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In an era of increased political polarization, it is important to measure how receptive US American citizens are to diverse political views. Being more open to diverse political viewpoints—openness to political pluralism—may involve holding emotional and intellectual tolerance, non-rigidity, and proactive motivation to seek out different political perspectives. In three preregistered studies of US residents, we present a new self-report measure of openness to political pluralism (OPP) consisting of 25 items. In Study 1 (MTurk n = 400), we verified a preregistered bifactor model with four facets, conducted initial validity analyses, and created a short five-item version (OPPS). Both OPP and OPPS have high internal consistency and test-retest reliability. In Studies 2 and 3, MTurk participants (n = 258) and Qualtrics panel participants (n = 296) completed OPP and measures of related constructs to validate our scale. OPP was modestly correlated with actively open-minded thinking (AOT) and highly correlated with open-minded cognition-political (OMC-P). Greater OPP was associated with an inverted U-shape relation to left-right political orientation. It was also correlated with more politically diverse social networks and varied information seeking. We discuss how our measure of openness to political pluralism can be used in future research.

This special thematic section spotlights the current state of political psychology in Southeast Asia. Drawing from various research methodologies, five papers published in this special thematic section provide psychological insights into different political topics in the past and present-day Southeast Asia, including 1) Islam and politics; 2) terrorist labelling; 3) violence against minorities; 4) moralised policies; and 5) vote-buying. Overall, this special thematic section contributes to the understanding of the political psychology of non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations, particularly in Southeast Asia. The need for more publications with non-WEIRD samples in the field of political psychology is discussed, as are some strategies to actualise this goal.

Political psychology has a pivotal role in the discipline of international relations, particularly in handling the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict severely affects all global aspects, from the economic to security, including Indonesia’s G20 Presidency. This study aims to analyze how political psychology contributes to reducing or becoming the key to the performance of the Indonesian G20 Presidency in conjunction with the Russia–Ukraine conflict and diplomatic bluff by some countries. With descriptive qualitative research methods, and data collection techniques with literature studies from books, journals, and webpage news, data were analyzed, and conclusions were drawn. The Russia–Ukraine conflict not only threatens international peace and security order but also challenges Indonesia’s G20 presidency as Russian Vladimir Putin gets invited to attend the summit. This article used the Tree Model, offering three mechanisms by prioritizing psychopolitics and psychoanalysis, which can be a reference for conflict resolution. This tree model is expected to be applied in response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, bridge differences between all G20 members, and help Indonesia be well-prepared and successful for the summit.KEYWORDSDiplomatic Bluff; G20 Presidency; Political Psychology; Russia–Ukraine Conflict

In this dissertation, I assess the modern impact of a central historical myth in American culture and politics: the idea that Black men threaten the chastity and safety of White women. Emphasis on Black men sexually harming White women—the “peril narrative” (Stoler, 2001)—has been widely mobilized throughout American history: to justify policies that restrict the rights of Black men and to justify policies that ostensibly protect White women. Taking the peril narrative as an example of one important way race is framed in gendered and sexualized terms, I argue that White Americans’ understanding of politics is co-constructed with intersecting ideas about race, gender and sexuality. Using nationally representative survey data and original survey experiments, I find support for this argument in multiple political arenas: police reform, elections, criminal justice policy, and efforts to end sexual violence. The project enhances our understanding of how racism and sexism affect attitudes in tandem, with broad implications for understanding how power operates in American politics and society.

The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement arose to put a much-needed spotlight on police brutality and systemic racism. In two comprehensive studies, we sought to investigate the determinants of support for the BLM movement. First, in a systematic review 1,588 records were identified and findings from twenty-four studies (Npooled=27,691) were narratively synthesized along five categories relating to demographics, race, partisanship and ideology, discrimination and prejudice, and psychology. Second, we exhaustively examined the determinants of BLM support across thirteen probability-based nationally representative datasets (Npooled=31,779), finding thirty-seven common predictors for which individual meta-analyses were conducted to estimate the strength and robustness of their associations. Our results suggest a near perfect match between BLM opposition and positive attitudes towards political actors and institutions rooted in systemic racism in the United States. The present work contributes to a broad categorization of correlates of support for BLM across social, psychological, and political domains.

A new political structuring took place in Iraq after 2003. During this period, sub-national political movements came to the fore along with the United States (USA). Institutions of the Iraqi state after Saddam Hussein were formed in 2003-2005. This structure does not make Iraq successful today. However, in the 2005 elections, a large part of Iraqi society cast their votes for sub-national parties. The study aims to analyze the reasons behind the social support of ethnic parties which do not allow Iraq to be a successful state. For this purpose, political psychological concepts were used to understand the Iraqi society within the conditions of the period. The data reflecting the political psychological attitudes of Iraqis were collected and the reasons for social polarization and support for ethnic parties were analyzed. In this study, it was concluded that when a new situation arises in a country and sub-national groups feel threatened, they tend to polarize and reflect it on their political behavior.

People often agree that speech has consequences, but they disagree on the kinds of consequences that should happen to a speaker. To explore the range of what's seen as appropriate, we conducted a pilot with 119 self-identified liberals and conservatives in November 2022. Participants were shown 16 offensive statements, supposedly posted by someone on a social media platform. For each statement, participants were shown 16 different negative consequences, ranging from criticism to judicial consequences, and asked to select all of the consequences that they consider to be appropriate for the speaker. In this project, we will attempt to replicate the pilot findings in a larger sample and extend them by also sampling self-identified moderates.

The project seeks to explore how partisans evaluate utilitarian decisions made either by an in- or an out-party politician.

This study will experimentally test the differences between symbolic and instrumental disruptive action and test potential mechanisms. Specifically, the present study examines whether symbolic and instrumental disruptive action are perceived to have different goals (i.e., raising awareness vs. resolving an issue), and whether these goals inform people’s understanding of the status quo and the social movement. We focus our attention to the potential of symbolic disruptive action to elicit pluralistic ignorance, and the potential of instrumental disruptive action to elicit collective efficacy.

Conspiracy beliefs are stigmatized beliefs (Douglas et al., 2021) that even lead people who endorse them to fear social exclusion (Lantian et al., 2018). It is not uncommon to hear how people's relationships with strong conspiracy believers get affected by their endorsement of conspiracy narratives. Yet, the emerging literature on the consequences of conspiracy theories has not systematically addressed the impact that conspiracy beliefs have on people's interpersonal relationships. The present study aims to investigate how the conspiracy beliefs of individuals within people's social network relates to perceived relationship quality and satisfaction. By using an ego-centered network survey, we will examine how participants' (henceforth, egos) assessment of their relationship quality and satisfaction with individuals from their inner and outer social network (henceforth, alters) is associated with the perception that the alters believe in conspiracy theories. Beyond its main goal, this study will serve to explore potential moderators of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and relationship quality and satisfaction at the ego and alter levels.

Factor and cluster analysis of (closed) electoral data from various European countries. Various derivative analyses are also preregistered.

Testing if belief system networks can help us predict when attitudes will be easier to persuade. This is the preregistration for Study 1a which is attempting to persuade conservatives.

This research is aimed at developing an applied/practical political knowledge scale measuring political decision-making skill or competence. We have purchased a module from the 2022 CES study to gather data from a nationally representative sample of 1000 adults. The study is conducted in two waves, one before and one after the 2022 federal elections. There is definitely an exploratory nature to this research, but we have definite a priori plans for measuring concepts we hope to utilize in this research, and clear hypotheses about construct validity correlations that ought to be true – if our theory is correct. We want to describe those a priori measurement plans and early hypotheses as much as possible before the clearly exploratory phase of the research begins.

This is an inquiry about participation in a research project focused on how people intend to vote (or not to vote) and how this is linked to their group identities. This is a collaborative project between the departments of psychology at Baze University here in Abuja, and at the University of Oslo, Norway.

This is the final study of Tessa Buchanan's PhD. Following on from a pilot study with Prolific Academic, this study will test whether attitudes towards immigration change when survey participants are exposed to texts framed in terms of authoritarianism.

The term paper for PSY 845 (Fall 2023) at Michigan State University

This paper explores whether reminding a person of their prior experience with either natural disasters, economic hardship, or political persecution can induce a greater willingness to grant admittance of different types of migrants. I argue that this memory prime will reframe migrants from the out-group to part of the person's in-group, given their shared experience with the primed phenomena, thereby increasing acceptance of the respective type migrants.

Replicating Adams, J., Bracken, D., Gidron, N., Horne, W., O’Brien, D. Z., & Senk, K. (2023). Can’t we all just get along? How women MPs can ameliorate affective polarization in Western publics. American Political Science Review, 117(1), 318-324. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000491 (For the Montreal Replication Games)

Pre-registration for experimental component of BodyPolitic - Study Two

The COVID 19 pandemic, which broke out in early 2020, put the whole world in a state of emergency. Drastic measures were taken to contain the virus and protect the population. There were soon protests against these measures in many countries, increasingly characterized by vaccination skepticism and criticism of the government. This was also the case in Austria and Germany. At the center was the so-called "Querdenken" (D) or "Fairdenken" (A) movement, whose disinformation campaigns were often censored on social media such as Facebook. This censorship led to "deplatforming" and increased use of the messenger service Telegram, which is known for its lack of censorship (Fielitz & Schwarz, 2020; Peter et al., 2022; Wich et al., 2021). In addition to using Telegram to organize protests and share opinions, over time these Telegram channels evolved into platforms for sharing fake news and conspiracy ideologies (Hohlfeld et al., 2021; Kiess et al., 2022). Similar to network analyses of far-right actors (Urman & Katz, 2022) or other hate networks (Wich et al., 2021), Holzer (2021) conducted a network analysis of the German COVID-19 skeptics on Telegram. He found that these groups were embedded in a larger network of anti-government channels and convey a sense of of community by devaluing "mainstream" opinions. Kiess and colleagues (2022) also conducted an initial analysis of the topics discussed in these Telegram groups and found a range of topics extending beyond the pandemic, including the Unrechtsstaat, anti-Semitism, QAnon, and SHAEF. However, their analyses are limited to Saxony, a region in Germany, and were not systematically evaluated in terms of content. In this study, using sentiment analysis on data collected from 174 German and Austrian Telegram groups in the anti-COVID-measures-movement, we analyse which emotions were prevalent in the movement’s ingroup communications and to which extent these emotions (such as anger, fear, anxiety, joy, etc.) predicted conventional versus non-conventional and low-cost versus high-cost types of political participation. We use electoral data from German and Austrian regional elections to operationalize low-cost conventional participation, party membership numbers in the newly founded “MFG” and “dieBasis” for high-cost conventional participation (provided we can gain access to these data), various petitions for low-cost non-conventional participation, and demonstration participant numbers - triangulating estimates from different sources - for high-cost non-conventional participation.

Indonesia adalah negara demokrasi yang menjunjung tinggi keadilan bagi seluruh rakyat. Namun pada realitanya, tidak semua orang dianggap mampu untuk menjadi sosok pemimpin di Indonesia. Beberapa kelompok, seperti jenis kelamin dan agama merasa bahwa perempuan dari agama minoritas (non-Muslim) sulit untuk menjadi kandidat politik. Fenomena ini dapat dijelaskan melalui integrated threat theory dengan empat faktor, yaitu realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, negative stereotype. Penelitian ini akan dianalisis menggunakan metode regresi linear berganda, dengan total target 400 partisipan. Hasil penelitian akan menunjukkan daya prediktif integrated threat theory terhadap intensi memilih kandidat politik perempuan non-Muslim.

Responding to the increased use of online political campaigning, many democratic countries have introduced legislation requiring paid online political advertisements (OPA) to include digital disclaimers. This study experimentally tests the political transparency-political trust association in a UK sample in the context of digital disclaimers on political ads. Past experimental research has evidenced that political transparency under certain conditions can have backfire effects for political trust, potentially posing an unanticipated challenge to political campaigners. One key factor in predicting an individual’s reaction to transparency appears to be their prior level of general political trust. The impact of such general political trust orientations on specific trustworthiness evaluations has not yet been tested in the context of OPA transparency disclosures. This research addresses this gap, testing the extent to which political trust orientations are predictive of how an individual will perceive a digital disclaimer, and in turn if this influences their evaluation of the political party promoted and the advertisement itself. This study also aims to add to theoretical and methodological discussions on political mistrust. Two measures for mistrust are included, and competing claims about the outcome of increased scrutiny on trust evaluations in the context of political advert transparency are tested.

Humans are a uniquely cooperative species (Henrich, 2017; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021). Yet, their generosity is not distributed equally towards all their conspecifics. Rather, human cooperation is typically parochial: people tend to favor socially close individuals—family, friends, and community members—over strangers and outsiders (Cappelen et al., 2022; Enke, 2019; Hruschka et al., 2014; Hruschka & Henrich, 2013; Kirkland et al., 2023; Schulz et al., 2019; Tomasello, 2020; Waytz et al., 2019). Of course, parochialism is highly variable across individuals and can manifest in many different forms: humans have been found to discriminate on the basis of religion, nationality, language, and many other social categories (Cappelen et al., 2022; DeJesus et al., 2017; D. J. Hruschka & Henrich, 2013; Romano et al., 2017; Romano et al., 2021; Shaver et al., 2018). Despite this diversity, one sort of parochialism is especially widespread: favoritism on the basis of shared ancestry. Across many cultures, large human groups are defined and organized on the basis of their shared biological descent from the same ancestors. Many of the typical social units that structure the social organization of many populations are descent groups: lineages, clans, tribes or phratries (Gil-White, 2005). Likewise, the belief in shared ancestry is also one of the defining characteristics of ethnicity and nationality—whenever nationalism is expressed in ethnic terms (Gil-White, 2005; Smith, 2009). In most of these social units, people use their shared ancestry to justify the boundaries of their group and, most importantly, the high degree of cooperation that is expected within these boundaries (Wimmer, 2019; Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 2009; Van den Berghe, 1987). Nation-states, for instance, require high levels of commitment on the part of citizens—they must contribute taxes, serve in the military and commit to respect the political rights of other citizens—despite strong incentives to shirk these obligations (Hechter, 2000). As such, nationalist propaganda typically relies heavily on myths of shared ancestry to increase the consent of the population to these forms of large-scale cooperation (Bouchard, 2013). More dramatically, social divides based on shared ancestry can motivate ethnic clientelism, exclusionary racism, warfare, and even genocide (Coakley, 2012; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Hall, 1997; Zefferman & Mathew, 2015). The prevalence of shared ancestry as a criterion for parochial cooperation is often considered natural by virtue of its similarity with kinship—as manifested by the frequent use of kin terms like “brotherhood” or “motherland”—to refer to group members (Cronk et al., 2019). Yet, descent groups routinely number in the thousands or even in the millions, in the case of ethnic groups and nation-states. At such scales, the genetic relatedness between group members is so low that it should not significantly affect the distribution of prosocial behavior (Jones, 2018). Consequently, the cross-cultural significance of shared ancestry should puzzle social scientists. Why do humans so readily build communities on the basis of fictive kinship ties with unrelated strangers? Why would such a remote sense of biological descent unite entire ethnic groups and nation-states into a special moral contract? This research project seeks to understand why shared ancestry is such a powerful organizing principle in many human societies, both in traditional and modern industrial contexts. Our main hypothesis is that the psychological significance of shared ancestry for human social behavior is not a natural extension of kin altruism. Shared ancestry, we argue, is not perceived as a cue for genetic relatedness, but as a proxy indicator for information that is relevant for organizing collective action—like cultural homogeneity, efficient coordination norms, or the presence of efficient sanctioning institutions . Importantly, our framework can simultaneously explain why perceived shared ancestry delimits cooperative boundaries in many social contexts, and why it can be so readily dismissed in others. To test this hypothesis, we designed a vignette experiment to examine the interaction effects of shared ancestry with other information of high importance for cooperation on perceived group cohesion. The objective of our experimental design is to show that the effect of shared ancestry on perceived group cohesion can be readily dismissed when combined with information that is actually relevant for cooperation—focusing on cultural homogeneity in the present study. If shared ancestry is indeed nothing but an indirect cue for inferring group cohesion, then information about cultural homogeneity should make it significantly less relevant. The logic of our experiment follows that of Kurzban et al., 2001, who showed that skin color ceased to be encoded by the social cognition of participants when this information was combined with information that was more relevant for predicting coalitional affiliations (Kurzban et al., 2001). In brief, we predict that information about shared ancestry should have a significantly reduced effect on perceived group cohesion when it is incongruent with more relevant information, such as cultural homogeneity and cooperation efficiency.

Research on the reputational effects of policy change has found that repositioning often is associated with reputational costs. Yet, it remains unclear whether certain individuals are more psychologically disposed to accept or reject parties' policy change. Using a survey experiment, I examine whether the personality traits of respondents affect their acceptance of repositioning. Specifically, I will examine whether individuals' preference for consistency, dogmatism, and cognitive flexibility affect their responses to a political candidate that changes its policy position. In addition, I explore the interaction effect of the need for cognition on responses to repositioning. Using an abbreviated version of the Big 5 personality scale, I also explore whether openness to experience and agreeableness affect the acceptance of repositioning.

Little research has been conducted focusing on the mechanisms underlying the legitimation process of gender inequality. This scoping review aims to identify and characterize existing literature. Specifically, to understand the theoretical and empirical association between gender inequality and theories of legitimation of social inequalities based on political ideology, e.g. social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and system justification.

We investigate if the radical flank effect is mediated through categorization. To manipulate the perceived distinctness/similarity of a moderate faction (i.e. Fridays For Future/FFF) and a radical faction (i.e. Letzte Generation/LG) of the climate movement we present fake newspaper articles in which the moderate faction either solidarifies with the radical flank, gives no statement or demarcates itself from the radical flank.

Online behavioral data, such as digital traces from social media, have the potential to allow researchers an unprecedented new window into human behavior in ecologically valid everyday contexts. However, research using such data is often purely observational, which limits its usefulness for identifying causal relationships. Here we review recent innovations in experimental approaches to studying online behavior, with a particular focus on research related to misinformation and political psychology. In hybrid lab-field studies, exposure to social-media content can be randomized, and the impact on attitudes and beliefs can be measured using surveys, or exposure to treatments can be randomized within survey experiments, and their impact on subsequent online behavior can be observed. In field experiments conducted on social media, randomized treatments can be administered directly to users in the online environment (e.g., via social-tie invitations, private messages, or public posts) without revealing that they are part of an experiment, and the effects on subsequent online behavior can then be observed. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are discussed, along with practical advice and central ethical constraints on such studies.

Exploration of the dimensions of human nature beliefs in the UK

Emotion expressions of outgroup members inform judgements and prompt affective responses in observers, shaping intergroup relations. However, in the context of political group conflicts, emotions are not always directly observed in face-to-face interactions. Instead, they are frequently linguistically ascribed to particular actors or groups. Examples of such emotion ascriptions are found, among others, in media reports and political campaign messaging. For instance, anger and fear are frequently evoked in connection with and ascribed to right-wing populist groups. Yet not much is known about the specific effects that ascriptions of discrete emotions to outgroups can have on intergroup relations. With this pre-registered study, we contribute to bridging this gap by analysing the effects of ascriptions of anger and fear to a right-wing populist outgroup. In an online survey experiment, administered to a sample of the German general population (N = 3500), we manipulated the emotions ascribed to these outgroups using brief vignettes. Our findings suggest that ascriptions of anger to right-wing populist outgroups increase reactive anger in observers, whereas ascriptions of fear reduce anger as well as contempt towards populists. Effects of ascribed emotions on stereotype content and action tendencies could not be identified.

Does a state of emergency necessarily contract human behavior? In times of security crises, for instance, citizens overcome their divides. Our analysis explores the relationship between county‐level partisanship in the United States during COVID‐19 and mobility. We provide an original theoretical analysis to distinguish pandemic politics from politics in times of emergency as we had known them. Our framework helps reconcile previous contradictory findings about this type of emergency politics. Such a frame is needed as it has been a century since the last major global pandemic and COVID‐19 may not be the last. There are five reasons to distinguish COVID‐19 from previously familiar types of emergency politics: psychological, national sentiments, policy related, elite related, and time related. Our extensive mobility big data (462,115 county*days from March–August 2020) are uniquely informative about pandemic politics. In times of pandemic, people literally vote with their feet on government actions. The data are highly representative of the U.S. population. At the pandemic outbreak, our exploratory innovative analysis suggests political divides are exacerbated. Later, with mixed messages about the plague from party leadership, such exceedingly partisan patterns dissipate. They make way to less politically infused and more educationally, demographically, and economically driven behavior. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Political Psychology is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper makes a novel contribution by examining the puzzle of one Southeast Asian nation, Myanmar, and its dramatic shift of ‘fortune’ in its international status and the domestic consequences o...

Prior theory and research suggest that threats to the status of White Americans may increase support for Donald Trump. Consistent with this, one previous experiment conducted in early 2016 documented this effect (Major et al., 2018), finding that making salient the declining White majority in the United States increased support for Trump’s presidential candidacy among White participants with high levels of ethnic identification. We report the results of five very similar experiments (total N = 3,076) also conducted in 2016, including one conducted on a national probability sample. The first experiment (conducted in January 2016) found that racial status threat increased Whites’ support for Trump. The other four (conducted from February to October 2016), however, all found null results, and an internal meta-analysis of the five studies found no significant main effect overall. Additionally, none of the studies found an interaction of racial demographic shift and ethnic identification in which racial demographic shift increased Trump support among high-identifying Whites. We conclude by discussing a variety of potential explanations for our findings, including (a) that racial status threats did not increase Whites’ Trump support, (b) that racial status threats increased Trump support early in the 2016 election cycle, but the role of this factor in Trump support declined over time, or (c) that this pattern is an example of a broader tendency of declining experimental treatment effects on candidate support over time in campaigns (Kalla & Broockman, 2018).

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to identify the major political and social effects of the Hong Kong National Security Law on Hong Kong. It is argued that the enactment of this Law allows Hong Kong not only to end its protracted political turmoil since its return to China in 1997, but also will generate the favorable conditions for long-term stability and effective governance in the territory.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is based on the author’s close observation of what had happened in Hong Kong in the year since the Hong Kong National Security Law came into effect on 1 July 2020.FindingsThe Hong Kong National Security Law has brought about significant changes in the political psychology of Hongkongers, the balance of power among different political forces, the ability of external forces to interfere in Hong Kong politics, the way Hong Kong is governed, the relationship between the government and the legislature, the activities in the educational and cultural sectors, and the behavior of the judiciary.Originality/valueThis paper would be of interest to scholars and people who are interested in the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) as well as Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong in the aftermath of Hong Kong’s unprecedented riots and violence.

Left-right political auto-identification has been used widely in socio-political research to interpret and organize political attitudes and opinions. In this paper we analyse whether the meaning of left-right orientation is the same in Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Using data from two big European survey programmes, European Social Survey and European Values Study, we show that while citizens’ support for economic liberalism is positively related to their left-right political auto-identification, their support for cultural liberalism is negatively related. More importantly, we also present evidence for the regional diversity hypothesis, which shows that this pattern was more prominent among citizens of Western European countries those of Eastern European countries. The results confirm the specificity of Eastern Europe when it comes to relationships between political auto-identification and other beliefs that are traditionally linked, implying that the concept of left-right political auto-identification cannot be transferred mechanically between Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

By all accounts, we currently live in a polarized political state in which virtually every fact is contestable. From climate change to vaccine efficacy, people feel free to choose their own facts to support politically charged arguments. Partisans in every area of American life are unable to agree on the basic assumptions underlying political debate. Research on cultural cognition demonstrates that people's political and cultural commitments shape how they process information from news sources, scientists, and public officials, thereby dictating which policies they support and which ones they oppose. When partisan loyalties determine what evidence people will accept, political compromise becomes difficult or even impossible. All is not lost, however. Cultural cognition has a powerful influence, but facts are stubborn things. In some areas of public debate, facts and evidence have overcome political divides. Furthermore, an understanding of the influence of cultural cognition can facilitate remedies to partisanship. This article examines the research that demonstrates the extent of cultural influences on people's understanding of public debates, identifies the limits of cultural cognition, and describes the extent to which cultural cognition itself provides keys to breaking down partisan divides.

The discursive domain of (in)security is integral to nationalist populism, as documented in the political rhetoric of Donald Trump. This article combines insights from political psychology on blame attribution with scholarship in International Relations on security narratives to show how the reframing of national identity through a populist security imaginary elevated internal ‘enemies of the people’ to an ontological status of equal, or even superior standing to that of external threats to national security. Portraying internal and external Others as equally existential threats endangering the ‘real’ United States informed both foreign policy choices and mobilised voters through an affective persuasion of audiences, actively dividing society for political gain. Populist appeals to resentment, fear, and anxiety constituted a shared affective space between Trump and his followers that provided a source of mutual ontological reassurance and the legitimation of America First measures from immigration restrictions to trade protectionism and a Jacksonian foreign policy.

We test three competing theoretical accounts invoked to explain the rise and spread of political (mis)information. We compare the ideological values hypothesis (people prefer news that bolster their values and worldviews); the confirmation bias hypothesis (people prefer news that fit their preexisting stereotypical knowledge); and the political identity hypothesis (people prefer news that allow them to believe positive things about political ingroup members and negative things about political outgroup members). In three experiments ( N = 1,420), participants from the United States read news describing actions perpetrated by their political ingroup or outgroup. Consistent with the political identity hypothesis, Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their ingroup or the value-undermining behavior of their outgroup. Belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, but Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake news.

Historical trends seem to show that populism, defined here as movements that self-identify as representatives of a unified good people confronting a corrupted or malevolent elite, tends to co-occur...

Peace processes can bring to the fore a host of normative and practical questions that produce heated public disagreement. These disagreements can generate political obstacles to the successful neg...

How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.

When people support voter identification (ID) laws, who do they imagine they are keeping in and out of the voting booth? We investigated this question across three studies. First, using a traditional survey approach, we found support for voter ID laws was associated with beliefs that ID requirements reduce illegal voting by both Black and White people to the same degree. Because explicit surveys are vulnerable to social desirability concerns, in the following two studies, we utilized an indirect measure, reverse correlation, to investigate mental images of those who try to vote illegally (Study 2) and mental images of those who should and should not get to vote (Study 3). The findings of these studies suggest that support for voter ID laws is associated with racially biased perceptions of illegal voters and who should get to vote. Critically, these biased perceptions may be underestimated by traditional explicit survey approaches.

Mutual trust in European Union law traditionally refers to a horizontal relationship between Member States, requiring them to consider ‘all the other Member States to be complying with EU law’, as the European Court of Justice has repeatedly stated. This Article considers a new perspective: is it possible to detect the existence of trust between Member States on one hand and the European Union’s institutions on the other hand? If so, what are its legal manifestations? And what light does trust shed on the cooperation between the peoples of Europe? To answer these questions, the Article seeks to offer a synthetic vision of the case law, selecting legal issues of European integration as examples of ascending (from Member States to the EU) and descending (from EU to Member States) trust. It then discusses reasons why the Court of Justice of the European Union may want to create a relationship of trust with Member States, drawing from the fruitful insights of political psychology. EU law, mutual trust, political psychology, vertical trust, supremacy, internal market

This is actually an almost identical study to "Political False Polarization and its Consequences v.2". The only difference is that this was run post election, in order to determine whether perceived and actual polarization were intensified at all.

We aim to test the effect of intent on judgments related to cultural appropriation among Black and White Americans. In this online study, Black and White Americans recruited from Prolific.com will read a vignette (adapted from Mosley & Biernat, 2021) in which the protagonist, a chef, copies elements of Black culture with either negative intentions (to exploit it), positive intentions (to show respect), or no intention (he was unaware he was copying from Black culture). Replicating earlier studies, we hypothesize that, compared to the negative intention condition, White and Black Americans in the positive intention condition will: judge the actor as engaging in less appropriation, perceive less harm, judge the actor as less disrespectful of Black culture, judge the behavior as less disrespectful of Black culture, and endorse lower support for confronting the protagonist about their behavior. Based on the results of an earlier study, we also predict a main effect of race such that Black participants will generally make more extreme judgments (e.g., the actor caused more harm, was more disrespectful) than White participants across intent conditions. In an earlier study, we had predicted (and preregistered) an interaction between intent and participant race, such that Black participants would make more extreme judgments than White participants in the positive intention condition, and that this difference would be larger than the difference between Black and White participants in the negative intention condition. Instead, as described above, we found a main effect of race across intention conditions but no interaction. In the current study, we added the "no intention" condition to explore if we can find the previously predicted interaction between intent and participant race. Specifically, we are interested in seeing whether the “no intention” condition in which the actor is unaware of their copying might show the larger differences in judgements between Black and White participants that we expected to see in the positive intention condition in the last study.

The literature regarding the relationship between system-justification and mental health in minority groups present contrasting and even contradictory results. Given the lack of literature reviews that integrate these findings, this scoping review has the goal of mapping the evidences available on the relationship between these two variables in minority groups, investigating intervening variables that affect this relation.

IntroductionI investigated the authorship gender gap in research on political psychology.MethodsThe material comprises 1,166 articles published in the field’s flagship journal Political Psychology between 1997 and 2021. These were rated for author gender, methodology, purpose, and topic.ResultsWomen were underrepresented as authors (37.1% women), single authors (33.5% women), and lead authors (35.1% women). There were disproportionately many women lead authors in papers employing interviews or qualitative methodology, and in research with an applied purpose (these were all less cited). In contrast, men were overrepresented as authors of papers employing quantitative methods. Regarding topics, women were overrepresented as authors on Gender, Identity, Culture and Language, and Religion, and men were overrepresented as authors on Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology.DiscussionThe (denigrated) methods, purposes, and topics of women doing research on politics correspond to the (denigrated) “feminine style” of women doing politics grounding knowledge in the concrete, lived reality of others; listening and giving voice to marginalized groups’ subjective experiences; and yielding power to get things done for others.

Previous research has demonstrated that, in general, people tend to have a preference for the status quo option, versus alternative options. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the effect of incidental affect on status quo preference, and which underlying mechanisms may be involved. Specifically, the affects we will be investigating in the present study are happiness, fear, and a neutral control. We hypothesize that those in the happiness condition will be more likely to accept the status quo than those in the fear condition, and that both emotion conditions will differ from the neutral condition. We expect that incidental affect (IV) will differentially impact certainty, anticipated effort, and attentional activity appraisals of emotional experience, and that these variables will serve as mediators in the effect of incidental affect on status quo preference.

A pre-analysis plan for 2020 ANES data to assess the relationship between authoritarianism and preferences regarding lockdowns in the United States.