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Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) plays a central role in scenario pathways that limit global warming in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Yet deliberate policy efforts to incentivise BECCS—whether through amending existing climate policies or introducing entirely new ones—remain rare. In this paper, we contend that BECCS must be incentivised responsibly, through policy-making processes which account for diverse and geographically varying societal values and interests. More specifically, we make the case for responsible incentivisation by undertaking a comparative analysis of stakeholder attitudes to four idealised policy scenarios for BECCS, including representatives of government, business, nongovernmental and academic communities, in the UK and Sweden. The scenarios were: business as usual; international policy reform; national BECCS policy; and national policy for negative emissions technologies. Based on our findings, we recommend that policymakers 1) recognise the need to develop new incentives and make enabling reforms to existing policy instruments; 2) consider the risk of mitigation deterrence in their real world (and not abstracted) contexts; 3) employ multi-instrument approaches to incentivisation that do not overly rely on carbon pricing or 4) force a choice between technology specific or technology neutral policies; and 5) attend to the diversity of stakeholder and wider public perspectives that will ultimately determine the success—or failure—of their policy designs.

Carbon border levies have been suggested as an important tool for ramping up climate action. Such a levy is being negotiated as part of the EU’s Green Deal, with input from public consultations. The success of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will depend on its design and acceptance. While most analyses focus on resistance from the EU’s major external trade partners, this article analyses the views of non-state actors within the EU. Their views will be decisive for the cohesion and determination of the EU as the CBAM proposal encounters external resistance. Examining the views of European business and civil society organizations expressed by 276 respondents in the EU’s public consultation, we show that there is general support for CBAM but divergent views on its purpose and on what to do about the allocation of free allowances in the EU Emissions Trading System, sectoral coverage, exemptions for third countries, export rebates and emissions scope. The success and strength of CBAM will depend on whether the EU is able to resolve these design issues and reach compromises between the opposing views of business and civil society. Graphical Abstract

Most mitigation scenarios compatible with a likely change of holding global warming well below 2 °C rely on negative emissions technologies (NETs). According to the integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to produce mitigation scenarios for the IPCC reports, the NET with the greatest potential to achieve negative emissions is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crucial questions arise about where the enormous quantities of biomass needed according to the IAM scenarios could feasibly be produced in a sustainable manner. Africa is attractive in the context of BECCS because of large areas that could contribute biomass energy and indications of substantial underground CO2 storage capacities. However, estimates of large biomass availability in Africa are usually based on highly aggregated datasets, and only a few studies explore future challenges or barriers for BECCS in any detail. Based on previous research and literature, this paper analyses the pre-conditions for BECCS in Tanzania by studying what we argue are the applications of BECCS, or the components of the BECCS chain, that are most feasible in the country, namely (1) as applied to domestic sugarcane-based energy production (bioethanol), and (2) with Tanzania in a producer and re-growth role in an international BECCS chain, supplying biomass or biofuels for export to developed countries. The review reveals that a prerequisite for both options is either the existence of a functional market for emissions trading and selling, making negative emissions a viable commercial investment, or sustained investment through aid programmes. Also, historically, an important barrier to the development of production capacity of liquid biofuels for export purposes has been given by ethical dilemmas following in the wake of demand for land to facilitate production of biomass, such as sugarcane and jatropha. In these cases, conflicts over access to land and mismanagement have been more of a rule than an exception. Increased production volumes of solid biomass for export to operations that demand bioenergy, be it with or without a CCS component, is likely to give rise to similar conflicts. While BECCS may well play an important role in reducing emissions in countries with high capacity to act combined with existing large point sources of biogenic CO2 emissions, it seems prudent to proceed with utmost caution when implicating BECCS deployment in least developed countries, like Tanzania.The paper argues that negative BECCS-related emissions from Tanzania should not be assumed in global climate mitigation scenarios. Funding agencies: Linkoping University; Swedish Research CouncilSwedish Research Council; Sida through the Swedish Governments development aid funds; Formas and Fortes research appropriations (Sustainability and Resilience - Tackling Climate and Environmental Changes) [201 LUNETs

Using policy cycle model as a heuristic, this article studies Indian, Brazilian, and South African engagement with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by (a) comparing NAMA policy process and (b) identifying factors driving or limiting the framework’s domestic application. India largely remained uninterested in NAMAs, Brazil aligned its domestic climate policy and NAMAs, while South Africa had a more nuanced engagement when formulating NAMAs. Four factors influenced these countries’ NAMA engagements: the level and necessity of international support, the availability of domestic policy provisions to tackle climate change, the domestic institutional capacity to coordinate interministerial functioning, and the role of individuals in the institutional apparatus. As an international climate policy framework, studying NAMA engagement provides learnings for nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement for designing the instrument, ensuring clarity on support provisions for ratcheting up ambitions, and enhancing institutional capacity, to expedite transition from policy formulation to implementation and beyond.

Fulfilling the UN Paris Agreement on climate change requires societal change at transformational scales, with associated challenges that are intensified in developing countries. In this context, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) – a key instrument in support of developing countries’ climate actions – are promoted for their high theoretical transformative potential. However, little is known of how NAMAs are related to transformation in practice. This article studies how developing countries intend to use the instrument to implement climate actions and whether these intentions are related to how transformation can be spurred at landscape, regime, and niche levels. 144 developing countries’ Intended Nationally Determined Contributions to the Paris Agreement are examined alongside 17 representative NAMA proposals. Although there is scope to improve consideration of the instrument’s theoretically high transformative potential in actual design, current practices indicate that spurring transformational change is already a high priority of NAMA designers. Funding agencies: Swedish Energy Agency [P35462-2] GovNAMAs

Sweden and Finland have national goals to reach net negative greenhouse gas emissions before mid-century. Achieving these ambitious goals could employ negative emission technologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, but it is unclear how this technology could be realized in an energy transition. Sweden and Finland stand out for having a large share of substantial point source emissions of biogenic carbon dioxide, in the production of pulp, heat and power. In the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, Sweden and Finland reported 64% and 51% biogenic emissions, respectively, in facilities emitting over 100 kt of carbon dioxide in 2017, while the corresponding collective figure for all European states in the database is 6%. This qualitative study highlights company actors’ perspectives on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage within a Nordic regional context and explores their perspective on emerging tensions in the energy transition. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 of the 24 companies with the largest point sources of biogenic emissions. The results are framed around four emerging tensions regarding bioenergy with carbon capture and storage from companies’ perspectives in this study: (1) absence of reliable long-term policies; (2) limits to companies’ climate change responsibility; (3) technical trade-offs of carbon capture; and (4) lack of customer demands for negative emissions. According to most of the companies, it is technically feasible to capture carbon dioxide, but it could be a challenge to determine who is responsible to create a financially viable business case, to enact supporting policies, and to build transport and storage infrastructure. Company representatives argue that they already contribute to a sustainable society, therefore bioenergy with carbon capture and storage is not their priority without government collaboration. However, they are willing to contribute more and could have an increasing role towards an energy transition in an international context. Funding agencies: The work has been carried out within the scope of the Graduate School in Energy Systems and MESAM, financed by the Swedish Energy Agency under the project, 'An integrative systems approach to a carbon neutral industry'. This research was supported by the Swedish Energy Agency [grants 46222-1 and 46036-1]; Formas - The Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning [grant 2016-00958]; and the Swedish Research Council [grant 2016-06359]. We would also like to thank the company representatives who participated in this study, extend appreciation to colleagues who contributed feedback on the text, and thank the Linkoping University Library for covering the costs to make this article open access.

The market potential of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) depends both on demand for and the cost of BECCS. In making investment decisions, capital as well as operational expenditure is weighed against potential revenues. As BECCS is providing no added value but mitigation, revenues are pending policy instruments capable of providing a market pull for BECCS or an ability to develop a premium market segment encouraging voluntary customer compensation. While the cost side of BECCS has been studied substantially, little is known of sociopolitical factors such as acceptance and political prioritization. This chapter explores questionnaire data from UN climate change conferences from before and after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015. A total of 2547 completed questionnaires are analyzed to explore if the views on BECCS as a mitigation technology has changed with increasing attention given to negative emission technologies following in the wake of the Paris Agreement. The chapter overall concludes that BECCS is prioritized low for investments both pre and post-Paris. Put in context of the lack of a global collective mitigation ambition, this is pointing toward a moral dilemma. The moral hazard of avoiding radical mitigation action today on the basis of trust in future deployment of BECCS is exacerbated if followed by a lack of interest in investing in BECCS.

Finance is at the heart of UN climate diplomacy. Through the long-term finance pledge, developed countries have committed to mobilize USD 100 billion annually from 2020 onwards to support climate action in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is also expected to become a key player in the climate finance landscape. This viewpoint presents the views of representatives of developed and developing countries’ governments on how the annual sum of USD 100 billion should be dispensed by the GCF, based on a survey conducted at the 2013 UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw. Respondents’ give their views on (1) the mitigation/adaptation ratio in GCF support and (2) the public/private ratio in financial sources. Respondents from developing countries would prefer to channel a substantially higher amount of the long-term finance pledge through the GCF. The extent to which the long-term finance pledge should be governed by the GCF is contentious, because governments pledge long-term finance without specifying the mitigation/adaptation ratio, whereas the GCF Board is tasked with balancing the allocation of its funds between adaptation and mitigation. This contention is fuelled by the fact that developing countries have a greater say in the allocation of funds from the GCF than from alternative sources of finance for the long-term finance pledge. We suggest that it is time to (1) reformulate the pledge to clarify its mitigation/adaptation ratio and (2) agree to definitions of key concepts such as “climate finance” and “private finance” to allow for more distinct negotiating positions on sources of finance. GovNAMAs

1. Introduction: How and why to deconstruct the greenhouse Chris Methmann, Delf Rothe and Benjamin Stephan 2. Discursive Interplay and Co-constitution: Carbonification of Environmental Discourses Aysem Mert Part I: The Economization of Climate Change 3. Climate Politics as Investment: Understanding Discourse through Governmental Practice Simon Wolf 4. How to Trade 'Not Cutting Down Trees': A Governmentality Perspective on the Commodification of Avoided Deforestation Benjamin Stephan 5. Interpretive Openness and Climate Action in an Age of Market Environmentalism Larry Lohmann Part II: The Securitization of Climate Change 6. Climate Chains: Neo-Malthusianism, Militarism and Migration Betsy Hartmann 7. Apocalypse Now (And Then)! From Exceptional Rhetorics to Risk Management in Global Climate Politics Chris Methmann and Delf Rothe 8. (In)Convenient Convergences: 'Climate Refugees', apocalyptic discourses and the depoliticization of climate induced migration Giovanni Bettini Part III: The Technocratization of Climate Change 9. My Space: Governing Individuals' Carbon Emissions Matthew Paterson and Johannes Stripple 10. Governing Knowledge Through START and the Expansion of Global Environmental Change Research Ola Uhrqvist 11. Climate Engineering: Spectacle, Tragedy or Solution? A Content Analysis of News Media Framing Holly Jean Buck Part IV: Between De- and Repoliticisation 12. White Ponchos Dripping Away? Glacier Narratives in Bolivian Climate Change Discourse Anna Kaijser 13. 'Climate Justice', 'Green Economy' or 'a one planet lifestyle' -Hegemonic Narratives in Transnational NGOs and Social Movements Philip T. Bedall 14. Building Legitimacy: Consensus and Conflict over Historic Responsibility for Climate Change Mathias Friman 15. Democratizing the Global Climate Regime John S. Dryzek and Hayley Stevenson 16. Reflections Chris Methmann, Delf Rothe and Benjamin Stephan

Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration,and diffusion (RDD&D). It examines the given policy drivers and obstacles at multiple scales (e.g., international, supranational, and national) and in terms of various forms of instruments (e.g., economic, regulatory, and informational). The chapter concludes that current policy instruments mostly fail to incentivize BECCS RDD&D in Sweden. The instruments partly favor R&D yet fail to provide incentives covering operational costs. Under current circumstances, BECCS is unlikely to reach demonstration scale in Sweden.