivo para la conversion trascendental de la fenomenologia. EnglishThis paper carries out a critical analysis of the methodological role played by free phantasy inthe first book of Ideas. Putting forward the close relation between consciousness modalization and thenoetic-noematic structure of intentional acts, the aim is to demonstrate the complementarity betweenthe methods of eidetic and phenomenological reductions for Husserl’s project of a phenomenologicalcritique of knowledge. By this, it will be stressed the decisive impact that the phantasy performance hadfor the transcendental turn of phenomenology

De que modo uma filosofia que originalmente se ocupava de problemas de fundamentação da matemática devém uma filosofia da consciência? O objetivo deste artigo é esclarecer essa transformação que se encontra nas origens da fenomenologia de Husserl. Para tanto, orientamos nossas análises pela evolução do problema do conhecimento não-intuitivo nos seus primeiros escritos. Pretende-se, com isso, mostrar que a circunscrição temática da fenomenologia às vivências intencionais da consciência é o corolário do fracasso do primeiro programa filosófico de Husserl de fundamentação do cálculo. Mais precisamente, é a insuficiência da teoria das representações impróprias de atuar como fundamento do programa de aritmetização da análise que motiva Husserl a desenvolver sua própria teoria da representação – esta última responsável por romper com o marco empirista inicial que norteava seus primeiros esforços. Conclui-se indicando que a análise correlativa característica do período das Investigações Lógicas em diante é sua alternativa para os impasses dessa abordagem empirista com a qual primeiramente se enfrentou o problema do conhecimento não-intuitivo.

Transcendental Phenomenology of language wrestles with the relationship of language to mind’s manifestation of being. Of special interest is the sense in which language is, like one’s embodiment, a medium of manifestation. Not only does it permit sharing the world because words as worldly things embody meanings that can be the same for everyone; not only does speaking manifest to others the common world from the speaker’s perspective; but also speaking, as a meaning to say, may achieve the manifestation of the world also for the speaker herself. This requires finding the right words to form true propositions in a well-formed sentences. The manifest telos of proposition-rendering sentences is adumbrated and founded in the infant’s elemental formation of simple phonemic identity syntheses and syntax. This instinctual dynamism is founded in what Husserl names “the idea of truth” which supports the thesis of a universal language instinct.

The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality’s giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and ‘ultimate’ in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl’s analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge.

In the present article we propose an approach to the analysis around the touch and the hand in fundamental works of Husserl and Heidegger, in a dialogue with the respective analysis of J. Derrida. By means of a reading that recognizes continuities and deployments, we will seek to demonstrate that the practical elaborations of the touch developed by Derrida articulate an understanding in certain continuity with those traditional elaborations, in the context of a singular reading of the respective texts. En el presente artículo proponemos un abordaje de los análisis en torno al tacto y la mano en trabajos fundamentales de Husserl y Heidegger, en un diálogo con el análisis respectivos de J. Derrida. Por la vía de una lectura que reconoce continuidades y despliegues, buscaremos demostrar que las elaboraciones prácticas del tocar desarrolladas por Derrida articulan una comprensión en cierta continuidad con aquellas elaboraciones tradicionales, en el marco de una lectura singular de los textos respectivos. &nbsp

The paper follows the track of a previous paper "Natural cybernetics of time" in relation to history in a research of the ways to become mathematical regardless of being a descriptive humanitarian science with investigating unique events and thus rejecting any repeatability. The pathway of classical experimental science to be mathematized gradually and smoothly by more and more relevant mathematical models seems to be inapplicable. Anyway quantum mechanics suggests another pathway for mathematization; considering the historical reality as dual or "complementary" to its model. The historical reality by itself can be seen as mathematical if one considers it in Hegel's manner as a specific interpretation of the totality being in a permanent self-movement due to being just the totality, i.e. by means of the "speculative dialectics" of history, however realized as a theory both mathematical and empirical and thus falsifiable as by logical contradictions within itself as empirical discrepancies to facts. Not less, a Husserlian kind of "historical phenomenology" is possible along with Hegel's historical dialectics sharing the postulate of the totality (and thus, that of transcendentalism). One would be to suggest the transcendental counterpart: an "eternal", i.e. non-temporal and non-spatial history to the usual, descriptive temporal history, and equating the real course of history as with its alternative, actually happened branches of the regions of the world as with only imaginable, counterfactual histories. That universal and transcendental history is properly mathematical by itself, even by a neo-Pythagorean model. It is only represented on the temporal screen of the standard historiography as a discrete series of unique events. An analogy to the readings of the apparatus in quantum mechanics can be useful. Even more, that analogy is considered rigorously and logically as implied by the mathematical transcendental history and sharing with it the same quantity of information as an invariant to all possible alternative or counterfactual histories. One can involve the hypothetical external viewpoint to history (as if outside of history or from "God's viewpoint" to it), to which all alternatives or counterfactual histories can be granted as a class of equivalence sharing the same information (i.e. the number choices, but realized in different sequence or adding redundant ones in each branch) being similar and even mathematically isomorphic to Feynman trajectories in quantum mechanics. Particularly, a fundamental law of mathematical history, the law of least choice of the real historical pathway is deducible from the same approach. Its counterpart in physics is the well-known and confirmed law of least action as far as the quantity of action corresponds equivocally to the quantity of information or that of number elementary historical choices.

CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior O tema que motivou a presente pesquisa foi o da possibilidade de articulação entre fenomenologia e ontologia. Ela teve a pretensão de mostrar, a propósito, que a retomada do problema do ser era já a possibilidade central inscrita no projeto filosófico husserliano. Basta recordar, com efeito, que a tendência de pensamento que surge com Husserl e prossegue, depois, com Heidegger, Sartre e outros, parece, justamente, querer corroborar tal suposição. Husserl inaugurou a fenomenologia já designandoa, explicitamente, para a tarefa de constituir uma ontologia universal dos fenômenos. A introdução e o epílogo das Meditações Cartesianas e, em particular, o parágrafo 59 deste livro, sinalizam também para a mesma ideia. Colocamonos assim, de início, na averiguação dessa hipótese guiados pela leitura de Husserl e de alguns de seus intérpretes. Outra questão, porém, logo se impôs, ao longo do processo, requisitando nossa atenção: Husserl parece propor um quadro de referências fenomenológicas que antecipa o estabelecimento da ontologia e se oferece como item indispensável a este estabelecimento. O referido quadro é constituído por quatro referênciaschave – que parecem assumir o papel de condições e diretrizes para toda ontologia que queira estabelecerse a partir da fenomenologia. São elas: 1º a correlação intencional; 2º a tese da imanência e da transcendência; 3º a redução fenomenológica; 4º a estrutura teleológica. Como sabemos, o trajeto histórico da fenomenologia, depois de Husserl, passa por Heidegger e Sartre. A hipótese reitora de nosso trabalho, portanto, será a de que os quatro referenciais servem de orientação para eles na sua tentativa de converter a fenomenologia transcendental numa ontologia fenomenológica. A proposta aqui será conferir de perto o desenlace desse projeto, vendo a recepção dos referenciais por parte de Heidegger e Sartre, e o modo como sua ontologia fenomenológica se comporta em relação ao quadro de diretrizes acima elaborado por Husserl. Iremos ver que tudo se passa, de fato, como se toda ontologia – cuja orientação seja fenomenológica – parte dos referenciais da correlação, da imanência, da transcendência, da redução, da teleologia, a eles retorna e neles se mantém – seja prolongandoos, seja modificando seu sentido. Desejamos aqui, todavia, não estabelecer um esquematismo, cujo excedente formalismo acabaria nos afastando da realidade. A ideia é apenas propor uma via de interpretação que permita entender melhor o modo como a fenomenologia transcendental é convertida por Heidegger e Sartre numa ontologia fenomenológica, mas sem perder de vista o quadro referencial legado de início por Husserl. The theme that has motivated this research was the possibility of articulation between phenomenology and ontology. It had the intention to show, about this, that the resumption of the problem of being was already the central possibility inscribed in Husserl’s philosophical project. It’s enough to remember, indeed, that the tendency of thinking that comes with Husserl and goes on through Heidegger, Sartre and others, seems rightly to want to corroborate that assumption. Husserl inaugurated phenomenology assigning it already explicitly to the task of forming an universal ontology of phenomena. The introduction and epilogue of the Cartesian Meditations and, in particular, the paragraph 59 of this book, also point to the same idea. So, we put ourselves, firstly, at the investigation of that hypothesis guided by Husserl’s reading and some of his interpreters. However, another question has soon imposed to us, throughout the research process, requiring our attention: Husserl seems to propose a phenomenological reference framework that anticipates the settingup of ontology and offers itself as an indispensable item for that. This framework consists of four keyreferences – which seem to assume the role of conditions and guidelines for all ontology that wants to establish itself from the phenomenology. They are: 1 the intentional correlation; 2 the thesis of the immanence and transcendence; 3 the phenomenological reduction; 4 the teleological structure. As we know, the historical path of phenomenology, after Husserl, carries on through Heidegger and Sartre. The dean hypothesis of our work, therefore, will be that the four benchmarks provide guidance for them in their attempt to convert the transcendental phenomenology in a phenomenological ontology. We propose here to check closely the outcome of this project, seeing the reception of the references by Heidegger and Sartre, and how their phenomenological ontology behaves in relation to the guidelines above elaborated by Husserl. We will see that all takes place, in fact, as if every ontology whose orientation is phenomenological starts from the references of correlation, immanence, transcendence, reduction, teleology, goes back to them and there remains be extending them or be changing their meaning. However, we wish here does not establish a schematism, whose surplus formalism would ultimately moving away from the reality. The idea is just to propose a way of interpretation in order to better understand how the transcendental phenomenology is converted by Heidegger and Sartre in a phenomenological ontology, but without losing sight of the reference framework firstly left by Husserl. Dissertação (Mestrado)

There is a long-standing tradition of questioning the viability and scientificity of first- person methods. Husserlian reflective methodology, in particular, has been challenged on the basis of its perceived inability to meet the standards of objectivity and reliability, leading to what has been called “phenomenological skepticism” (Roy, 2007). In this article, I reassess this line of objection by outlining Daniel C. Dennett’s empirically driven skepticism and reconstructing his methodological arguments against Husserlian phenomenology. His ensuing phenomenological skepticism is divided into strong skepticism and categorical and gradual versions of weak skepticism. Both strands of Dennett’s criticism are then countered by analyzing the key components of Husserl’s method of phenomenological reflection: epoché and transcendental reduction, intentional analysis, eidetic variation, and intersubjective validation. Laying out the basic features of phenomenological reflection serves two purposes. First, it undermines Dennett’s methodological arguments, which are based on the unfounded assumptions that Husserl is committed to introspection, methodological solipsism, the first-person-plural presumption, and the lone-wolf approach. Second, it shows how Husserl’s own methodology can alleviate the more justified empirical worries concerning overinterpretation, underdescription, and disagreement. Finally, I argue that gradual weak skepticism is the only plausible form of phenomenological skepticism and conclude that Husserlian methodology is well-equipped to combat it. publishedVersion

It is a fact that the varied philosophical movement that goes under the name of “phenomenology” has broadly accepted in its own field of inquiry a whole family of issues, all converging on a virtual blaze that can be defined, by first approximation, with the generic and all-encompassing noun “religion”. The paradigmatic example of an “ontological-regional” approach is Max Scheler's phenomenology of religion. According to Scheler it is possible to identify a class of experiences and objects, specifically religious, that define the scope of relevance of a phenomenological-eidetic discipline that is totally autonomous. Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology also makes explicit use of a pre-phenomenological ground intended as a reserve of sense, from which it is possible to derive useful tools for a radicalization of the very idea of phenomenology.

In my book Eigenname und Bedeutung (1996), I started from the observation that modern theories of proper names fail to do justice to the specific and complex semantic nature of proper names. Since the 1960’s and 1970’s, theorizing about proper names has been dominated largely by scholars working in the traditions of analytic philosophy and logic, in particular John R. Searle and Saul Kripke. I argued, however, that the highly specific kind of meaning typical of proper names should be studied within a theory more in touch with general linguistics proper. The main philosophical (especially referential) and logical (especially formal) accounts start from the assumption that a proper name is “backed up” by encyclopaedic information held by speakers of the referents (Searle), or that a proper name is a meaningless, yet rigidly designating sign (Kripke). In contrast to these views, I argue that a general linguistic definition of the proper name has to focus not only on logical and philosophical issues, but also on the specifically linguistic semantic function of the proper name as a “part of speech” in actual utterances. This approach has nothing to do with pragmatics or discourse analysis, but aims at describing proper names and appellative nouns as categories of speech in language use, bringing into play a functional focus on proper names that has largely been lacking in definitions of the proper name so far. An outline of a semantic theory of proper names is then proposed based on some aspects of a “phenomenology of language and linguistics” as found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Eugenio Coseriu. Roughly speaking, Husserl represents the general epistemological implications of the paper and Coseriu its specifically linguistic aspects.

The article discusses the linguo-philosophical novations of Vyach. Ivanov and A.F. Losev in the interpretation of L.A. Gogotishvili, aimed to identify the underlying connections between the two theorists of symbol, myth, and language. It analyzes conceptual approach of the interpreter including the methods and techniques she used. The paper reveals likewise the logic and sequence of the ways these interpretations have been constructed, as well as their nature, originality, and scholarly importance. Gogotishvili’s research contribution to the study of Russian symbolism and onomatodoxy, with its doctrine of language, consists in her seminal understanding of their philosophy of language, as well as of the intellectual “techniques” used by Losev. This understanding helped Gogotishvili to develop her own theoretical approaches to the problem of reception of Ivanov’s symbolism and Losev’s work. In her study of symbolism, Gogotishvili moved from describing the religious status of language in onomatodoxy as well as , its communicative and predicative interpretations, to examining the predicative concept of symbol in Vyach. Ivanov, and then returning to Losev. As a result, here conclusions concerning general features of Ivanov’s and Losev’s novations have undergone some important changes.

A partir de los manuscritos tardíos de Husserl sobre ética, donde la dimensión afec- tiva de la experiencia del deber es reconocida con un estatus ético pleno, se busca analizar la concepción husserliana del amor como fuente de normatividad ética. Se aborda el amor ético y su distinción frente a las formas naturales e instintivas en las que arraiga, y se examina el tratamiento del mandato ético de amor al prójimo, con énfasis en lo relativo a su extensión universal. The article seeks to analyze the Husserlian conception of love as a source of ethical normativity. To that effect, it discusses Husserl’s late writings on ethics, in which the affective dimension of the experience of duty is awarded full ethical status. The paper addresses ethical love and its differences with the natural and instinctive forms in which it is rooted, and examines how Husserl deals with the ethical mandate to love one’s neighbor, emphasizing its universal scope. Fil: Cabrera, Celia Olga. Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos "Eugenio Pucciarelli". Sección de Investigaciones sobre Pensamiento Argentino; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina