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El principio ne bis in idem, en su vertiente de proscripción del doble enjuiciamiento, tiene tras de sí una esforzada construcción que ha dado pie a diferentes reglas de articulación operativa entre los dos planos secuenciales, penal y administrativo-sancionador, de nuestro sistema. Una de esas reglas, positivizada en el art. 77.4 de la LPAC, enseña que los hechos declarados probados en resoluciones penales firmes vincularán a la Administración sancionadora. Vinculación que, vista con las lentes del particular, se convierte en un arma de doble filo: puede bloquear definitivamente el curso del procedimiento administrativo si se produce, paradigmáticamente, una declaración de inexistencia, pero cabe también, por el contrario, que facilite a la Administración la imposición de la sanción por haber quedado acreditados en sede penal los hechos esenciales de la infracción. El objeto de este trabajo es profundizar en la explicación y encaje dogmático de este singular registro de fuerza positiva de los hechos penales, analizando qué cariz le imprime la práctica, y ello con el propósito último de tratar de fortalecer la manera de concebir su función garantista, señaladamente en lo que hace a la virtualidad de la sentencia absolutoria por falta de prueba. The ne bis in idem principle, in its aspect of the prohibition of double prosecution, has behind it a laborious construction that has given rise to different rules of operational articulation between the two proceedings levels, criminal and administrative, of our system. One of those rules, mentioned in the Art. 77.4 of the LPAC, provides that the facts declared proven in final criminal resolutions will bind the Administration. Connection that, seen through the lens of the individual, becomes a double-edged sword: it can definitely block the course of the administrative procedure if, paradigmatically, a declaration of non-existence is produced, but it may also, on the contrary, facilitate the Administration the imposition of the sanction for having been accredited in criminal proceedings the essential facts of the infraction. The purpose of this work is to delve into the explanation and dogmatic fit of this unique record of positive force of criminal factum, analysing what aspect the practice prints on it, and this with the ultimate purpose of trying to strengthen the way of conceiving its guarantee function.

The ne bis in idem principle (procedural defence) proscribes multiple criminal proceedings and punishments for the same criminal offence/conduct, which is predicated on a final verdict of acquittal or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Incorporated as a fundamental human right through Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 annexed to the ECHR and fundamental right safeguarded through Article 50 CFR, the principle is conjoined with the right to free movement of persons through Article 54 CISA. An evaluation of the characteristics, substance, rationale, scope, and limitations associated with the autonomous procedural defence reveals corresponding purposes. CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence have delineated the scope and limitations of the procedural defence and the two European courts have reciprocally influenced their respective case law. Definitive and practical judicial guidelines on the application of the principle facilitate consistency of approach by diverse national legal systems consistent with the principle of legality. The article provides an interpretative analysis of the procedural defence and associated jurisprudence of the two European courts that aim to ensure consistency of approach by national legal systems notwithstanding the applicability of the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity. The article concludeswith an evaluation of the narrow same criminal offence criterion (idem crimen) commensurate with broader proscribed conduct (idem factum) criterion that is pivotal to the application of the procedural defence and evidently the most litigated aspect of the ne bis in idem principle. The main issue causing tensions between the different streams of case law seems to be the question of the combination of distinct types of proceedings (administrative and criminal), and there is a reciprocal influence of the ECHR and CJEU on this issue.

Under the dual sovereignty doctrine the Supreme Court has accepted that different sovereigns may prosecute an individual for the same facts without violating the double jeopardy clause if the act of the individual infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This article aims to analyze the evolution of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the doctrine has been highly criticized by scholars, the Supreme Court has persistently upheld it. . Besides, the article addresses the safeguards that currently exist against eventual abuses of the dual sovereignty doctrine, such as the “sham exception” and the “Petite Policy”. Finally, since the previous safeguards have been considered insufficient, the contribution briefly explores the possibility of applying the Eighth Amendment as an additional protection against eventual abuses committed under the dual sovereignty doctrine., Bajo la doctrina de la soberanía dual, la Corte Suprema ha aceptado que diferentes soberanos persigan penalmente a la misma persona sin violar la cláusula double jeopardy por los mismos hechos si es que la conducta de tal individuo infringió las leyes de cada soberano. El presente artículo tiene por objeto estudiar la evolución de la doctrina de la soberanía dual en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema. Además, el artículo aborda las protecciones actualmente existentes en contra de eventuales abusos que puedan ser cometidos bajo la doctrina de la soberanía dual, tales como la “sham exception” y la “Petite Policy”. Finalmente, y dado que las anteriores protecciones han sido consideradas insuficientes, el artículo explora brevemente la posibilidad de aplicar la Octava Enmienda como una protección adicional en contra de eventuales abusos que la aplicación de la doctrina de la soberanía dual pueda generar.

Este artículo tuvo como objetivo un análisis crítico sobre la administración de justicia indígena en Ecuador, desde la cosmovisión indígena. En otras palabras, interpretar cómo la esta se deriva de las costumbres, mitos y leyendas provenientes de todo un aprendizaje de sus ancestros. Por otro lado, busca contrastar cómo y cuáles son los principales problemas que se presentan entre la justicia indígena y la ordinaria. Sus penas y/o castigos, cosmogónicamente, el elemento justicia no puede ser otra cosa que el reflejo de todos estos usos y costumbres. Gracias a las enseñanzas de adultos mayores, padres y abuelos, se fue formando un paradigma de respeto de valores, principios éticos y armonía. La ley natural es ese conjunto de normas objetivas que rigen la naturaleza, independiente de la voluntad del hombre; como es la ley del día, de la lluvia, del viento, el ciclo de la vida: nacer, crecer, reproducir y volver dándose de esta forma una relación del hombre y la naturaleza, conservando el equilibrio natural. El presente trabajo aborda un ejemplo de problemática de la aplicación de justicia por parte de los pueblos indígenas ecuatorianos: non bis in ídem, que en español significa “no dos veces por lo mismo”, y que también es usada la forma ne bis in ídem.

Aimed at establishing an effective and consistent enforcement of market abuse regulation, the regime introduced by Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (‘MAR’) and Directive 2014/57/EU (‘MAD II’) relies on a mix of criminal penalties and administrative sanctions, both of which are subject to the principles of double jeopardy and due process. In the light of a few cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), the features of this regime are, however, unclear, and it is doubtful whether the current framework is adequate to achieve its goals. This article criticizes the decision to criminalize market abuse at the EU level and argues that a credible EU supervisory system is better served by an enforcement system based on administrative sanctions. Moreover, the article discusses the solution offered by the ECtHR to the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in administrative proceedings and proposes an allocation of prosecution and decision-making to independent bodies within the same supervisory authority as a means to better balance efficiency and fairness.

Our purpose here is to compare the protection against insider trading in Brazil and the European Union law, specifically the way insider trading is sanctioned in these two jurisdictions. We highlight the different compositions between administrative and criminal sanctions found in the two systems and their implications for the fundamental rights and personal rights (in case of Brazil) of those held liable for the practice of insider trading. The possible cumulation of punishments imposed by criminal courts and administrative regulatory bodies raise the question whether there might be a violation of the ne bis in idem principle. The response to that question is different in each system. We will start by briefly taking stock of the genesis and evolution of anti-insider trading regulation in Brazil and in the EU in order to comprehend the different rationales for the prohibition of insider trading in the two jurisdiction, so as to understand the reasons behind their divergencies and convergencies. Nuestro propósito aquí es comparar la protección contra el uso de información privilegiada en Brasil y la ley de la Unión Europea, específicamente la forma en que se sanciona el uso de información privilegiada en estas dos jurisdicciones. Destacamos las diferentes composiciones entre sanciones administrativas y penales encontradas en los dos sistemas y sus implicaciones para los derechos fundamentales y los derechos de la personalidad (en el caso de Brasil) de los responsables por la práctica del uso de información privilegiada. La posible acumulación de sanciones impuestas por los tribunales penales y los órganos reguladores administrativos plantea la cuestión de si podría haber una violación del principio ne bis in idem. La respuesta a esa pregunta es diferente en cada sistema. Comenzaremos revisando brevemente la génesis y evolución de la regulación sobre el uso de información privilegiada en Brasil y en la UE con el fin de comprender las diferentes razones de la prohibición del uso de información privilegiada en ambas jurisdicciones con el fin de comprender las razones detrás de sus diferencias y convergencias. Nosso objetivo aqui é comparar a proteção contra insider trading no Brasil e na União Europeia, especificamente a maneira como o insider trading é sancionado nessas duas jurisdições. Destacaremos as diferentes combinações entre sanções administrativas e criminais encontradas nos dois sistemas e suas implicações para os direitos fundamentais e da personalidade (no caso do Brasil) dos responsáveis pela prática de abuso de informação privilegiada. A possível acumulação de punições impostas por tribunais criminais e órgãos reguladores administrativos levanta a questão de saber se pode haver uma violação do princípio ne bis in idem. A resposta a essa pergunta será diferente em cada sistema. Começaremos fazendo um breve balanço da gênese e da evolução da regulamentação sobre uso de informações privilegiadas no Brasil e na UE, a fim de compreender as diferentes razões para a proibição do insider trading nas duas jurisdições de forma a entender os motivos por trás de suas divergências e convergências.

In Gamble v. United States, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine under the double jeopardy clause. In its judgment, delivered on 17 June 2019, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine, according to which different sovereigns may prosecute an individual without violating the double jeopardy clause if the individual's act infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This comment aims to address the reasoning of the Supreme Court and the rationale of the dual sovereignty doctrine, suggesting the convenience and necessity of a further study on its limits and possible safeguards against potential abuses. Resumen: En Gamble v. United States, el imputado cuestionó la constitucionalidad de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, en el contexto de la garantía non bis in ídem. En su sentencia, de 17 de junio de 2019, la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos confirmó la aplicación de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, conforme a la cual distintas soberanías pueden enjuiciar a una persona, sin violar el ne bis in idem, si la conducta del imputado infringió las leyes de cada una de ellas. El presente comentario tiene por objeto abordar el razonamiento de la Corte Suprema y el fundamento de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, abogando por la conveniencia y necesidad de un estudio profundizado sobre sus límites y posibles salvaguardias en contra de posibles abusos.

This article discusses the recent developments in the case laws of the European Courts on the principle of ne bis in idem at the interface between criminal and administrative law, in particular with regard to the legitimacy of double-track enforcement systems. It is argued that both, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have aligned not only in lowering their previously more protective standards, but also in laying down new rules that, though partially converging, remain highly unclear. Through an analysis of the case law following the ECtHR’s judgment in A and B v Norway and the three CJEU 2018 decisions in Menci, Garlsson and Di Puma and Zecca, it is demonstrated that the uncertainty generated as to the precise conditions under which dual criminal and administrative proceedings are permissible leads to unforeseeable outcomes. The potential consequences, most importantly, also tend to put pressure on other aspects of this fundamental guarantee, as well as on the standard of protection of other fundamental rights that to date are considered as given. Against this background, we will discuss at last whether the slight differences in the approach adopted by the CJEU to that of the ECtHR could reveal a silent effort on its part to take a more right-friendly stance.

In dem hier besprochenen Erkenntnis setzt sich der VwGH mit der Reichweite des Doppelbestrafungsverbots im Kontext des Tierschutz- und Jagdrechts auseinander. Wird ein tierschutzrechtliches Verwaltungsstrafverfahren nach § 45 Abs 1 Z 2 VStG durch Erkenntnis eines VwG eingestellt, so kann ein und dasselbe Verhalten aufgrund des Doppelbestrafungsverbots nicht mehr aufgrund des Jagdrechts verwaltungsstrafrechtlich geahndet werden. (VLID)2625517

The paper portrays the new European Union extradition system, established by the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States of 2002. In the introductory remarks, the author explains the formation and development of the traditional extradition procedure, depicts relevant legal sources, and points to its flaws, which boil down to tardiness and inefficiency. The main author's standpoint is that the European arrest warrant is based on mutual trust in the member-states' legal systems, and that it depoliticizes the extradition procedure by transforming interstate cooperation into cooperation between member - states' law enforcement authorities. On these grounds, the author determines the nature of this new legal institute, that introduces radical changes into the paradigm of the classical extradition, and explains its main features as well as the scope of application. Further on, the paper explores the conditions for issuance of the European arrest warrant, which are proscribed by negative formulations - as absolute and relative obstacles for extradition. Finally, the author explains the standardized formal elements of the European arrest warrant content, which should make its application easier and more expeditious.

[ES] A partir de la argumentación de dos sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, la primera del año 2009 y la segunda de 2011, y de una Sentencia de la Sección primera de la Audiencia Nacional de 2010, en relación con el delito de “Desórdenes públicos del artículo 557.1 del Código Penal, se plantean dos cuestiones. La primera, el inicio de ejecución del citado delito. La segunda, en relación con la anterior, si dado el adelantamiento del inicio de la ejecución, en el caso concreto, puede plantarse una violación del Principio de legalidad en su contenido de prohibición de la doble incriminación (“no bis in idem”). [EU] Kode Penaleko 557.1 artikuluko “desordena publikoa” delituari buruz Auzitegi Gorenak bi sententziatan emandako argudioetatik (bata, 2009koa, eta bestea, berriz, 2011koa) eta Auzitegi Nazionalaren lehenengo sekzioak 2010ean emandako sententzia batetik abiatuta, bi gai landuko dira. Batetik, delitu horren gauzatzearen hasiera landuko da. Bestetik, berriz, aurrekoari lotuta, gauzatzearen hasiera aurreratuz gero, kasu zehatz horretan, leporatze bikoitzaren debekuaren edukian legezkotasunaren printzipioaren urraketa planteatu ote daitekeen aztertuko da (“non bis in idem”). [FR] Sur la base de l’argumentation de deux jugements de la Cour Suprême -l’un de 2009 et un autre de 2011- et d’un jugement de la Section première de la Cour Nationale d’Espagne, par rapport au délit de désordres publics de l’article 557.1 du Code pénal, l’auteur pose deux questions : une première question sur le commencement de la mise en œuvre, et une deuxième question, par rapport au première et en vue de l’avancement du commencement de l’exécution, fi xe l’attention sur la possibilité de considérer, dans le cas concret, une violation du principe de légalité, de son contenu de double incrimination (« non bis in idem »). [EN] Based on the reasoning advanced by the High Court in handing down certain sentences - the first in 2009 and the second in 2011, and another Sentence handed down by the Court of Assizes in 2010, with regard to Public Order offenses, as contained in Article 557.1 of the Penal Code - two questions are raised. The fi rst regards the moment when the commitment of such an offense can be said to actually begin. The second, in relation to the fi rst, raises the question as to whether, if that moment is brought forward, this then constitutes a violation of the principle of legality given ne bis in idem.

The article deals with the enforcement of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in domestic systems, and particularly with the advisability of a provision that allows the review of a final judgment at domestic level when the Court found that judgment in violation of the Convention. The most relevant provision is Article 46 of the Convention. After showing how the way Article 46 is construed influences the protection of fundamental freedoms (I), the article focuses specifically on Italy, that - unlike other countries - has never provided for any form of review of its final judgments in order to comply with Article 46. Though recently the courts have started filling this gap in the law (II). The thesis is that the only way to comply with Article 46 is to allow a review and an immediate suspension o f the enforcement o f a judgment, with no conditions and for any kind of proceeding, whenever the Court found it was in violation of the Convention (III). Then, the article contrasts the proposed approach to the bills on the matter pending before the Italian Parliament (IV), and concludes by arguing that the proposed legislative reform is advisable both for European federalists and for 'Eurosceptics' (V).

The deepening and widening of European integration has led to an increase in transborder crime. Concurrent prosecution and sanctioning by several Member States is not only a problem in inter-state relations and an obstacle in the European integration process, but also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, defined as a transnational human right in a common judicial area. This article analyzes whether and to what extent the ECHR has contributed and may continue to contribute to the development of such a common ne bis in idem standard in Europe. It is also examined whether the application of the ne bis in idem principle in classic inter-state judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the framework of the Council of Europe may make such a contribution as well. The transnational function of the ne bis in idem principle is discussed in the light of the Court of Justice’s case law on ne bis in idem in the framework of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally the inherent tension between mutual recognition and the protection of human rights in transnational justice is analyzed by looking at the insertion of the ne bis in idem principle in the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.

Since Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement gave the rule of ne bis in idem a transnational dimension, talk of the ‘transnational ne bis in idem principle’ has been commonplace. Thus, when looking for general principles of transnational criminal law, scholars refer to the principle of ‘transnational ne bis in idem’ . It is doubtful, however, that ne bis in idem qualifies as a principle of law. It should be regarded, rather, as a rule of criminal procedure, traditionally based on the principle of res judicata . Giving the rule of ne bis in idem a transnational dimension therefore requires either transnationalising the principle of res judicata , or giving the rule of ne bis in idem a new foundation. The principle of res judicata principally serves the credibility of the justice system in a given jurisdiction by prohibiting several tribunals, all acting within the parameters of their jurisdiction, from contradicting each other’s interpretation of the same facts. For this reason, the principle of res judicata does not provide an adequate basis for a transnationalised rule of ne bis in idem . From a human rights perspective, multiple prosecutions against the same person for the same facts collides with protecting individuals against arbitrary judicial treatment. This is true whether the multiple prosecutions all take place in one country or in several different countries. The rule of ne bis in idem could therefore be regarded as a manifestation of the (new) ‘principle of personal legal certainty’.

Citizens and companies globalize: they are increasingly making use of their rights to free movement, to free settlement, to offer services and goods, to realize financial transactions, etc. Enforcement systems, including the criminal justice system, have to follow suit. They are obliged to go abroad to gather evidence, for the detention and extradition or surrender of suspects, to confiscate assets, to deal with conflicts of jurisdiction and the choice of allocating a criminal investigation and adjudication. Globalizing criminal justice systems increases the risk of double prosecution and/or double punishment. Do (legal) persons have the (fundamental) right not to be prosecuted or punished twice for the same facts in a globalizing and integrating world. Are they protected against these forms of double jeopardy in settings of transnational criminal justice, such as for instance in the EU area of freedom, security and justice? Does the ne bis in idem principle have a transnational reach? If so, what does this mean and what are the obstacles and exceptions thereto? In posing these questions, this article asks whether a (legal) person can derive a right to transnational protection in the area of freedom, security and justice from the different sources of ne bis in idem obligations in domestic law, in public international law (human rights law and mutual legal assistance) and in EU law. By analysing these sources and the case law thereon, I come to the conclusion that (legal) persons are unprotected against transnational double jeopardy, with the exception of the transnational ne bis in idem in the EU area of freedom, security and justice. However, even in the case of the latter exceptions, derogations, reservations and draw back interpretations based on national sovereignty undermine the rationale and scope of a real transnational ne bis in idem principle in a common space of transnational criminal justice.

The deepening and widening of European integration has led to an increase in transborder crime. Concurrent prosecution and sanctioning by several Member States is not only a problem in inter-state relations and an obstacle in the European integration process, but also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, defined as a transnational human right in a common judicial area. This article analyzes whether and to what extent the ECHR has contributed and may continue to contribute to the development of such a common ne bis in idem standard in Europe. It is also examined whether the application of the ne bis in idem principle in classic inter-state judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the framework of the Council of Europe may make such a contribution as well. The transnational function of the ne bis in idem principle is discussed in the light of the Court of Justice’s case law on ne bis in idem in the framework of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally the inherent tension between mutual recognition and the protection of human rights in transnational justice is analyzed by looking at the insertion of the ne bis in idem principle in the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.