Search

Supplemental material, sj-docx-3-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-2-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-2-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-3-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

Supplemental material, sj-docx-4-mdm-10.1177_0272989X211053563 for A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery by Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube in Medical Decision Making

In order to determine the optimal allocation of responsibilities in disease interventions, and in designing commitment mechanisms, the paper develops a three-period game comprising policy- makers, the international community providing financial aid, and individuals. A policy-maker chooses, in period 1, a fraction of funds to be allocated to disease prevention, and the remaining fraction is allocated to disease treatment. The policy-maker chooses additional funds provision in period 2 for disease treatment. The international community chooses funding in period 3 for disease treatment. Persons engage in risky versus safe behavior which may or may not cause disease contraction. When the international community funds, the policy-maker free rides by not funding additionally. We determine which factors impact how the policy-maker allocates funding between disease prevention and treatment. If the policy-maker funds substantially, the international community free rides by funding less. We quantify how more allocation of funds by the policy-maker to disease prevention causes lower disease contraction probability and higher probability that a person remains sick or dies, and how the international community’s funding impacts these two probabilities. We derive seven assertions from the properties of the model. The model is also tested against empirical data on Africa. The results show consistency between the theoretical model and empirical estimates.

As the 20th anniversary of the transition to democracy approaches in 2014, the economic policy debates in South Africa are in full flow. The forthcoming Oxford Companion to the Economics of South Africa contributes to the policy and analytical debate by drawing together perspectives on a range of issues – micro, macro, sectoral, country wide and global – from leading economists working on South Africa.

With the year 2015 – the MDG finishing line – approaching, post-2015 goals as they impact Africa need to be firmed. The goal of ending extreme poverty remains paramount. Globally, the World Bank set goals to end extreme poverty by 2030 and to promote shared prosperity in every society. We examine feasibility of these objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest but rapidly rising region. We find that under plausible assumptions on consumption growth and redistribution, eliminating poverty by 2030 is out of the region's reach. Even under our 'best case' scenario of accelerated growth and redistribution from the richest 10 percent to the poorest 40 percent of the population, the poverty rate would still be around 10 percent in 2030. A more realistic goal for the region would be reducing poverty by a range from half to two thirds. At this rate, especially if in part achieved by lowering inequality, the Africa region would meaningfully contribute to the global agenda. Policies need to focus on mutually reinforcing objectives of making growth stronger, resilient to shocks, and inclusive.

The shortages of entrepreneurial skills have lowered search effectiveness of potential young entrepreneurs and the rate of youth start-ups. Our paper contributes to closing a gap in the entrepreneurship and development literature with a model of costly firm creation and skill differences between young and adult entrepreneurs. The model shows that for young entrepreneurs facing high costs of searching for business opportunities, support for training is more effective in stimulating productive start-ups than subsidies. The case for interventions targeted at youth rises in societies with high costs of youth unemployment. We test the role of skills and training for productive youth entrepreneurship on data from a recent survey of entrepreneurs in Swaziland.