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The transverse harvest knife, also commonly called the finger or finger-bladed knife, has been utilized by rice farmers in southeast Asia for many centuries. The finger knife persisted in many traditional cultures long after the introduction of the sickle, a tool which provided farmers with the means to execute a much faster harvest. Several theories in interpretative archaeology have attempted to account for this rejection of more modern technological innovations. These theories, which include community-based social organization ideas and practical reasons for the continued use of the finger knife, are presented in this paper. Here I suggest an alternate theory based on a re-interpretation of existing research and fusion of existing theories: the primary reason for the historical and continued use of the finger knife is for seed selection through a centuries old tradition of plant breeding. Though I accept the accuracy of the practical and community-based, socio-cultural reasons for the use of the finger knife put forth by other authors, I suggest that seed selection and genetic improvement was the driving factor in the use of the finger knife. Indeed, intricate planting and harvesting rituals, which both ensured and encouraged varietal conservation and improvement co-evolved with the use of the finger knife as the primary harvest tool due to its unique ability to aid the farmer in the art and science of seed selection. When combined with previous ideas, this interpretative theory, based on the connection between ethnoagronomy and material culture, may provide a more complete picture of the story around the persistence of the finger knife in traditional rice-growing cultures in southeast Asia. I focus my theory on the terrace-building Ifugao people in the mountainous Cordillera region of northcentral Philippines; however, to put the use of the finger into a wider regional context, I draw from examples of the use of the finger knife in other traditional cultures throughout the region of southeast Asia.

This paper presents new estimates of the benets of equal education opportunity for blacks over the period 1820-2000. For the better part of US history, blacks have enjoyed less access to schooling for their children than whites. This paper attempts to quantify the value of this discrimination. Our estimates of the welfare cost of this form of discrimination prior to the Civil War range between 1.7 and 10 times black wealth, and between 1.6 and 4 times black wealth prior to 1960. Further we find that the Civil Rights era was valued by blacks in the South by between 1 percent to 2 percent of wealth. Outside of the South we find significant costs of discrimination prior to 1960, ranging from 8 percent to 100 percent of black wealth! For these divisions from 1960-2000 blacks have attained rough parity in schooling access. The welfare magnitudes are similar to the hypothetical gains to blacks if they had white mortality rates.

This paper considers the costs of reducing consumption of goods by making their production illegal and punishing illegal producers. We use illegal drugs as a prominent example. We show that the more inelastic either demand for or supply of goods is, the greater the increase in social cost from further reducing its production by greater enforcement efforts. So, optimal public expenditures on the apprehension and conviction of illegal suppliers depend not only on the difference between the social and private values of consumption, but also on this elasticity. When demand and supply are no so elastic, it does not pay to enforce any prohibition unless the social value is negative. We also show that a monetary tax could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than optimal enforcement against the same goods if it were illegal, even though some producers may go underground to avoid a monetary tax. When enforcement is costly, excise taxes and quantity restrictions are not equivalent.

This paper explores Rosenstein-Rodman's (1943) idea that simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be profitable for all of them, even when no sector can break even industrializing alone. We analyze this ides in the context of an imperfectly competitive economy with aggregate demand spillovers, and interpret the big push into industrialization as a move from a bad to a good equilibrium. We show that for two equilibria to exist, it must be the case that an industrializing firm raises the demand for products of other sectors through channels other than the contribution of its own profits to demand. For example, a firm paying high factory wages raises demand in other manufacturing sectors even if it loses money. In a similar vein, a firm investing today in order to produce at low cost tomorrow shifts income and hence demand for other goods into the future and so makes it more attractive for other firms also to invest today. Finally, an investing firm can benefit firms in other sectors if it uses a railroad or other shared infrastructure, and hence helps to defray the fixed cost of building the railroad. All these transmission mechanisms that help generate the big push seem to be of some relevance for less developed countries.